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Abstract   
 This thesis examines public policy implementation in catch-up regions through 
the analytical lens of Smart Specialisation Strategies (S3). Smart specialisation is a 
regional innovation strategy, introduced in 2010 as the main European cohesion policy 
to promote economic convergence. Empirical research shows that catch-up regions 
encounter major difficulties in putting S3 theory into practice. The need to understand 
why S3 development cannot be taken for granted, brings into focus the 
implementation challenge of smart specialisation, which is currently associated with 
weaknesses in building responsive governance models, thick institutions and strong 
research capabilities for innovation-driven growth.  
 This study investigates S3 challenges in two European catch-up regions: Crete 
and Central Macedonia. It builds upon a conceptual framework that brings together 
elements from regional innovation studies with institutional and capacity building 
theories, aiming to investigate public policy implementation barriers in two Greek 
regions which have been in fiscal crisis for over a decade. It suggests that S3 barriers 
derive from a much wider knowledge gap in regional studies, already existing before 
the introduction of smart specialisation as a development strategy. This gap rests on 
the lack of empirical understanding of what governance and institutional change is 
required in lagging regions to tackle the regional innovation paradox: how change 
impacts on economic growth, when change must be initiated to be feasible and 
realistic, and what capabilities are needed to support change for regional renewal and 
development. To operate the conceptual framework, a qualitative case study approach 
has been designed, using evidence from academic, public and private local actors with 
a key role in developing S3. Primary data were collected by means of fifty semi-
structured interviews; participant observation was also used as a complementary 
method. Secondary data were gathered from a detailed documentary analysis of 
official textual sources. 
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 The thesis demonstrates the implementation challenge of smart specialisation, 
extending previous studies which examine S3 development in lagging regions. In 
contrast to much literature, it shows that S3 barriers are not simply due to weakness of 
catch-up regions to build research capacities, but also to non-smart specialisation-
related barriers, yet highly influential on policy implementation. Such barriers include 
critical mass accumulation problems, public-sector administrative burden and lack of 
public-private trust. They are institutional and capacity building-related, and they 
should not been seen, in conceptual terms, as a precondition to effective S3 
implementation. Rather, they are the result of a concurrent existence of weak policy 
governance models, limited institutional autonomy for regional self-governance and 
lack of transformative capacities for structural shifts. 
 Two contributions to knowledge are made. Firstly, the research contributes to 
bottom-up theoretical understanding of regional policy development by showing that 
S3 debate should no longer be just about improving research capacities, but about how 
to best understand and address opportunities and challenges emerging from bringing 
together institutional integration, policy governance advances and capacity building 
improvements. Particularly, it evidences that S3 challenge needs to be examined and 
understood through a concurrent analysis of the ways in which governance, institutions 
and capabilities embedded in the wider environment of a region are related and 
evolved. Secondly, it contributes to the further advancement of regional studies, by 
providing a practical understanding of how to best develop S3 in practice. A three-stage 
policy implementation model is developed to support innovation strategists to search 










Declaration of originality of submitted work 
 
I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been 
submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where 
















































































































First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors for their 
excellent support and guidance. My doctoral journey under the supervision of Dr. 
Alessandro Rosiello and Prof. David Wield has been always a great experience for me. 
They deserve my sincere thanks for their encouragement and willingness to share with 
me their time, thoughts and knowledge. Thank you also for being persistent, honest 
and kind with me. 
 
I deeply thank my wife Kiki and my son Stathis for their endless love, patience and 
understanding during my PhD. They have always been there for me. Thank you both.  
 
Special thanks to Dr. Antonios Kaniadakis from the Queen Mary University of London, 
for his real support. Antonios has been a fantastic mentor from the very beginning to 
the very last moment of this thesis.  
 
A special mention goes to Artemis Saitakis from the Science and Technology Park of 
Crete, GR for his kind support.   
 
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) for funding this thesis, as well as all interviewees who participated 










BERD Business Enterprise R&D Expenditure 
CM Central Macedonia 
DTC Directorate of Transport and Communications  
ELSTAT Hellenic Statistical Authority 
EPO 
EC 
European Patent Office  
European Commission 
ERA European Research Area 
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council 
EU European Union   
FORTH Foundation for Research and Technology 
FP7 7th Framework Programme 
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GERD Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 
GSRT General Secretariat for Research and Technology 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
NIS National Innovation System 
NUTS2 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, level 2 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
R&D Research and Development 
RIC  Regional Innovation Council 
RIM Regional Innovation Monitor  
RIS Regional Innovation System  
RIS3 Regional Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation 
RQ Research Question  
RTDI Research, Technology Development and Innovation 
S&T Science and Technology 
S3 Smart Specialisation Strategies  
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises 
STEP-C Science and Technology Park of Crete 
STI Science, Technology and Innovation  
T&I Technology and Innovation 
TMF Technologically-mature Firms 
TT Technology Transfer 
TTO Technology Transfer Office 








CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 2 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Aim, objectives and research questions ..................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Research approach and design .................................................................................................. 9 
1.4 Thesis overview ....................................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW - DEVELOPING A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR SMART SPECIALISATION .............................................................. 12 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 12 
2.2 Understanding the theoretical context of smart specialisation................................................ 13 
2.2.1 From the origins of smart specialisation to ex-ante conditionality ........................................... 18 
2.2.2 The details of the entrepreneurial discovery............................................................................. 19 
2.2.2.1 No optimal way for implementing the entrepreneurial discovery ................................... 21 
2.3 A typology of catch-up regions: conceptualisation and understanding .................................... 24 
2.3.1 The characteristics of less-favoured regions ............................................................................. 26 
2.4 Enablers of smart specialisation implementation .................................................................... 27 
2.4.1 Capacity building and Smart Specialisation ............................................................................... 28 
2.4.1.1 Economic growth and capacity building ........................................................................... 28 
2.4.1.2 Types of capacity building ................................................................................................. 29 
2.4.2 Do micro- and meso-level capacities matter for smart specialisation? ..................................... 32 
2.4.3 Institutions, governance and smart specialisation .................................................................... 35 
2.4.3.1 Institutions and regional growth ....................................................................................... 35 
2.4.3.2 Institutional dynamics and smart specialisation: theoretical and empirical contributions
 38 
2.4.3.3 Smart specialisation and governance practices ................................................................ 40 
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 44 
CHAPTER 3: BUILDING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...................................... 48 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 48 
3.2 Concept mapping..................................................................................................................... 49 
3.2.1 Background and existing knowledge (A) .................................................................................... 51 
xi 
 
3.2.2 Empirical knowledge gap (B) ..................................................................................................... 54 
3.2.3 Building the framework to address the gap .............................................................................. 56 
3.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 62 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................... 64 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 64 
4.2 Research questions and objectives .......................................................................................... 66 
4.3 Strategies for answering research questions ........................................................................... 71 
4.3.1 Case study approach and selection ........................................................................................... 72 
4.4 Data collection and analysis .................................................................................................... 74 
4.4.1 Secondary data collection .......................................................................................................... 74 
4.4.2 Primary data collection .............................................................................................................. 75 
4.4.3 Data analysis .............................................................................................................................. 83 
4.5 Ethical considerations .............................................................................................................. 89 
4.6 Case study specificities ............................................................................................................ 89 
4.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 90 
CHAPTER 5: SETUP OF THE REGIONS ............................................................................ 92 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 92 
5.2 Background of the regions ....................................................................................................... 92 
5.2.1 The region of Crete .................................................................................................................... 92 
5.2.2 The region of Central Macedonia .............................................................................................. 93 
5.2.3 Geography of regions ................................................................................................................ 94 
5.3 Cretan economy, industrial and innovation system: an overview ............................................ 95 
5.3.1 Networks and clusters ............................................................................................................... 98 
5.3.2 Knowledge and business infrastructure .................................................................................. 100 
5.3.3 Non-R&D activities ................................................................................................................... 103 
5.3.4 Competiveness, innovation conditions and ecosystems ......................................................... 103 
5.4 Central Macedonian economy, industrial and innovation system: an overview .....................107 
5.4.1 Economic crisis and regional recession ................................................................................... 108 
5.4.2 Structure, resources and specialisation of R&D ...................................................................... 110 
5.4.3 The aftermath of a previous innovation experience ............................................................... 113 
5.4.4 Innovation conditions and ecosystems ................................................................................... 115 
xii 
 
5.4.5 Regional collaborations and networking ................................................................................. 117 
5.4.6 Groups of regional actors and interrelation among them ....................................................... 121 
5.5 University-industry inefficiencies at the sub-national level: an overview ...............................123 
5.6 Innovation and R&D trends in Crete and CM: what data says .................................................124 
CHAPTER 6: THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SMART SPECIALISATION 
STRATEGIES IN CRETE AND CENTRAL MACEDONIA .............................................. 128 
6.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................128 
6.2 PART A: national context - a brief overview ...........................................................................130 
6.2.1 Priorities of the national smart specialisation strategy ........................................................... 130 
6.2.2 Policy tools for developing national S3 .................................................................................... 132 
6.2.2.1 National innovation platforms ........................................................................................ 132 
6.2.2.2 Foresight ......................................................................................................................... 134 
6.2.2.3 Benchmarking ................................................................................................................. 134 
6.3 PART B: regional context ........................................................................................................135 
6.4 Smart specialisation practices in the region of Crete ..............................................................137 
6.4.1 S3 overview, entrepreneurial discovery and priority areas of Crete ....................................... 137 
6.4.1.1 The entrepreneurial discovery in the region of Crete ..................................................... 138 
6.4.1.2 Priority areas in Crete ..................................................................................................... 140 
6.4.2 Place-specific actions and regional tools for S3 design ........................................................... 142 
6.4.2.1 Smart specialisation experts team .................................................................................. 143 
6.4.2.2 Regional Innovation Council of Crete ............................................................................. 147 
6.4.2.3 The value of previous experience in innovation strategies ............................................ 149 
6.4.2.4 Crete Innovation Initiative (CRINI) .................................................................................. 150 
6.4.3 The implementation phase: regional actions and policy tools ................................................ 151 
6.5 Smart specialisation practices in Central Macedonia ..............................................................158 
6.5.1 S3 overview, entrepreneurial discovery and priority areas of Central Macedonia ................. 158 
6.5.1.1 The entrepreneurial discovery in Central Macedonia .................................................... 160 
6.5.1.2 Priority areas in Central Macedonia ............................................................................... 166 
6.5.2 The implementation phase: policy actions and tools .............................................................. 167 
6.5.2.1 Regional Scientific Council for Research & Innovation ................................................... 168 
6.5.2.2 S3 one-stop-shop ............................................................................................................ 168 
6.6 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................169 
CHAPTER 7: GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR SMART SPECIALISATION STRATEGIES .............................................................. 172 
xiii 
 
7.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................172 
7.2 PART A: Current governance and institutional reforms affecting smart specialisation strategies 
in Crete and CM ..................................................................................................................................173 
7.2.1 The governance of previous innovation frameworks in Crete and CM ................................... 174 
7.2.2 The process of smart specialisation as a driver of change ...................................................... 176 
7.2.3 Ongoing governance and institutional reforms for smart specialisation ................................ 178 
7.2.3.1 Change in public administration attitude towards S3 governance ................................. 179 
7.2.3.2 Intensity of policy practices ............................................................................................ 184 
7.2.3.3 Institutionalising and empowering existing and new tools for intensified S3 
implementation ................................................................................................................................ 186 
7.3 PART B: New governance and institutional reforms for smart specialisation strategies in Crete 
and CM 189 
7.3.1 Mapping the need for new governance and institutional arrangements towards S3 ............. 189 
7.3.2 Governance reforms, changes and adjustments for smart specialisation strategies .............. 191 
7.3.2.1 Changing autonomy and flexibility levels in regional policy governance ....................... 191 
7.3.2.2 Adjustments to simplify the governance of smart specialisation related practices ....... 194 
7.3.2.3 Governance reforms in public administration collaboration .......................................... 200 
7.3.2.4 Policy governance adjustments to accumulate critical mass .......................................... 201 
7.3.3 Reforming and adapting institutions for smart specialisation governance ............................. 204 
7.3.3.1 Public sector reforms to reduce institutional uncertainty and administrative burden .. 205 
7.3.3.2 Increasing regional self-government and autonomy ...................................................... 208 
7.3.3.3 Implementation and enforcement of legislation ............................................................ 210 
7.3.3.4 Regional restructuring for smart specialisation (regional amalgamations) .................... 212 
7.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................216 
CHAPTER 8: CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SMART SPECIALISATION STRATEGIES 
IN CATCH-UP REGIONS ..................................................................................................... 222 
8.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................222 
8.2 PART A: Existing micro- and meso-level capabilities ...............................................................224 
8.2.1 Technology and innovation capabilities of firms ..................................................................... 224 
8.2.1.1 Group A: Zero-level capability firms (ZLC) ...................................................................... 225 
8.2.1.2 Group B: Technology & Innovation Learners (learners) ................................................. 227 
8.2.1.3 Group C: Technologically-mature firms (TMF) ................................................................ 230 
8.2.2 Summary of firms' innovation and technological capacity ...................................................... 233 
8.2.3 Micro- and meso-level networking capabilities ....................................................................... 235 
8.2.3.1 Firm-level intra-regional networking behaviour (micro-level) ........................................ 235 
8.2.3.2 Networking capacity and institutional patterns at the regional level (meso-level) ........ 240 
8.2.4 Entrepreneurial capabilities ..................................................................................................... 247 
8.2.4.1 Academic entrepreneurship ........................................................................................... 248 
xiv 
 
8.2.4.2 Firm-level entrepreneurship ........................................................................................... 250 
8.2.4.3 Regional-level entrepreneurship .................................................................................... 254 
8.2.5 Administrative and governance capabilities ............................................................................ 258 
8.3 PART B: Capabilities required at the micro- and meso-level ...................................................259 
8.3.1 Capacity I: Capacity to map regional dynamics ....................................................................... 260 
8.3.2 Capacity II: Capacity for decentralisation and regional autonomy .......................................... 264 
8.3.3 Capacity III: Capacity to develop regional communication, networking and clustering .......... 268 
8.3.4 Capacity IV: Capacity to link cross-sectoral activities .............................................................. 272 
8.3.5 Capacity V: Capacity to understand and upgrade firms' T&I potential ................................... 275 
8.3.6 Capacity VI: Capacity to enhance local entrepreneurship ....................................................... 279 
8.3.6.1 Embedding enterprise and entrepreneurial skills in academia ...................................... 280 
8.3.6.2 Leverage private capital for entrepreneurial investments ............................................. 281 
8.3.6.3 Competences to design new place-based tools to support S3 entrepreneurial capacity
 282 
8.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................284 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION ......................... 290 
9.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................290 
9.2 Putting empirical results together - interpretation and discussion .........................................290 
9.3 Contribution to knowledge .....................................................................................................302 
9.3.1 Contribution to regional innovation theory development ...................................................... 303 
9.3.2 Contribution to policy implementation ................................................................................... 310 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................... 316 
10.1 Thesis overview ......................................................................................................................316 
10.2 Key findings, conclusions and contribution to knowledge ......................................................319 
10.3 Limitations of the study ..........................................................................................................333 
10.4 Areas for future research ........................................................................................................334 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 336 
































List of Tables  
Table 2.1 The definition of RIS3 ................................................................................................... 16 
Table 2.2 Forms of capacity building at the micro-level .............................................................. 31 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of research strategies .................................................................................. 72 
Table 4.2 Sources of primary and secondary data ....................................................................... 74 
Table 4.3 Composition of respondents ........................................................................................ 80 
 
Table 5.1 Boarders, population and administrative units ........................................................... 95 
Table 5.2 Facts and figures of Crete ............................................................................................. 97 
Table 5.3 STI infrastructure of Crete .......................................................................................... 101 
Table 5.4 Competitiveness of Crete: ranking and scores ........................................................... 104 
Table 5.5 Facts and figures of Central Macedonia ..................................................................... 109 
Table 5.6 STI infrastructure of Central Macedonia .................................................................... 112 
Table 5.7 Competitiveness of Central Macedonia: ranking and scores ..................................... 117 
Table 5.8 Innovation and R&D data: a comparison between the two regions .......................... 125 
 
Table 6.1 Priorities of the national smart specialisation strategy ............................................. 131 
Table 6.2 Priorities of the smart specialisation strategy in Crete .............................................. 140 
Table 6.3 Respondents' attitude on key forerunners of S3 design ............................................ 143 
Table 6.4 Cretan S3 experts team .............................................................................................. 144 
Table 6.5 Regional Innovation Council of Crete experts per thematic group ........................... 148 
Table 6.6 Number of submitted proposals and consultation groups per RIS3 domain ............. 157 
Table 6.7 Priorities of S3 and key technologies for horizontal support in CM .......................... 166 
 
Table 7.1 Number of responses indicating improvements in the governance of S3 ................. 178 
Table 7.2 Number of responses highlighting ongoing institutional and governance changes for 
S3 ................................................................................................................................................ 179 
Table 7.3 Number of responses on S3 governance transformation .......................................... 191 
Table 7.4 Number of responses on institutional reforms for smart specialisation governance 205 
 
Table 8.1 Results of interviews: Number and percentage of responses ................................... 224 
Table 8.2 Most reported reasons for meso-level shortcomings in regional innovation capacity 
building ...................................................................................................................................... 229 
Table 8.3 Summary of characteristics of firm-level T&I capabilities.......................................... 234 
Table 8.4 Most common characteristics of firm-level entrepreneurship .................................. 252 
Table 8.5 Number of interview responses on what capabilities are required for S3 
implementation ......................................................................................................................... 260 
Table 8.6 Competences summary for Capacity I ....................................................................... 264 
xvii 
 
Table 8.7 Results on tailor-made policy initiatives related to regional autonomy .................... 266 
Table 8.8 Key competences for building regional networking and clustering capacity ............ 272 
Table 8.9  Capacity to connect related, yet disconnected business activities ........................... 275 
Table 8.10 Competences to map firms' technological and innovation potential ...................... 279 
Table 8.11 Competences to promote academic entrepreneurial capacity ............................... 281 
Table 8.12 Mixture of policy supportive tools to enhance innovative entrepreneurship ......... 284 
 
Appendices Table 1 Early-stage Research Questions ................................................................ 354 
Appendices Table 2 Participant Information Leaflet ................................................................. 354 
Appendices Table 3 Informed Consent Form ............................................................................ 356 
Appendices Table 4 List of semi-structured interviews ............................................................. 357 
Appendices Table 5 Observational research: list of S3 events .................................................. 360 
Appendices Table 6  Basic Questionnaire Guide ....................................................................... 361 
Appendices Table 7 Basic Questionnaire Guide for longitudinal research ................................ 365 
Appendices Table 8 List of organisations participated in the CM consultation process ........... 367 


















List of Figures  
Figure 3.1 Sequence of conceptual framework ........................................................................... 50 
Figure 3.2 Bringing relevant theories and concepts together ..................................................... 59 
 
Figure 4.1 Characteristics of interviews ....................................................................................... 81 
Figure 4.2 Questioning strategy ................................................................................................... 83 
Figure 4.3 Organisation of data ................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 4.4 From codes to theory: a streamlined model .............................................................. 86 
Figure 4.5 NVivo analytical information categories for RQ3 ....................................................... 88 
 
Figure 5.1 Geographical location of regions ................................................................................ 94 
Figure 5.2 Percentage (%) of (A) most dynamic companies per sector / (B) type of innovation 96 
Figure 5.3 The Regional Innovation System of Crete: linkages and knowledge diffusion ......... 106 
Figure 5.4 Percentage (%) of types of innovation in Central Macedonia (2010-12) ................. 115 
Figure 5.5 The regional Innovation system of CM: linkages and knowledge diffusion ............. 120 
Figure 5.6 Innovation and R&D in Crete and Central Macedonia (2007-2016) ......................... 126 
 
Figure 6.1 Schematic illustration of the national innovation platforms .................................... 133 
Figure 6.2 Cretan entrepreneurial discovery: A narrow-to-broad approach ............................ 138 
Figure 6.3 Available funding by selected R&D domain (Region of Crete) ................................. 141 
Figure 6.4 A 6-stage approach for the implementation of the S3 pilot projects ....................... 152 
Figure 6.5 Early steps during the design of S3 in CM ................................................................. 161 
Figure 6.6 Entrepreneurial Process of Discovery in CM: a snapshot ......................................... 162 
 
Figure 7.1 The new local administrative system of Greece ....................................................... 214 
 
Figure 8.1 Linking cross-sectoral related activities .................................................................... 274 
 
Figure 9.1 Theoretical approaches to S3 implementation challenge ........................................ 307 
Figure 9.2 Smart specialisation development process: policy thinking and implementation 
factors ........................................................................................................................................ 312 
 


























Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 This PhD journey was inspired by my enthusiasm to investigate and understand 
the process in which regions change, diversify and evolve, and it became a reality 
thanks to funding provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Its 
beginning coincided with the start of a growing debate about the relatively new, at that 
time, concept of smart specialisation. Interestingly, an increasing number of studies, 
initially within, and later beyond the boundaries of the European Research Area (ERA), 
started investigating regional renewal and development through the analytical lens of 
smart specialisation.  
 Smart specialisation is a contemporary innovation strategy for innovation-
driven growth, introduced as an academic concept in regional innovation studies in the 
mid-to-late 2000s (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). Originally, it was launched as a 
sectoral and industrial policy with deep and grounded theoretical origins in  
neoclassical economic theory. The genesis of the concept can be traced back to the 
work of Knowledge for Growth-K4G (OECD 2013), an EU expert group aimed to foster a 
pan-European knowledge generation and diffusion framework with the objective of 
examining the transatlantic differences between Europe and US1 (van Ark, O'Mahony, 
and Timmer 2008; Ortega-Argilés 2012; OECD 2013). The interest in S3 development 
has been growing widely over the last years, shifting attention from sectoral and 
industrial planning to spatial applicability at the national and particularly at the sub-
national level. Presently, smart specialisation is seen as a new strategic policy approach 
to regional renewal and development, aimed to address innovation in a collective and 
inclusive social manner (Marques and Morgan 2018). It is based on a simple rationale 
which promotes a policy-prioritisation process in which regions use their own resources 
1 The ‘transatlantic productivity gap’ refers to the European economies which were falling behind the 
North American economies; (Ortega-Argilés 2012) 
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to develop entrepreneurial search capabilities to support regional renewal and 
development (Foray 2014). Its principles rely on the idea of structural change and 
regional realignment (Kyriakou et al. 2016; OECD 2013; Foray 2012); institutional 
transformation (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014; Grillitsch 2015); agglomerations and 
knowledge spill overs (Thissen et al. 2013); and entrepreneurial experimentation and 
diversification (Boschma and Gianelle 2014).  
 Research into smart specialisation  intensified from 2010 onwards, when smart 
specialisation strategies (S3) were introduced as the main regional innovation strategy 
in the Innovation Union EU flagship initiative (EC 2012). Currently, S3 is the mainstream 
EU cohesion policy for economic convergence among European regions, and it 
constitutes a powerful regional tool for place-based innovation-driven growth. 
Motivated by a number of new, dominant research trends in regional development, S3 
became the main unit of analysis in this thesis. 
 However, while S3 research has recently contributed to understanding smart 
specialisation's theoretical underpinnings at the regional level (Capello and Kroll 2016; 
Foray 2016), a growing number of researchers had also begun to argue that many 
European regions experience major difficulties in turning their S3 ideas into practice. 
The investigation to understand why S3 implementation was challenging and uncertain 
at the regional level (Thissen et al. 2013; Landabaso 2014; Capello 2014), brought into 
focus the so-called implementation challenge of smart specialisation (Morgan 2015). 
The S3 challenge is currently linked to the weakness of less-advanced regions in 
implementing regional innovation strategies (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; Kroll 
2016), and constitutes one of the most critical knowledge gaps of the S3 literature. 
Interestingly, one of the main characteristics of the smart specialisation challenge is 
that it is multifaceted and its causes and effects differ noticeably across diverse EU 
territories with unlike regional environments. As such, challenges may range from the 
difficulties in conducting entrepreneurial searches to generating the critical mass 
needed for policy implementation.  
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 At present, there are an increasing number of theoretical and empirical studies 
which seek to indicate the causes of the smart specialisation challenge in European 
territories. The vast majority of this work associates S3 implementation problems with 
the innovation paradox (Oughton, Landabaso, and Morgan 2002) and with many of the 
features that less-advanced European regions usually possess, e.g. fragmented 
innovation systems (Cooke, Gomez Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997; Tödtling and Trippl 
2005; Martin and Trippl 2014); weak learning capabilities and skills (Malerba 1992; 
Oughton, Landabaso, and Morgan 2002); significant challenges in mobilising 
institutional and structural change (Neffke et al. 2014); and low entrepreneurial 
potential (Fritsch 1992). For example, there is a growing tendency to link smart 
specialisation implementation barriers with the quality of institutions in weaker 
European regions. The underlying argument is that many of the S3 implementation 
challenges arise from the poor institutional environment of the less-advanced regions 
(McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016; Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; Gianelle et al. 
2016; Morgan 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014; Foray and Goenaga 2013), 
which hinders the process of putting their innovation strategies in place. This view 
highlights the role of increasing regions' institutional capacity in shaping S3 
implementation dynamics (Sörvik et al. 2016; Grillitsch 2015; Asheim, Grillitsch, and 
Trippl 2016).  
 Other studies underpin that institutions are only one important aspect of the 
smart specialisation dynamics, suggesting that multi-level governance and policy 
implementation capabilities are also increasingly relevant for S3 development (Gianelle 
et al. 2016; Kyriakou et al. 2016; Iacobucci and Guzzini 2016; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo 2015; Landabaso 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014). For instance, it was 
argued lately that regions with ineffective governance structures are indeed 
experiencing difficulties in implementing S3 (Reid and Stanovnik 2013), while, on the 
contrary, good multi-level policy governance models are more likely to support the 
development of a more integrated S3 framework for regional renewal and 
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development (Kyriakou et al. 2016; OECD 2017a), as they are seen as an underlying 
condition, necessary for modern public administration (EC 2014b). In a quite similar 
way, other studies perceive policy implementation capabilities as a precondition for 
policy implementation (Bachtler et al. 2017), and recognise the existence of different 
capacity building forms, e.g. administrative capacity, transformative capacity, 
absorptive capacity, and technology and innovation capacity, as a key driver of S3 
implementation and development (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013a; Foray 2014; 
Baier, Kroll, and Zenker 2013b).      
 Given that catch-up regions usually have institutionally weak environments 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2013), lack well-developed governance systems (OECD 2013), and 
their potential to build capabilities for renewal and development is limited (Neffke et 
al. 2014), S3 implementation is still an open issue in weaker European environments, 
raising a number of interesting questions for the S3 debate. For example, a number of 
scholars (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016b; Kroll 2016; Foray 2016; Capello and Kroll 
2016; Kyriakou et al. 2016) raise several questions including the following: what specific 
governance and institutional reforms do really matter for the implementation of S3 in 
catch-up regions? How can such reforms affect the realisation of S3 in less-developed 
regions, and what is the extent to which they must be made? Similar sets of questions 
arise if attention is primarily given to the capacity building aspect. For instance, what 
types of capacity building forms are most appropriate for less-developed regions in 
order to put S3 implementation in place? Does a combination of different capacity 
building forms impact S3 development better? What pre-existing capacities must be 
improved and what new capacities must be built to maximise the effects of smart 
specialisation policies? What is the extent to which these capacity building adjustments 
must be made in catch-up regions? All these research questions address ongoing 
challenges and gaps directly related to the implementation of S3, and become a core 
unit of analysis in the S3 debate which seeks to inform S3 implementation in catch-up 
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European regions. This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate, and sets specific aims, 
objectives and research questions to drive its empirical study.   
 
1.2 Aim, objectives and research questions  
Aim and research objectives  
 This thesis investigates the implementation challenges of S3 in catch-up regions. 
Its aim is to contribute to translating smart specialisation theory (design) into practice 
(implementation), by understanding how S3 can be effectively implemented in weak 
regional environments. To accomplish this aim, both general and specific research 
objectives are set in this thesis. Its general research objective is to study the 
implementation challenge of S3 in catch-up regions, which have been at the top of the 
EU cohesion policy agenda (EC 2014c). Research focus is primarily on Southern 
European catch-up regions, given their prolonged economic recession, thin institutions 
and profound difficulties in implementing S3 (Landabaso, Komninos, et al. 2014). Its 
specific research objective is to investigate and understand empirically how  
governance, institutions and different forms of firms' and regions' capabilities can 
impact S3 practices in two Greek regions (Crete and Central Macedonia), which have 
been in fiscal crisis for over a decade. This latter objective is linked to the ongoing S3 
debate which highlights the increasing role of governance and institutional capacity in 
S3 development. In particular, it seeks to understand empirically the way in which 
smart specialisation implementation can be favoured through institutional integration 
and capacity building. At present, the details of this dynamic process are still unknown 
and constitute a key empirical knowledge gap in  regional development studies and in 
the S3 literature particularly (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018; Radosevic et al. 2017). 
Three central questions are still open, which limit our ability to inform innovation 




- How do institutions, innovation policy governance and capacity building affect the 
development of S3 in catch-up regions?  
- What institutional reforms and governance adjustments can support S3 
development in institutionally weak regions? 
- What improvements in capacity building favour institutional and governance 
changes for the implementation of S3, and how? 
 
These questions are directly related to each other and highlight the importance of 
studying governance, institutions and capabilities which are currently seen as an 
important driving force of S3 policy implementation (Kyriakou et al. 2016). To address 
the ongoing empirical knowledge gap of S3 and meet our objectives analytically, we 
reformulate these general questions to three specific research questions (RQs) which 
aim to study S3 in Crete and Central Macedonia (hereafter CM).  
 
Research Questions  
(RQ1): In what ways did the selected Greek regions develop smart  
  specialisation  strategies? 
(RQ2):  How do, and can, institutional arrangements and governance reforms 
  impact on smart specialisation practices? 
(RQ3):  What capabilities exist and are required to develop smart specialisation 
  strategies in catch-up regional environments 
 
 RQ1 seeks to understand and explain the way in which S3 practices were 
adopted and carried out by Crete and CM. Given that there is no empirical work to 
reveal S3 implementation routes and behaviours in the case study regions, the 
objective of RQ1 is to provide the basis for building and developing the empirical 
investigation in the study. Particularly, it aims at understanding whether or not Crete 
and CM followed similar methodological approaches to implement S3, and why; what 
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were the practical difficulties and the main challenges for implementing S3; and what 
policy strategic tools have been created and used to address these challenges.  
 RQ2 falls into two parts. The first part "how do [...] institutional arrangements 
and governance reforms impact on smart specialisation practices" seeks to achieve an 
analytical understanding of regions' existing governance and institutional dynamics 
effect on S3 development. To meet this objective analytically, a number of sub-
questions are formulated: How is governance impacting on smart specialisation at 
present? Do the existing institutional arrangements facilitate the implementation of 
smart specialisation in practice? Have the two regions considered and introduced 
different types of reforms in an attempt to support the design and implementation of 
S3 effectively? Have such reforms already affected the ongoing smart specialisation 
practices, and if so in what ways? The second part of RQ2 "how can institutional 
arrangements and governance reforms impact on smart specialisation practices" seeks 
to examine what additional governance and institutional reforms are still required to 
support the implementation of smart specialisation. The main objective of the second 
part is to move from what is there to what is missing and empirically to show what is 
required in terms of institutional and governance reforms in order to favour S3 
implementation. 
 RQ3 aims at exploring and understanding how  existing or new capabilities can 
support governance and institutional change for S3 development. Given that micro-
level (firms) and meso-level (regions) competences  both need to succeed in regional 
development, (Morgan 1997; Iammarino et al. 2012; Malmberg and Maskell 1997), 
RQ3 examines capacity building at the level of firm and regions. The focus is mainly on 
those capabilities which seem to have a direct impact on innovation policymaking and 
regional development: social capabilities (Abramovitz 1986; Ohkawa and Rosovsky 
1974); networking capabilities (Walter, Auer, and Ritter 2006); technological 
capabilities (Kim 1980; Lall 1992); innovation capabilities (Kim 1997); and absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
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1.3 Research approach and design  
Case study approach  
  This thesis is based on a qualitative study and the empirical evidence is 
gathered through an in-depth case study approach. The regions of Crete and Central 
Macedonia (CM) have been selected as two case studies from Southern European 
catch-up regions. Each region constitutes one single case study and each is examined 
separately as a unit of analysis. The sampling strategy is purposive, considering that 
both regions have been hit drastically by the macro-economic crisis in Greece, which 
has raised additional implementation barriers to S3 (Morgan 2017); possess strong 
academic potential at the local level; represent a relatively higher innovation and 
technological profile as compared to the national average; design and implement their 
own regional innovation strategies; and are currently in the process of developing S3.    
Data collection and analysis 
 To collect the data and ensure their utility and integrity,  a triangulation 
approach was followed (Bryman 2004), using both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary data (both audio and textual) were collected by means of semi-structured 
interviews and observation. Participant observation took an ethnographic form 
(Fetterman 1989; Jorgensen 1989) and was carried out through direct participation in 
diverse S3 events, workshops and public consultations conducted for both regions in 
the period 2015-17. Interviewing took place in the period 2015-18. Fifty personal 
interviews were conducted with high-level national and regional innovation experts, 
academics from state universities and public-funded research centres, local 
entrepreneurs, and representatives from varied intermediary organisations (e.g. 
science parks, incubators, business networks, chambers etc). Analytically, there were 
20 interviews for CM and 20 interviews for the Crete, followed by 10 additional ones 
(longitudinal study) conducted from August to November 2017. Given that the in-depth 
interviewing generated an enormous amount of textual information, NVivo (Ver.7) was 
used to organise and analyse the data effectively. The majority of the interviews were 
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transcribed, translated (from Greek to English) and inserted in NVivo for the 
codification process. To build knowledge of the data, interview information was 
allocated to specific coding schemes and meta-categories (see chapter 4 for guidance).  
 
1.4 Thesis overview   
 The thesis consists of ten chapters including this introduction which sets the 
scene for the study. The content of each chapter is briefly summarised as follows. 
 Chapter 2 (Literature review) develops an analytical framework in order to 
review previous theoretical and empirical findings related to the development of smart 
specialisation strategies (S3) in the regional setting. The analysis builds on the existing 
regional innovation systems literature, aiming to study smart specialisation's 
theoretical underpinnings and to define particular experiential knowledge gaps. We 
focus on catch-up regions and  review the way in which smart specialisation is related 
to other important elements of regional innovation development concepts and 
evolutionary economic theories. Particular attention is given mainly to theories related 
to capacity building, institutions and policy governance.  
 Chapter 3 (Conceptual framework) puts together many of the theoretical 
concepts and ideas discussed in the literature review. It seeks to build a conceptual 
framework in which the research objectives could be effectively met. Based on a 
synthesis of different sources of theory (institutional theory, catch-up theory, 
governance and capacity building theory), chapter 3 constructs an analytical framework 
to define a specific empirical gap and assists in refining the research goals and 
formulating realistic research questions. 
 Chapter 4 (Methodology and research design) discusses the methodological 
approach employed in this thesis to meet its research objectives. It provides a thorough 
explanation of how the conceptual framework is operationalised in particular regional 
contexts through the formation of three research questions. Case study selection, 
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research strategies and data collection methods and analysis are justified and 
discussed.   
 Chapter 5 (Setup of the regions) provides a detailed overview of the regional 
profiles of the case study regions. It analyses demographic, economic and social factors 
that have gradually influenced the productive structure of Crete and Central 
Macedonia over time. The chapter discusses the extent of changes occurring in the 
regions' socioeconomic structure before and after the financial crisis of 2008. 
 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 form the empirical part of the thesis and present the 
analytical findings emerging separately from each of the research questions. 
 Chapter 9 (Discussion - theoretical & empirical contributions) brings together all 
of the empirical findings from chapters 6, 7 and 8. An analytical discussion is set to 
explain how the empirical findings from the regions of Crete and Central Macedonia 
are linked to, or enhance previous ideas, theories and concepts presented in the 
literature review (chapter 2). This chapter provides a number of conclusions which lead 
to certain theoretical and practical contributions as to how smart specialisation 
development can be better understood and implemented in institutionally weak 
regional environments. The chapter acknowledges the importance of improving 
regions' research capacities for S3 implementation; however, it evidences that other 
non-S&T barriers, which may not be directly related to public policy implementation 
are also part of the S3 implementation challenge in catch-up regions. 
 Chapter 10 (Conclusions) provides an overall overview of the study (research 
problem, objectives and strategy followed, implications of findings in light of existing 
theory), highlights its limitations and closes with a perspective on further research 
emerging from this work. It evidences that the implementation challenge of smart 
specialisation in catch-up regions, and particularly in areas with prolong economic 
recession,  goes far beyond Science and Technology (S&T), as it is conditioned by multi-
level politics in policy governance, institutional regulations and regional capacities, to 
bring about change. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review - Developing 
a theoretical framework for smart 
specialisation  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter we develop an analytical framework to review both theoretical 
and empirical findings from previous and recent work that was published in order to 
study the development of smart specialisation strategies (S3) in catch-up regions. In 
particular, chapter 2 conducts a systematic literature review about smart specialisation 
with three objectives. The first is to introduce the notion of smart specialisation as a 
relatively new place-based territorial strategy, and to build a solid understanding as it 
has been conceptualised from its main advocates in recent years. It analyses the nature 
of its key elements (e.g. the entrepreneurial discovery) and seeks to identify and 
discuss a number of empirical outcomes regarding its implementation across diverse 
European territories. Our analysis draws attention to less-favoured regions with limited 
innovation capacity and potential. The second objective is to review the way smart 
specialisation is related to other important elements of regional innovation 
development concepts and evolutionary economic theories, aiming at understanding 
more precisely its realisation in the regional setting. Particular attention is given to 
theories related to capacity building, institutions and policy governance. The third 
objective is to identify experiential knowledge gaps which need further empirical 
investigation, as well as to facilitate the development of a well-structured conceptual 
framework to address particular research problems. Given that the conceptual 
framework of smart specialisation has been importantly informed in recent years 
(Foray 2016; Capello and Kroll 2016), empirical investigation is not meant to identify 
theoretical gaps, but rather practical challenges to S3 implementation.    
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 The chapter begins with an understanding of the smart specialisation notion 
and provides an historical background on how the S3 paradigm has moved from 
national and sectoral patterns to regional approaches. This first part outlines the way 
smart specialisation theory is currently taking an innovation policy approach with 
practical effects at the regional level. Also, given that our primary focus is on 
understanding smart specialisation practices in less-favoured environments, a review of 
the main characteristics of catch-up regions is given. Two key sections follow in which 
implementation enablers of smart specialisation are reviewed and analysed from two 
different perspectives: the capacity building perspective and the institutional and 
governance perspective. Since S3 literature emphasises the centrality of both elements 
in the regional setting, we review existing theoretical and empirical findings regarding 
the framework in which capacity building, institutions and governance arrangements 
impact smart specialisation strategies.          
  
2.2 Understanding the theoretical context of smart specialisation  
 Smart specialisation is a contemporary innovation strategy for regional renewal 
and development. It was introduced as an academic concept in regional innovation 
studies in the mid-to-late 2000s (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). Its principles rely 
on the idea of structural change and regional realignment (Kyriakou et al. 2016; OECD 
2013); institutional transformation (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014); agglomerations 
and knowledge spill overs (Thissen et al. 2013); and entrepreneurial experimentation 
and diversification (Boschma and Gianelle 2014). Smart specialisation is based on a 
simple rationale which promotes a policy-prioritisation process in which regions use 
their own resources to develop entrepreneurial search capabilities for regional renewal 
and development. Dominique Foray, one of the founding fathers of the Regional 




"The notion of smart specialisation describes the capacity of an economic 
system (a region for example) to generate new specialities through the 
discovery of new domains of opportunity and the local concentration and 
agglomeration of resources and competences in these domains" (Foray 
2014, 1)    
 
 The discovery of economic areas, or domains as defined in the smart 
specialisation terminology (David, Forey, and Hall 2012), with existing and potential 
competitive advantages is based on a dynamic and continuous bottom-up identification 
process. In the context of smart specialisation, this process is known as entrepreneurial 
discovery (Foray and van Ark 2007), and it is closely linked with the principles of the 
economic self-discovery concept, introduced and discussed in the industrial policy 
literature by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). While the entrepreneurial discovery process 
is not specific to smart specialisation itself, it advocates a differentiated approach 
(compared to classical work in industrial studies and economic geography), in which 
local entrepreneurial actors, with a broad meaning, take a dominant role in searching 
for business opportunities. Foray defines entrepreneurial discovery as a process of 
"deployment and variation of innovative ideas in a specialised area that generate 
knowledge about the future economic value of a possible change" (Foray 2014, 495). 
The entrepreneurial discovery is an interactive process in which regions can use their 
existing strengths towards diversifying their entrepreneurial activities into new or 
related economic areas (Boschma and Frenken 2009), to support R&D specialisation 
and boost regional development. Interestingly, the RIS3 does not necessarily promote 
the idea of a more specialised region, which risks making it vulnerable to external 
shocks (Coffano and Foray 2014); rather, it advocates the idea of specialised 
diversification in which knowledge diffusion and innovation-driven growth are seen as 
a key factor in constructing a regional advantage (Asheim, Boschma, and Cooke 2011) 
and promoting regional competitiveness in a globalising knowledge economy. In this 
view, smart specialisation underlines the idea of regional diversification, which is seen 
to have a key role in regional growth. Boschma and Gianelle (2014) define 
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diversification as "an emerging process through which new activities develop out of 
existing ones, but the scope and outcome of this process are fundamentally affected by 
technological and cognitive constraints". This definition is closely linked with the 
related variety literature (Boschma and Frenken 2009; Boschma and Iammarino 2009; 
Frenken, Van Oort, and Verburg 2007), which suggests that regions possess more 
opportunities to diversify into new related industries, if technological relatedness and 
related variety are kept at high levels. Mastroeni, Tait, and Rosiello (2013) have 
recently argued that in order for RIS3 to be successful, it is essential to continuously 
maintain the relevant variety in a region’s economy. 
Historically, the idea of smart specialisation goes back to 2008 when the Growth 
Report prepared by the Commission on Growth and Development highlighted the need 
for EU regions to conduct a self-discovery process in order to build their comparative 
advantages (EC 2012). As one of the pillar concepts of the Innovation Union Flagship 
initiative, the EU launched smart specialisation as a key innovation policy tool with a 
very promising strategic potential at the regional level. Very soon, RIS3 became a key 
element of the EU 2020 Innovation Union Initiative2 with five main objectives (see 
Table 2.1). Currently, the strategic approach of smart specialisation ranks at the top of 









2 Europe2020 strategy focuses on the development of a resource-efficient economy and prioritises the 
triplex smart-sustainable-inclusive growth model, Source: (EC 2012) 
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Table 2.1 The definition of RIS3 
 
i. RIS3 focus policy support and investments on key national/regional 
priorities, challenges and needs for knowledge-based development 
ii. RIS3 build on each country/region’s strengths, competitive advantages 
and potential for excellence 
iii. RIS3 support technological as well as practice-based innovation and aim 
to stimulate private  sector investment 
iv. RIS3 get stakeholders fully involved and encourage innovation and 
experimentation. 
v. RIS3 are evidence-based and include sound monitoring and evaluation 
systems 
Source: EC (2012)  
 
 The economic geography literature has extensively emphasised the importance 
of local actors in place-based policy intervention (Barca, McCann, and Rodríguez-Pose 
2012; Barca 2009a). Likewise, smart specialisation’s theoretical underpinnings highlight 
the increasingly important role that different local actors must take during the 
entrepreneurial discovery. In the RIS3 context particularly, an increased number of 
regional players from diverse stakeholder groups are expected to undertake a key 
strategic role in policymaking, which seems to have different but highly complementary 
facets. The first facet refers to the self-assessment process which aims at identifying 
and mapping regions' knowledge assets, competences and dynamic capabilities in 
specific economic domains (McCann and Oxley 2012). This process requires the 
creation of regionally-based entrepreneurial search mechanisms. The second requires 
local players to establish public-private synergies to jointly discover specific 
entrepreneurial opportunities within their domains. The process of setting 
entrepreneurial search mechanisms is interactive and by no means static. It also relies 
on the ability to exploit the advantages of generic technology platforms and networks, 
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known also as General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), to regenerate the targeted 
domains through the co-invention of applications (David, Forey, and Hall 2012).  
 
General Purpose Technologies in the S3 context  
 Concerning the effective utilisation of GPTs, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) 
highlighted their economic value recognising them as engines of growth. Similarly, later 
empirical findings point out that the invention and co-invention in GPTs could foster 
and deliver innovation (Aghion, David, and Foray 2009) and simultaneously reveal new 
economic opportunities in sectors of rapid technological change and globalisation 
(Kyriakou 2014). GPTs have a key role to play in the development of S3. Furthermore, 
smart specialisation proposers suggest that all EU regions, no matter what size or 
innovation capacity and potential, can and should have a collective role in exploiting 
and diffusing GPTs. Forming dynamic partnerships and joint networks within and 
between European peripheries, advanced regions with scientific and technological 
superiority could conventionally invest in the invention of key enabling technologies 
(OECD 2013), for example Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). This 
view is in line with findings from previous regional studies; see Koschatzky (2005), 
which suggests that regions with advanced technological excellence should create the 
appropriate framework conditions to generate, defuse and exploit new technologies 
and applications, rather than focusing on existing ones. Respectively, catch-up regions 
should mainly invest in the co-invention of applications, ensuring that both types, 
technology driving and technology application regions will get equal access to the 
benefits associated with the exploitation and diffusion of innovative technologies (Baier, 





2.2.1 From the origins of smart specialisation to ex-ante conditionality   
The theory of smart specialisation was initially associated with the economics of 
knowledge and technological change (Foray, 2004), but it expanded rapidly as a new 
regional academic concept in the economic geography literature in a very short period 
of time (Foray 2016). To highlight the growing value of smart specialisation in the 
regional innovation landscape, Philip McCann points out in his recent work: 
 
"The novelty of the smart specialisation concept was that although it 
emerged from the literature on the economics of knowledge and 
technology, it provided a policy-prioritisation logic and a policy agenda 
which was rather different to most of the currently popular technology 
policy recommendations, although it was based on ostensibly the same 
underlying rationale, namely that of enhancing innovation, technology 
and growth" (McCann 2015, 170)   
 
Smart specialisation received growing attention when economists looked at 
fostering a pan-European knowledge generation and diffusion framework, by 
examining the transatlantic differences between Europe and US, and by attempting to 
explain how different approaches to knowledge spill overs contributed to creating this 
productivity gap (van Ark, O'Mahony, and Timmer 2008; Ortega-Argilés 2012). Later 
work showed empirically that regional performance in Europe, compared to the US, 
was linked with inefficiencies in the existing institutional and governance setup of the 
EU territorial landscape (Fagerberg, Feldman, and Srholec 2014). Similarly, the logic of 
R&D specialisation, whose significance has been increasingly stressed in the S3 
framework, is not new, as several studies have systematically attempted to examine 
how the variation in R&D intensity impacts on sectoral, regional and national 
performance (OECD 2011a). Historically, some of the smart specialisation ideas (e.g. 
the entrepreneurial discovery) have been widely used in innovation and economic 
studies for many years under different terminologies (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 
2013b), but it was recently redefined by a group of academics, called the Knowledge for 
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Growth-K4G Expert Group (Foray 2014), who provided a more collective approach. The 
K4G Expert Group operated as an independent advisory body to the EU to advise how 
sustainable growth and prosperity could be better promoted within the European 
Research Area (ERA).   
 The logic of smart specialisation was initially applied at a sectoral level, and then 
shifted to an appealing policy approach which currently concentrates the regional 
policy interest in Europe (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). The policy-prioritisation 
incused in smart specialisation rationale is based on the assumption that different 
countries and regions possess different knowledge and learning systems and, 
therefore, it is more likely to develop diverse capacities and specialise in different 
economic areas. Clearly, smart specialisation has successfully overcome a series of 
previous criticisms; e.g. considered as a policy tool for advanced regions only, for which 
McCann (2015) argued that, quite the opposite, it is especially useful for many non-
core regions. At present, its adoption and implementation constitutes an ex-ante 
conditionality for the EU regions to get access in the 2014-20 EU Structural Fund 
Programmes. Specifically, under this new research and innovation ex-ante 
conditionality, all EU territories are obliged to develop their own entrepreneurial 
search processes to develop their policy plans through an RIS3 approach (EC 2012). In 
practice, the ex-ante conditionality marked the beginning of smart specialisation as a 
regional innovation strategy and consolidated its implementation in the European 
territory.     
 
2.2.2 The details of the entrepreneurial discovery  
 Arguably, the entrepreneurial discovery is the cornerstone of the smart 
specialisation strategy, as it is the main means of experimenting and discovering which 
specific domains of the economy lead, or will lead, to entrepreneurial opportunities for 
knowledge-based and innovation-driven growth. It is a practical tool for either 
economically weak or strong territories (OECD 2012b), providing an analytical 
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framework for strategic identification and prioritisation in regional innovation 
policymaking. Capello (2014) recognises the entrepreneurial discovery as a conceptual 
pillar of smart specialisation. In general, it is argued that it is the entrepreneurial 
discovery itself which distinguishes  smart  specialisation from  other traditional  
industrial and innovation strategies (OECD 2013). Methodologically, the 
entrepreneurial discovery differentiates itself from the traditional exercise of Science 
and Technology (S&T) foresight, given that it contains imagination, creativity and 
strategic vision (Foray 2016), elements which are currently neglected and missing from 
the technology foresight exercise or other similar forecasting tools. In addition, to 
design and apply the entrepreneurial discovery effectively, repeated and collective 
efforts are required (Moodysson, Trippl, and Zukauskaite 2015), in which the 
mobilisation of both the public and private sectors is absolutely necessary and crucial 
(McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013b). In the S3 literature, local actors are understood as 
entrepreneurial actors, encompassing a broad list of players, beyond the traditional 
meaning of the term entrepreneur (Foray, David, and Hall 2011). Universities, private 
firms, intermediary organisations, development agencies, regional authorities and 
other official entities with a key development role are considered as entrepreneurial 
actors in the S3 context.    
 Through S3 practices, entrepreneurial actors from diverse economic sectors are 
encouraged to collectively identify, assess and understand the complex nature and 
dynamics of their regional ecosystems, with the objective of supporting regional 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policymaking in the context of S3. In this 
framework, it is vital to make sense of the entrepreneurial action that key stakeholders 
such as firms, universities, regional agencies etc, should be jointly undertaking during 
the discovery process to identify specialisations within economic domains which 
currently excel or will excel in the future. Interestingly, joint action and interplay among 
key entrepreneurial actors is not only essential for improving innovation performance - 
it is argued that a continuous interaction among different R&D actors strengthens 
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further the systems of innovation (Lundvall 2010; Edquist 1997) - but also represents 
potential for additional intra-regional cumulative learning (Foray 2016). Moreover, 
within a regional innovation ecosystem, several sub-systems including entrepreneurial 
networks, R&D clusters, knowledge accelerators, research-industry consortia etc, are 
likely to function quite differently (Landabaso and Foray 2014) and therefore the 
discovery process could be thought of as a useful tool for the learning region (Storper 
1997; Florida 1995; Asheim 1996b) to supplement and fortify its knowledge further on 
how such complexity works and evolves over time. In this respect, the entrepreneurial 
discovery can be seen as an ongoing learning process in which different types of 
knowledge sets (e.g. science and technology knowledge, entrepreneurial and market 
knowledge) are combined to drive specialised diversification (OECD 2013).    
 
2.2.2.1 No optimal way for implementing the entrepreneurial discovery 
 The theoretical underpinnings of smart specialisation suggest that there is no 
optimal way to run the entrepreneurial discovery in the regional setting, given that 
regional dynamics vary greatly across Europe; see for example Landabaso (2014); 
David, Forey, and Hall (2012); OECD (2013); Foray, David, and Hall (2011). An analytical 
explanation for S3 implementation is limited to a series of methodological studies 
which have been published to support smart specialisation development through the 
provision of abstract guidelines. Most studies indicate a common methodological 
element, which suggests that the entrepreneurial discovery should follow a continuous 
participatory process in which a massive stakeholder involvement should be ensured; 
see for example (EC 2014d, 2012; OECD 2012a). Neither do recent empirical findings 
indicate a clear and analytical pattern as to how regional self-identification and 
prioritisation should be carried out in the context of S3; see for guidance Capello and 
Kroll (2016); Gianelle et al. (2016); McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016a); Sörvik et al. 
(2016). The lack of clear and detailed guidelines for the implementation of the 
discovery process is to some extent reasonable, given the spatial heterogeneity of 
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European regions in generating and boosting innovation-driven growth (e.g. 
heterogeneity in terms of research, innovation and entrepreneurial potential; 
institutional and governance capacity; regional autonomy etc). Also, it can be explained 
through the lens of the one-size-fits-all theory (Tödtling and Trippl 2005), which 
suggests that local and regional policymaking cannot be merely based on copying best 
practice models. While there is an indication of the three most important complements 
of the entrepreneurial discovery, meaning the entrepreneurial actors, the generation of 
entrepreneurial knowledge, and the interaction among those possessing 
entrepreneurial knowledge (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015), we still lack clarity as to 
how these factors are related and work in practice. Research addresses such topics 
currently.       
 
What empirical evidence says at present  
 An important question in the frame of smart specialisation is how the practical 
dynamics of the entrepreneurial discovery can be better understood in the regional 
context. And as we have already discussed previously, the answer to this question is 
still unknown. In fact, understanding better the practical workability of the discovery 
process and its step-by-step realisation in the regional setting is still an open issue in 
the S3 literature (McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016), and rests on the ability to 
investigate and collect a growing number of empirically based findings from diverse 
regional territories (Capello and Kroll 2016). In this respect, entrepreneurial discovery 
can be better understood if it is studied as an evidence-based approach. Besides, the 
importance of evidence and expertise in policymaking and action has been extensively 
studied in the literature (Mittra 2006; Shaxson 2005). To this end, several studies, 
reports and surveys have been conducted throughout Europe since the onset of S3, 
with a particular attention to the role that different stakeholders should take during 
the design, implementation and self-evaluation of the discovery process. Examples at 
the European level include S3 empirical investigations in Møre and Romsdal (Asheim 
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and Grillitsch 2015); Scania (Moodysson, Trippl, and Zukauskaite 2015); other 
Scandinavian regions (Asheim, Grillitsch, and Trippl 2016); Malta (Luke et al. 2014); 
Basque country (Morgan 2016; Valdaliso et al. 2014; Estensoro and Larrea 2016; 
Marques and Morgan 2018); Andalucía (Gianelle et al. 2014); Wales (Morgan 2017); 
and other EU regions and countries (Kroll et al. 2014; Aranguren et al. 2018; Patricia 
and Tea 2017; Iacobucci 2014). 
 The importance of investigating what particular actions should be undertaken 
by different entrepreneurial actors, is a high S3 priority due to the gap in understanding 
how these actors are practically engaged in bottom-up activities (Marinelli and 
Perianez-Forte 2017). For example, a number of empirical studies emphasise the 
significant role of universities and research centres in the discovery process, by 
highlighting their potential to connect global  and  local  knowledge  domains; see the 
work of (Kempton et al. 2013; Rodrigues and Fonseca 2017; Fotakis et al. 2014; Marlow 
and Richardson 2016). Other studies acknowledge the value of ensuring a broad 
participation of private firms in sharing and diffusing entrepreneurial knowledge 
(Landabaso, McCann, and Ortega-Argilés 2014; Gianelle et al. 2016), as well as the role 
of intermediary agencies (e.g. financial institutes) in supporting the development of the 
entrepreneurial discovery (Foray, David, and Hall 2011; Kroll 2016). Marques and 
Morgan (2018) stress the importance of multi-scalar co-ordination in policymaking, in 
which key actors at different geographical levels need to collaborate to implement 
innovation policies and strategies.  
 The existing evidence on entrepreneurial discovery shows clearly that it is a 
multifaceted and inclusive process (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015). It also shows that 
its effective realisation is by no means a straightforward process, given the inherent 
difficulty of conducting an in-depth discovery process in which broad priority areas can 
be turned into specific action plans for regional specialisation and diversification. For 
instance, Patricia and Tea (2017) have recently used empirical evidence from the 
Slovenian territory to show the complexity of recognising specific industrial 
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specialisations during the discovery process. Along the same line, Landabaso, 
Komninos, et al. (2014) have previously stressed the tendency to define regional 
specialisation in a broad manner, instead of specifying detailed S3 actions and activities 
due to the difficulties inherently connected with the entrepreneurial search processes 
(e.g. inadequate collaboration among local entrepreneurial actors).         
 Another aspect of the entrepreneurial discovery has been recently revealed by 
a number of empirical studies, which have further informed S3 ongoing literature. 
Evidence from these studies suggests that the process of discovery has evolved from a 
single identification activity into a continuous process suitable for showing how new 
institutional and governance arrangements might bring more efficiency in the S3 
context, by mobilising an active participation of entrepreneurial actors; for example, 
see (Marinelli and Perianez-Forte 2017). In this emerging view, the entrepreneurial 
discovery is not only about priority choices and identification of complementarities 
among different policy domains (Foray and Goenaga 2013), but also about 
experimental self-discovery geared to yielding learning on what capacities, institutions 
and governance reforms might be more appropriate for the development of S3 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016; Foray 2016). 
Thus, within a continuously changing S3 context, the discovery process currently takes 
on a new learning-by-doing dimension which may help catch-up regions to identify 
priority actions in new venture opportunities and simultaneously indicate other 
important aspects for S3 implementation (e.g. what forms of capacity building are 
relevant, where and how to accelerate structural change etc). But what exactly is 
meant by catch-up regions? What are the main features of a typical catch-up region in 
the European territory?  
 
2.3 A typology of catch-up regions: conceptualisation and understanding    
 It is important for the thesis to provide a solid understanding of the nature and 
structural specificity of catch-up regions. The typology employed in this study takes into 
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account various determinants of innovative performance of a given territory with 
concrete geographical boundaries. It is based on the NUTS-Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics classification provided by the EU (EU 2015).  
 At a policy level, there have been several ways of classifying regions into 
different performance groups according to their innovation capacity and their different 
innovation journeys (Benneworth 2007). For example, the classification provided by the 
EU through the Regional Innovation Scoreboard and Innovation Union Scoreboard, (EC 
2015, 2014e), categorises European regions into four core innovation performance 
groups: leaders, followers, moderate and modest. The last two categories, namely the 
modest and moderate innovators, perform below the EU average and typically fit well 
with the characteristics of the regions addressed in this study. Methodologically, the EU 
approach is based on the analysis of three sets of indicators which measure the 
innovation performance external to the firm (enablers), at the level of the firm (firm 
activities) and capture the effects of firms’ innovation activities (outputs).  
 The indicators proposed by the OECD (2011a) are appropriate  for identifying 
regions with weak innovation capabilities and structures (Trippl, Asheim, and Miorner 
2015). Furthermore, the OECD regional classification scheme, also based on different 
innovation-related variables, categorises regions into three main groups: knowledge-
hubs, industrial production zones and non-S&T driven regions, where the latter is more 
likely to represent the characteristics of the regions we target in this work, as it refers 
to primary-sector-intensive areas with high levels of structural inertia. Moreover, the 
non-S&T driven category includes lesser performing regions with high levels of 
unemployment rates, low technological capabilities, and limited abilities in 
manufacturing (OECD 2011b).    
 
Regional classification in the context of smart specialisation  
 Reflecting on the way in which smart specialisation is being implemented 
throughout Europe,  Kroll (2015a) distinguishes three main types of EU regions: starters 
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(Eastern European regions), active beneficiaries (Southern European regions) and 
drivers (Central and Northern European regions). This grouping, however, seems to be 
based mainly on the mismatch between smart specialisation action plans and local 
governance systems, without considering a number of micro-level parameters such as 
capabilities and competences developed at the level of firms. Through their analysis of 
a comparative study of eight regional cases, Aranguren et al. (2018) use a broad 
typology to group European regions into different groups from a multi-level 
governance perspective: single-level regions in which S3 practices are dominated by 
one level of government; top-down multilevel regions, in which S3 development is 
largely based on national-level decision-making; and networked multilevel regions, in 
which multiple territorial levels are used to develop S3.  
 
2.3.1 The characteristics of less-favoured regions    
 While there are not any universally accepted standardised criteria for grouping 
regions into different innovation performance groups, our classification is based on the 
way in which territories (mainly at NATS2 level) are able to produce and absorb new 
knowledge and technology; create new or upgrade existing specialisation patterns; and 
undertake particular processes for institutional change and structural reform to catch-
up. The interest of this study is centred particularly on low innovation performance 
regions, which typically tend to face weaknesses related to the smart specialisation 
implementation (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). Such regions are usually defined 
under different terminologies: learning (Morgan 1997; Lundvall 2010; Lundvall and 
Johnson 1994; Asheim 1996a; OECD 2001; Florida 1995; Maskell and Malmberg 1999); 
technology-followers (Forbes and Wield 2002); catch-up and backward (Abramovitz 
1986; Verspagen 1991; Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996; Cappelen, Fagerberg, and 
Verspagen 1999); less-favoured (Morgan and Nauwelaers 2004); transition (Cooke 
2011; EU 2015).  
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 In general, less-advanced regional territories are usually characterised by 
relatively low innovation performance and seem to have little social capital and 
governance capacities. More specifically, they are likely to have fragmented regional 
innovation systems (Cooke, Gomez Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997; Tödtling and Trippl 
2005; Martin and Trippl 2014), weak learning capabilities and skills (Malerba 1992; 
Oughton, Landabaso, and Morgan 2002), low potential for absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990; Lundquist and Trippl 2013; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015), limited 
abilities to diversify into new industries (Boschma, Heimeriks, and Balland 2014), low 
entrepreneurial potential (Fritsch 1992), and significant challenges in mobilising 
institutional and structural change (Neffke et al. 2014) due to the existence of strong 
path-dependent inefficiencies and various forms of lock-in effects (McCann and Ortega-
Argiles 2013a; Boschma, Heimeriks, and Balland 2014; Isaksen 2001). Additionally, they 
appear to have limited power to tackle fundamental issues related to unemployment 
and social exclusion (Lovering 1996), and, usually, suffer from inefficiencies associated 
with under-institutionalisation (Landabaso, Valdaliso, et al. 2014).  
 
2.4 Enablers of smart specialisation implementation   
 Empirical evidence suggests that smart specialisation practices are conducted 
differently across diverse EU regions, depending on their capacities, institutions and 
governance structures (Foray 2014; OECD 2012a; Kroll 2015b; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Wilkie 2015). They also depend on the ability of regions to initiate structural reforms 
and improve the way that innovation policymaking is institutionalised, governed and 
regulated (McCann 2015; Gianelle and Kleibrink 2015; Grillitsch 2015). For example, 
studying S3 practices in economically strong European regions, Asheim, Grillitsch, and 
Trippl (2016) have recently found that three Scandinavian regions (the North Denmark 
Region, Scania in Southern Sweden, and Møre og Romsdal in North Western Norway) 
were able to adopt and implement S3 for regional diversification. In contrast, poorer 
regions such as Malta (Luke et al. 2014) and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (Marques 
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and Morgan 2018) faced important implementation barriers due to thin institutions 
and weak capabilities. In this regard, it would be essential to review how the existing 
literature captures the role of capacity-building in developing smart specialisation, as 
well as the way in which institutional governance frameworks shape S3 realisation in 
the regional setting. Both aspects are reviewed and discussed separately in the 
following sections. 
 
2.4.1 Capacity building and Smart Specialisation  
2.4.1.1 Economic growth and capacity building  
 The pivotal role of capabilities in boosting regional development has been 
extensively acknowledged in economic growth (Bell and Pavitt 1995). Storper (1997) 
emphasised that the ability of territories to improve capacity is a determinant factor of 
economic success, while Varblane, Ukrainski, and Lillestik (2012, 53) argued that the 
"critical task for the catch-up economies is to increase the learning capacity of the 
whole society". Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie (2017) have recently argued that regions, 
particularly poorer areas, must overcome capacity building constraints to design and 
implement sound development strategies. In this respect, the authors see capacity 
building as a means to implement regional development. Empirical research suggests 
that a successful mobilisation and exploitation of different types of capabilities is not 
only essential for a region, but also for diverse local actors found within the region 
(Iammarino et al. 2012; von Tunzelmann 2009; Bell and Pavitt 1995). Literature on 
capacity building is particularly vast, with plenty of arguments supporting the 
importance of studying capabilities at both the organisational (micro-level) and 
regional level (meso-level). For example, previous studies have argued that regional 
development is strongly conditioned by the effectiveness of building individual firm-
level capabilities (Lall 1998; Howells 1999; Neffke et al. 2014), while firms' success is 
greatly dependent on the available resources and capabilities of a given region (Maskell 
and Malmberg 1999; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Howells and Bessant 2012). To show 
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the significance of setting capacities at the micro-level, Cooke and Memedovic (2003, 
8) underline that "there is a growing awareness among regional authorities that the 
economic growth and competitiveness of their regions depend largely on the capacity of 
indigenous firms to innovate". Likewise, Best (2001, 132) indicates the interaction 
between firms' and regional capabilities by arguing that "regional technological 
capabilities spawn entrepreneurial firms, which upgrade regional technological 
capabilities, which spawn more entrepreneurial firms". Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie 
(2017) argue that improving the capacity of local authorities can empower regions to 
develop sounder place-based approaches to regional development. In this respect, an 
analytical investigation at both levels (micro- and meso-) is increasingly important in 
understanding how the development of new and existing capabilities may condition 
the success of designing and implementing regional innovation strategies in the S3 
context. 
 There are a large number of theoretical and empirical studies seeking to 
understand the way in which capacity building is related to productivity, innovation and 
development. For example, Kim (1997) indicated the central role that technological 
capabilities played in South Korea's rapid industrialisation, by showing how imitation 
was replaced gradually by innovation. Likewise, using empirical evidence from East 
Germany, Von Tunzelmann et al. (2010) showed how diverse interactive dynamic 
capabilities contributed to the successful regeneration of the national innovation 
system. Apart from these indicative studies, the role of other types of capabilities has 
been systematically examined to understand the evolutionary approach of regional 
renewal and development. The following section outlines different types of capacity 
building with an essential role in regional innovation studies.    
 
2.4.1.2 Types of capacity building 
 Without doubt there is extensive literature on capacity building. Different kinds 
of capabilities have been studied thoroughly at the level of firms and organisations 
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(micro-level), as well as at the level of regions (meso-level). Focusing on the micro-
level, Winter (2003, 991) defines organisational capability as: "a high-level routine (or 
collection of routines) that, together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an 
organisation’s management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs 
of a particular type". Similarly, Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko (2009, 32) mention that 
"when a combination of resources enables an organisation to accomplish a task, those 
resources are referred to as a capability". Innovative capabilities; networking 
capabilities; absorptive capacity; technological capabilities; strategy building; strategic 
capabilities; competitive capabilities; managerial capabilities; learning capabilities, 
administrative capabilities; fundraising capabilities are only some of the most generic 
forms of capacity building which concentrate both policy and academic interests in 
regional development.  
 Normally, such capabilities condition the innovation potential of the local 
players, who in their turn, tend to shape the regional paths of development (Cantwell 
and Janne 1999; Miguélez and Moreno 2015). For the purpose of this study, we include 
the following forms which are usually associated with knowledge, innovation and 
regional development and have been highlighted and discussed in detail during the 
interviews: technological and innovation capabilities (Kim 1980; Lall 1992; Kim 1997; 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997); networking capabilities (McGrath and O'Toole 2013; 
Walter, Auer, and Ritter 2006); administrative capabilities (Farazmand 2009; Lodge and 
Wegrich 2014); entrepreneurial capabilities (Patel and Fiet 2011; Ireland, Covin, and 
Kuratko 2009; Corner and Wu 2012) and financial-investment capabilities. In addition 
to the complex process of local capability formation (Kim 1997), we seek to highlight 
the overlapping range of the most common types of capacity building identified above. 
Thus, in order to provide additional clarification on the different forms of capacity 
building, we present Table 2.2 which outlines a short description and explains briefly 




Table 2.2 Forms of capacity building at the micro-level 
Type of capability   Description   Relevant literature  
Absorptive capacity  "Organisations' ability to recognise the value of new external 
information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends" 
 (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Bosch, 
Volberda, and Boer 1999; Zahra and 
George 2002) 
Technological and 
innovation capabilities  
 "Technological capability refers to organisations' ability to make 
effective use of technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, 
use, adapt, and change existing technologies" 
 
"Innovation capabilities refer to the ability to continuously 
transform knowledge and ideas into new products, processes and 
systems for the benefit of the firm and its stakeholders" 
 (Kim 1980; Lall 1992; Bell and Pavitt 
1995; Kim 1997; Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen 1997; Lawson and Samson 
2001; Zheng, Liu, and George 2010) 
Networking capabilities  "Organisations' ability to develop and utilise inter-organisational 
relationships to gain access to various resources held by others" 
 (McGrath and O'Toole 2013; Walter, 
Auer, and Ritter 2006; Håkansson and 
Snehota 1989; Anderson, Dodd, and 
Jack 2010; Ebers 1999; Hakansson et 
al. 2010; Sullivan Mort and 
Weerawardena 2006) 
Administrative capabilities  "Ability to improve administration structures and processes"  (Farazmand 2009; Eglene, Dawes, and 
Schneider 2007; Lodge and Wegrich 
2014; OECD 2006) 
Entrepreneurial capabilities    "An entrepreneurial capability exists when an organisation 
exhibits a systematic capacity to recognise and exploit 
opportunity" 
 (Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko 2009; 
Covin and Slevin 1991; Corner and Wu 
2012; Newbert, Gopalakrishnan, and 
Kirchhoff 2008; Patel and Fiet 2011) 
Financial-investment 
capabilities   
 The ability to use a mixture of skills and competences to assess 
and make strategic decisions on medium and long-term level 
investments. It also refers to the ability of organisations to look 
for different types of financial resources and make sense of them 
to fulfil their objectives 
 (Kempson, Collard, and Moore 2005; 





2.4.2 Do micro- and meso-level capacities matter for smart specialisation?    
 Both early and late S3 evidence suggests that EU regions with well-developed 
capabilities appear to be most responsive to the smart specialisation agenda (McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2016a). In this respect, capabilities do matter for smart 
specialisation and, therefore, capacity building and S3 should co-evolve in a hand-in-
hand approach. In former work, Foray (2014) emphasised that regions' S3 challenges 
are to design place-specific policies which will later allow the creation of intrinsic 
capabilities for achieving an interregional comparative advantage. While poor 
institutional and governance capacity may not necessarily imply innovation policy 
failure, in the smart specialisation context it is highly related to challenges surrounding 
the development of S3 (OECD 2013). This view can be better understood in catch-up 
regions which are routinely backward in capacity building (Verspagen, 1991), suffer 
considerably from weak learning abilities (Morgan 1997; Malerba 1992; Lall 1998; 
Cooke and Morgan 1998b), and tend to lack strong institutional structures (Rodríguez-
Pose 2013). In this regard, the need to understand the connection between capabilities 
and smart specialisation has received a growing interest since the onset of S3 in the 
regional setting. Thus, an important part of S3 research is currently driven by the 
investigation of empirical evidence, aimed at explaining how, and under what specific 
conditions the formation of capabilities would help catch-up territories to tackle the 
operational challenge of S3 (Morgan 2016). 
 Clearly, current evidence suggests that capacity building is crucial for the 
development of S3, as it supports regions in building search mechanisms for 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; Foray 2016) and, 
simultaneously, facilitating the initiation of institutional and governance reforms 
(Grillitsch 2015; McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016). Empirical examples which 
show the way capacity building currently impacts the realisation of smart specialisation 
vary considerably, indicating how different forms of capacities contribute to S3 




up regions to "provide the right framework conditions to build capabilities that 
stimulate the entrepreneurial discovery process". It showed empirically that certain EU 
regions have seen remarkable progress in the entrepreneurial discovery due to 
collective efforts to improve the absorptive capacity of diverse local entrepreneurs (the 
case of South Moravian region in Czech Republic). This is one example from the micro-
level perspective which shows how organisations' absorptive capacity can progressively 
facilitate the entrepreneurial mechanisms of the regions. Examples at the meso-level 
study provide evidence on how the enhancement of intra- and inter-regional 
networking capabilities led to better experimentation and discovery results through 
interactive learning; see (Foray 2016; Foray 2014). It was argued that interactive 
learning among different local players is crucially important as it facilitates knowledge 
exchange (Edquist 1997), and supports the creation of dynamic capabilities appropriate 
to accelerate structural change (Morgan 1997). Kyriakou et al. (2016) and Gianelle et al. 
(2016) indicated how improvements in local governance capabilities provided 
opportunities for institutional learning in the S3 context.  
 The rising importance of studying capacity building for smart specialisation has 
been also underlined by Sörvik et al. (2016) who stressed the need to understand the 
way regional capabilities could influence the encouragement of inter-regional 
collaborations. The authors supported further the empirical observation that 
collaborations among different stakeholders have been decisive for the 
implementation of S3, and explained why additional research studies are needed to 
analyse the effect that new skills and capacity building might have on the self-discovery 
process. In the same vein, Kroll (2015a) assumed that regions with weak regional 
structures and limited capacity are more likely to face conceptual and practical 
difficulties in implementing RIS3 efficiently.  
 The cases discussed above suggest that the success of integrating smart 
specialisation policymaking is partly conditioned by regions' collective ability to 




creating new ones. However, although the current literature acknowledges the 
importance of capacity building at the sub-national level e.g. (McCann and Ortega-
Argiles 2013b; Foray, David, and Hall 2011; Boschma and Gianelle 2014), it still lacks 
robust evidence in respect of which particular capabilities and what learning conditions 
should be developed exclusively for a rapid adaptability of smart specialisation in the 
regional context. The crucial point is not only to drive smart specialisation research 
towards developing regional competences to recognise the potential of renewal 
(Boschma and Gianelle 2014), but also towards understanding the patterns for 
improving regions' ability to transform this potential into practice. In fact, the process 
of learning is inherently complex in nature (Morgan 1997), and this rather indicates 
that the formation of new regional capabilities which is based on different learning 
dynamics might be ambiguous. Up to now, research remains normative and descriptive 
rather than analytical and critical, as it merely indicates the difficulty to adapt smart 
specialisation interventions and simply shows the need of regions to improve their 
learning abilities to diversify in the long-run. Within the current smart specialisation 
framework the process of learning is not fully captured in an explicit way, as both the 
new types of knowledge and the domestic capabilities that should be mobilised and 
combined are still unknown. Surprisingly, there is not any clear framework to study 
empirically how and to what extent improvements in regional capability building will 
ultimately affect the learning process of the regions to trigger structural change and 
stimulate new path creation. For example, while the available evidence can now 
acknowledge empirically the importance of related variety on the RIS3 effectiveness 
e.g. (Boschma and Frenken 2009), our understanding in respect of how regions could 
improve their learning mechanisms to systematically address technological 
connectedness within the smart specialisation context is still limited and fuzzy. In the 
same way, although there is a general acceptance that the mobilisation and 
engagement of key local entrepreneurs is vital for the discovery process, we still do not 




to generate regional consensus and trust to effectively overcome institutions' inertia. 
This gap seems to increase markedly in the case of the less-favoured regions where the 
challenges that emerged during the ongoing macro-economic crisis in Europe have 
increased the vulnerability of the local ecosystems to external shocks (Komninos, 
Musyck, and Reid 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013b), and, in fact, have limited 
importantly our ability to achieve robust space-neutral policy observations.  
 There is a strong need, therefore, to explore which specialised learning 
capabilities and which effective combinations of knowledge competences are more 
likely to work better for the smart specialisation dynamics particularly in less-favoured 
regional environments. In this area, current research is limited and gaps should be 
tackled efficiently. In practice, new empirical research should be designed and oriented 
towards identifying which new types of capabilities should be created and which pre-
existing capacities and structures should be upgraded to facilitate the feasibility of 
institutional and governance reform, with the ultimate aim to support regions to catch-
up in the long-run. In this respect, several findings related to smart specialisation 
studies have recognised the need for intervention at institutions and at different levels 
of governance, e.g. (Foray 2014; OECD 2013; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; EC 2012; 
Thissen et al. 2013), as several bottom-up governance issues appear to have a 
remarkable impact on policy outcomes (Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich 2012; 
Rodríguez-Pose 2013).    
 
2.4.3 Institutions, governance and smart specialisation 
2.4.3.1 Institutions and regional growth   
 The importance of institutions in economic development has been increasingly 
acknowledged in evolutionary economics (Grillitsch 2015; Rodrik 2005). As such, 
institutions have been studied at different geographical levels, comprising the regional, 
national and supra-national levels (Hassink 2010), as well as through other analytical 




efforts have been made to study the way place-specific institutional structures impact 
on regional economic performance. Most of this work seeks to understand how 
institutions and institutional change are possible to address policy failure and improve 
economic growth (Streeck 1991). But, what do we mean by institutions and how are 
institutional arrangements related to regional innovation strategies and economic 
development? Given that there is no unanimity in the definition of institutions, this 
thesis adopts the most commonly cited definition given by North:        
 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way 
societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding 
historical change (North 1990, 3) 
 
In general, institutions are numerous and vary considerably (Lakshmanan and Button 
2009). Within the institutional economics framework, two key concepts have drawn 
attention over the last decades: formal institutions and informal institutions. Formal or 
hard institutions refer usually to rules, laws and organisation, while informal or tacit 
institutions include individual habits, routines, social norms and values (Amin 1999). In 
practice, the former take an explicit form to regulate social behaviour and the latter 
emerge as an outcome of daily patters and social routines. North (2005) emphasises 
that though informal institutions are usually not written in a clear and official manner, 
they tend to be more persistent than written rules in formal institutions. Institutions, 
either formal or informal, are seen as essential for economic activity and growth 
(Rodrik 2004a) and, as such, are also an important unit of analysis for the development 







Institutions and regional innovation strategies   
 There is much ongoing discussion about how regional institutions affect local 
growth strategies. It is argued that institutional factors play a key role in shaping 
regional development growth (North 1990). Watkins et al. (2015) suggest that good 
development policies will need to be supported and governed by capable and informed 
institutions. Amin and Thrift (1995) suggest that there are regions which experienced 
economic development because of their institutional thickness. According to the 
authors, institutional thickness refers to "a combination of features including the 
presence of various institutions, inter-institutional interactions and a culture of 
represented identification with a common industrial purpose and shared norms and 
values which serve to constitute ‘the social atmosphere’ of a particular locality" (Amin 
and Thrift 1995, 104). Other authors, for example Rodríguez-Pose (2013), suggest that 
institutional thickness (e.g. areas with a large number of institutions) does not 
necessarily lead to successful policy outcomes, as it is a proper mix of institutions that 
seems to matter more. Acknowledging either view, the underlying argument relies on 
the fact that good institutions favour the framework in which development strategies 
are implemented. Especially if these strategies are based on a place-based approach, 
then a series of tailor-made institutional changes might be necessary at the local level 
(Morgan 2013).  
 The impact of institutions on regional strategies and growth can be examined 
and discussed from many different perspectives. For example, focusing on the learning 
approach, Morgan (1997) argued that the learning capacity of a region is very much 
determined by its institutional base; e.g. lack of effective institutions to favour network 
linkages may lead to limited knowledge exchange and learning fragmentation. Other 
perspectives of analysis show that sound formal institutions improve the conditions for 
private investments and economic activity (Jütting 2003) and minimise uncertainty and 
corruption by reducing the risk of social and political instability (Rodrik 2004a). 




2013) and make policy governance performance more stable (Amin 1999). Dosi and 
Malerba (1996) emphasise that it is the interrelation between formal and informal 
institutions that determines the incentives for, and constraints to, innovation policy 
processes. Recent empirical findings show that institutions have indeed an impacting 
role on regional innovation performance; see for example the work of Ederveen, Groot, 
and Nahuis (2006); Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015). Hence, an interesting 
question of particular interest in this study is how institutions and institutional change 
are practically affecting the implementation of smart specialisation strategies in catch-
up territories. Are there any empirical findings at present and what do they show? For 
example, concerning the dynamics of institutional change, historical institutionalism 
distinguishes between four modes of change: displacement, layering, drift and 
conversion (Busetti 2015; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). According to the authors, 
displacement takes place when existing rules are replaced by new ones,  layering refers 
to the introduction of new rules alongside existing ones, while drift and conversion 
keep formal rules the same (in this case, institutions' impact derives from changes in 
exogenous factors). This work, however, studies institutional change in economically 
strong European regions.   
 
2.4.3.2 Institutional dynamics and smart specialisation: theoretical and empirical 
contributions 
 Given that formal and informal institutions determine the framework in which 
regional growth strategies evolve, one should reasonably expect that the institutional 
set-up of a region should also affect the development of smart specialisation (as a 
regional innovation strategy). Latest theoretical and empirical findings tend to support 
this assumption, by revealing a straight connection between the institutional 
environment and the realisation of S3 (McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; Gianelle et al. 2016; Morgan 2013; McCann and 




from the perspective of diversity and integration, Grillitsch (2015) shows how 
improvements in these particular areas could possibly affect S3 outcomes in the 
regional setting. The author provides a theoretical model to show how changes in 
institutional diversity and integration stimulate entrepreneurial discovery and 
agglomeration processes. The problem with this approach, however, is that no other 
institutional dimensions are analytically examined (e.g. industry-specific institutions, 
interplay between different levels of territorial institutions etc) to determine if and how 
other elements and types of institutional framework may affect S3 implementation in 
practice.  
 Other similar studies examine empirically the relationship between institutions 
and smart specialisation development. For example, focusing particularly on the 
process of entrepreneurial discovery, Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie (2015) suggest that 
the institutional environment of a region is a prominent determinant of whether the 
interaction and collaboration among diverse entrepreneurial actors will be effectively 
initiated and sustained. The authors argue that thin institutions are more likely to 
hinder the validity, effectiveness and outcomes of the discovery process and, therefore, 
"a sound institutional context  seemingly  provides the optimal setting for the 
entrepreneurial discovery process" (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015, 20).  
 Analysing the UK case, McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2014) examined how 
domestic institutional reforms have been initiated and conducted in England to support 
S3 development. The authors argue that smart specialisation acted as a catalyst for 
changing part of the institutional set-up. In a quite similar way but from a broader 
perspective, Kroll (2015a) shows how diversity in European institutional patterns and 
settings determines policy governance options for S3 implementation. In this view, 
smart specialisation success is conditioned by an evidence-based thinking on what 
institutional framework conditions should be introduced and possibly changed to 
favour innovation strategies in the S3 context. A number of other related studies reveal 




smart specialisation challenges tend to increase in number and intensity if institutional 
and policy governance structures are weak and not flexible (Landabaso, Komninos, et 
al. 2014; Iacobucci 2014; Capello and Kroll 2016; Komninos, Musyck, and Reid 2014).  
 As to how different forms of institutions (formal or informal) tend to affect S3 
capacities and progress, empirical investigation shows that both types are equally 
important in the context of S3. Interestingly, it is not only hard institutions that matter 
for the realisation of S3 (e.g. rules and laws). It is argued that soft institutions, such as 
policy routines and practices, also have a pivotal role in the development of smart 
specialisation strategies (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014).   
 
2.4.3.3 Smart specialisation and governance practices    
 The significance of improving governance for policy implementation and 
economic development has been increasingly highlighted during the last years in the 
European policy arena (McCann 2015). In general, it is argued that environments with 
good and modern governance structures can benefit more from the implementation of 
innovation policies, compared to areas with less advanced administrative structures 
and conditions (OECD 2017a). In such structures, the creation of sound multi-level 
governance partnerships among and within different administrative levels (e.g. local, 
regional, national, European) is regarded as a critical success factor in the 
implementation of innovation-driven growth (OECD 2017b; Baland, Moene, and 
Robinson 2010; OECD 2017a). The governance literature suggests that good 
governance structures for STI policies must take into account the quadruple helix 
(government, industry, academia, and civil society) (Carayannis and Rakhmatullin 
2014), and may lead to regional success in different ways. For example, considering the 
importance of diversification in regional development, Dani Rodrik mentions that 
“diversification is unlikely to take place without directed government action" (Rodrik 




support regions in absorbing European Regional Development Funds more effectively, 
and putting their regional plans into practice.   
 As to the S3 context especially, there is a widespread acceptance that the 
success of smart specialisation polices will partly dependent on the ability of regions to 
rethink and redesign their governance mechanisms (Foray 2014; Grillitsch 2015; EC 
2012; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015). The process of making regional governance 
mechanisms more autonomous and self-regulated is seen as an important element of 
the S3 procedure (Kroll 2016). It is argued that policy governance authority may be 
shifted downwards (from national to regional levels) or outwards (from government to 
non-governmental actors) (Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011). Cooke et al. (2011, 
530) argued that "regional intelligence and policy learning suggest that a more 
proactive role is required of regional innovation governance in future". From a narrow 
smart specialisation perspective, McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2014) stressed the 
significance of designing a differentiated governance structure at the sub-national 
level, appropriate to overcome the challenges associated with the implementation of 
S3 in different regional territories. In essence, the role of this new governance structure 
will be to restart the mobilisation of the regional triple-helix mechanism (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 1995), and secure a dynamic and constant smart specialisation interaction 
among different entrepreneurs from the local government, academia and business 
community.  
 An increasing number of studies, see for example McCann (2015); Landabaso 
and Foray (2014), can now confirm that, at the theoretical level at least, there is reason 
to believe that smart specialisation could possibly be treated as a strategic tool 
appropriate for any type of EU region. However, as regions with different innovation 
potential are likely to offer different types of entrepreneurship and innovation 
structures (Sternberg 2011), it is essential to study how a dynamic interaction among 
government, academia and entrepreneurs will be effectively governed at an exclusively 




The challenging point is to ensure that weaker regions will create in-house governance 
capabilities that will continuously allow them to develop and later on to keep the 
necessary regional ownership and autonomy for designing and implementing S3 locally. 
At present, there is an increasing risk for the weaker regions to abandon the 
opportunity to design and implement S3 at the sub-national level due to their inability 
to govern the complexity of smart specialisation practices mainly at the three different 
layers as identified by Boekholt et al. (2002): political, administrative and operational. 
Centrally-designed policies for regional intervention, however, would be entirely 
opposed to the principles advocated by the smart specialisation logic, and such top-
down practices will gradually lead to policy failures as happened broadly in the past. As 
discussed earlier, less-favoured areas suffer regularly through weak governance 
structures when compared to more advanced ones, and this may strangle their ability 
to design RIS3 locally. In fact, several policy documents, e.g. Kroll (2015b), Landabaso, 
Gianelle, et al. (2014) and Charles, Gross, and Bachtler (2012) have recently stressed 
the difficulties of EU followers to implement effective RIS3 due to the lack of capacity 
building and previous policy learning in government. The above discussion suggests 
that the acceptance of smart specialisation as an innovation strategy for diverse EU 
regions remains at a rather theoretical level in the sense that we still lack empirical 
evidence about how context-specific factors will influence the learning ability of the 
less-advanced regions to build multi-level governance capabilities which will potentially 
preserve all RIS3 phases aligned at the sub-national level.  
 In this respect, OECD (2013) argues that the process of setting effective 
governance models requires the creation of diverse capacities, and, therefore, 
identifies three forms of capacity building which are necessary for capturing and 
governing smart specialisation practices: the ability of regions to recognise local 
strengths, the ability to design policy actions, and the ability to engage a critical mass 
for conducting an effective implementation. From a practical point of view, the 




would be unrealistic in the medium term for many of the less-favoured regions. It was 
assumed earlier in this chapter that it may not be realistically possible for all regions to 
possess learning abilities to locally design and implement place-based policy making, 
meaning that some level of centrally-designed intervention is possibly inevitable. An 
empirical example with practical implications in the smart specialisation process is the 
fact that small regions with fragmented innovation systems and weak entrepreneurial 
structures are unlikely to achieve the critical mass required for conducting the 
identification process effectively (Landabaso, Georghiou, et al. 2014). Thus, the crucial 
point is to drive research into two distinct and important directions, relevant for 
different smart specialisation phases. The first one, rooted by the inherent difficulty of 
the catch-up regions to promote place-based interventions, is to investigate what 
regionally-based capabilities are required to strike a balanced equilibrium between 
centralised and decentralised governance action. A self-reinforcing learning of how to 
systematically reconcile these two seemingly conflicting bottom-up and top-down 
approaches will release additional policy learning and facilitate place-based policy 
action in the short and medium term. The second direction considers smart 
specialisation practices from a more permanent and long-standing perspective. Its aim 
will be to study how the setting of inter- and intra-regional learning mechanisms will 
increase the ability of regions to improve their bottom-up governance structures and 
become smart specialisation efficient in the long run. In practice, as cumulative learning 
may support the unlocking of regions from inefficient path-dependent routines (Martin 
and Sunley 2006), smart specialisation success is predicated on the presence of 
research that will enable an analytical understanding of how follower regions can shape 
their institutional setup by improving their regional governance capacities. The analysis 
of this dynamic process will gradually help peripheries that are tightly bound to 
centrally-designed routines to learn how to adapt their sub-systems to meet the place-





2.5 Conclusion  
 In this chapter we reviewed the theoretical context of smart specialisation as it 
has evolved and been deployed during recent years, and discussed its practical 
dynamics as an innovation strategic tool in the regional setting. A number of interesting 
aspects arise from the review. Furthermore, at a theoretical level, the 
conceptualisation of smart specialisation has been progressively informed during 
recent years, providing an analytical understanding of its theoretical underpinnings. We 
saw that since the academic foundations of smart specialisation have been extensively 
studied and enriched in the regional context, research interest shifts from theoretical 
to practical issues (Capello and Kroll 2016). Thus, an important part of the ongoing 
smart specialisation research seeks to understand empirically how S3 could be 
implemented in diverse EU regional environments.  
 At a practical level, reviews of recent research indicate two key factors that are 
seen as critical to enable and favour S3 development. The first refers to the importance 
of capacity building in strengthening regions' ability to tackle the implementation 
challenge of S3 (Radosevic et al. 2017). The S3 challenge is multifaceted and relies on a 
great heterogeneity of EU regions to respond efficiently to place-based innovation 
strategies and policies. We review empirical evidence from diverse European milieus 
which suggest that the development of different forms of capabilities constitutes and 
impacts an inherent collective capacity of the regions to implement S3. However, the 
process of capacity-building is only one key aspect of the smart specialisation dynamics. 
Governance and institutional issues are also increasingly relevant for S3. Particularly, 
other research shows that by setting up good institutions and governance models, 
regions have more chance of developing a more integrated S3 framework for regional 
renewal and development. Given that catch-up regions usually suffer from poor 
governance models and non-responsive institutional structures, the process of 
rethinking and redesigning regional mechanisms and practices ranks as a high priority 




studying S3 development are currently asked to address a number of questions related 
to institutional and governance matters. For example, what particular institutions and 
governance arrangements matter for the implementation of smart speciation 
strategies in EU regional environments? How do such permanent structures and policy 
practices affect the realisation of S3 in practice? Does any single institutional and 
governance aspect affect smart specialisation adaptability in the regional setting? What 
institutional reforms and changes in governance patterns are required to favour S3 
policymaking and action? To what extent should these changes be made to bring about 
the required results? The literature review suggests that many of these questions are 
still open, lacking an empirical framework.  
 Similar sets of questions arise if attention is primarily given to the capacity 
building aspect. We clearly know that improving capabilities is a dynamic process which 
assists S3 development in different ways. However, what types of capacity building are 
most appropriate to affect the implementation of innovation strategies in a S3 context? 
Does a combination of different capacity building forms impact S3 development 
better? What pre-existing capabilities must be improved and what new capacities are 
needed to maximise the effects of smart specialisation policies? What is the extent to 
which these capacity building adjustments must be made?  
 All these research questions address ongoing challenges and gaps directly 
related to the implementation of smart specialisation as an emerging innovation policy 
tool for rebuilding the EU cohesion policy. These questions constitute a major part of 
the research mainstream of smart specialisation. As such, it is of great importance to 
address them systematically, if a well-informed and integrated approach to S3 
implementation is sought. Acknowledging the value of bridging this research gap to 
favour S3 implementation in the regional setting, we build an empirical framework in 
which some of the above questions may find some analytical answers. The main 
objective of this framework is to investigate what institutional and governance reforms 




understand how improvements in capacity building forms can facilitate the onset and 
development of these reforms. To set the research objectives and design the empirical 
investigation, an analytical conceptual framework will be built, presented and analysed 













































Chapter 3: Building the conceptual 
framework 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 This chapter seeks to put together many of the theoretical ideas and views 
discussed in chapter 2, with the objective of building a conceptual framework in which 
the research objectives could be effectively met. Based on a synthesis of different 
sources of theory, the sections of this chapter construct and develop an analytical 
framework in order to address a specific empirical gap, by assisting in refining research 
goals and formulating realistic research questions (for guidance see chapter 4, 
Methodology and research design). This gap relates to a central S3 research problem 
(why lagging regions cannot develop S3 effectively) and relies on the lack of adequate 
experiential knowledge to explain the context in which three key related aspects of 
smart specialisation theory (institutions, governance and capacity building) can shape 
S3 implementation in catch-up regions.  
 Moreover, in the previous chapter we reviewed the theoretical and practical 
underpinnings of smart specialisation as an emerging place-based innovation strategy 
for regional renewal and economic growth. This review revealed the important role of 
institutions, governance and capacity building as a key means of implementing drivers 
in the strategic framework of S3. There is a paradox, however, lying between these 
smart specialisation enablers and their influence on the way S3 practices are actually 
favoured in lagging regions. While we know that institutions and governance do matter 
for smart specialisation (Radosevic et al. 2017), we lack clarity as to which specific 
forms of institutions and governance arrangements must be changed in lagging regions, 
and how to support S3 development. We also lack understanding of the right timing for 
change which must happen for bringing the required results (Morgan 2016). In his 




that institutions matter, there is less agreement about exactly how they matter, when 
they matter and whether they are a cause or a consequence of development". This 
implies that we may be confident that thick institutions and well-established capacities 
are synonymous with smart specialisation development (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 
2016a), but it is difficult to determine the way in which specific forms of capabilities 
(e.g. innovation capabilities, absorptive capacity, productive capabilities, networking 
capacities etc) or institutional reforms (either formal or informal) can appropriately 
support S3 implementation in a specific regional environment. This challenge is due to 
the fact that regions with different institutional and governance structures require 
different types of intervention and change to become responsive to innovation policy 
implementation. This chapter develops a framework to address this theory-policy gap 
in Crete and CM with the objective of building a coherent and responsive approach to 
address the implementation challenge of S3 in catch-up regions. Practically, it seeks to 
build a conceptual framework to investigate and understand how catch-up regions can 
overcome institutional, governance and capacity building barriers to implement S3 
effectively.    
 
3.2 Concept mapping  
 Given that conceptual frameworks in qualitative studies are better done 
diagrammatically than textually (Miles and Huberman 1994), we use a concept-
mapping approach (Novak and Gowin 1984) to illustrate the conceptual model 
graphically. Figure 3.1 illustrates a theory-driven model, which seeks to favour a 
threefold objective. Firstly, to examine what the existing literature says about the 
importance of governance, institutions and capabilities in developing S3; secondly, to 
indicate the empirical knowledge gap on these three critical elements which hinders 
smart specialisation implementation in lagging regions and keeps S3 debate open; and 
thirdly, to explain how to contribute to this debate by addressing empirically the 




Empirical knowledge gap (B) 
Process to fill knowledge gap in 
selected regions (C) 
Relevant economic development 
theories & concepts to be used  
of relevant economic development theories and concepts that are used and elaborated 
to build the conceptual model. 























3 References illustrated in this figure are indicative.  
Improvements in governance institutions 
& capabilities of catch-up regions are 
critical for S3 development 
(Landabaso 2014; Grillitsch 2015; OECD 
2017a; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; EC 
2012; Foray 2014; Boschma and Gianelle 
2014; Iacobucci 2014; Thissen et al. 2013) 
 
Existing knowledge (A) 
 When, how and what changes can 
bring improvements in governance, 
institutions & capabilities to support 
S3 implementation? 
(Morgan 2016, 2017; Kyriakou et al. 
2016; Radosevic et al. 2017; McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2016a; Foray 
2016; Capello and Kroll 2016; Kroll 
2016; Sörvik et al. 2016) 
 
 




ii. Examine and map S3 practices 
conducted in case study regions  
 
 
iii. Investigate how governance and 
institutional structures affect S3 
development in Crete and CM 
 
 
iv. Investigate what capabilities are 
needed to induce and support 
change in innovation policy 
governance and institutions   
Catch-up theory (Forbes and Wield 2002; 
Abramovitz 1986; Verspagen 1991; 
Dunford and Smith 2000; Shapira 2005; 
Rodrik 2001; Cappelen et al. 2003; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018)    
 
Institutional theory (Rodrik 2004a; Rodrik 
and Rosenzweig 2010; North 1989; Amin 
1999; Grillitsch 2015; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Wilkie 2015; Morgan 1997) 
 
Regional policy governance and capacity 
building theory (Kim 1997; Iammarino et 
al. 2012; von Tunzelmann 2009; Lall 1992; 
OECD 2017a, 2017b; Asheim et al. 2003; 
Cooke et al. 2011; Cooke and Morgan 
1998a; Streeck 1991) 
50 
 
                                                          
 
3.2.1 Background and existing knowledge (A) 
 The literature suggests that the particularities of the institutional and 
governance structure of a given territory are likely to affect the design, implementation 
and outcome of innovation policymaking and, possibly, the economic development of a 
territory (Cooke and Morgan 1998a; Rodríguez-Pose 2013; North 1990; Streeck 1991). 
For example, catch-up regions or nations which have established inadequate 
institutional structures and poor models to govern public policy have fewer chances to 
expand economically than those which possess high-quality institutions and 
government norms (Woolcock 1998; Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie 2017). Not surprisingly, 
the centrality of institutions and the importance of setting effective governance models 
for policy implementation have also been discussed in the S3 literature (Foray 2016; 
OECD 2013; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014; Asheim, Grillitsch, and Trippl 2016), 
which currently seeks to determine the way in which institutional thickness and multi-
level governance affect the implementation of S3 in lagging regions (Capello and Kroll 
2016). 
 Moreover, in the S3 context, the ability of regions to introduce modern 
institutional arrangements and initiate governance reforms has been directly linked to 
the successful realisation of smart specialisation (Grillitsch 2015; McCann, van Oort, 
and Goddard 2016). Radosevic et al. (2017) have recently argued that an effective 
development of smart specialisation requires an analytical investigation of the 
institutional context and capacities which are seen as a means of delivering greater 
efficiency in the S3 progress (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). In this respect, it is 
increasingly important to understand how a new institutional and governance 
formation paves the way for a more effective and productive realisation of S3 (Kyriakou 
et al. 2016), and clarify when public intervention and change can be best initiated to 
ensure an effective implementation (Morgan 2017).  
 Following the discussion above, a conceptual framework which acknowledges 




specialisation is built. Inspired by the literature, it adopts the perception that the 
success of S3 implementation in backward regional environments is conditioned by, at 
least, three critical factors which are closely related to each other.  
The first refers to the way in which institutional and policy governance frameworks of a 
region are structured and work in practice. It proposes that the more advanced they 
are, the better policy results they are expected to bring. This point is very important for 
smart specialisation development in the sense that catch-up regions face significant 
problems in implementing S3 due to their weaknesses in developing and retaining 
strong and responsive institutional mechanisms for policy implementation (Landabaso 
2014; Grillo and Landabaso 2011). The second relates to the collective capacity of a 
region, both at the level of firms (micro-level) and of regions (meso-level) to develop 
place-based innovation strategies to react to institutions and policy governance. The 
model suggests that regions with strong inherent capabilities may have more chance of 
succeeding in building responsive innovation strategies for regional development. The 
third refers to the right timing for inducing and promoting change to improve regions' 
institutions and capabilities to develop S3 (Marques and Morgan 2018). To highlight the 
importance of timing, Kevin Morgan has argued recently that "the great ironies of the 
RIS3 programme is that it expects the public sector to be more agile, creative and 
experimental when the ‘age of austerity’ is eviscerating public sector budgets and 
undermining the competence and confidence of public bodies" (Morgan 2017, 578). 
Similarly, by studying the actions required for place-based development strategies, it 
was recently pointed out that "the timing of each action is also crucial. Invest too early, 
for too long, or too much on one of these development axes and the risk of ending up 
with a strategy that yields scarce returns is high" (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018, 
38).  
 However, we saw in the literature that it is not only the interaction among 
existing institutions, governance arrangements and capabilities that affects S3 




Ortega-Argilés 2016a). Hence, the degree in which institutions, governance patterns 
and capabilities can be changed and improved to favour public policy, is also seen as a 
critical enabler of S3 in this conceptual model. In this respect, it is essential not only to 
study how governance and institutions affect S3 implementation, but also how change 
in governance, institutions and capacity building impacts on S3 development. Besides, 
regional development theory and particularly smart specialisation, advocate that 
innovation strategies should be designed and evolve along with the ability to bring 
about institutional change (Foray 2014; Boschma and Capone 2015). Furthermore, we 
know that the implementation of S3 actions requires strong institutions and 
governance models appropriate to support S3 practices (e.g. facilitate the complexity 
of the entrepreneurial discovery); and, if these structures are not effective they have to 
change. Change, however, does not happen automatically and, most importantly, its 
nature and ultimate impact may be very different across diverse regional ecosystems, 
due to high regional diversity. For example, a series of joint modifications or reforms in 
the governance of innovation policy strategies may have a very different smart 
specialisation upshot from region A to region B, given their different capabilities for 
responding to change (Heidenreich 2005). This view fits the one-size-fits-all concept 
(Tödtling and Trippl 2005) and underlines the importance of investigating change in 
diverse regional contexts.  
 The above discussion can lead to an assumption comprised of two sequential 
parts which form the underlying principle of the conceptual framework. The first 
assumes that in order to effectively incorporate the smart specialisation logic into their 
innovation strategies, catch-up regions must start rethinking and rebuilding their 
institutions and governance models. This assumption is advocated by a number of 
empirical studies which relate S3 development to the creation of sound institutions 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015) and strong policy governance models (Kyriakou et al. 
2016). The second assumes that in order to build responsive institutional and 




the micro-level (firm-specific capacities) and meso-level (regional capabilities) (Foray 
2016). Both aspects are incorporated into this study and examined analytically to 
understand what institutions must be reformed and when, what governance models 
must be changed and how, and what types of existing or new capabilities are needed to 
induce change and to support innovation policy action in the S3 context. The lack of 
adequate empirical studies to answer this question from a theoretical and policy 
implementation perspective leads to a key research gap in the growing literature of 
smart specialisation as discussed below.  
 
3.2.2 Empirical knowledge gap (B) 
 Following the discussion above, one could argue that S3 implementation is 
conditioned by the quality of governance and institutional arrangements embedded in 
regions' structures, as well as the ability of these regions to bring about change and 
build effective implementation policy capabilities. Put simply, the more advanced these 
structures are, the more likely they are to support the implementation of S3. There are 
a large number of smart specialisation-related studies which evidence this view at 
present, showing notable progress in our understanding of the role of institutions and 
capacity building in S3 development. However, there is a critical question, still 
unanswered, which constitutes a key research gap in the empirical literature of smart 
specialisation implementation (see Figure 3.1, B): 
 
What changes can bring improvements in governance, institutions and 
capabilities to support S3 implementation in catch-up regions, how and when? 
 
This question consists of three sub-questions which form the basis to formulate specific 
research questions (see chapter 4, section 4.2) to lead the investigation of this research 
study. It combines the work of several studies which show empirically that the process 




2017; Kyriakou et al. 2016; Radosevic et al. 2017; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a; 
Foray 2016; Capello and Kroll 2016; Kroll 2016; Sörvik et al. 2016). In fact, this question 
seeks to explain empirically how change in governance, institutions and capacities 
impacts on regional development. Its investigation goes beyond the boundaries of S3 
implementation studies, and relies on the fact that we still lack empirical understanding 
of what governance and institutional change is required in lagging regions for regional 
renewal and development (Kroll 2016; Radosevic et al. 2017), how such change impacts 
on economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018), when this change must be 
initiated to be feasible and realistic (Morgan 2017) and what capabilities are needed to 
induce and support this change (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013a).  
 All these questions are the subject of regional development studies, yet they 
have received growing attention recently due to the S3 implementation problems in 
lagging European regions. As such, this theory-policy challenge is directly transferred to 
the smart specialisation context, questioning S3 implementation in catch-up regions. In 
particular, the lack of a well-grounded theoretical explanation for these critical aspects, 
limits our ability to inform further innovation policymaking and action in the S3 
context. For example, we know from the literature that institutions affect the validity 
and outcome of the discovery process (Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie 2017), that policy 
governance options which promote the strengthening of regional autonomy are critical 
to policy development (Kyriakou et al. 2016; Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011) and 
that different forms of capacity building can shape the ability of regions to implement 
their S3 action plans (Foray 2016). However we still lack empirical understanding of 
how to best connect and interrelate these three key elements to regional development 
in a specific regional context in order to favour S3 implementation. While we know that 
institutional change and new capability formation are needed to favour the 
implementation of S3 in lagging regions (Capello and Kroll 2016), we still lack the 
details of building and following a systemic process to interconnect these different but 




example, we saw in the literature review chapter that the strengthening of regional 
autonomy is critical to policy governance and implementation, but it is by no means 
clear how much autonomy can or must be given at the regional level, given that catch-
up regions usually lack the required capacities for self-governance (Morgan 1997; 
Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose, and Storper 2017) and that policy governance is 
dependent on the overall political logic and processes embedded in a national regime 
(Braun 2008). In this specific example, we see that the provision of regional autonomy 
in catch-up regions cannot be taken for granted and, therefore, an empirical 
investigation is required to improve further our understanding.         
 
3.2.3 Building the framework to address the gap 
 To address this gap and provide an empirical understanding of how to best 
tackle the implementation challenge of S3 in catch-up regions, an analytical model is 
built to study the impact of policy governance, institutions and capacity building on 
smart specialisation development. Through this model we seek to examine the way 
each of these regional development forces impacts on public policy development and 
particularly on S3 realisation, and to understand how an interaction with each other 
can bring about change to favour regional development in the case study regions. To 
meet this objective, four core stages are proposed (see Figure 3.1, C).   
 
i. Understand Cretan and Central Macedonian specificities 
 This first stage suggests that in order to analyse the framework in which smart 
specialisation practices take place within a certain regional environment, we first need 
to investigate and understand the characteristics and specificities of this environment. 
Its rationale is based on previous research which shows that due to high levels of 
regional diversity, it is necessary to understand regional features before considering 
what regional innovation policies are most appropriate to trigger regional development 




To highlight the importance of regional diversity in S3 practices, Aranguren et al. (2018) 
use a comparative analysis of eight regional cases to show that the entrepreneurial 
discovery can be affected by different elements which are specific to each region. This 
stresses the importance of considering regional particularities such as local innovation 
conditions, entrepreneurial sectors and business specialisations, networks and clusters, 
knowledge systems and structures, R&D activities etc when examining S3 practices in 
the case study regions.  
 
ii. Examine and map S3 practices conducted in the case study regions 
 Then, an outlining of what particular actions have been conducted by the 
selected regions to develop smart specialisation strategies follows. To meet this 
objective consistently, an analytical empirical investigation is required, which must be 
lead by the formulation of a clearly-defined research question. During this process, the 
emergence of several different elements is not only expected to provide an 
understanding of the way S3 was developed in Crete and CM, but also to provide the 
basis for building a set of additional research objectives appropriate to address the 
ongoing research gap (e.g. why particular routes to S3 development were selected, 
what were the alternatives, what tools have been created and used to support policy 
implementation etc). An in-depth analysis and understanding of the S3 practices 
conducted in the case study regions requires reflection on a combination of existing 
regional innovation theories and concepts, which go beyond S3 theory, and relate to 
the one-size-fits-all approach (Tödtling and Trippl 2005), the impact of regional 
disparities on implementing innovation policies (Camagni and Capello 2015; Grillo and 
Landabaso 2011), spatial heterogeneity on regional development and renewal (Neffke, 
Henning, and Boschma 2011), and governance and institutional aspects on policy 





iii. Investigate governance and institutional structures affect S3 development in Crete 
and CM 
 Given that governance and institutions play a leading role in the development 
of smart specialisation processes (Aranguren et al. 2018), the third stage is to 
investigate institutional and policy governance dynamics from two different 
perspectives. The first is to study the existing governance and institutional structures of 
Crete and CM and examine how they have impacted on S3 progress and development. 
Acknowledging previous empirical studies which evidence the importance of building 
and promoting strong regional structures for innovation-driven growth (Cooke et al. 
2011), this stage aims to understand the way existing governance and institutional 
structures have shaped S3 implementation. In addition, inspired by earlier and recent 
research studies which highlight the significance of a number of place-specific factors in 
creating a favourable environment for policy implementation, (Milio 2008; Marques 
and Morgan 2018; Aranguren et al. 2018), our intention is to investigate how external 
shocks, (e.g. EU directives), or other dynamics embedded in the wider institutional 
environment of the case study regions (e.g. political support, will and legitimacy to 
support public-sector reforms) have favoured or hindered S3 development in Crete and 
CM.  The second is to examine what additional changes are still required to make an 
institutionally-friendly environment to support S3 implementation. Both perspectives 
require an empirical investigation in which the collection of primary data from the case 
study environments is essential for the study.  
 
iv. Investigate what capabilities are needed to induce and support change in 
innovation policy governance and institutions    
 The last stage is related to the importance of capacity building and aims to 
study how and what improvements in capacity building can favour institutional and 
governance changes for the implementation of innovation strategies in the S3 context. 




transformative capacities (Foray 2014) and that these capacities are increasingly 
important for creating responsive S3 (Valdaliso et al. 2014), this final stage seeks to 
understand the role of building firm-level (micro) and regional-level (meso) capabilities 
towards making a favourable environment for the implementation of smart 
specialisation. Capacity building is investigated at firms' and regions' level, given that 
both are required to succeed in regional development (Morgan 1997; Iammarino et al. 
2012; Malmberg and Maskell 1997).  
 
Combining theories and concepts relevant to the study   
 Our investigation is informed and guided by the consideration of four key 
theories which are related to each other and have a direct impact on regional 
innovation studies and, therefore, to smart specialisation strategies: catch-up theory, 
institutional theory, innovation policy governance and capacity building theory, (see 
Figure 3.2).  
 






















As to the first, we are interested in studying views, ideas and concepts related to catch-
up theory for two main reasons. Firstly, as discussed in previous chapters, a number of 
theoretical and empirical studies suggest that S3 practical challenges tend to be most 
profound in weaker regions which tend to have thin institutional structures and 
underdeveloped governance regimes. In this respect, studying the implementation 
challenge of S3 in catch-up regions (instead of examining more-advanced territories) 
may be seen as a first priority in the ongoing literature of S3. Thus, theoretical ideas 
emerging from the catch-up theory are increasingly relevant to understand the 
framework in which EU backward regions can benefit from S3 development to catch up 
with top European leaders. In general, catch-up theory advocates that regions 
with relatively low levels of scientific and technological literacy could attain high 
productivity rates and grow more rapidly than the leaders if they effectively exploit 
new knowledge and technological opportunities (Fagerberg, Feldman, and Srholec 
2014; Verspagen 1991). The problem, however, with the application of catch-up theory 
to smart specialisation practice is that less-advanced European regions are found to be 
too weak to effectively implement S3 and converge with the EU leaders. Hence, it is 
essential to link catch-up theory with the implementation barriers of S3 and examine 
whether its principles can further inform S3 implementation through our empirical 
investigation. 
The second is that the selected regions (Crete and Central Macedonia) are two less-
favoured EU regions which display many of the characteristics of catch-uppers as 
discussed in the literature review chapter, e.g. fragmented regional innovation systems 
(Cooke, Gomez Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997; Tödtling and Trippl 2005; Martin and 
Trippl 2014), weak learning capabilities and skills (Malerba 1992; Oughton, Landabaso, 
and Morgan 2002), low entrepreneurial potential (Fritsch 1992), limited abilities to 
diversify into new industries (Boschma, Heimeriks, and Balland 2014), and significant 
challenges in mobilising institutional and structural change (Neffke et al. 2014). (See 




 Apart from catch-up theory, a combination of governance and institutional 
theories are also relevant to this study, given that governance of public policies is 
strongly dependent on the institutional thickness of a region (Davoudi et al. 2008). On 
the one hand, in the S3 context particularly, they are relevant in the sense that 
institutions are currently seen as a precondition of smart specialisation (Radosevic et al. 
2017), which provides both challenges and opportunities for S3 development 
(Aranguren et al. 2018), while institutional change is seen as a key driver of S3 
implementation (Grillitsch 2015; Kroll 2016; McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016), yet 
we still lack empirical understanding of how exactly they favour or hinder regional 
policy implementation in lagging regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018). For 
example, the literature suggests that the required endogenous institutional change for 
S3 development may take several forms including displacement, layering, drift and 
conversion (Busetti 2015; Mahoney and Thelen 2009), (see section 2.4.3.1) but, at 
present, there is no adequate empirical evidence to clarify the mechanism in which this 
change takes place in catch-up regions. On the other hand, as advocated recently by 
Aranguren et al. (2018, 4) "the design and emergence of new innovation policy 
governance does not occur in a vacuum or begin from scratch, but from a given context 
of previous institutions, policies and actors". In this respect, the authors suggest that S3 
practices "may be shaped by or be in conflict with the legacy of pre-existing strategies 
and policy mixes" (Aranguren et al. 2018, 4), which raises the importance of 
investigating the aspects of path dependency in the governance of public policy.     
 From the capacity building perspective, the S3 literature evidences that a 
number of barriers to S3 implementation rest on a lack of capabilities in both the 
private and public sectors of lagging regions (Aranguren et al. 2018), showing that 
"successful policies depend on the capacities of actors as much as on institutions" 
(Bachtler et al. 2017, 117). In this regard, it is also critical to examine capacity building 
in the conceptual framework of the thesis. Besides, different types of capabilities, both 




specialisation policy (Gianelle et al. 2016), and as such, they are expected to have a 
major impact on S3 development (Thissen et al. 2013). Capacities which focus on 
Technology and Innovation (T&I), networking, entrepreneurship, administration and 
public policy governance are traditionally seen as increasingly relevant for innovation 
strategies and regional renewal (von Tunzelmann 2009; Boschma and Gianelle 2014; 
Farazmand 2009; Aghion, David, and Foray 2009) and, therefore, their impact on S3 
development is examined analytically in this thesis. In economically strong regions 
these capabilities are built and become available for exploitation for a number of local 
actors even if they have not contributed to their provision (Berger 2013). In lagging 
regions, however, there is a problem of developing and exploiting capabilities, and local 
actors are less likely to benefit from capacities developed elsewhere (Kyriakou et al. 
2016).     
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 In this chapter we built and discussed the conceptual framework of the study. 
Using insights from various empirical studies on S3, we highlighted an emerging 
research gap which currently surrounds the implementation of smart specialisation 
strategies in catch-up regions. We linked this gap to the inability of catch-up regions to 
build strong and responsive public policy implementation mechanisms, and we 
explained why filling this gap is crucial for the ongoing S3 literature. In addition, we 
clarified how the examination of four particular theories from the regional innovation 
studies (catch-up theory, institutional theory, innovation policy governance and 
capacity building theory) is related to the one-size-fits-all view (Oughton, Landabaso, 
and Morgan 2002) and to our investigation particularly. This framework stresses certain 
research needs and it is expected to help with framing relevant research questions and 































Chapter 4: Methodology and research 
design 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 This chapter discusses the methodological approach employed in this thesis to 
meet its research objectives. It provides a thorough explanation of how the conceptual 
framework developed in the previous chapter is operationalised in particular regional 
contexts. There is plenty of literature suggesting that the development of a feasible 
social research design is probably the most important step to be taken in a research 
study; see for example (Blaikie 2009; Bryman 2004; Patton 2002; Yin 2003b). Yin 
(2003b, 18) asserts that "a research design is the logic that links the data to be 
collected, and the conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of a study". Thus, an 
extensive number of social research design studies have been examined, aiming at 
identifying and selecting the most appropriate methods for building a reasonable and 
well-grounded research framework. As discussed in previous chapters, this is a 
qualitative study, which seeks to investigate, understand and explain the context in 
which S3 policy dynamics are developed and evolved in certain catch-up regional 
environments. For this purpose, the methods of this thesis endorse a research 
approach in which a relatively small but rather in-depth unit of analysis is identified and 
studied. In this respect, the thesis does not use numerical and statistical methods to 
achieve an in-depth insight of S3 implementation in the regional setting; rather, it 
builds and examines specific case studies of S3 implementation, and puts the emphasis 
on their relevance and uniqueness.  
 Before explaining the details of the ultimate research design, we should start 
the discussion by confessing that the content of chapter 4 was by no means static. 
Contrariwise, both research design methods and practices followed an evolutionary 




foundation. During this evolving process, research aims, research questions (RQs) and 
the finalised means of collecting the empirical evidence were evolved and changed 
notably. They were modified and aligned according to the relevance and availability of 
the collected data. For example, while three different types of data collection methods 
were initially employed to answer seven RQs (interviews, observation and questioners), 
eventually, two main sources of data collection (interviews and participant 
observation) were chosen to answer three central RQs. The reason for modifying 
research strategies, aims and objectives and supporting specific decision-making 
options on research design methods is discussed systematically in different sections of 
this chapter.   
 As a qualitative study, the thesis builds its core research framework on the 
elaboration of a case study approach, in which Crete and CM have been purposively 
selected as a unit of analysis. Both regions represent catch-up characteristics and are 
currently developing an S3 route to converge with more advanced EU regions. We 
formulated two types of RQs (what and how), whose answers were based on a 
sequential logic of descriptive and exploratory research. To answer each RQ separately, 
a combination of research strategies was used, including both an inductive and 
abductive reasoning. Qualitative data collection methods and especially personal 
interviewing and participant observation, are seen as particularly suited to this thesis. 
Specifically, primary data were collected by means of semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation, while secondary data were gathered from a detailed 
documentary analysis constituted by a series of official textual sources. Moreover, the 
collection and analysis of primary data were divided into two different phases. In the 
first phase, 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted for both regional 
ecosystems. Interviewing addressed three main types of regional actors with a direct 
engagement in regional innovation strategies: public authorities and agencies; firms 
and private-sector bodies; and local academics. To give further accuracy to the study, 




depth interviews was organised and conducted in the region of Crete. Longitudinal 
research was necessary to identify and examine key ongoing trends, practices and 
dynamics of S3, during the investigation and development of the thesis. 
 Chapter 4 is structured as follows: it commences with an analytical discussion of 
the RQs employed to meet the research aims of this thesis. The discussion is focused on 
the justification of selecting three central questions, as well as on the objectives that 
each of them meets. A detailed account of the selected research strategies follows in 
order to explain the main methods used to answer RQs. An extended section is 
developed to provide a thorough overview of the methods and tools used to collect 
and analyse both primary and secondary data. Finally, ethical considerations and 
methodological limitations are discussed.     
 
4.2 Research questions and objectives  
 To address its research objectives analytically, this thesis incorporates the logic 
of formulating RQs. There are several empirical and theoretical studies which highlight 
the importance of RQs in designing and developing both qualitative and quantitative 
research; see for example (Mason 2002; Yin 2003b; Creswell 2007; Bryman 2004; 
Hedrick, Bickman, and Rog 1993). Mason (2002) defines RQs as vehicles which help 
researchers moving from broad research interests to specific research objectives. Other 
social research studies suggest that RQs can take several forms, depending on their 
nature and scope. In this study, we use the work of Blaikie (2009) who distinguishes 
RQs into three main kinds according to the research purposes they serve: what 
questions, which follow a descriptive approach to study patterns in social phenomena; 
why questions which are intended to identify the cause and reasons of a particular 
phenomenon; and how questions which are directed toward understanding change.  
 In the beginning, seven RQs were created, aiming to address exploratory, 
explanatory and descriptive objectives (see Appendices for a full list of the seven RQs). 




according to the availability and validity of the collected data, and came up with a set 
of three central RQs, presented and discussed below. We use a combination of what 
and how questions to provide the basis for building the empirical investigation of this 
study. Each RQ forms an empirical chapter and contains subsidiary questions, aiming to 
meet specific research objectives. We examined a set of five key factors to formulate 
and finalise the questions in order to meet the objectives of this thesis:  
 
i. Formulating what- and how- types of RQs, which can provide a clue about what 
research strategies should be pursued. 
ii. Developing RQs in accordance with the ongoing literature and the gaps to be 
covered. A detail examination of the existing literature assisted the 
identification of up-to-date and focused research questions.   
iii. Keeping RQs reachable and answerable, in the sense that analytical answers can 
occur within a reasonable time schedule. 
iv. Formulating specific, simple and clear RQs and sub-questions, which facilitate a 
thorough investigation for meeting the requirements of this study. 
v. Ensuring interrelation and logic sequence among RQs, to link empirical chapters 
and provide credibility to the study. 
 
Research questions  
RQ1: In what ways did the selected Greek regions develop smart specialisation 
strategies? 
 The aim of this question is to discover and systematically describe the 
procedures followed by Crete and CM to develop S3. In fact, little is known about the 
rationale behind any methodological approach followed by the Greek regions to 
develop their smart specialisation action plans. It is of crucial importance, therefore, to 
start our research by investigating more closely how S3 practices were adopted and 




of this study. In this context, RQ1 follows a descriptive approach, with the aim of 
recognising particular characteristics of the smart specialisation procedures. A set of 
subsidiary questions include: Has smart specialisation been perceived similarly by the 
two regions? If not, why not? Did the chosen regions follow similar smart specialisation 
methodological approaches? If not, why not? The first two questions are closely related 
to the different meanings that smart specialisation can take across regions. In fact, 
both questions stimulate an inductive approach to identify specific variables that can 
provide an explanation of why regions perceive smart specialisation differently. The 
outcome of this justification can facilitate further the theoretical integration of the 
smart specialisation logic, as the understanding of its practicability in the regional 
setting is still a matter of concern (McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016; Capello and 
Kroll 2016). The other two questions are seen as a continuation of the previous ones, 
dealing with the identification of the resources and tools that each region exploited for 
the purpose of smart specialisation. Another sub-question which can also have a 
supportive role towards building further the empirical framework of S3 is: What are the 
practical difficulties and the main challenges for appreciating smart specialisation? All 
these questions have a descriptive character. An analytical understanding of RQ1 will 
move our research forward by putting the basis for studying and understating RQ2 and 
RQ3.   
 
RQ2: How do, and can, institutional arrangements and governance reforms impact on 
smart specialisation practices? 
 RQ2 consists of two parts. The first part (how do) examines the current situation 
and seeks to achieve an analytical understanding of how the existing institutional 
arrangements and governance systems influence the implementation of smart 
specialisation in the two regions. It is intended to examine whether and how the 
present institutional and governance setup has affected the ongoing implementation of 




years, it is critical to investigate if and what institutional arrangements have been put in 
place to support the development of smart specialisation practices in the regions. 
Hence, questions attracting both academic and policy interest are raised: How is 
governance impacting on smart specialisation at present? Do the existing institutional 
arrangements facilitate the implementation of smart specialisation in practice? Have 
the two regions considered and introduced different types of reforms in an attempt to 
support the design and implementation of S3 effectively? Have such reforms already 
affected the ongoing smart specialisation practices, and if so, in what ways? The second 
part of the question (how can) is based on the previous analysis and follows an 
evolutionary approach by seeking to examine how practices in institutional 
arrangements and governance might be evolving over time to support the 
implementation of smart specialisation. The investigation into how institutional 
arrangements and governance reforms may affect S3 concentrates both policy and 
academic interest, see for example  (EC 2014d; Grillitsch 2015; McCann and Ortega-
Argilés 2014). At a practical level, this approach will support our understanding about 
what new institutional and governance structures are needed for the regions and how 
particular reforms can productively affect the development of smart specialisation 
strategies in practice. The main objective of the second part is to move from "what is 
there" to "what is missing" and empirically to show "what is required" in terms of 
institutional and governance reforms in order for both regions to support the 
development of smart specialisation strategies. 
 
RQ3: What capabilities exist and are required to develop smart specialisation 
strategies in catch-up regional environments? 
 This question is a continuation of RQ2. It aims to explore and understand what 
capabilities are relevant to support potential institutional and governance 
transformation and to favour the implementation of S3 in catch-up regional 




sections. The objective of the first section is to systematically identify what types of 
capacity building are currently available to develop S3 in the case study regions. While 
capacity building is seen as a critical process for developing S3 (Foray 2016; McCann, 
van Oort, and Goddard 2016), we still lack fundamental knowledge as to what forms of 
capabilities would be the most appropriate to overcome a number of place-specific 
implementation challenges of S3 in Crete and CM. Practically speaking, we do not know 
what capabilities are required for developing S3 effectively, because we do not know 
what capabilities  currently exist at both the micro- and meso-level. Taking into account 
that both micro- and meso-level competences are needed for success in regional 
development, (Morgan 1997; Iammarino et al. 2012; Malmberg and Maskell 1997), 
RQ3 investigates both levels. The micro-level refers to the ability of local actors (firms, 
universities, regional authorities et al) to constantly exploit various localised resources 
and competences to develop S3 in practice. The meso-level investigates capacity 
building from the regional perspective, relying on the logic that capabilities are seen as 
a pre-condition for successful catch-up (Kim 1980; Lall 1987; Abramovitz 1986). In this 
respect, the regional dimension is focused on capabilities that are based on various 
systemic elements that are normally embedded in the wider institutional environment 
of the local actors; these forms of capabilities are not strictly developed within 
organisations' borders but rather are distributed across a set of heterogeneous actors. 
To answer RQ3 systematically, it is important to examine in what sense different forms 
of organisational and regional capability building are directly linked with S3 practices, 
and how particular aspects and elements of these capabilities can affect its 
implementation in the regional setting. This part has been studied analytically in 
chapters 2 and 3 (literature review and conceptual framework chapters). The focus is 
mainly on those capabilities which seem to have a direct impact on innovation 
policymaking and regional development, including social capabilities (Abramovitz 1986; 




technological capabilities (Kim 1980; Lall 1992); innovation capabilities (Kim 1997); and 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
 
4.3 Strategies for answering research questions   
 To achieve an analytical approach and answer the RQs thoroughly, this study 
elaborates a combination of research strategies in both stages of data collection and 
analysis. A mixture of inductive and abductive research approaches is employed. 
Furthermore, in chapters 6 and 8, which address RQ1 and RQ3 respectively, 
the inductive approach is used to move from general observations to inferences. 
Specifically, with regards to chapter 6, we follow an inductive logic to collect evidence 
from Crete and CM, with the objective of building epistemological assumptions and 
deriving a solid understanding of the way the selected regions have developed their S3. 
We gather a mixture of primary and secondary data to explore, describe and model the 
way in which the case study regions developed their own S3 action plans. Chapter 8 
(RQ3) follows also an inductive reasoning to understand what forms of capacity 
building are relevant for the implementation of S3. The reason for selecting this 
particular strategy for these two empirical chapters derives from the difficulty of 
generating and testing hypotheses. Particularly, the absence of previous empirical 
evidence (this is the first time that S3 practices have been examined and described 
analytically for Crete and CM), suggests that an inductive bottom-up approach would 
help us move from particular observations to broader empirical generalisation and 
theory conceptualisation. Also, we considered Blaikie (2009) who suggests that ‘what’ 
questions are better answered with inductive research strategies. For chapter 7 (RQ2), 
we use an abductive strategy which is essential to answer how questions (Blaikie 2009). 
An abductive reasoning will help us to explore further our epistemological assumptions 
which are concerned with how institutional arrangements and governance reforms 
impact S3 practices. This type of question is closely related with understanding and 




employed to answer each RQ separately. Also, it shows the correspondence between 
questions and empirical chapters. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of research strategies 
Empirical 
Chapters 




 Nature of 
research 
 Aim/Purpose 
6  1st  what  inductive  descriptive  Explore, understand & 
model regional practices 
for S3 development  
7  2nd  how  abductive   exploratory  Understand how 
institutional arrangements 
and governance reforms 
impact S3 practices  
8  3rd  what   inductive  exploratory  Understand capacity 




4.3.1 Case study approach and selection   
 A case study is a commonly used method for conducting social science studies 
(Yin 2003b). To investigate the research objectives effectively we use the case study 
approach as an analytical research strategy, aiming to examine S3 practices in specific 
regional environments. The case study methodology was considered as the best means 
for developing this study, because it allows a systematic investigation which takes into 
account the wider context (e.g. territorial, historical) in which regional innovation 
policies are designed and developed. In addition, through a case study research, a mix 
of methods to gather the data can be used, including systematic interviewing and 
ethnographic approaches. Yin (2003b) emphasised that when phenomena have not 
been studied in detail (this fits well with the case of S3 implementation), the use of in-
depth case studies might be an ideal research option to collect empirical evidence. In 
earlier work, the author argued that case studies are suitable for answering why and 
how questions (Yin 2003a), which fit the descriptive and exploratory nature of the 




descriptive and exploratory approaches are employed. We use the following definition 
cited in Yin (2009, 17) to describe the meaning that the case study takes in this thesis:  
 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions, why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result 
(Schramm 1971) 
 
We are interested in studying the impact of capacity building on S3 in catch-up regional 
environments, which have been at the top of the cohesion policy agenda (EC 2014c). To 
this end, we selected two different regional case studies from S. European peripheries 
and from Greece in particular: the region of Crete and the region of Central Macedonia 
(CM). Each region constitutes one single case study and it is examined separately as a 
unit of analysis. Both cases follow a descriptive and explanatory route (Yin 2003b), 
seeking to examine S3 practices analytically. The sampling strategy which is used is 
purposive rather than random; precisely, we have selected Crete and CM from among 
other Greek or EU regions at the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics-NUTS2 
level4 because they simultaneously:  
 
i. have been hit drastically by the macro-economic crisis in Greece; the economic 
crisis raises additional implementation barriers to S3 (Morgan 2017), beyond 
those already existing in catch-up regional territories;  
ii. possess strong academic potential at the local level, (because it is universities 
and research centres that are expected to play a dominant role in the 
development of S3 where critical mass in innovation is limited);  
iii. represent a relatively higher innovation and technological profile as compared 
to the national average;  
iv. design and implement their own regional innovation strategies;  
4 further information: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts 
73 
 
                                                          
 
v. are currently in the process of developing S3   
 
4.4 Data collection and analysis 
 To collect the data and ensure their utility and integrity, a triangulation 
approach was followed (Bryman 2004), using both primary and secondary sources. 
Secondary data were exploited to obtain an understanding of (i) the ongoing literature 
around the subject of this thesis and (ii) the existing environment of the case study 
regions and their level of development. Primary data (both audio and textual) were 
collected by means of semi-structured interviews and observation to answer the RQs 
analytically. Table 4.2 summarises the sources of primary and secondary data, which 
are discussed thoroughly in the following sections. As to the primary data, a detailed 
list of all interviews and S3 events is presented in the Appendices.  
 
Table 4.2 Sources of primary and secondary data 
Data  Sources  No 
(a) Primary  semi-structured interviews 




(b) Secondary  policy & academic papers, text books  
thematic studies  
official statistics 
reposts related to regional innovation action plans 
S3 reports  
official speeches 










4.4.1 Secondary data collection 
 Secondary sources are based on a documentary analysis, exploiting existing 
data gathered by thematic studies, statistics and figures from electronic databases and 
the national census, regional innovation action plans and other available reports 




and national level. We also explored official speeches, public records, power point 
presentations and other relevant S3 documents, that were freely available for the two 
regions. Inspired by the work of Scott (1990), four main criteria were employed to 
identify and study the most appropriate textual materials for this thesis: authenticity 
(documents gathered from official sources such as regional and national authorities, 
scientific work etc), credibility (documents with a high-level of trust and accuracy), 
representatives (typical documents which cover sufficiently thesis subject in both case 
study regions) and meaning (adequate, available, understandable and comprehensive 
documents). The main sources of the data included government departments and 
authorities, statistical offices, documentation centres, trade associations, EU, Eurostat, 
OECD, universities and research centres. The reason we have chosen official sources is 
that most of these organisations provide a detailed description of the methods used to 
gather their data, allowing us to assess data validity and credibility. To develop the 
literature review of this study and build the conceptual framework, we also used a 
large number of policy and academic papers, books and technical reports. Additionally, 
the inputs of both the documentary analysis and the literature review were used to 
support the design and setting of the semi-structured interviews. 
 
4.4.2 Primary data collection   
 As regards to primary data, the evidence is gathered by using a mixed method 
approach. Semi-structured interviews are the central means of collecting the data. 
Observation was also used as a complementary means of gathering information to 
evidence additional empirical data. Both methods were conducted in the case study 
regions in Greece using local sources.  
 
Observational research in the region of Crete  
 Participant observation took an ethnographic form (Fetterman 1989; Jorgensen 




workshops and public consultations that have been conducted in the region of Crete in 
the period 2015-17. While interviews were the main method used to collect the data, 
observational research was also employed to obtain supplementary information from 
the Cretan environment. We simultaneously exploited both methods (interview and 
observation) for two main reasons. Firstly, observation provided opportunities for 
extended discussions with local experts which, apart from the information provided 
directly through observational research, helped us to design and then modify the 
interview guides accordingly. Practically, observational research helped us plan the 
interviews in advance and, therefore, get them better prepared. Secondly, observation 
enabled a kind of probabilistic snowball sampling approach (TenHouten, Stern, and 
TenHouten 1971), in which the discussions with local experts provided suggestions that 
led to the identification of additional respondents, beyond those already identified in 
our unit of analysis. The main objective of the participant observation was to 
understand how locals from different stakeholder groups address S3 challenges. We 
were highly interested in identifying and analysing different understandings, opinions 
and ideas that local actors from diverse stakeholder groups possessed about S3 and its 
implementation in the regions.  
 Observational research (see Appendices for details) was conducted only for the 
region of Crete, due to time and budget limitations. My current professional position at 
the Science and Technology Park of Crete (STEP-C) allowed me to attend a number of 
local S3 workshops organised in the region of Crete. Given that STEP-C routinely acts as 
a key local player for regional development and entrepreneurship, I was given the 
opportunity to participate in a series of smart specialisation events not as an 
innovation expert, but rather as a social science researcher. In particular, with the 
consensus of the participants (they were officially informed about my PhD research in 
Crete and CM) my role was not to represent STEP-C in the meetings 




understanding, roles and behaviours around S3 practices. This helped to avoid conflict 
of interest. 
 No tape recorder was used in observation research in order to comply with the 
National Data Protection legislation, and avoid critical ethical considerations. For the 
analysis, hand-written notes (memos, minutes etc) were used to record the results of 
the observation. We secured our participation in at least six thematic workshops 
organised during the self-identification process, as well as in two local consultations 
and one S3 Platform peer-review workshop organised by the EU (see Appendices for 
details).  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
 In social research, personal interviews may be structured, semi-structured, or 
unstructured (Bryman 2004; Yin 2003a). Each form has advantages and disadvantages 
and its usefulness and appropriateness relate to the nature and type of research being 
conducted. For example, structured interviews are particularly well-suited for 
quantitative survey research (Bryman 2004), while semi-structured interviews are 
usually encountered in case study research (Hancock and Algozzine 2006). At the time 
of conducting this study, the design and in particular the implementation process of S3 
included uncertainty and difficulty in the sense that little was known about how S3 
policymaking and policy action would be best applied in the regional setting. 
Consequently, in order to collect as many data as possible, we performed semi-
structured interviews, aiming to allow new emerging questions and relevant topics to 
be embedded in the discussion, providing  added value to the study. Besides, semi-
structured interviews are a very common type of gathering data in case study research 
(Hancock and Algozzine 2006), in which open-ended questions allow for generating 
research hypotheses (Yin 2003a). The flexibility provided by semi-structured interviews 
(e.g. attaining enriched personalised information, changing in the sequence of 




data and study the participants' views, experiences and attitudes on specific matters of 
our topic of interest.  
 Interviewing took place in the period 2015-17. With the consent of the 
respondents, interviews were tape-recorded, except for two for which an official 
permission was not given by the participants for individual reasons. All respondents 
were interviewed individually in Greek which is the local language of both case study 
regions (see interview list in Appendices). Despite the problems that translation can 
bring (e.g. time-consuming process, textual equivalence in translation), we decided to 
perform interviews in the local language and keep interview responses anonymous, by 
replacing names with codes. This process allowed us to give respondents further 
flexibility to express their ideas and opinions freely. In general, five main steps were 
taken in order to carry out  interviewing: 
 
1. Designing (preparation of RQs, interview guides per target group, participant 
information leaflet)  
2. Pilot testing (ensure questions are simple, clear and workable; secure appropriate 
means of interviewing) 
3. Interviewing (leading an informal conversation to answer interview guide questions 
and questions emerging during the discussion) 
4. Transcribing and translating (listening in Greek, transcribing in English)  
5. Analysing and interpreting (use of NVivo for continual analysis of obtained data and 
identification of answers to RQs being investigated) 
 
Interview data  
 In total, fifty personal interviews were conducted with high-level national and 
regional innovation experts, academics from state universities and public-funded 
research centres, local entrepreneurs, and representatives from a varied range of 




chambers). We identified and selected respondents whose knowledge, opinion and 
experience could lead to important insights for the RQs. The criteria for selecting 
particular respondents included the following:  
 
i. Relevance, engagement and role of the respondent in regional innovation and 
development with a particular focus on S3. For example, from the public-sector 
perspective, we identified top-hierarchy S3 co-ordinators to participate in 
interview discussions.   
ii. Respondents from both the private and public sector, in the sense that we were 
interested in institutional and individual opinions with private and public policy 
interests 
iii. Representativeness of respondents from different stakeholder groups with 
diverse developmental tasks in the regional setting (e.g. entrepreneurs, policy 
makers, academics)  
iv. Ease of access to interviewees, willingness to participate (e.g. examining 
reasonable means of identifying and gaining access to respondents) 
 
In this respect, all respondents had either a direct or indirect involvement in regional 
innovation strategies and particularly in S3 at different levels of development (design, 
implementation and evaluation), ensuring wide representativeness in both regions. To 
present an overview of the sample, we grouped interviewees into three main 
categories: public sector, academia and private sector. The composition of the 
respondents and the types of stakeholder groups included in each of the three 








Table 4.3 Composition of respondents 
   Crete  C. Macedonia   TOTAL 
Group of 
respondents 
 No. of 
respondents 
(%)  
 No. of 
respondents 
(%)  
  No. of 
respondents 
(%)  
Public sector1   11 36.7  10 50.0   21 42.0 
Academia2   6 20.0  4 20.0   10 20.0 
Private sector3   13 43.3  6 30.0   19 38.0 
TOTAL  304 100.0  20 100.0   50 100.0 
Notes: 
1Public sector (regional administration, public agencies, policymakers) 
2Academia (universities and research centres) 
3Private sector (firms, intermediaries, networks, clusters, associations, innovation 
facilitators, business clubs, chambers of commerce)  




 Analytically, we carried out 30 interviews for the region of Crete and 20 
interviews for the region of CM (see Figure 4.1). We performed more interviews in 
Crete, due to the second part of the longitudinal study conducted from August to 
November 2017. Longitudinal research was undertaken in order to examine S3 
developmental trends in the region of Crete and provide further validity to the study. 
Its outcomes contribute mainly to the completion of chapter 6 which studies the way 
S3 was developed and progressed in the case study regions. Practically, through the 
collection of longitudinal data we aimed at providing new insights into the process and 
continuity of S3. It is worth noting that alongside the interviews, longitudinal research 
included also the participation in an additional set of S3 events organised in the 
summer of 2017. We strongly believe that the need for a longitudinal study was 
essential to collect adequate evidence, given the delay in the implementation of S3 in 




 As illustrated in Figure 4.1, most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face 
(76%). Skype technology (16%) and telephone (8%) were also used to reach a small 
number of the respondents mainly from the region of CM. We note that the basis for 
conducting fieldwork in both regions was Crete. The distribution of the interviewees 
per stakeholder group was based on the criteria discussed above as well as on the 
availability of the individual respondents.   
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Interview instruments  
Two basic tools have been designed and prepared in order to reach interview 
respondents: the interview guide and the participant information leaflet. Additionally, a 
detailed informed consent form was sent to respondents to provide information about 
the research and obtain the required approval (see Appendices). 
 
 
a) Interview guide 
The purpose of the interview guide was to facilitate the interviewing process by 
asking pre-determined questions. It was developed to encourage a detailed interview 
discussion and to help achieve the research objectives by using a set of open-ended 
questions. Patton (2008) suggests that open-ended interviews depend upon inductive 
analysis, which was selected to address two of the RQs. The guide was prepared and 
piloted in advance to ensure appropriateness and clarity. In terms of its logic and 
questioning order, the more general questions were asked at the beginning aiming to 
motivate respondents’ interest and to prepare the discussion for more difficult 



















Source: Author  
 
 We created a central interview guide as a base line, which was adjusted 
according to the respondents' target group (e.g. academics, entrepreneurs, public 
agents). For the longitudinal research an upgraded interview guide was prepared and 
used. We created simple questions to elicit respondents' opinions and allow them to 
discuss topics that diverged from the guide. 
 
b) Participant Information Leaflet  
Along with the interview guide a Participant Information Leaflet was sent to 
explain the purpose and scope of the interview as well as other crucial issues such as 
trust and confidentiality. 
 
4.4.3 Data analysis  
 As Marshall and Rossman (2006, 111) point out, data analysis is the "process of 




depth interviewing generated an enormous amount of textual information, NVivo 
(Ver.7) was used to organise and analyse the data effectively. NVivo was essential for 
elaborating this study for at least two important reasons. Firstly, to overcome the 
difficulties in analysing a huge amount of non-standard data and to make the process 
of discovering tendencies and deriving conclusions much easier. And secondly, to 
secure a quick and easy access to the datasets. The majority of the interviews were 
transcribed, translated (from Greek to English) and inserted into NVivo for the 
codification process. Though there are plenty of professional software packages to help 
transcribe audio recordings, no computer-based word-processing program was used, as 
transcription and translation were conducted simultaneously. As illustrated in Figure 
4.3, both observation notes and interview transcripts were grouped into different 
folders per regional case study. Data processing and analysis was conducted separately 
for Crete, CM and the longitudinal research, allowing for single analysis in each regional 
environment or for comparisons between the case study regions. Datasets were also 
divided into three stakeholder groups: public sector, academia and firms, which 
allowed us to make some initial estimates as to how better to arrange and analyse the 
data. 



























Codes, nodes and queries   
 To build knowledge of the data, interview information was allocated to specific 
coding schemes and meta-categories. Miles and Huberman (1994) define coding as 
"labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study". To start the codification process in NVivo, we created a large 
number of thematic tree nodes (in the sense of hierarchical order with categories and 
sub-categories) for each RQ separately, by coding primary data from the categories of 
Crete, CM and longitudinal research (see Figure 4.3). Richards distinguishes codes and 
nodes, pointing out that "nodes are the ways of storing ideas and the coding of 
documents" (Richards 1999, 69). After reading line-by-line the interview transcripts 
several times, we developed the first coding schemes to start the analysis and allow for 
flexible comparisons between the two regions and among the three stakeholder groups 
of our interest (public sector, academia and private sector). Data were inserted in such 
a way as to analyse single or combined variables and sources. Codification was theme-
based and repeated several times (re-coding) during the phase of analysis to 
understand its connection to the objectives of this study. Usually, the codes included 
single sentences, descriptive phrases, or entire paragraphs which revealed a series of 
analytical concepts. A number of participants' statements were used directly in the 
study to elucidate indicative tendencies and findings.  
 For the analysis of chapters 6 and 8 an inductive reasoning was carried out in the 
process of coding, in which general tree nodes were created to collect and study 
specific data for potential generalisations. For example, in chapter 6 two main 
categories were created in NVivo, one for each region. In total, we generated 325 code 
references from which 34 single quotes (19 for Crete and 15 for CM) were used to 
evidence our findings. In chapter 7 we created 2 main nodes with a number of sub-
nodes including 470 coding references, while in chapter 8 a total number of 266 quotes 




1st level coding 
 
B. The method of our work is presented in a simplified form in Figure 4.4 
diagrammatically. 
 













 After first-level coding in which all tentative answers were elaborated, we 
reviewed all data again and performed a recombination of coded passages, by grouping 
the existing nodes into new tree nodes to move to the second level of interpretation. 
The number of nodes at this stage of analysis was lower compared to the begging, 
while each node included only one concept/theme. We ran the coding again and 
created a new series of codes and sub-codes (new codes or codes from already coded 
data) to test in what ways emerging patterns and ideas from the interviews were 
related to the RQs. To identify patterns of association among different groups of tree 
nodes and to create categories, we ran several queries such as text search queries and 
coding queries in specific sources to find ideas and content coded at selected nodes 
(e.g. identify what entrepreneurial capabilities are existing in the case of Crete only), or 
at a combination of nodes (e.g. study how academics or local firms treated the 

















memos which were written during the interviews and observation, to identify and 
explicate emergent patterns in the data as we were re-coding the nodes. This second 
round of codification helped to minimise the datasets, by keeping those that related 
most to the RQs and the theory we have elaborated in the conceptual framework. 
Finally, we elaborated the categories created during the previous stages to generate 
themes, concepts and ideas related to the RQs. 
 To show how tree nodes and coding have evolved during our analysis, we use 
an example from the analysis of the data we used to answer RQ3: What capabilities 
exist and are required to develop smart specialisation strategies in catch-up regional 
environments? Figure 4.5 illustrates how a large number of specific sources codified in 
various tree nodes have been reduced for generalisation into six types of capacity 



























Figure 4.5 shows that in the beginning of the analysis, a broad number of nodes (4 
nodes, 16 sub-nodes) were used to code data for RQ2, while at the end, the analysis 
came up with 1 key node and only 9 sub-nodes. This process shows how from a 





4.5 Ethical considerations  
 The ethical issues in this study concerned issues of informed consent. Data was 
collected exclusively for this thesis and used to examine the selected case study 
regions. All materials obtained from secondary analysis were public, while interviews 
were held with consent of participants. In conformity with good ethical practice, we 
asked for permission to record and use the interviews for the purpose of this research. 
Although participants did not share sensitive or personal information, confidentiality 
was secured by keeping their identities secret. Anonymization was secured by using 
pseudonyms. 
 
4.6 Case study specificities  
 As in any case study research, we recognise a number of specifies regarding the 
methodological approach. First, since the data were entirely gathered from Crete and 
CM, our findings refer exclusively to these particular regions. In this respect, our 
conclusions may not be necessarily transferable to other regional contexts beyond 
Crete and CM, acknowledging the risks highlighted by the one-size-fits-all principles 
(Tödtling and Trippl 2005). The second specificity is linked with the progress of the 
selected regions in developing S3. In particular, given that the case study regions have 
not yet fully put their S3 action plans in place, it is difficult to identify and analyse in a 
certain research design all possible implementation challenges at once. Consequently, 
part of our analysis takes necessarily an indicative approach which remains to be 
proved during the implementation phase in both regions.  As a final specificity we refer 
to the restricted availability of updated secondary data which has been used to analyse 
both regional contexts (e.g. reports, regional studies etc). Most of the secondary 







 The study of this thesis required the elaboration and development of an 
analytical research design with specific and comprehensive units of analysis. The details 
of this research design have been explicitly presented, analysed and justified in 
different sections of this chapter. The case study approach has been selected as a core 
means of developing our epistemological assumptions for the regions of Crete and CM, 
for which systemic interviewing and observational research were used for the 
collection of primary data. In the introduction, we highlighted that this is a qualitative 
study which is not intended to gather and use numerical evidence to generate 
statistical generalisation. Rather, we used case study research to develop theory and to 
produce an analytical generalisation in our unit of analysis. In this respect, statistical 
generalisation is well distinct from analytical generalisation, which has been extensively 
applied to fulfil the research objectives of this study. 
 Apart from the importance of discussing the main strategies used to build 
research tools and address research questions, chapter 4 has also drawn attention to 
the evolutionary approach of the research methods employed to address the 
particularities of our research. The availability of primary data, their connection to 
research objectives and the need to address ongoing literature gaps were the main 































Chapter 5: Setup of the regions  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides a detailed overview of the regional profiles of Crete and 
Central Macedonia (CM). It discusses demographic, economic and social factors that 
have gradually influenced the productive structure of both regional environments over 
time. The chapter discusses the extent of changes occurring in the regions' 
socioeconomic structure before and after the financial crisis of 2008, with the objective 
of providing the framework for developing the other sections. Primary emphasis is 
given on the regional knowledge base, as well as, on the research and innovation 
patterns of public and private sectors in both regions. It also provides a detailed 
overview of the relationships usually existing among key regional stakeholders which, 
to a large extent, are still unknown and vague. The chapter takes the following 
structure: it starts with a brief background of the regions which outlines key regional 
characteristics, followed by a detailed overview of the economy, industrial and sub-
national innovation systems of Crete and CM. At the end, eight basic innovation and 
R&D indicators are presented, indicating a number of variations in regional 
performance which allows for regional comparisons between Crete and CM in the 
decade 2007-2017.       
 
5.2 Background of the regions  
5.2.1 The region of Crete  
 Crete (NUTS2: EL43) is the largest island of Greece and the fifth largest island in 
the Mediterranean area. Located in the southern part of the country, it covers 8.336 
km2 with a total coastline length of more than 1000 km. It is surrounded to the north 
by the Sea of Crete (Aegean sea) and to the south by the Libyan Sea. Due to its 
geographical position, Crete provides unique opportunities for co-operation and 




North Africa. According to the General Population Census 2011 (ELSTAT 2016), the 
region is ranked the 5th most populous area in the country with 621.340 permanent 
inhabitants. The island experienced population gains since 1981; a population increase 
of 19.7% in the period 1981-2001 and 3.4% between 2001-2011 (ELSTAT 2016). The 
capital city, Heraklion, is the 4th largest city of the country, surrounded by three main 
cities found from west to east: Chania, Rethymno and Agios Nikolaos. Administratively, 
the region of Crete is divided into four prefectures: Chania and Rethymno to the west 
and Heraklion and Lassithi to the east. Although it is an island, Crete is very 
mountainous with high mountain ranges and physical constraints. Due to its 
geographical position and to a number of physical constraints, Crete is more developed 
in the north coastline, while much of the south part of the region is still sparsely 
developed. As a result, most of the economic activities are intense in the north part of 
the island. The history of Crete dates back to the Minoan civilisation, which is treated 
as the earliest recorded civilisation in Europe, flourished in the period 2600 to 1100 BC 
(Chaniotis 2010). Minoan Crete declined after the destruction of its capital city Knossos 
by the tsunami waves of the eruption of Santorini volcano in 1.650 BC. There are many 
surviving ancient Minoan sites throughout the island of Crete.  
 
5.2.2 The region of Central Macedonia  
 Central Macedonia (NUTS2: EL52) is part of the northernmost and largest 
geographical unity of Greece, Macedonia which shares borders with the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bulgaria. It is the biggest region of the 
country in terms of size, covering a total area of 19.166 km2, and the second most 
populous area (after Attica), with 1.882.108 inhabitants, approx. 17.5% of the 
population of Greece, (ELSTAT 2016). As opposed to Crete, CM covers important 
lowland areas optimal for high-value agriculture and industrial activity. Traditionally, 
the business community of the region is economically active and strong in both sectors. 




administrative prefectures: Chalkidiki, Imathia, Kilkis, Pella, Pieria, Serres and 
Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki is the capital and the largest city and concentrates almost the 
60% of the whole regional population. The city of Thessaloniki is regarded as an 
international exhibition and congress centre and, by tradition, it plays an important 
role as a financial centre in the Balkans. From a practical perspective, the city of 
Thessaloniki provides easy access to the Balkans via good road infrastructures and 
railway networks. Additionally it is considered as an education centre concentrating a 
significant number of students and academics in interdisciplinary fields.  
 
5.2.3 Geography of regions  
This section outlines key indicators of population and geographic structure for 
the two regions. Moreover, Figure 5.1 illustrates the geographical location of each 
region in relation to the rest of the country, while Table 5.1 summarises basic 
geographical and other administrative and demographic characteristics.  
 






Table 5.1 Boarders, population and administrative units 
 Crete  C. Macedonia 
Ranking    
Greek regions by size 9th (8.336 km2)  1st (19.166 km2) 
Greek regions by population 5th (623.065m)  2nd (1.882.108m) 
 









North: Aegean sea, 




South: Aegean sea, 
Thermaic Gulf 
Admin. units 4  7 
Source: Author 
 
5.3 Cretan economy, industrial and innovation system: an overview  
 On the whole, Crete has a long-term growth prospective generating 
approximately 5% of the Greek GDP. Concerning the salient features of the local 
economy, Crete has shown a long tradition in tourism over time which, currently, is 
the most active and specialised sector of the island with 54% of the most dynamic 
companies in the region, followed by services, mainly trade and shipping, with 12% (see 
A in Figure 5.2). The development of tourism infrastructures (mostly driven by local and 
international hotel units, tour operators and other related chains) is currently seen as a 
determinant of regional development with long-term perspectives. While primary 
sector has a leading role in terms of production and employment, it is still largely based 
on outdated models of cultivation and fragmented technological infrastructure, which 
have been accused of hampering the competition of the local economy (Papamichail 
and Saitakis 2013). However, agriculture (mainly agro-food) is a very promising sector 
in which vegetables possess a relatively high specialisation index, occupying the 9th 
place among the other European regions (Region of Crete 2015). In addition, an 
important part of the agro-food domain (e.g. production of diversified wine varieties, 
5 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
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organic cheese and olive oil) has turned its activities into niche markets and high-
quality production, providing the region with opportunities for creating strong 
potential competitive advantages. 
 
Figure 5.2 Percentage (%) of (A) most dynamic companies per sector / (B) type of 
innovation 
                                            A                                                       B (2010-2012) 
 
Source: Data collocated and elaborated from EKT (2015a) & Region of Crete (2015) 
 
A mixture of indicators and statistics which have been grouped and presented for the 
purpose of this study, ranks Crete as one of the best performers in the country in terms 
of its socioeconomic and STI performance (see Table 5.2). When analysing basic 
indicators of the economic activity of the region, we see that due to the economic crisis 
and its adverse impact on the local economy, the Cretan GDP per capita in PPS has 
been reduced notably since 2008 - a 14% fall between 2008 and 2015 - with significant 
effects on the business enterprise sector. In the same way, unemployment rates have 
almost doubled from 2010 to 2017 (first four months), reaching more than 20%, raising 
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Table 5.2 Facts and figures of Crete 
Indicator  Value 
Size (in square km) 8.336 
Population in millions (2011) 623.065  
GDP per capita in PPS  (2008) 21.400 
GDP per capita in PPS  (2015) 18.800 
Unemployment (2010) 12% 
Unemployment (2014) 24% 
Unemployment (Jan-Apr 2017) 20.2% 
Percentage of innovative enterprises (2010-12) 65,2% 
Percentage of enterprises with New Product Development 10,7% 
Percentage of enterprises which collaborate for New Product Development 7.5% 
Main sectors of economic activity: Primary sector, Agriculture, Tourism, Services  
 
R&D expenditure in millions (€), 2013 
Indicator  Value 
Business Enterprise Sector – BES & Private non-Profit – PNP 6,52 
Higher Education Sector – HES 54,72 
Government Sector – GOV 59,44 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 1,35% 
Source: Author 
 
 Concerning innovation and development (see also innovation conditions 
section), the Cretan R&D is largely dominated by the government and higher education 
sectors, which remain the largest sources of R&D investment. In the private sector, 
there are a fairly small number of leading companies which conduct high R&D activities 
and hold 22 active patents. In general, most of these firms can be considered as the top 
innovation leaders of Crete. The top four in terms of innovation and R&D concentration 
include Plastika Kritis SA, Megaplsat SA, Mechatrone SA and Cretafarms SA. 
Interestingly, each of these companies plays an important role in the global 
marketplace developing all four types of innovation, with a particular focus on product 
and process innovation (see B, Figure 5.2). The first three companies operate in the 
industrial sector. They run R&D departments dealing with plastics in horticultural and 
agricultural markets; specialised packaging materials and renewable energy 




it is one of the largest firms in Greece. Additionally, there is a small group of enterprises 
operating in various industrial sectors that have introduced a series of non 
technological innovations and have gained international reputation. These innovations 
are not usually related with product or process innovation, but rather with 
organisational and marketing innovation, covering 24.4% and 32.7% respectively (see 
B, Figure 5.2). Interestingly, non-technological innovation is more frequent than 
product and process innovation, covering almost 43% of the most dynamics companies 
of the region.   
 
5.3.1 Networks and clusters  
 In terms of inter-firm synergy and business networking, innovation networks 
are mostly concentrated in four industrial sectors: tourism, agricultural products, 
agriculture-livestock and construction. The most well known are the winery network 
and a number of olive oil associations which are typically run by local producers and 
entrepreneurs in the field. Additionally, the Agro-Food Partnership which is co-
ordinated by the Region of Crete was built to promote Cretan traditional products 
overseas. Until that time, the creation of networks, thematic clusters and other forms 
of collaborative synergies between public and private actors has been collectively 
attempted through the development of various regional and national programmes 
conducted over the last 15 years (see for instance CRINNO Project and the Regional 
Innovation Pole of Crete). It is worth noting that most recently, significant efforts have 
been made to turn industrial and businesses networks to R&D clusters, without 
however fulfilling this ambition systematically; its realisation requires time-consuming 
processes and collective endeavours emerging from cross-sectoral interaction. A 
leading role in this process was undertaken by the Science and Technology Park of 
Crete (STEP-C), which habitually acts as an intermediate between the local enterprise 
sector and the research community of Crete. In fact, STEP-C was found to play an 




development of science-business collaborations. However, an adequate number of 
effective R&D clusters, business networks and other similar structures and innovation 
accelerators are still missing from the regional innovation system of Crete. Apart from 
the Hellenic Photonics Cluster initiated by the Foundation for Research and Technology 
(FORTH-HELLAS) to support a limited number of innovative enterprises active in diverse 
areas of photonics, no other similar initiatives have been conducted up till now.  
Traditionally, strategic co-operations in the private sector are conducted on an 
ad-hoc basis, largely dominated by personal relations. The complexity of setting 
business and R&D networks is path-dependent affected by different types of systemic 
failure (e.g. market failure, government failure etc), as empirically found by other 
similar studies in diverse regional environments, see for example (Von Tunzelmann et 
al. 2010). Likewise, no competence centres or innovation platforms across diverse 
disciplines have been actively established to support technology and innovation 
actions, with the expectation of the new innovation platforms initiatives designed and 
run under the RIS3 framework. This initiative is expected to have a particular role in 
supporting and promoting the development of business-research partnerships in the 
smart specialisation context.   
By analysing the complexity of institutions’ collaboration in specific domains of 
the local economy, we see that even in the ICT sector where Crete shows a relatively 
higher innovative and entrepreneurial performance due to the existence of the strong 
research and technological infrastructure in the field (e.g. University of Crete Computer 
Science Department, Institute of Computer Science at the Foundation for Research 
Technology), no significant agglomeration spill overs have been generated to provide 
an added value to the local economy. While literature suggests that clustering tends to 
be pronounced in high-tech industries (Delgado, Porter, and Stern 2014), for example, 
electronics and computing etc, in the case of Crete, ICTs and other interactive 
networking applications have been individually exploited (e.g. installations of ICT 




promotion of the local tourism product). A representative sample gathered by the 
respondents from the ICT business community of Crete suggests that while local 
companies and entrepreneurs have started recognising the implications of business 
clusters and industrial R&D networks on business performance, they still consider such 
structures with scepticism, fearing loss of competitive advantage through the exchange 
of entrepreneurial ideas and business secrets. This conservative view has been 
extensively recorded in the interviews conducted with a number of smart specialisation 
organisers, highlighting the reluctance of some local entrepreneurs to share their 
entrepreneurial ideas for setting up business and technological synergies during the 
open processed of the entrepreneurial discovery. In contrast with this position, the 
Cretan S3 document indicates the crucial role that thematic clusters can play in various 
fields of the local economy and rank the formation of a series of cluster-based 
initiatives as a high priority during the entrepreneurial discovery.   
 
5.3.2 Knowledge and business infrastructure  
 As being one of the most innovative regions in Greece, with a relatively long 
tradition in innovation (the percentage of innovative enterprises in 2010-12 was above 
the Greek average 65.2%, see Figure 5.2), one could expect that Cretan business sector 
is going to play a key role in the modernisation of the new regional innovation policies 
of the country. Similarly, from a RIS3 potential, Crete demonstrates a significant 
concentration of scientific research potential, hosting a noteworthy number of well-
established centres with scientific excellence in innovative ICTs and in Key Enabling 
Technologies (KETs). While the innovation performance of the island has decreased 
considerably during the last two years (approximately 19%), it is argued that the region 
of Crete still possess "an important concentration of cultural and natural resources that 
can boost the creation of new sustainable development" (Region of Crete 2015). From 
the one hand, this is due to a number of internationally recognised research bodies and 




to the creation of a strong local research community with international knowledge 
linkages.  
 
Table 5.3 STI infrastructure of Crete 
Institution Size/performance Location 
A. Academic Institutions     
University of Crete  5 faculties, 16 departments Heraklion & 
Rethymnon 
Technical University of Crete  5 faculties 16 depart/sectors Chania 
Technological Educational Institute 
of Crete 
5 faculties, 15 departments Heraklion, 
Rethymnon & 
Chania  
B. Research Centres    
Foundation for Research and 
Technology  
6 institutes  Heraklion & 
Rethymnon 
Dimitra Greek Agricultural 
Organisation 
6 institutes Region of 
Crete 
Hellenic Centre for Marine Research Marine research Heraklion 
Mediterranean Agronomic Institute 
of Chania 
Research & Education in 
Mediterranean Agronomic Studies 
Chania  
Institute of Geology & Mineral 
Exploration   
Earth science Rethymnon 
C. Private sector  
(Clusters, networks, SMEs associations, intermediaries,  firm R&D hubs, incubators) 
Science and Technology Park of 
Crete  
Business incubators (appr. 15 
companies)  
Heraklion 
Help-Forward  Technology transfer mechanisms, 
industry academia collaborations   
Heraklion & 
Rethymnon 
Chambers  Entrepreneurial Hub, SMEs 
support    
Region of 
Crete 
Industrial Zones  Industrial agglomeration Region of 
Crete  
Development Agencies  SMEs support   Region of 
Crete 
Hellenic Photonics Cluster 10 companies, 5 labs    Region of 
Crete 
Wines of Crete Networking R&D in winery (appr. 







 Interestingly, Crete demonstrates an important agglomeration of public 
knowledge creators which have exerted a strong influence in generating, stocking and 
diffusing different types of knowledge. Furthermore, there are a large number of 
academic institutions and research centres (see A and B in Table 5.3 which access 
important research funds and attract researchers with multidisciplinary backgrounds 
with national and international experience. In this respect, Cretan academia provides 
an important source of high qualified personnel with potentially significant 
contributions in the local productive system of the island. Indicatively, in 2014, Crete 
concentrated approximately 4.4% of the entire Greek human resources in S&T, while 
during the period 2008-2012, the academic community of the island participated in 
6.677 publications with 48.301 citations (RIM 2016). Additionally, official data provided 
by EKT (2015b) shows that Crete possesses the 3rd position among the other Greek 
regions in terms of the number of participation in collaborative research projects 
funded by the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) in the period 2007-13. To give a better 
sense of these significant numbers, we note that the Cretan population in the nation is 
approximately 5.8% (ELSTAT 2016). On the other hand, despite the existence of a 
number of key players with intermediary roles in business and innovation (see C in 
Table 5.3), the private sector seems less effective in creating and making sense of new 
knowledge-based incentives and assets. The absence of adequate knowledge-intensive 
industries suitable to support technological development and industrial partnerships 
strangles the ability of the region to collectively keep high levels of R&D investments in 
the private sector. Consequently, the business R&D expenditure (as a share of GDP) 
remains below the European average (OECD 2005), a phenomenon which is particularly 
pronounced throughout the duration of the economic recession. In such an 
unfavourable environment, local policymakers and strategists are asked to restart the 
local economy of Crete by designing new place-based innovation policies which are 





5.3.3 Non-R&D activities  
 On the other hand, however, it is worth highlighting the performance of the 
Cretan companies in non-RTDI activities. Data from the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 
2016 ranks Crete in the top 20 EU regions with the highest scores in non-R&D 
innovation expenditures in SMEs as percentage of turnover (EC 2016). In fact, the 
nature and process of conducting non-RTDI activities vary across sectors and industrial 
specialisations. For example, exporting can be well demonstrated under the activities 
of the Exporters’ Association of Crete which support the promotion of the Cretan 
products abroad and facilitate the access into new foreign markets through various 
internationalisation channels. Data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority shows that 
the total export value for Crete in 2016 was EUR 457.7m, dominated by the food sector 
(62.9%) and the plastic industry (25%) (Exporters’ Association of Crete 2017). Within 
the food sector, olive oil exports account for more than half of the Cretan exports 
related to food. The majority of these companies can show a relatively good 
performance without conducting or introducing core R&D-based activities. Similarly, 
other business associations with a strong presence in the local tourism industry (e.g. 
various local hotel associations, associations of tourism and travel offices, etc) have 
played a supportive role in the development and promotion of the local tourism 
product of Crete, without incorporating research and development practices in their 
business functions.   
 
5.3.4 Competiveness, innovation conditions and ecosystems   
 The European Regional Innovation Scoreboard ranks Crete (grouped in the 
mega-region Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti) as a modest-high innovator (EC 2014e). Although there 
is a relatively high concentration of public R&D activities with significant participation in 
EU research programmes, mainly from universities and research centres as discussed 
above, the commercialisation process and the linkages of the scientific community with 




innovation and competitiveness. Despite the superiority of the Cretan R&D landscape 
relative to other regions of the country (i.e. critical mass of regionally-based education 
and research institutions which are not spatially concentrated in a particular district), 
the increased rate of brain drain in both the public and private sectors is getting an 
extremely negative dimension, preventing the region to overcome many of its current 
challenges with regards to its competitive position. Furthermore, data at a national 
level shows that in the period 2009-2014 some 20.000 scientists left the country in 
search of better opportunities abroad, while according to the Bank of Greece, 427.000 
higher educated young Greeks have immigrated since 2008 (Kathimerini 2017). Under 
these unfavourable conditions, the medium and long-term competitiveness of the 
region is further threatened. Currently, recent official data from the 2016 EU Regional 
Competitiveness Index (RCI) ranks Crete in the 250th position out of 263 EU regions, 
(see Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4 Competitiveness of Crete: ranking and scores 
 Rank  Score (0-100) 
Competitiveness 250/263  6.6 
Innovation dimension  228/263  20.7 
Technological redness  236/263  29.0 
Infrastructure   238/263    6.4 
Business Sophistication 202/263  22.6 
Source: Elaborated data from RCI, 2016 
 
By summarising five indicators at a regional level, (Table 5.4) shows clearly an 
underperformance of the regional competitiveness of the island. A possible justification 
which can partly explain the above situation is as simple as looking at the Regional 
Innovation System of Crete and at some of its drawbacks as evidenced in this study: 
fragmented and weak institutional structure; limited regional power and autonomy; 
unfavourable environment for innovative and knowledge-based entrepreneurial 




dramatic effects of the financial crisis, which have drastically affected the competitive 
environment of the enterprise sector. What happens in practice is that Cretan RIS 
suffers from the lack of strong and constant synergetic partnerships among the public 
and private sector and, as a consequence, the research system of the region is 
sometimes found decoupled from the domestic economy. In this respect, several 
empirical studies, see for example (OECD 2005; Papamichail and Saitakis 2013; Reid et 
al. 2012c) have stressed the complexity of matching science with local societal and 
economic needs due to the lack of soft rather than hard innovation and R&D 
infrastructures in the region of Crete. Interestingly, various collaboration and 
knowledge linkages are not only found relatively weak among different stakeholder 
groups, for example industry-academia partnerships, but also among key local players 
within the same group, e.g. inter-firm collaborations (see Figure 5.3). This is due to one 
of the most significant problems of the private sector which is the difficulty to get 
access into financial resources for innovation and R&D. The latter can partly explain 
why Crete (despite its strong research community) still lacks critical knowledge 
intensive clusters and thematic networks in areas where a comparative advantage 
could exist. Figure 5.3 illustrates the Regional Innovation System of Crete and 
represents the linkages and knowledge diffusion within and among different 
stakeholder groups of the island. It is worth highlighting the multidisciplinary 
dimension that the RIS of Crete can take (it combines diverse sets of scientific 
knowledge with important specialisations in biotechnology and life sciences, computer-
based and ICT applications, physics and laser technologies etc) which provides 









Figure 5.3 The Regional Innovation System of Crete: linkages and knowledge diffusion 
 
Note (research centres): The regional unit of the Institute of Geology and Mineral Exploration is 
also located in the city of Rethymnon  
 
Source: Author  
 
A close examination of the micro-environment of the Cretan RIS shows the 
existence of an enduring challenge to link science with technological knowledge to 
generate innovations for commercial applications. Put simply, the existing structure of 
the innovation ecosystem of Crete and its current institutional interactions occurring 
among its players are not still favourable for generating innovation-driven growth. In 
other words, innovation, particularly from the business perspective, is not systemic but 
rather the outcome of a non-collaborative process, which in most of the times is 




regional dynamics to create collective opportunities for intra- and inter-sectoral 
collaborations with either the private sector (mainly firms, business clubs and 
associations) or the public organisations throughout the region (e.g. universities and 
research centres). The term medium collaboration intensity is used in the sense that 
networking and synergies for knowledge production and diffusion are not carried out 
regularly and formally; for example, promoting technological collaborations between 
universities and local firms for new product development. On the contrary, instead of 
taking place in a routine basis, knowledge transfer approaches which are critical for 
innovation and learning are conducted at an ad-hoc basis, depending on particular 
needs and circumstances. Respondents from the interviews identify clearly the absent 
of a set of enduring channels appropriate to allow and promote knowledge spill overs 
effects. Our findings show high consensus and representativeness on this view; they 
are gathered by various groups of policymakers with different roles and innovation 
policy perspectives: academia, business and public sector organisations. Despite the 
existence of a number of intermediary organisations, the lack of formal communication 
channels which could be regarded as lack of permanent knowledge systems is still an 
open challenge for the local community of Crete which still questions the innovation 
capacity of the region. In the case of Crete, while geographical proximity of diverse 
local actors (in the sense of spatial concentration of a large number of multi-level 
players) has been of great importance, its effects on learning and knowledge transfer 
are still pending.       
 
5.4 Central Macedonian economy, industrial and innovation system: an overview  
 Central Macedonia (CM) is one of the most important regional economic 
players in the country, which plays a leading role in the development of the Greek sub-
national system. According to the Greek national statistics, the region generates 
approximately 15% of the national GDP, from which 11.7% is produced in the city of 




secondary and tertiary sectors, with particular specialisation in the production of 
peaches, cotton and tobacco, as well as in processed food, retail and textile finishing 
products. During the last years, the tertiary sector has expanded its share, dominating 
the local economy by covering approximately 76% in 2009 (ELSTAT 2016). In addition, 
other knowledge intensive industries including biomedicine, organic farming and ICTs 
have started gradually to play an increasing role in the production and diffusion of new 
entrepreneurial knowledge (Region of CM 2015). Companies operating in these fields 
are usually hosted in industrial parks and zones, science parks, and other business 
incubators (see section C in Table 5.6), which traditionally provide practical support and 
facilities to their tenants. In addition, processing industries, food and chemicals 
(petrochemicals, plastics, polymers etc), furniture and metal products have also gained 
the bulk of the economic activity in the region, attracting private investments and 
public funding. Nevertheless, it is argued that an important number of the local firms 
operating in these business sectors do not habitually invest in technological innovation, 
and as a consequence, their competitiveness remains rather static (Reid et al. 2012a). 
This trend has been captured in a number of regional reports, which has been recently 
documented in the S3 strategic document of the region. In addition, during the last 
years, the region has experienced intense deindustrialisation due to the relocation of 
labour intensive industries to neighbourhood countries, mainly to Bulgaria and Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  
 
5.4.1 Economic crisis and regional recession    
From a developmental perspective, the current production structure and the 
limited range of sectoral specialisation of the region do not facilitate the local economy 
to absorb shocks arising from the financial crisis. Indeed, the region has suffered 
importantly due to effects of the Greek economic crisis which has strangled the 
industrial sector in particular. The extended shrinking of the real local economy has led 




by the Thessaloniki Chamber of Handicrafts, a total number of 14.180 firms (mainly 
craft business) were out of business (companies filed for bankruptcy) over the last eight 
years (2000-2017), while for the same period, only 5.527 new companies were founded 
(Alpha965 2017).          
 In the same vein,  close attention to the macroeconomics of the region shows a 
fairly similar situation. The GDP per capita (in PPS) decreased remarkably during the 
period 2008-2015 (by apr. 22.2%) while in 2010-2014 the official unemployment rates 
of the region grew dramatically (by 109.5%) (see Table 5.5), leading to significant brain 
drain effects, especially for science and technology educated people who left the 
region of CM for more prosperous and developed working environments.  
 
Table 5.5 Facts and figures of Central Macedonia 
Indicator  Value 
Size (in square km) 18.811  
Population in millions (2011) 1.882.108 
GDP per capita in PPS  (2008) 19.400 
GDP per capita in PPS  (2015) 15.100 
Unemployment (2010) 13,7% 
Unemployment (2014) 28,7% 
Unemployment (Jan-Apr 2017) 22.7% 
Percentage of innovative enterprises (2010-12) 53% 
Percentage of enterprises with New Product Development 13% 
Percentage of enterprises which collaborate for New Product Development 13,3% 





R&D expenditure in millions (€), 2013 
Indicator  Value 
Business Enterprise Sector – BES & Private non-Profit – PNP 33,1 
Higher Education Sector – HES 97,3 
Government Sector – GOV 52,9 






5.4.2 Structure, resources and specialisation of R&D   
From a STI perspective, one of the key characteristics of CM is the large number 
of academic innovation support actions which are mainly concentrated in the city of 
Thessaloniki. According to Table 5.5, the R&D expenditure of the region is 
predominantly localised at the public higher education sector (€97.3m in 2013), in 
which an important number of internationally recognised institutions are found to play 
a significant role in the scientific community. The contribution of the government 
sector (both regional and national funds) is also central in funding R&D activities, 
reaching 52.9m in 2013. However, the CM R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(0.7%) remains below the EU-28 average which was approximately 2.0% in 2015. In the 
same vein, while the percentage of innovative enterprises for the period 2010-2012 
was more than the half (53%), the industrial specialisation of the region is not well 
synchronised with the scientific research undertaken in academic institutions, suffering 
from the lack of cross-scale inter-sectoral linkages; data shows that only 13.3% of the 
firms which generate and diffuse different types of innovation conduct activities 
related to new product development.  
The industrial specialisation in CM is mostly based on service sector activities, 
related to tourism and agro-food, which traditionally do not achieve critical 
investments in R&D and do not follow a science-based approach (Reid et al. 2012a); we 
note that firms in the private sector spent €33.1m for R&D in 2013. Rather, they 
require other structures of innovation diffusion such as innovation platforms, industrial 
clusters, business networks, science parks, innovation distributors which may be of 
great importance for developing innovation in local businesses. We notice, however, 
that while there are some of such essential infrastructures and policy initiatives in the 
CM innovation regime (see section C, in Table 5.5), their policy impact on innovation is 
still underdeveloped with limited outputs. However, no R&D clusters or business 
networks are existed at present to constantly promote intersectoral integration in the 




externalities, diversification and technological spill overs are almost absent; likewise, 
regional networking at the level of firms for generating scale economies in innovation 
actions is relatively weak.  
 As a result, a notable contradiction has emerged in the regional innovation 
landscape; from the one hand, an increased critical mass of higher education, research 
and technology institutions is concentrated in the region, while from the other, the 
innovation activity and potential of the local private actors remain low and fragmented. 
Avranas and Nioras (2011) have shown empirically that while academic institutions 
seem to play a pioneering role in generating and delivering the innovation potential of 
the region, their linkages with the local economy remain weak. Invent here - exploit 
elsewhere practices are broadly found in the case of CM, where business local capacity 
to absorb new research outputs remains low. Consequently, research is concentrated 
in university laboratories, and the CM innovation system is mostly dominated by the 
higher education system, consisting of high-level institutes such as the Aristotle 
University, the University of Macedonia, the Centre for Research & Technology-Hellas.  
From a physical presence, the academic community of CM holds an important 
representation of R&D activity in the country (Table 5.6 records 25 university faculties 
and 62 departments, as well as 4 research bodies with 10 research institutes); 
indicatively, we note that the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki is the biggest state 
university in Greece, while the Alexander Technological Educational Institute of 
Thessaloniki is the second largest technological institute. Practical information about 
the current STI infrastructure of the region (private and public) is presented in Table 
5.6, where the most important regional players are grouped into three main categories: 
(a) academic institutions; (b) research centres and (c) private sector actors. The spatial 
concentration of research activity conducted by a large number of academic 






Table 5.6 STI infrastructure of Central Macedonia 
Institution Size/performance Location 
A. Academic Institutions  
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 11 faculties, 23 
departments 
Thessaloniki  
University of Macedonia 4 faculties 8 
departments 
Thessaloniki 
International Hellenic University 3 faculties Thessaloniki 
Alexander Technological Educational Institute of 
Thessaloniki 
5 faculties, 23 
departments 
Thessaloniki 
Technological Educational Institute of Central 
Macedonia 
2 faculties, 8 
departments 
Serres 
American Farm School STEM studies  Thessaloniki 
B. Research Centres 
Centre for Research and Technology - Hellas 5 institutes  Thessaloniki 
National Agricultural Research Foundation  5 institutes Thessaloniki 
South East Europe Telecommunications and 
Informatics Research Institute 
 Thessaloniki 
C. Private sector  
(Clusters, Networks, SMEs associations, intermediaries,  firm R&D hubs, incubators) 




Thessaloniki Science Centre & Technology 
Museum 
STI exhibitions,  Thessaloniki 
Technopolis Thessaloniki ICT Business Park Incubator ICT Thessaloniki 
i4G Innovation for Growth Incubator Technological incubator Thessaloniki 
Thermi Business Incubator Start-up incubator Thessaloniki 
Alexander Innovation Zone  Innovative SMEs, 
incentives for R&D 
collaborations  
Thessaloniki 
Business & Cultural Development Centre SMEs competitiveness Thessaloniki 




Federation of Industries of Northern Greece Entrepreneurial 
networking, R&D 
projects, industrial 
planning   
Region of C. 
Macedonia  
Chambers  Technology brokerage 
events, training, reports   







 Interestingly, concerning the private sector, a notable number of local actors 
are found to dominate the business and innovation landscape of the region, including a 
science park, thematic business incubators, technology and innovation accelerators, 
business associations etc. Most of them are located in Thessaloniki where most of the 
activities take place; the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece and the chambers 
take a more geographically expanded role, covering different areas throughout the 
region. Although the existence and networking of such bodies is supportive for the 
local businesses to overcome diverse barriers of the region, they are still threatened by 
a number of challenges. As an example, we refer to an important challenge recently 
emerged (mostly after the 2008 financial crisis and the enforcement of the capital 
controls in 2015) which is the continuous trend of industrial companies mainly to 
immigrate to the Balkans, the so-called business run. Indeed, at a more aggregative 
level, there are a number of national reports which document the bulk escape of Greek 
SMEs in the Balkans, mostly in Bulgaria, to benefit from lower taxes and wages, access 
to funding and better insurance contributions. The tendency of Greek firms to transfer 
their headquarters or part of their business or R&D activity abroad has been currently 
reported by the Endeavor Greece, an international non-profit organisation which 
supports entrepreneurship (Endeavor 2016). This unfavourable situation is delivering 
negative effects on the future prosperity of the CM productive system.  
 
5.4.3 The aftermath of a previous innovation experience 
 As a means to overcome the science-industry challenges, a total of 306 RTD 
projects (204 addressed local businesses) were approved and financed by the Regional 
Operational Program of the region with the aim of supporting innovation policy 
actions. It is argued, however, that the majority of these initiatives failed to fully 
achieve the desired outcomes (Reid et al. 2012a). The power and the level of 
engagement of diverse regional players in such policy initiatives fluctuate over time. A 




policies is not measured and assessed systematically; its evaluation is rather based on a 
set of baseline values and indicators which are insufficient to achieve a solid 
understanding of the medium and long-term effects of the policies; it is reasonable to 
assume that, simply measuring the No. of scientific publications, patent applications; 
start-ups, spin-offs etc is definitely the one side of the coin. What also seems to be 
crucial though is a thorough examination of the demand side, where an analytical 
approach would measure empirically how and to what extent a set of output indicators 
are connected with local demand. Previously, the development of various regional STI 
policies in CM was mainly initiated in 1995 by the introduction of innovation planning 
actions such as the Regional Technology Plan (RTP), followed by the Innovative Actions 
Programme, the Regional Innovation Pole etc. In fact, such programs were the first 
concerted effort of the regional policymakers to address the local RTDI system and 
understand the innovation ecosystem of CM in a more analytical way. In the context of 
these innovation support programs, a number of critical actions were launched with 
the objective of generating critical mass, particularly in the industrial sector, and 
creating strong linkages with the public research community. It is argued that the most 
important impact of these programs was the promotion of a more systemic innovation-
based cooperation between academic and business actors (Komninos 2013). However, 
despite these improvements, the industry-academia gap contains a number of 
obstacles for generating technological innovation in the business sector. Innovation in 
the business sector is mainly generated by organisational and marketing interventions. 
As Figure 5.4 shows innovation in marketing and process innovation were the most 









Figure 5.4 Percentage (%) of types of innovation in Central Macedonia (2010-12) 
 
Source: Data collocated by EKT (2015a) 
 
As far as productivity is concerned, the industrial sector CM used to poses a higher 
average productivity than the rest productive activities of the region (Region of CM 
2015). However, it still lacks critical mass in R&D infrastructures and suffers from the 
lack of effective innovation relay mechanisms such as technology transfer structures, 
innovation intermediaries and accelerators etc, which could bring closer local 
companies with R&D infrastructures for developing joint innovative actions. 
Statistically, this can partly explain why innovation in new product development holds 
the lower percentages (13,4%) in the private sector of the region (see Table 5.5).    
 
5.4.4 Innovation conditions and ecosystems   
 The regional innovation system of CM seems to have many similarities and 
knowledge attributes with the Cretan one. One of its main characteristics is the 
continuous domination of the local scientific community (compared to the private 
sector), which concentrates high quality of indigenous research infrastructures with an 
international potential. In this respect, public research organisations play a central role 
in formulating the research agenda of the region, while companies and other private 
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region. In fact, public knowledge creators have become the main players in the CM 
technology innovation system. Local academia consists of public research centres, 
located mainly in Thessaloniki, and various educational institutes dispersed throughout 
the region with strong knowledge-based capital. Through these permanent 
infrastructures, multiple sources of knowledge and creativity are generated in various 
scientific fields, affecting the innovation capacity and potential of CM sub-system.  
In fact, the region possesses an important number of high-quality R&D facilities 
which support the development of basic research that is not ultimately applied in the 
industrial sector. Indeed, while academic research is a major determinant of the local 
R&D landscape of the region, it seems disconnected with the local economy (Reid et al. 
2012a) and, apart from a few exceptions, it appears far away from the ongoing needs 
of the local industrial sectors. Traditionally, academic activity was not typically oriented 
towards cooperation with the local enterprise sector, and therefore, it is not found to 
have a particularly active and continuous role in the local value chain. Undoubtedly, 
local universities and research centres generate high-level scientific knowledge, 
providing the region with a significant multidisciplinary knowledge base. What is still 
vague is the relevance of such academic knowledge in developing new innovation 
dynamics within the local business economy, highlighting an innovation generation-
adoption gap. In this respect, the industry-academia linkages remain relatively weak, 
yet important, highlighting the need to strengthen further policy initiatives related to 
commercialisation processes and IPR strategies, particularly in multidisciplinary areas 
where development costs are usually higher. For example, in our research, we have not 
identified any comprehensive IPR strategy neither at public bodies (e.g. universities) 
nor at private firms, appropriate to effectively protect and manage organisations’ 
intellectual capital. The science-industry disconnection, however, tends to affect 
drastically the creation of knowledge spill overs which, in their turn, promote the 




 More precisely, regarding the competitiveness of CM recent data from the 2016 
European Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI), shows that the region remains at low 
levels, as it is ranked 242nd out of 263 EU regions. Shifting focus from strict 
socioeconomic indicators to more innovation related factors, the RCI 2016 points out 
that the region is found in the bottom of the ranking list in most of the indicators (see 
Table 5.7), with the exception of business sophistication where CM is performing above 
the EU average.        
 
Table 5.7 Competitiveness of Central Macedonia: ranking and scores 
 Rank  Score (0-100) 
Competitiveness 242/263  11.7 
Innovation dimension  214/263  25.6 
Technological redness  243/263  26.1 
Infrastructure   203/263  13.4 
Business Sophistication 150/263  32.9 
Source: Elaborated data from RCI (2016) 
 
5.4.5 Regional collaborations and networking 
 Concerning regional networking and business partnering, synergies and 
networks are more conspicuous in non-R&D intensive industries, in which traditional 
local firms seek to benefit from economies of scale; for example there is a large 
number of active tourism and agriculture associations, commercial chains etc, including 
both smaller and larger firms. The lack of strong knowledge private-public synergies as 
illustrated in Figure 5.5 is partly caused by the fact that the majority of the local firms 
are family-owned businesses with limited technological sophistication. 
Characteristically, these firms have a low-tech profile and significantly low capacity to 
absorb new knowledge and succeed in innovations by exploiting new knowledge 
dynamics and innovative technologies. They have also been affected dramatically by 
the financial crisis, which has almost urged industrial players to exclude any large-scale 




regards to this relatively new challenge, we have performed interviews with local 
entrepreneurs from the CM business sector, and we have documented their financial 
difficulty to allocate private money for innovation and R&D investments (note: recent 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard data shows a clear decline in Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D in the business sector in the decade 2007-2017, see Table 5.8).  
More precisely, in the question if they would invest in R&D infrastructures for gaining a 
potential added value, almost all of them responded negatively, due to the uneven 
consequences of the unstable macroeconomic environment. As a result, an emerging 
attribute of the new financial situation is that these firms are not usually able to create 
and retain their own R&D capacities and, above all, they do not seem capable to make 
use of the existing R&D infrastructures provided by the scientific community of the 
region. Clearly, this is an increasingly emerging challenge which currently is distributed 
rapidly throughout the region. An important exception is the case of an increasing 
number of new high-tech companies and spin-offs, mainly from the ICT sector, which 
appear more capable to adopt cross-sectoral approaches to set inter-disciplinary R&D 
synergies. In this case, diverse local players are part of a collective system of knowledge 
with important knowledge spill overs. The process of knowledge exchange between 
academia and this kind of firms is treated as an extremely critical resource for the 
innovation enhancement of the business community, as empirically demonstrated by 
recent studies in other regional environments, see for example (Todtling, Asheim, and 
Boschma 2013). Most of these companies are located around the greater area of 
Thessaloniki and possess a combination of advanced scientific and entrepreneurial 
knowledge created by constant R&D efforts and investments.  
 From a financial perspective, the CM innovation system is largely based on 
public investments, without following a market-oriented approach. The financial sector 
and its investment policies over the last 20 years have not been very supportive for 
generating innovation-driven growth. The lack of venture capitals and other financial 




technology and innovation investments; this weakness has been offset by the 
allocation of public funds. The absence of important sources of private and public 
funding, however, acts as a prohibited factor towards setting up interactivity between 
industry and academia for developing joint innovative actions. To some extent, this also 
impedes knowledge flow and diffusion of technological innovations; for knowledge-
intensive companies this is usually translated into problems of accessing and managing 
technical knowledge (in a more engineering sense), while for firms operating in more 
traditional sectors, knowledge takes a more organisational form (e.g. how to organise 
better business functions such as sales and marketing, enrich accounting with ICT 
applications etc). On the other hand, the existence of diverse intermediaries in the CM 
innovation is absolutely an important advantage of the innovation system of the region 
(see Figure 5.5), which however needs further modernisation to gain a systemic 
presence in the productive system and get embedded in the academic community. 
Institutional intermediaries, however, (e.g. industry associations) are seen as an 
important factor for shaping economic development (Watkins et al. 2015; Papaioannou 
et al. 2018). Currently, the business and innovation intermediary service system of CM 
consists of four main kinds of official bodies including the science park, the innovation 
zone, a number of business incubators, innovation accelerators, business networks etc. 
We have performed interviews with four experts from such organisations and we have 
recognised a clear strategic approach of supporting the creation of spin-offs and 
university start-ups in the region, although legislation and regulatory framework are 










Figure 5.5 The regional Innovation system of CM: linkages and knowledge diffusion 
 
Note for research centres: The regional unit of the Institute of Geology and Mineral Exploration 
is also located in the city of Thessaloniki  
 
Source: Author  
  
From a general point of view, the innovation system of CM is dominated by the 
existence of diverse players with different institutional roles, configurations and 
capabilities for innovation. The interactions among these actors and their linkages with 
other players outside the region (national and international) determine the way CM RIS 
develops and evolves over time. In this respect, the innovation regime of the region is 





5.4.6 Groups of regional actors and interrelation among them   
Generally speaking, there are four kinds of institutional actors which play a key 
role in generating, delivering and assimilating innovation and new knowledge within 
and outside the region. The first group (illustrated on the top of Figure 5.5) refers to a 
number of policymakers, consisted of regional public organisations and other 
government institutes responsible for innovation policy and regional development (e.g. 
public agencies, developmental units etc). While most of these bodies are closely 
connected to each other, at times, they are characterised by elements of discontinuity 
resulted by their limited power and autonomy inherently developed over years (e.g. 
inertia due to institutional constraints, communication uncertainty and delays in 
decision-making due to bureaucracy, etc). During the period of the Greek financial crisis 
(from 2008 up to now), an important number of governmental organisations have been 
experienced significant institutional and political changes due to the difficulties 
imposed by the fiscal consolidation (e.g. cut of resources, merger activities 
understaffing due to layoffs and hiring freezes etc). This challenge has affected the 
performance of these organisations.    
The second group of actors, named academia, includes technology and 
knowledge creators (mainly universities and research bodies) which conduct basic and 
applied research in various S&T fields. By tradition, they take a pioneering role in 
formulating the variety of scientific knowledge in the region, providing diverse localised 
learning patterns. The collaboration among these types of organisations is usually 
related with the development of joint R&D projects within and outside the region; 
occasionally, the more active players of this group may also stimulate the creation of 
inter-sectoral partnerships to support the development of activities undertaken among 
different organisations. The remaining two groups constitute the business enterprise 
sector (firms and other business-oriented entities including funding bodies) and a 
number of private and public organisations which play an intermediate role through 




type of firms’ innovation, knowledge-intensive companies and businesses with 
advanced technological capabilities are more likely to develop product and process 
innovation. On the other hand, innovations for more traditional or smaller family-
owned firms are usually related with marketing and other organisational functions. In 
this respect, the innovativeness of a firm (level, intensity and type) is conditioned to its 
business traits developed over years (understanding of technology, capacity to access 
learning, ability to collaborate etc). As regards to funding, innovation is not financed 
regularly. The possibility to getting non-state funding for RTDI investments from 
financial institutions such as banks, business angels etc, is extremely limited, 
particularly after the first effects of the economic crisis. In fact, banks and other 
financial organisations provide an extremely limited number of funding for supporting 
innovation and business development. The interviews we have conducted with the 
business community of CM come up with a strong common finding: from 2009 
onwards, most of the financial institutions do not finance innovation.         
Institutionally, there are no clear patterns to explain how decision-making, 
implementation and supervision of S&TI is taking place within and particularly among 
these different groups of local stakeholders. In this respect, we argue that at present 
there is no systemic understanding of the RIS of CM. The lack of sophisticated 
indicators (both qualitative and quantitative) at the regional level (e.g. to measure the 
proportion of start-ups and new spin-offs per industry, assess business failure/success 
per sectors of economy, identify patenting trends per type of firm and sector of 
activity, map the distribution of different types of innovation per sector etc) is also a 
prohibited factor in understanding and analysing the micro-dynamics of the RIS. 
Without the introduction of such practical indicators a totally clear and consistent 
picture is difficult to get for the region. For instance, since inter-sectoral collaboration 
does not happen automatically or naturally, we cannot actually say with confidence 
how or in which specific areas inter-firm and inter-organisational learning takes an 




innovative companies, technological learning is diffused through R&D projects, 
characterised by sector-specific patterns (e.g. the case of the ICT sector where firms 
exchange sets of knowledge through technological collaborations). In other forms of 
businesses, perhaps in more traditional sectors, technology learning and knowledge 
spill overs are normally embedded in customer-supplier relationships. However, to 
better understand the institutional functioning of the regional ecosystem of CM (this 
also applies in the case of Crete), we possibly need to analyse the micro-systems of 
innovation from a more aggregative perspective which will follow both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches.    
 
5.5 University-industry inefficiencies at the sub-national level: an overview       
During the last years, both regions have made notable efforts to change their 
RTDI policies with the objective of focusing more on how to better increase public-
private RTDI initiatives instead of investing in public infrastructures. However, in 
practice, little has been achieved to bridge successfully the industry-academia gap for a 
number of place-specific reasons. First, the absence of mutual need for constant 
collaboration appeared to play a central role. In reality, as companies and academic 
institutions used to be able to get access to public funding, the need to set industrial 
and academic collaborations remained at very low levels for many years. Second, the 
lack of trust-based relationships between academic institutions and businesses due to 
the lack of reliability, readiness and validity from both sides, can also explain the 
reluctance for building institutional collaboration. In this respect, institutional dynamics 
are strongly shaped by endogenous powerful interests and external old-fashioned 
legislation. Research centres and universities particularly, suffer from organisational 
and managerial long-standing pathogeneses, (for example various types of limitations 
emerging from the academic asylum, over-powerful student associations etc). 
Companies' low absorptive capacity is seen as a third obstacle that makes industry-




community from the one, and the weak innovative entrepreneurship of the industrial 
sector from the other, leads to mismatching between mature research outcomes and 
local market needs. In practice, universities and research centres are crucially closed to 
businesses. Research centres and particularly universities are not extroverted; internal 
institutional environments, anachronistic rules and bureaucracy act as prohibiting 
factors. It is clear that getting access to funding is probably the most important reason, 
if not the only one, that local academia looks occasionally for business partnerships. 
This problem increases notably due to the lack of permanent institutional translators 
that would facilitate both sides understand, communicate and cooperate with each 
other. In fact, the academic community in lacks proper liaison mechanisms and 
commercialisation channels, and therefore, the exploitation of research outcomes is 
not conducted consistently and repeatedly, while the commercialisation process takes 
place at an ad-hoc basis. 
 
5.6 Innovation and R&D trends in Crete and CM: what data says 
From a general point of view, we could argue that the regional innovation 
systems of Crete and CM are of roughly equal weight and importance of the regional 
innovation structure of Greece. Based on the analysis of the Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard which assesses how European regions perform with regard to innovation, 
Table 5.8 brings together basic innovation and R&D data for the greater areas of Crete 
and CM, and provides a comparable overview for the decade 2007-17. The table 
summarises data for two groups of regions as categorised by the EU Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard: (A) South Greece which contains three administrative regions: 
Central Macedonia, Western Macedonia and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace; and (B) 
Crete and Aegean islands which cover the region of Crete, the region of North Aegean 






Table 5.8 Innovation and R&D data: a comparison between the two regions 
Indicators 
(A) 
Southern Greece  
(B) 
Crete  & Aegean islands 
2007  2009  2011  2016  2017  2007  2009  2011  2016  2017 
GERD 0.28  0.32  0.32  0.23  0.50  0.39  0.41  0.40  0.40  0.73 
BERD 0.15  0.10  0.19  0.12  0.11  0.09  0.04  0.16  0.08  0.06 
Intensity of SMEs’ innovation 0.35  0.28  0.34  0.43  0.50  0.36  0.27  0.36  0.58  0.56 
Intensity of SMEs’ collaboration 0.12  0.25  0.12  0.42  0.43  0.14  0.23  0.14  0.23  0.66 
EPO Patents 0.23  0.24  0.28  0.13  0.13  0.21  0.21  0.26  0.15  0.15 
Intensity of SMEs’ employment 0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  n/a  0.06  0.14  0.16  0.12  n/a 
Innovation sales 0.35  0.50  0.42  0.30  0.41  0.36  0.52  0.44  0.28  0.49 
Population with tertiary education 0.48  0.50  0.52  0.56  0.59  0.40  0.41  0.38  0.40  0.45 
Source: combined data from RIS 2007, 2009, 2011, 2016, 2017 
 
Notes:  
1 Normalised data (The maximum normalised score is equal to 1 and the minimum normalised score is equal to 0)  
2 GERD: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D includes expenditure on research and development by business enterprises, 
higher education institutions, as well as government and private non-profit organisations 
3BERD: Business enterprise R&D expenditure 
4 2017 data refers exclusively to C. Macedonia and Crete respectively 





In general, the analysis of Table 5.8 shows that the two groups of regions in which 
Crete and CM belong to, represent a relatively similar innovation and R&D performance 
without any notable difference. For example, if we compare the average of the first 
two indicators (GERD and BERD) in the period 2007-2017, we see that the private and 
public R&D expenditures of the regions range roughly on the same levels (S. Greece: 
0.33 and Crete & Aegean islands: 0.46). Similarly, data on the Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D in the business sector, suggest a decline tendency occurring in 
both regional environments from 2011 onwards. This decrease is probably linked with 
the difficulty of the business sector to allocate financial resources for innovation-
related investments, as previously discussed.    
A relatively small but noteworthy difference between the two regions may be 
observed particularly in the period 2011-2016 for the intensity of SMEs’ collaboration 
(where S. Greece performs better during the last years), as well as for the intensity of 
SMEs’ innovation indicator (where Crete & the Aegean islands show a better 
performance), see Figure 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.6 Innovation and R&D in Crete and Central Macedonia (2007-2016) 
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Moreover, the figure illustrates regional performance for seven of the above 
innovation and R&D indicators during the period 2007-2016. Interestingly, the results 
show a mixed picture for the two regions, with only two of the indicators (intensity of 
SMEs' collaboration and intensity of SMEs' innovation) to demonstrate some difference 
as discussed above. The remaining ones illustrate either a slight fluctuation or a notable 
decline mainly from 2009, where the first effects of the economic crisis have been 
profoundly seen.   
Overall, we can argue that there is no fundamental divergence between the two 
regional innovation ecosystems, in the sense that they represent a relatively similar 
innovation, R&D and business performance. However, this does not automatically 
mean that there are no path-dependent attributes or place-based organisational 
routines suitable to diversify the way these two ecosystems develop and evolve over 
time. As an example, we refer to the innovation performance of the private sector, that 
traditionally remains at quite similar levels for the two regions; what is different though 
is the type of innovation (e.g. product or process innovation, marketing or 
organisational innovation etc), the type of sectors and industries in which innovation is 
usually generated and diffused (e.g. trade-shipping in the case of Crete, textiles and 
clothing in the case of CM), and the proportion and contribution of diverse local actors 
in creating innovation and new path development (e.g. number of academic centres 
and their linkages with the local society, types of intermediary organisations and level 
of support etc). Clearly, one possible way to better understand the institutional 
functioning of the regional ecosystems of Crete and CM is to analyse the micro-systems 
of innovation from a more aggregative perspective including both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Currently, what is missing is a systematic exploration of the 







Chapter 6: The design and implementation 
of smart specialisation strategies in Crete 
and Central Macedonia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 6 aims to answer the first Research Question (RQ) of this thesis "In 
what ways did the selected Greek regions develop smart specialisation strategies", by 
investigating how S3 was designed and implemented in Crete and CM. Empirical 
evidence is collected and analysed from both regional environments with the objective 
of conducting a first systematic attempt to describe the processes of developing S3 in 
the two regions, highlighting both theoretical considerations (from the design phase) 
and practical aspects (from the implementation phase).   
 As discussed in the literature review chapter, many aspects of the S3 
implementation require additional empirical evidence and clarification to provide a 
better understanding of how S3 could be realised in the regional setting. Surprisingly, 
while there are plenty of supportive documents, aimed at providing administrative and 
practical guidance at the EU, national and sub-national level, the realisation of S3 
cannot be taken for granted at present, given that there is no optimal way of 
institutionalising and governing its implementation. Quite the opposite, EU regions 
seem to follow their own approaches according to a place-specific understanding of 
what smart specialisation is and how it can be addressed in practice. Besides, we know 
from the recent S3 literature that regions with different development features and 
innovation potential may need to develop different methodological approaches to 
implement S3, depending on their capacity to stimulate, govern and regulate regional 
development; see for example (OECD 2013; Gianelle et al. 2014; Sörvik et al. 2016; 
McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016; Marques and Morgan 2018). In this regard, the 




copied and applied at different regional milieus and, as such, it would be crucial to 
study diverse regional cases throughout Europe to inform S3 policy making and action.  
 Considering the needs of this new policy framework, one could argue that the 
more evidence we can gather, the more confident we can be regarding how S3 
implementation can be better understood. In chapter 6 we acknowledge this priority 
view and we examine a series of critical elements associated to the design and 
implementation of S3. To meet this objective analytically, a number of sub-questions 
are formulated and examined empirically for Crete and CM: What particular actions 
have been carried out by Crete and CM to design and implement S3? Are there any 
significant methodological differences between the two regions? What policy tools and 
resources have been exploited? What practical barriers have been emerged, and which 
of them have been effectively encountered? Are there any policy lessons to be learned 
from the Cretan and CM cases? Most of these sub-questions are descriptive in nature 
and follow an in-depth narrative approach. 
 The value of chapter 6 is based on two key elements. The first is that it builds a 
thorough understanding of S3 practices, provided for the first time in the Greek 
regional context. Apart from a limited number of conventional studies, official 
presentations and oral speeches, no systematic data is available to describe in depth 
how S3 has been addressed in the Greek periphery. An exception is the recent work of 
Marques and Morgan (2018), who explore S3 practices in Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace. Additionally, there are no analytical studies, especially focused on the 
particularities of the Greek Science Technology and Innovation (STI) landscape 
appropriate to assist the work of local policymakers in the S3 context. What we know 
so far about smart specialisation is mostly focused on evidence and work conducted 
beyond the borders of Greece (see literature review chapter, section: what current 
empirical evidence says). Second, by describing the procedures followed by Crete and 




addressed in the ongoing S3 literature (e.g. governance and institutional settings 
analysed in chapter 7 and capacity building examined in chapter 8).  
 During fieldwork, we found that Greek S3 are conducted both at the national 
and sub-national level (regional). At the national level, S3 is carried out as an adjunct to 
regional strategies that constitute the basis of the new programming period. Thus, to 
build the smart specialisation narrative, chapter 6 falls into two main parts: the 
national context (Part A) which describes the national situation briefly; and the regional 
context (Part B), which discusses in detail the S3 situation for Crete and CM separately. 
To perform the analysis and investigate S3 practices analytically for the two regions, 
two main categories were created in NVivo (one for each region), with a number of 
sub-categories. In total, as presented throughout the chapter, we generated 325 code 
references from which 34 single quotes (19 for Crete and 15 for CM) were used to 
evidence our findings.    
 
6.2 PART A: national context - a brief overview  
 As already discussed in the introduction, in the case of Greece, smart 
specialisation strategies are not only conducted at the regional but also at the national 
level. Given that regional and national S3 plans are strongly connected with each other 
(GSRT, 2012), it is essential to examine both levels. In this section we provide a brief 
discussion on the national level. We present what smart specialisation domains have 
been identified and selected, and examine what particular policy tools are used to 
support the development of national strategies in the context of S3. 
 
6.2.1 Priorities of the national smart specialisation strategy 
 The formation of the general strategic framework for national smart 
specialisation was initiated in 2010 under the supervision of the General Secretariat of 
Research and Technology (GSRT), which is responsible for the national policy for 




approval of the national strategy came five years later (August 2015). A series of 
consultation procedures conducted during this 5-year period, as well as the analysis of 
previous economic and technological specialisation studies prioritise eight key R&D 
domains (GSRT 2012), referred as Sectoral Priorities of the National Strategy, for the 
implementation of the national smart specialisation strategy (see Table 6.1). A detailed 
description and explanation of each selected priority area is given in the official S3 
document, titled: National Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialisation 
2014-20206. 
 
Table 6.1 Priorities of the national smart specialisation strategy 
 
 Agro-food 
 Health - medicines 
 ICT 
 Energy 
 Environment and sustainable development 
 Transport 
 Materials - construction 
 Tourism/Culture - Creative industries 
Source: Author 
 
It is argued that the national smart specialisation priorities have been identified in 
sectors and technologies in which the country has shown a competitive advantage 
(Reid et al. 2012b). Interestingly, as discussed in the coming sections of Part B, many of 
the selected national domains are also included in the regional S3 action plans of Crete 
and CM, promoting regional-national connectivity and interaction. Specifically, agro-





                                                          
 
food, ICT, energy/environment and tourism/culture are some of the main R&D domains 
which have also been selected by both regions.  
 
6.2.2 Policy tools for developing national S3  
To facilitate the design and implementation of S3 and particularly of the 
entrepreneurial discovery as an ongoing and dynamic process, three main policy 
instruments were employed and used at the national level: innovation platforms, 
foresight and benchmarking (GSRT 2012). These three instruments constitute the 
national S3 innovation policy toolkit which is used to identify key priorities for future 
areas of specialisation. 
 
6.2.2.1 National innovation platforms 
 The creation of eight open innovation platforms (one for each selected domain) 
has been used as a central strategic tool to support institutional networking and 
facilitate public consultation during the development of S3 (see Figure 6.1). Innovation 
platforms are seen by the national S3 co-ordinators as a means of concentrating the 
interest of different stakeholder groups at both a national and sub-national level, as it 


















 Through the development and exploitation of this new platform initiative, the 
national government aimed at creating a favourable collaborative environment for 
national and regional players, as well as, at avoiding duplication among the central and 
regional action plans. The importance of building and functioning innovation platforms 
within the S3 framework is stressed in the following quote provided by a Cretan 




























Innovation platforms seems to be a useful tool for smart specialisation as 
it can facilitate the communication among different local actors and 
contribute to the identification of S3 specialisations (DACr44, 2017)      
 
In this respect, the innovation platforms not only constitute an important tool for 
regional-national networking but also a basic policy instrument to be used during the 
entrepreneurial discovery.  
 
6.2.2.2 Foresight  
 The exercise of foresight has been also introduced as a complementary strategic 
tool to facilitate the entrepreneurial discovery. According to the mainstream, 
documented in the strategic document prepared and published by the GSRT (2012), the 
method of national foresight was not used to simply predict the future, but to 
stimulate a creative and participatory process in which new entrepreneurial 
opportunities could be identified and selected. The main role of foresight in this 
dynamic process was to help national policymakers and strategists identify continuities 
and discontinuities in both national and sub-national developmental paths. Foresight 
was scheduled to run in parallel with the prioritisation process and being repeated 
several times during its realisation.  
 
6.2.2.3 Benchmarking 
 In the Greek S3 framework, the process of benchmarking is used to perform 
comparisons in two different ways: among entrepreneurial actors (e.g. compare their 
performance and ability to respond to S3 challenges) and among projects, programmes 
and policies implemented within the S3 framework (e.g. compare outcomes across 
different S3 projects), with the objective of identifying gaps and opportunities. In this 
respect, GSRT (2012) argues that benchmarking can serve as a crucial tool for 




different entrepreneurial actors (firms, academic-research community, governmental 
bodies etc) should take in different S3 stages.  
 
6.3 PART B: regional context  
In general, the governance of S3 at the sub-national level is carried out by the 
regional councils of the thirteen Greek regions, pursuing the development of a cross-
regional governance structure. Each region is responsible to design and develop its own 
S3 framework, with the support of its Regional Scientific Council for Research and 
Innovation which is at present the official tool of each region to support innovation and 
boost regional development. Part B investigates smart specialisation strategies at the 
regional level, focusing particularly on Crete and CM. It seeks to understand what 
particular actions have been conducted to start the design and then the 
implementation of S3, what policy tools and resources have been used, and what 
challenges and barriers have been emerged during the smart specialisation process.  
 From a general perspective, our findings suggest that the regional context 
highlights different views as to how smart specialisation was initially understood and 
adopted by the regional communities of Crete and CM. For example, the analysis 
indicates that, in the beginning, there was no common understanding of the smart 
specialisation notion and particularly of its practical realisation as an innovation policy 
tool. We present three indicative quotes collected by interviewees from both regions, 
which show that the smart specialisation framework was vague and unclear, revealing 
a relatively weak understanding of its concept:  
 
At the beginning, our understanding around smart specialisation was 
very limited (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
What is smart specialisation, what is the entrepreneurial process of 
discovery and most importantly how this new approach can be realised 




directions as to how it can be applied, not sure at all how to proceed with 
it (SOCM37, 2015) 
 
Is there any particular institutional framework for developing smart 
specialisation strategies? Should smart specialisation strategies be 
developed at a national, regional or both levels? Who can tell us? 
(XACM39, 2016) 
 
On the other hand, other interview perceptions indicate smart specialisation as a new 
strategic tool, suitable to overcome previous policy inefficiencies and fight the deep-
rooted vulnerabilities of the Greek financial crisis. Indicative quotes follow:  
 
My personal opinion is that smart specialisation can correct mistakes 
from the past, it can help revising public policy interventions which were 
not really successful in the past. Smart specialisation is an innovation 
policy tool which supports regions trigger change and boost 
development in a rational way, and we need an effective governance 
model to support smart specialisation, which is currently missing from 
our region (PECM26, 2015) 
 
Smart specialisation helps regions identify themselves, understand who 
they are and what they can or can't do. It's a tool to see how to make 
sense of their own assets and trigger regional development (KYCM23, 
2015) 
 
The main idea of this view is that smart specialisation is seen as a regional strategic tool 
which is appropriate to progressively build the innovation potential of the regions and 
improve regional economic performance. Given the relatively weak understanding of 
the smart specialisation notion (at least in the beginning) on the one, and its emerging 
meaning as a regional strategic tool on the other, it is increasingly important to analyse 







REGION OF CRETE 
6.4 Smart specialisation practices in the region of Crete  
6.4.1 S3 overview, entrepreneurial discovery and priority areas of Crete 
 The first initiatives of smart specialisation were launched by the Managing 
Authority7 (MA) of the region of Crete in 2012, and took a structured shape at the end 
of the same year when an informal smart specialisation working group was set up and 
approved by the regional governor to initiate S3 (see following sections for details). 
This was the first official reaction of the political authorities at the sub-national level to 
fulfil the EU ex-ante conditionality and become eligible to get access to the 2014-20 
European funding. The interview responses tend to show off that Crete seemed to be 
one of first regions in the country which incorporated the logic of smart specialisation 
and adopted its policy principles in the regional context. They also point out that S3 
was accepted by the local political system as an appealing policy to tackle the negative 
effects of the financial crisis and improve island's employment and productivity rates. 
In respect to the early outset of the S3 practices, a member of the Cretan S3 working 
group says: 
 
We began smart specialisation in the middle of 2012, and I believe we 
were the first Greek region which introduced its logic in the regional 
setting (KACr12, 2015) 
 
A number of similar views (16 out of 30 respondents) suggest that Crete was found to 
play a groundbreaking role in the development of the Greek smart specialisation 
strategies, as being probably the first region which addressed S3 challenges, prior to 
larger regions such as Attica (Athens) and CM, whose smart specialisation planning 
started from 2013 onwards.  
 
7 The Managing Authority is responsible for the Regional Operational Programmes implemented within 
the National Strategic Reference Frameworks 
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6.4.1.1 The entrepreneurial discovery in the region of Crete  
 Cretan policymakers followed a place-specific policy approach to commence 
and develop the entrepreneurial discovery in the region. Our responses indicate a 
rather narrow-to-broad approach with five main stages as illustrated in Figure 6.2. The 
outcome of the first two stages (domain selection and domain identification) was 
influenced by specific (narrow) attributes and closed practices (in the sense of limited 
stakeholders’ participation). These two stages put the basis for initiating the early 
stages of the design of S3. The other three stages (public consultation, approval and 
action plan), were the outcome of a broader involvement of the local entrepreneurial 
actors which was based on the contribution of the different productive structures of 
the island. 
 
Figure 6.2 Cretan entrepreneurial discovery: A narrow-to-broad approach 
 
 





The identification and prioritisation of S3 was initiated by a group of S3 experts 
(RIS3 working group) which, as discussed later in detail, it was in charge to make 
proposals and recommendations to the regional governor regarding the domains to be 
selected for future specialisations. As illustrated in Figure 6.2, in these two first stages, 
a broad-based engagement of the local community was restricted. The main idea of 
keeping this approach narrow, was to speed up all necessary preparatory actions for 
the detection and selection of the main S3 domains with the ultimate objective to get 
approved and proceed with the identification of specific specialisations within these 
domains. Once S3 priorities were approved at an official level (by the regional, national 
and EU authorities), a series of public consultations were conducted to inform local 
society about the selected domains and start an open and continuous dialogue with the 
academic and business community of the island for the collection of ideas, proposals 
and suggestions. Representing a common perception, a Cretan S3 expert points out the 
process of consultation was extensive and repetitive: 
 
The region of Crete has had a long period of consultation, several events 
were organised, 2 or 3 informative workshops in which formal 
presentations were given. A number of organisations were invited to 
participate and the S3 document was sent in advance for better 
preparation (SACr1, 2014) 
 
Beyond any obvious reason (e.g. inform stakeholders, get public's input, 
stimulate public involvement etc), public consultations were seen as means of 
legitimising the decision making and, therefore, minimising the possibility for accusing 
policy options in the future. In general, the S3 co-ordinators expressed satisfaction on 
the final outcome of the consultation; this view is briefly presented by a member of the 





We didn’t receive any negative feedback from our presentations to the 
general public. We didn’t experience any disagreements for the selection 
of the specific R&D domains (ANCr11, 2015)     
 
A clear indication comes out from the above citation, suggesting that the consultations 
did not raise any significant disagreements on the selected domains, and therefore led 
to formal approvals (at the level of EU) and allowed the preparation of the first S3 
action plans.  
 
6.4.1.2 Priority areas in Crete  
 The Cretan smart specialisation strategy identifies four priority domains (as well 
as the use of ICT for horizontal application) as illustrated in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 Priorities of the smart specialisation strategy in Crete 
 
 Agro-alimentary complex 
 Cultural-touristic complex 
 Environmental complex 
 Knowledge complex 
Source: Author 
 
According to the Region of Crete (2015), the agro-alimentary complex refers to a set of 
activities linked to the primary sector and aims at "producing high added value food 
that has high nutritional value". The cultural-touristic complex targets activities in the 
tourism and cultural sectors such as hospitality, transpiration, promotion of cultural 
resources etc). The environmental complex refers to energy saving, renewable energy, 
climate change, while the knowledge complex focuses on the research and university 
institutions of Crete which promote state-of-the-art technologies in nanotechnology, 




Operational Programme of Crete for each of the selected R&D domain is shown in 
Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3 Available funding by selected R&D domain (Region of Crete) 
 
Source: Elaborated data by the Author (based on http://ris3.crete.gov.gr/download-
files)  
  
The four selected domains were outlined in the first edition of the S3 document 
which was approximately 100 pages long and included also a detailed overview of the 
most important socioeconomic and structural characteristics of the island. We gained 
access and elaborated the content of the S3 document and we found that most of its 
details were based on the analysis of secondary sources gathered by previous reports 
and regional studies (an enriched list of references and citations is included in the 
report). In its final version, the S3 document describes the macroeconomic 
performance of Crete, including useful information about key regional dynamics and 
recent trends in the business community and the R&D landscape. It also provides a 
detailed SWOT analysis, based on the availability of qualitative and quantitative data at 
the sub-national level, as well as, other practical aspects concerning the methodology 
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straightforward; it describes Cretan traits from different perspectives and attempts to 
provide a detailed outline of multi-level key policy recommendations. The selected 
R&D domains are those that one could expect to see for Crete and, in general, they are 
well fitted with the industrial structure of the island. A representative view on the 
smart specialisation priorities is given by RACr4 (2014):   
 
The S3 domains selected for Crete are those that one should expect, 
agro-food, tourism, services. These are economic areas in which Crete 
could show a competitive advantage in the future (RACr4, 2014) 
 
However, it is important to mention that in its final version as approved by the EU, the 
S3 report does not include a detailed plan for the implementation of specific actions. 
The lack of a clear and analytical action plan can be evidenced by reviewing the full 
version of the RIS3 of Crete (in Greek) which is available online at the official site of the 
region alongside with a short executive summary (in English)8.     
 
6.4.2 Place-specific actions and regional tools for S3 design 
 During the analysis we identified a number of regional initiatives and actions 
which seemed to have affected the design of S3 in the region of Crete. Four main policy 
tools to strategy design have been identified and highlighted in the interview data. 
These are the creation of a new S3 working group to initiate S3 practices, the work of 
the Regional Innovation Council, the exploitation of previous experience in regional 
innovation and strategy, and the formation of new innovation supportive programmes. 
Table 6.3 summarises the interview results as to what the respondents believe about 







                                                          
 
Table 6.3 Respondents' attitude on key forerunners of S3 design 
Policy instruments for  
the design of S3  No of respondents   Percentage*    Quotes 




















(*)Based on a total number of 30 interviews conducted for Crete 
Source: Author 
 
6.4.2.1 Smart specialisation experts team 
 To start the design of S3, the Managing Authority set a smart specialisation 
working group consisted of seven top-level experts from diverse stakeholder groups of 
the local productive system. We held in-depth face-to-face interviews with all group 
members to understand the role of this team as a smart specialisation strategy tool and 
its policy contribution in the early stages of S3. The structure and expertise of each 

















Table 6.4 Cretan S3 experts team  
 Professional occupation of experts  Area of 
Expertise 
 Type of expertise 
1 Executive Secretary, Region of Crete  Public sector   Strategic objectives and 
vision of Crete  
2 Director, Managing Authority, 
Region of Crete  
 Public sector  Implementation of 
Regional Operational 
Programs, national and 
EU relegations   
3 Director, Institute of Electronic 
Structure and Laser, Foundation for 
Research and Technology 
 Academia  Polymer Science & 
Engineering, 
management of STI 
initiatives  








5 Technical advisor, Heraklion 
Chamber of Commerce  
 Private 
sector  
 Business and industrial 
sector  




 Food & Agriculture 
7 Private Consultant (paid work)  Private 
sector 
 Preparation of S3 
reports and studies, 
industrial expertise   
Source: Author 
 
The S3 group consisted of one representative from academia, three experts from the 
private sector, one private consultant (paid work) and two senior staff from the 
regional government. The creation of the S3 team was regarded as a main policy tool 
for initiating and putting in place the strategic design of smart specialisation. The idea 
of setting a rather small number of experts to initiate S3 design was based on a 
deliberate action of the region to reduce time-consuming processes and achieve 
additional flexibility. As explained in the following quote, previous experience from 
Crete shows that a number of past meetings, workshops and other typical local events 
failed to fully bring the required results, due to their bureaucratic nature (e.g. time-
consuming processes for official approvals). In regards to this matter, there is a clear 




at speeding up the procedures of S3 and, simultaneously, ensuring an unofficial 
representativeness of the quadruple helix of Crete: industry, academia, government 
and civil society. Moreover, they suggest that this decision seemed effective as the 
selection of a small number of experts quickly and rather implicitly was a crucial factor 
which facilitated the prompt beginning of the smart specialisation procedure. A Cretan 
expert from the S3 working group explains:    
 
It was a working group consisting of individuals, not representatives of 
organisations or businesses, who had a deep understanding of the local 
productive system of the island. They didn’t want to give this group an 
official character in order to make sure that work will be done effectively 
without delays or other barriers occurring in typical official meaningless 
meetings (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
Interestingly, the case of Crete highlights a set of practical benefits in relation to how 
the decision to set a small S3 working group overcame bureaucratic challenges and 
affected the early stages of smart specialisation. In respect to the facilitation of the 
initial S3 stages, another Cretan interviewee points out:  
 
The invitation was given directly to individuals. Smart specialisation co-
ordinator used personal contacts to approach experts, who were very 
well informed about the current situation of Crete from many different 
perspectives: economical, technological etc. This methodology was 
mainly followed to avoid time-consuming processes and speed up the 
whole effort. I mean, we wanted ten people, experienced people, who 
could come up with a kind of smart specialisation action plan very 
shortly. This was the main idea (KACr12, 2015) 
 
The above quote shows an informal process in which S3 was organised through 
unofficial meetings, delivering further flexibility (e.g. ease to set, cancel or postpone 
meetings due to the limited number of the participants; meetings normally conducted 
on time without significant delays; participation was accomplished by the same people, 




informal allowing for less stressful situations etc). What makes the case of Crete 
interesting in these first stages of the smart specialisation design is the process per se, 
which shifts from various outdated policy routines and traditional practices to a more 
effective and straightforward model of policy co-ordination and action. Furthermore, in 
order to ensure flexibility and effectiveness, the Cretan S3 co-ordinators established a 
fast-track policy instrument to promote bottom-up action. The novelty in this approach 
was the fact that S3 experts were asked to act as individuals and not as representatives 
of their organisations. By doing so, no institutional permissions and official approvals 
were necessary for the experts to take part in the S3 process. Additionally, most of the 
opinions, suggestions and policy recommendations were freely expressed and 
documented by the experts at an individual basis, without having undesired delays as 
normally happen when organisations have to respond officially.  
 We have collected evidence which suggests that S3 working group was 
successful. Two indicative quotes show the effectiveness of the meetings and the good 
collaboration among the members of the S3 team: 
 
Yes, meetings worked really well, we had productive discussions from 
which some good ideas emerged (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
Yes, of course it worked well, there was only one issue related to me, but 
not really a conflict, just a different opinion regarding an optimum 
equilibrium between basic and applied research. There were people from 
academia who tried to promote basic scientific research, maybe more 
than the expected level, and my opinion was to start thinking further 
how applied research could be exploited (KACr12, 2015) 
 
The ultimate objective of the S3 group was to prepare a working document with the 
aim of supporting the Managing Authority of Crete to create a first draft of the S3 
document. To achieve this goal, five meetings were organised over a period of 
approximately 2.5 years. All group members we have interviewed confirmed the 




6.4.2.2 Regional Innovation Council of Crete 
 Crete was the first region in Greece which set an innovation council at the sub-
national level. One of the respondents with a key role in the formation of the RIC Crete 
says: 
 
Crete is the first Greek region which realised the importance of setting a 
regional innovation council, I think it was established in January 2011 
(SACr1, 2014)  
 
The Regional Innovation Council of Crete (RIC Crete) was found in January 2011, aimed 
at operating as an advisory body of the region for the promotion of science, technology 
and innovation. While the RIC Crete cannot be directly regarded as part of the smart 
specialisation process, it could be seen as a complementary tool aiming at creating 
favourable conditions for the design of S3. Furthermore, the interviewees suggest that 
the work of the council has contributed to the early reflection and adoption of S3 by 
nurturing a more favourable environment. SACr1 (2014) highlights its value by 
mentioning that:  
 
The innovation council was perhaps the first official tool of the region 
which attempted to network key local actors, its work accounts a series 
of developmental studies in diverse economic areas which were later 
used to support the design of smart specialisation (SACr1, 2014) 
 
 
The RIC Crete supported the creation of inter-regional collaborations. A number of key 
local actors came closer to each other, they shared common problems and challenges 
and created mutual patterns of collaborations through the formation of ten thematic 
working groups. The representativeness of these groups covered a wide range of 
different fields, stimulating a broad participation from both the private and public 




experts from 50 organisations, authorities and companies have been engaged actively 
in the working groups covering a wide range of expertise (see Table 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5 Regional Innovation Council of Crete experts per thematic group 
RIC Crete 
working groups 
 No. of 
participants 
 Type and area of expertise  
Primary sector  113  Members of the regional council, 
representatives from regional authorities, 
municipalities, trade unions  
Entrepreneurship   25  Academics, business consultants, entrepreneurs, 
companies' managers  
Green 
development  
 16  Civil engineers, representatives from the 
Technical Chamber, entrepreneurs,   
Health   8  Researchers, academics, entrepreneurs, 
members of the regional council  
ICT   23  Researchers, academics, SMEs, entrepreneurs, 
business associations   
Environment  24  Researchers, academics, representatives from 
regional authorities and municipalities   
Energy    21  Academics, researchers, entrepreneurs, 
representatives from the Energy Agency of 
Crete, private consultants  
Tourism   35  Tourist operators, representatives from 
municipalities, hoteliers, tourism entrepreneurs, 
academics    
Culture   19  Researchers, representatives from heritage 
culture places, museums, archaeology    
Source: Elaborated data by the Author (based on http://ris3.crete.gov.gr/download-
files)  
 
 Apart from setting the basis for creating a more productive cooperation 
framework, systematically missing from the regional innovation agenda, the RIC Crete 
produced a number of practical tools increasingly valuable for the design of S3. The 
respondents from the S3 experts team draw attention to the following as the most 
important ones, which were used to support the prioritisation process: preparation of 
policy suggestions geared to overcome the financial chaos; proposals for the creation 




collection and categorisation of a huge number of regional studies, thematic reports, 
academic papers, historical documents, indicators and statistics.  
 
6.4.2.3 The value of previous experience in innovation strategies 
 The experience from a mixture of previous innovation and strategy programs 
(e.g. Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy-RITTS Project, Crete 
Innovative Region-CRINNO, Regional Innovation Pole etc), appeared to have a 
supplementary role in enhancing the design of smart specialisation. The evaluation of 
the previous generation programmes provided policy learning outcomes and assisted 
S3 expert group to avoid past mistakes and take advantage of positive elements. We 
interviewed 5 of the past innovation council of Crete. The evidence suggests that 
experience from the RITTS project helped understanding better the systemic view of 
innovation (e.g. how innovation works in a systemic way, what barriers exist etc) and 
get better prepared to embrace these critical elements into the design of the new 
innovation policy framework of S39. In regard to this, SACr1 (2014) says: 
 
The RITTS Project was a great opportunity for Crete to start designing 
regional policies and strategies for the first time [...] RITTS urge local 
actors coming closer, get familiar with each other and start thinking of 
how to work together for innovation policymaking. RITTS was a great 
school, and we have taken into account its experience when addressing 
the design of S3 (SACr1, 2014)   
 
The example of RITTS shows that such programs were not only considered as an 
important means of policy analysis and planning, but also as a source of new 
innovation learning and strategic thinking in the context of S3. 
9 The RITTS Project was the first collective endeavour of the region to consider the design of 
regional innovation policies from a more analytical, strategic and systemic perspective; 
analytical and strategic in the sense that actions were designed and conducted collectively, and 
systemic in the sense that various key local actors were officially engaged in many different 
phases of the project. 
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6.4.2.4 Crete Innovation Initiative (CRINI) 
 The Crete Innovation Initiative (CRINI), introduced very recently as an idea to 
give local economy a knowledge-based approach (Region of Crete 2015), seems to 
becoming a new promising tool for supporting policy actions related to the design and 
implementation of smart specialisation. Previously, the design of innovation 
policymaking was almost entirely conducted by the central government in 
collaboration with certain regional authorities. CRINI seeks to change this policy routine 
by supporting entrepreneurial actors from the local private sector taking the role of an 
active driver for regional design and development. We interviewed 3 key persons with 
a direct engagement in the formation of CRINI. Its emerging role within the S3 
framework is documented in the following statement provided by one of the Cretan 
respondents from the governor office: 
 
It's time to see how firms and other organisations from the private sector 
can contribute to the design and development of new innovation 
strategies. In the context of smart specialisation, this process will be 
done by CRINI (RACr4, 2014) 
 
Similarly, the majority of the interviewees, either from the public or the private sector 
of Crete, strongly believe that the CRINI initiative will not only assist inter-regional 
collaboration during the entrepreneurial discovery, but it is also expected to provide 
significant guidance in the overall effort of the region to achieve its S3 objectives. 
SACr1 (2014) provides an indicate view on this attitude: 
 
The Crete Innovation Initiative, we call it CRINI, is a new initiative started 
from Crete with the aim of promoting knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship. We expect from CRINI to facilitate collaboration for 
developing smart specialisation [...] It's a new policy tool which can be 






Currently, CRINI takes an active role through the collaboration agreements signed 
between public and private actors, with the objective of jointly designing and putting 
the basis for developing the new S3 framework.    
 
6.4.3 The implementation phase: regional actions and policy tools   
Officially, the implementation phase of the Cretan S3 action plan was started in 
the middle of 2017, under the supervision of the General Directorate of Development 
Planning which, administratively, is divided into four units (we recall that the design 
phase was undertaken by the Managing Authority). To understand and outline the 
steps undertaken during the implementation of S3, a second round of data gathered 
from longitudinal analysis conducted in summer 2017 were analysed and used.  
In general, the implementation of smart specialisation in the region of Crete 
started with the creation of four new S3 working groups. The main responsibility of 
these groups was to create and develop a detailed action plan for each of the four 
selected domains, based on the outcomes of the consultation process and the 
entrepreneurial discovery. From our analysis we can observe six main stages conducted 















Figure 6.4 A 6-stage approach for the implementation of the S3 pilot projects 
 
Source: Author  
 
Description of the implementation stages   
Preparation of early processes  
In this first stage, a number of supportive actions were undertaken by the General 
Directorate of Development Planning (from now on S3 co-ordinator), with the objective 
of preparing and facilitating various preliminary procedures, appropriate to support the 
realisation of smart specialisation in the region of Crete. One of the first priorities was 
to form a new and updated business register, which was still missing at that time from 
the region in a clear and comprehensive structure. Interestingly, DACr44 (2017) reveals:  
 
One of our first priorities was to make a new business register to find all 
private firms and start informing them for the activities of S3. We 
created one business register for each S3 area. This was the most 
hardest part, because we had to make a new list almost from scratch 
(DACr44, 2017) 
 
The creation of this new business register was seen as an essential smart specialisation 
tool, geared to provide complimentary support to S3 co-ordinators. As DACr44 (2017) 
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points out, this first stage was quite complex as the process of collecting the required 
information was not straightforward but rather time-consuming. The new business 
register was developed separately for each smart specialisation domain, by 
geographical area (per prefecture), aiming at creating an effective communication 
channel between the S3 co-ordinator and the local firms (which potently would take an 
active role in the smart specialisation practices).  
Interestingly, as regards to the communication strategy of the region, a mixture 
of tools such as direct communication via emails and phone calls, focus groups, 
thematic meetings and face-to-face visits throughout the region were introduced. The 
type (mixture of means including different communication tools e.g. focus groups, 
distribution of self-evaluation questionnaires, provision of information per target group 
etc), intensity (e.g. increased number of face-to-face visits in a long period of time) and 
extent (visits in many different cities in all prefectures) of this new way of collaboration 
was certainly novel for the region, as no similar actions have been collectively 
conducted in the past for such reasons. The new way of thinking policy implementation 
and communication in the S3 context is highlighted by DACr44 (2017):  
  
We started from the agro-food sector, we organised the first informative 
workshop here in Heraklion. Last Wednesday we went to Ierapetra, on 
Friday in Chania, and we are going tomorrow to Rethymno. In the 21st 
we are going to visit Mires (DACr44, 2017) 
 
This new approach to local entrepreneurial actors, increased the potential for 
developing a more effective strategy as an increased number of local actors from 
diverse regional areas were given the opportunity to take an active role in the 
discovery process. In previous programming periods, the design of regional innovation 






Creation of policy tools to implement S3 action plans  
During the interviews with the S3 co-ordinator, the creation of two key policy 
instruments was highlighted to facilitate the realisation of the smart specialisation 
action plans at different stages of development: the regional innovation platforms and 
the unit for the development of entrepreneurship. 
 
i. Creation of regional innovation platforms per R&D domain  
To support the entrepreneurial process of discovery, four open innovation 
platforms were created at the sub-national level (one for each selected domain). As it is 
expected at the national level (see Figure 6.1), the introduction of the innovation 
platforms was intended to play a complementary role in the creation and development 
of the S3 action plans, by providing different levels of support to the participating 
organisations. It is the first time when such a policy initiative was launched in the 
regional setting with the objective of facilitating university-firm research collaborations 
and supporting the encouragement of inter-regional synergies. In respect to this, 
DACr44 (2017) highlights: 
 
We want to use innovation platforms as a means to support the 
collaboration of universities and research centres with local firms, to help 
scientists come closer to the businesses community and vice versa 
(DACr44, 2017)     
 
Region of Crete (2015), indicates other objectives that the S3 innovation platform seeks 
to meet in the S3 context:       
 
- to facilitate inter-sector knowledge flow and support the exchange of place-based 
expertise and know-how within the selected domain   
- to create and exploit joint strategic tools (e.g. develop common tools for protecting 




- to reinforce the linkages of the quadruple helix 
- to boost technological innovation in multidisciplinary areas  
 
ii. Establishment of the Unit for the Development of Entrepreneurship  
 The Unit for the Development of Entrepreneurship will be set as a new regional 
structure to support S3 practices in the long-run. Particularly, the main aim of this 
permanent instrument will be to support all stages related to the entrepreneurial 
discovery. DACr44 (2017) has indicated the following tasks in our discussion:   
 
- To introduce co-ordinated and constant actions towards bridging the industry-
academia gap at the level of the region. An e-platform, in which S3 players (existing 
and potential) can be registered will be designed and created. Through this new 
initiative, the region of Crete will take an informal intermediate role for supporting 
intra-regional collaborations research bodies and local firms.    
 
- In connection with the Regional Scientific Council for Research & Innovation, the 
Unit for the Development of Entrepreneurship will also have a monitoring role in 
relation to progress in implementing the S3 in Crete.  
 
Participation of stakeholders, submission of proposals and open consultation  
 This dynamic stage included different processes, aiming at bringing together 
diverse groups of local stakeholders and engaging them in diverse S3 practices. More 
precisely, once local actors were informed about the ongoing smart specialisation 
framework in Crete, the next step was to encourage their actual engagement by 
motivating them submitting their entrepreneurial proposals for future S3 projects and, 
later, by participating in open consultation processes. The purpose of asking and 
collecting these proposals was solely exploratory (e.g. to engage the local society in the 




emerged particularly for Crete), following the rationale indicated by the 
entrepreneurial process of discovery (Rodrik 2008; Foray 2016). Four open calls were 
published (one for each selected smart specialisation domain) inviting private firms, 
academic institutes and other local actors to bring ideas about what projects and under 
what particular synergies could be financed in the context of S3. To support the 
development of various integrated proposals and provide additional transparency and 
reliability to the process, the Cretan S3 co-ordinator set specific requirement. We 
participated in several S3 workshops and elaborated a number of presentations given 
by the S3 co-ordinator for each selected R&D domain (see Table 5 in Appendices). The 
analysis designates five key guidelines given to direct the creation of S3 proposals:     
 
• Submission of clear and comprehensive ideas/proposals from different stakeholder 
groups    
• Suggested ideas/proposals must be novel, reliable and mature  
• Detailed description and justification of funding required  
• Type and level of collaboration which is promoted   
• Estimation of project timeline 
 
The submission of the proposals was conducted directly to the General Directorate of 
Development Planning, through an online submission tool, ensuring confidentiality and 
privacy. All proposals were grouped into thematic classes, leading to the creation of 
different thematic groups for public consultation. The number of the submitted 









Table 6.6 Number of submitted proposals and consultation groups per RIS3 domain 
RIS3 domain   No. of 
proposals  




 Area of thematic groups 
Agro-food    n/a    
Tourism-culture   66  4  i. ICT for alternative tourism 
(group A)  
ii. ICT for alternative tourism 
(group B) 
iii. Promotion and enrichment of 
tourist products  
iv. Marketing and promotion of 
tourist products 
 
Environment   57  3  i. Sewage & Wastewater 
Treatment 
ii. Intelligent technologies in 
managing environmental and 
energy problems 
iii. Materials for the 
environmental application; 
optimisation of energy 
consumption  
Knowledge      n/a   
Source: Elaborated data by the Author (based on http://ris3.crete.gov.gr/download-
files)  
 
Evaluation and approval of proposals  
 The last three stages refer to the evaluation of the proposals, the approval of 
the consultation process and its outcome, as well as the finalisation of the 
specialisation areas to be selected after the final recommendation of the Regional 
Scientific Council for Research & Innovation. During these processes main focus was 
primarily given on the possibilities of creating intra- and inter-sector collaborations, 
aiming at maximising the number of synergies in which potential S3 beneficiaries could 





We really need to create a culture of collaboration, we want to 
encourage and promote intra-regional synergies through the smart 
specialisation projects which will be selected for funding (DACr44, 2017)     
 
While networking among regional entrepreneurial actors was ranked top S3 priority, at 
the time of writing this thesis, the evaluation of the submitted proposals was in 
progress and, therefore, no S3 calls were released to fund specific networking activities 
and synergies.      
 
REGION OF CENTRAL MACEDONIA  
6.5 Smart specialisation practices in Central Macedonia 
The following sections discuss the way smart specialisation practices were 
conducted in Central Macedonia (CM). As we have done for the case of Crete, focus is 
mainly given on formulating the narrative of the design and implementation phases 
carried out in the region. Concerning the latter, it is noted that the implementation 
phase covers the period up to the publication of the first calls for tenders (middle 
2017), as the actual realisation of the S3 (through specific projects) has not started yet.   
    
6.5.1 S3 overview, entrepreneurial discovery and priority areas of Central 
Macedonia 
Moving the regional innovation agenda forward, CM initiated its smart 
specialisation strategy in the first quarter of 2013, when the regional governor 
approved a diverse network of local experts, responsible for the development of S3. As 
to the first smart specialisation steps, a key member of the S3 co-ordination group says:  
 
Smart specialisation started on April, 2013 by creating the network of 
the experts of the regional innovation strategy, which consisting of 
representatives from local business bodies, from academic community 






The formation of this new S3 network was the first official step to incorporate the idea 
of smart specialisation as a regional innovation strategy and start designing its strategic 
framework in a collective and systematic way. Following a slightly different 
methodological approach comparing to Crete, this broad network consisted of an 
increased number of individual experts (mainly for the greater area of Thessaloniki), 
who officially represented a wide range of different stakeholder groups including 
various regional authorities, local academia and business sector, as well as, other key 
players from the regional productive system of CM. We recall that in the case of Crete, 
this early step was taken unofficially by a small group of individuals directly allocated by 
the regional authorities (see Table 6.4). Specifically, to address an adequate critical 
mass suitable to initiate S3 preparatory actions, more than 30 local actors were 
involved in the early stages of the design phase (see Table 8 in Appendices). The main 
reason for involving an extended number of local players was to achieve 
representativeness and effectiveness and meet the objectives of the discovery process 
as indicated in the S3 literature; see for example (Landabaso and Foray 2014; McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2015; Capello and Kroll 2016). One of the Central Macedonian 
respondents with an administrative role in the design of S3 explains: 
 
Our scope was to achieve high representativeness from different 
stakeholder groups, to inform as many organisations as possible about 
what smart specialisation is and what we want to do (MACM20, 2015) 
 
According to the S3 co-ordinators, representativeness was secured by inviting and 
stimulating the engagement of an increased number of high-level experts from a large 
number of organisations located throughout the region. Effectiveness was guaranteed 
by identifying local actors with pronounced experience and high interest in the 




6.5.1.1 The entrepreneurial discovery in Central Macedonia   
 The regional authorities of CM addressed entrepreneurial discovery as a 
continuous and dynamic procedure divided into two separated phases. The adoption of 
a two-phase approach is a particular strategic decision for CM which indicates the way 
local policy experts addressed S3 rationale in practice. The first phase refers to the 
practices carried out for the prioritisation and final selection of the smart specialisation 
domains; its analysis remained at a rather general level without providing a detailed 
action plan. As explained by KOCM21 (2015), in this first part, the main aim was to 
examine specialisation at a broad level through the exploitation of quantitative data 
and statistics (e.g. trends of markets, economic areas with strong competitive 
advantages, available innovations and technological applications etc):  
 
In the beginning we identified the domains of smart specialisation and 
then we tried to see what specialisations could be emerged from these 
domains (KOCM21, 2015) 
 
KOCM25 (2015) refers to five main steps which relate to the early stages of the S3 
design (see Figure 6.5). The first two stages aimed at creating a network of experts and 
providing a broad invitation to local actors to participate in the S3 practices (it is noted 
that at that time smart specialisation was a new idea and its conceptual understanding 
weak as documented in various interview quotes in this section). Later (stage 3), the 
objective was to focus on more specialised actions and create a first solid 
understanding around S3, followed by stages 4 and 5 in which six thematic working 









Figure 6.5 Early steps during the design of S3 in CM 
 
Source: Author   
 
 Once domains were identified and justified, a second more focused phase 
followed, aiming at proving further specialisation by identifying particular areas of 
actions within the selected domains (e.g. specific areas of expertise with increased 
potential for future economic development). The first methodological steps of CM to 
run the entrepreneurial discovery were based on a broad-to-narrow approach, 
followed by widely open and transparent practices (see Figure 6.6). This option fits well 
with the ongoing smart specialisation literature, which indicates broad practices and 
expanded stakeholders' engagement during the entrepreneurial discovery (Foray 2016; 
McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016b; Sörvik et al. 2016). In contrast with the early stages 
conducted by the Cretan S3 co-ordinators, various local actors from different 
stakeholder groups were mobilised and encouraged to participate in a continuous self-
discovery for the identification and prioritisation processes of the region. This was the 
first collective effort of CM authorities to examine what local adaptation would be 
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Figure 6.6 Entrepreneurial Process of Discovery in CM: a snapshot 
 
Source: Author  
 
As shown in Figure 6.6, the preparatory work of the identification of the S3 domains 
was based on a wide participation of diverse entrepreneurial actors through the 
creation of six thematic groups, while the selection of the domains was conducted by a 
revised group of local actors consisted of one working group. The involvement of the 
business community in these first stages (e.g. local entrepreneurs specialised in several 
business fields) was limited given that firms were mostly represented from their official 
collective bodies, (e.g. chambers of commerce) and from the entrepreneurs 





There were a large number of participants in our events, and I think, in 
general, it worked well. However, we faced many problems in persuading 
businesses participate in our meetings (KOCM21, 2015) 
 
The problem of stimulating the interest of local entrepreneurs was overcome in the 
following steps (public consultation, final approval and action plan) as a broad 
participation and representativeness was achieved. Interestingly, apart from the 
difficulties to stimulate and motivate the interest of private firms, the responses show 
that the formal approach of the entrepreneurial discovery acted as an inhibitory factor 
which appeared stressful, and at some point, unproductive. Furthermore, this was 
mainly due to the increased hesitation of many participants to officially express their 
strategic suggestions, fearing that they will be accused of supporting dark powerful 
interests and malevolent lobbying (this was pretty well related with the public 
institutions such as universities and research centres). The above view is well grounded 
in our quotes presented below:   
 
I think the most crucial challenge was to persuade institutes and local 
organisations to participate in the working groups without any fear, you 
know to make them realise that, in fact, they had nothing to lose from 
their participation and contribution in the workshops. [...] participants 
from the business community appeared cautious because, you know, the 
entrepreneurial process of discovery attempts to identify critical 
economic domains, so what happens if some of the participants, I mean 
the entrepreneurs see that their business activities or interests are not 
having a critical role in the selected sectors and that their businesses 
may not concentrate the interest of the others? This makes them 
cautious, and this is a challenge that one has to tackle when conducting 
the entrepreneurial discovery (KOCM25, 2015) 
 
Showing a quite similar opinion, another interviewee says: 
 
We delivered questionnaires and we asked from all participants to 
provide written feedback, we did receive some, not very useful and to the 




hesitating to provide feedback officially as they had to get a formal 
approval from the board of directors of their institutions [...] in order to 
persuade them sending some fruitful feedback we just mentioned that 
the provided information will not be published, it’s just to help us 
understanding better the complexities and difficulties that each 
organisation might experience within the smart specialisation framework 
in order to act accordingly (MACM20, 2015) 
 
As it turns out, two critical issues are found to play a challenging role in particular 
stages of the S3 design phase in CM. The first challenge relies on the difficulty of the 
CM milieu to gradually drive out the fear of picking winners and usual suspects. It is 
also linked to the relatively complex process to conceptualise smart specialisation as a 
collective endeavour to design joint development plans geared to support a wide range 
of businesses in cross-sector areas. The second challenge indicates the multifaceted 
nature of the complexity that local bodies are likely to experience when addressing 
smart specialisation. For instance, institutes' heterogeneity in terms of understanding 
and incorporating smart specialisation is very much stressed by the words of the 
second respondent.  
 To move S3 practices forward, more than ten parallel meetings were conducted 
per thematic group, mostly every two or three weeks until June 2013, as there was an 
obligation to deliver the first draft of the S3 document to the EU in July 2013. 
Specifically, MACM20 (2015) recites: 
 
We created six thematic working groups, consisting of representatives 
from the majority of the organisations which have been invited to 
participate. Each organisation has a representative in each of the 
working groups. We started working with these teams, it was in March. 
Our discussions were centred on smart specialisation and what we could 
achieve. Each group worked towards identifying which products 
appeared to be the more appealing, what actions should be undertaken 
to produce such products. I have to say that some working groups 
worked really well. Meetings were quite often at the beginning, every 2 
or 3 weeks until June, as we had the obligation to send a first draft to the 




A systematic approach is revealed from the above quote, indicating clear tasks and 
obligations to meet the objectives of the entrepreneurial search processes. Meetings 
were organised regularly with the aim of putting the basis for identifying specific 
entrepreneurial actions for future specialisations. In order to provide an alternative 
perspective and move the progress of S3 forward, the six thematic teams were later 
grouped into one working team consisted of a limited number of participants. 
Respondents from the S3 co-ordinators claim that this option was meant to provide 
further flexibility and speed up the process. Indicatively, MACM20 (2015) says: 
 
Later, the thematic groups became one big group, mainly for practical 
reasons, just to make things easier and support progress and speed up 
processes. So now we have one group called network of experts instead 
of having many thematic ones (MACM20, 2015) 
 
The final outcome of the new group was the preparation of several draft documents 
which included policy suggestions and details in the following areas (Region of CM 
2015):  
 
• exports  
• environment 
• foreign direct investments (FDI) 
• ICT 
• new product development 
• creative sector and branding 
 
 Afterwards, all S3 draft documents were elaborated by a private consultant 
with the objective of creating a finalised version of the S3 priorities to be released for 
public consultation. The consultation process was carried out in the city of Thessaloniki 




examined the final S3 document for CM, created in 2015. It includes the 
macroeconomic characteristics of the region, the current entrepreneurial trends of the 
business community, the characteristics of the local academic system, a detailed SWOT 
analysis, and a thorough explanation of the selected R&D domains and their 
governance framework. It came up with four main priorities (see Table 6.7), which, in 
general, were accepted by the majority of the local productive system of the region. As 
to the approval of the S3 document, KOCM25 (2015) points out:  
 
We submitted the final version of the smart specialisation document to 
the EU in May 2015 and some weeks later we received a letter 
mentioning that the document was accepted (KOCM25, 2015) 
 
The official approval of the S3 document marked the end of the design phase and 
initiated the beginning of the implementation stage. 
 
6.5.1.2 Priority areas in Central Macedonia  
The entrepreneurial discovery in CM indicated four strategic priorities for future 
specialisation in the region, as well as, the horizontal use of key enabling technologies 
to support S3 action in each selected domain (Table 6.7).  
 
Table 6.7 Priorities of S3 and key technologies for horizontal support in CM 





 Textiles and clothing 
 
 Information and Communication Technologies 
 Energy technologies 
 Environmental technologies 






According to the Region of CM (2015), the selection and finalisation of the CM domains 
was based on a set of criteria including the critical mass, the existing research 
infrastructures, the export orientation and the natural resources available in each of 
the selected priority areas. It is worth noting that CM is the only Greek region which 
has included the textiles and clothing domain in the S3 action plan.  
 
6.5.2 The implementation phase: policy actions and tools  
 The implementation phase in CM began with the introduction of an additional 
round of consultation processes with the objective of identifying specific S3 action 
plans. During 2016, several workshops per leading sector were carried out to promote 
cross-sector networking and gather specific proposals for the specialisation and 
implementation of the selected S3 action plans. TRCM35 (2015) recognises this 
procedure as a continuation of the discovery process, with a key role in showing which 
S3 actions will be funded; he says:  
 
In this new round of consultations public and private actors will be asked 
to submit their entrepreneurial ideas and proposals about what projects 
could be funded in each of the smart specialisation priority areas 
(TRCM35, 2015) 
 
In addition, to monitor the implementation stage and assess the smart specialisation 
outcome at the medium and long-term perspective, a two-level mechanism was 
designed and expected to run. Furthermore, it will be a regional mechanism comprised 
of the creation of the Regional Scientific Council for Research & Innovation and the 






6.5.2.1 Regional Scientific Council for Research & Innovation 
 The first level refers to the role that the Regional Scientific Council for Research 
& Innovation is expected to play in different developmental stages of S3. According to 
the Region of CM (2015), the establishment of the new innovation council is meant to 
have a key advisory role to the regional government regarding the evaluation and 
approval of the future S3 action plans. However, we should note that while there was 
an open call for applications for the appointment of eleven members since the end of 
January 2017, surprisingly, the innovation council was not created until July 2017.  
 
6.5.2.2 S3 one-stop-shop 
 The second level indicates the task of a new self-directed unit for the support of 
innovation and entrepreneurship, which is responsible to assist and monitor the 
development of S3 in the region. In regard to this new policy instrument, KOCM25 
(2015) says:  
 
We plan to set up a one-stop-shop mechanism to assist the 
implementation of smart specialisation. The role of this mechanism will 
be to support all local actors involved in the development of smart 
specialisation (KOCM25, 2015) 
 
It is noted that this new mechanism was approved and set in the region of CM in 
December 2017 with a total budget of 1.357.00 EUR (Region of Central Macedonia 
2017). It has been argued that it is a new regionally-designed mechanism which is 
expected to provide fast-track entrepreneurial and innovation support services in the 






6.6 Conclusion   
 This first empirical chapter aimed at creating a sound framework for clarifying 
the analytical issues of smart specialisation in the regions of Crete and CM. Its core 
objective was to answer RQ1 by providing an empirical understanding of the way smart 
specialisation strategies were developed in both regional environments. Particular 
attention was given to the design and early stages of the implementation phase, 
providing S3 implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages have not been fully 
started yet. In addition, given that Greek S3 is conducted both at the national and 
regional level, a brief overview was provided to introduce the basics of the national S3 
framework, followed by a detailed analysis of smart specialisation practices carried out 
at the regional level. Apart from putting the base for developing the other empirical 
chapters of this thesis, the results of this chapter are intended to offer a set of 
conclusions which could be analysed and used beyond the boundaries of Crete and CM. 
 A first conclusion is that both case study regions experienced difficulties in 
understanding and adopting smart specialisation as a core regional innovation strategy. 
Specifically, we found that in the beginning, smart specialisation lacked conceptual 
clarity and understanding of practical adaptability, raising uncertainty as to what core 
and complementary actions should have been carried out to meet the objectives of S3 
effectively. The data show that both regions faced challenges in conceptualising the 
theoretical and practical underpinnings of smart specialisation in the regional setting. 
Key findings indicate a wide range of interview perceptions as to how smart 
specialisation was understood and adopted in Crete and CM by different 
entrepreneurial actors. They suggest that the implementation challenge of S3 in Crete 
and CM derived from the fact that it was not clear what place-specific actions should 
have been planned to build and develop entrepreneurial search mechanisms, while S3 
institutional roles and responsibilities at both the regional and national level remained 
fuzzy. This uncertainty increased institutes' inertia, blocked public policy intervention 




 A second conclusion yielded from this chapter is that the selected regions 
followed a different methodological approach to design and implement their smart 
specialisation strategies. In particular, we evidenced different patterns of S3 behaviour 
between the two regions, and we showed that they are due to a different 
understanding and conceptualisation of the underpinnings of smart specialisation in 
the regional setting. For example, in the case of Crete, the first stages for the 
identification and prioritisation of the R&D domain were carried out by a small group of 
S3 experts, allocated unofficially by the regional authorities. While a broad 
participation of key entrepreneurial actors was absent from these early stages (it came 
later through public consultations), this option was selected to provide additional 
administrative flexibility, given that the identification process was further accelerated 
due to limited number of experts involved. The Cretan option indicates a place-specific 
approach to S3 policy action, in which speeding-up the process of the domain 
identification was a first priority, followed by the required consultation procedures to 
legitimate its outcome. On the contrary, in the case of CM, a wide involvement of 
diverse local entrepreneurial actors was attempted from the very beginning of the 
identification process to enrich S3 outcome and avoid criticism (e.g. provide equal 
participation opportunities for all developmental actors). Similarly, we indicated that 
Crete and CM created and used different policy tools to assist the design and 
implementation of S3. In the case of Crete, particular attention was given to the 
introduction of certain complementary instruments, including the regional innovation 
council and the Crete Innovation Initiative (CRINI). CM on the contrary, exploited the 
creation of a S3 one-stop-shop. 
 A third conclusion is that the final decisions regarding S3 policymaking and 
action were influenced by a series of place-specific characteristics which, to some 
extent, were different between Crete and CM. In particular, each region developed its 




and structures, endogenous dynamics) and capacities (e.g. ability to implement 
development strategies).  
 Closing the discussion in this first empirical chapter, we underpin that despite 
vagueness surrounding smart specialisation practices at the regional level, the evidence 
shows that S3 development can bring an added value to Regional Innovation System 
(RIS) approaches in catch-up regions. We saw that smart specialisation is an appealing 
regional innovation strategy in the selected regions, which is currently seen as the most 
appropriate development strategy for regional renewal and economic catch-up. The 
potential of S3 as a regional innovation strategy is evidenced in a Cretan and CM 
context by acknowledging its supportive role in overcoming developmental barriers 



















Chapter 7: Governance reforms and 
institutional arrangements for smart 
specialisation strategies  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is a continuation of chapter 6 and seeks to investigate the 
importance of institutional and governance integration on smart specialisation. It 
addresses RQ2, which analyses evidence to provide an analytical answer to "How do, 
and can, institutional arrangements and governance reforms impact smart 
specialisation practices". RQ2 falls into two sub-questions, aimed to meet a twofold 
objective. The first sub-question, (How do institutional arrangements and governance 
reforms impact on smart specialisation practices) constitutes a systematic endeavour to 
understand empirically the ways in which existing institutional and governance settings 
are currently affecting the ongoing realisation of smart specialisation in Crete and CM. 
This first section is focused on analysing what specific institutional and governance 
arrangements have been shaped so far at regional, national and EU levels to regulate 
S3 practices in the case study regions. It constitutes the first part of this chapter. The 
second sub-question, (How can institutional arrangements and governance reforms 
impact on smart specialisation practices) seeks to investigate how a series of new or 
improved governance reforms and institutional arrangements could progressively 
affect the implementation of smart specialisation in the two regions. It is intended to 
identify what new forms of smart specialisation governance are relevant for Crete and 
CM and, simultaneously, examine what specific institutions might be necessary to 
facilitate their development. This section constitutes the second part of this chapter. 
 The importance of studying institutions and governance structures remains an 
important frontier for future research in regional development (Rodrik and Rosenzweig 




formation does matter for S3 at one end of the spectrum (McCann, van Oort, and 
Goddard 2016; OECD 2017b), and that different institutional arrangements would be 
needed for different regions at the other end (Tödtling and Trippl 2005; Gianelle et al. 
2016), chapter 7 develops an abductive reasoning which elaborates a set of evidence-
based findings to indicate when and how either small or fundamental interventions in 
institutions and governance structures can support the dynamics of implementing 
successful S3. 
  To develop a sound empirical framework and build our findings, we use data 
from both regional environments. Two key elements of regional development (policy 
governance and institutions) are analytically studied in this chapter, seeking to 
understand their impact on regional strategies and particularly on the development of 
S3. As explained in detail in chapter 4, we started the analysis in NVivo by creating 2 
main nodes with a number of sub-nodes including a total number of 470 coding 
references (306 for the node governance and 164 for the node institutions). The 
finalised results included 379 coding references for governance and 222 coding 
references for institutions.  
 
7.2 PART A: Current governance and institutional reforms affecting smart 
specialisation strategies in Crete and CM  
 To analyse and understand better how a series of present governance and 
institutional reforms are currently shaping the ongoing implementation of smart 
specialisation in the selected regions, it is useful to start this chapter with a brief 
introduction to the governance of previous regional innovation strategies. To this end, 
we analyse data gathered from the interviews, which include general and specific 
questions, aimed at understanding how previous regional innovation strategies have 
been regulated, to compare with what smart specialisation theory is currently 




national strategists in developing and regulating new innovation policies at the regional 
level.    
 
7.2.1 The governance of previous innovation frameworks in Crete and CM   
 A number of EU and national empirical studies suggest that the results of the 
previous generation of regional innovation policymaking (e.g. initiatives including the 
Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy-RITTS Project, Crete Innovative 
Region-CRINNO, Regional Innovation Poles, Innovative Actions Programmes) were not 
fully successful for catch-up regions due to poor governance and institutional 
structures; see for example the work of Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005), Shankar and 
Shah (2009), who argue that past innovation policies lacked effective governance 
models and structural mechanisms to deliver policy integration. To verify these findings 
at the Cretan and CM context, we asked questions in the interviews related to the 
effectiveness and ways in which previous innovation policy frameworks were governed 
at the public level. The analysis, based on the views of 24 respondents (out of 32 who 
were asked to give their perspectives on this issue), reveals weaknesses in earlier 
governance models, e.g. limited contribution of local entrepreneurial actors in 
policymaking. More than half of the responses indicate that most of these weaknesses 
lie on a 'design nationally, execute regionally' policy approach which has been largely 
introduced in previous programmes. Concerning this contradictory approach to govern 
innovation policies, a Cretan policymaker from the regional government mentions:  
 
Regional strategies and innovation policies were designed centrally, 
funding was also managed centrally using national mechanisms, I think 
everything was designed centrally. So regions seemed to have limited 





In the same vein, to explain why past innovation policymaking was not that effective at 
the regional level, an interviewee from the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece 
says: 
 
[...] it was because of the homogenisation of policies, which means that 
it's not correct to have the same innovation policies for Crete and for 
Central Macedonia, because these two regions are different. We can't 
just put everything together (GECM33, 2015)  
 
Surprisingly, as both respondents point out, while such innovation initiatives were 
supposed to run regionally to trigger local change and boost regional development, 
they were centrally designed without securing the required engagement of the local 
entrepreneurial actors (e.g. as systematically proposed in the entrepreneurial 
discovery) and fitting the different needs that each region has. They also lacked 
permanent institutional tools, e.g. regional innovation councils to govern innovation 
policies at the regional level, funding mechanisms to promote knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship etc. This suggests that previous regional innovation strategies in 
Crete and CM were governed without the actual involvement of the local community. 
This is a notable element in the findings which differentiates the way in which previous 
generation of innovation policies were governed, comparing to the emerging practices 
of smart specialisation (in which the development of regional strategies is supposed to 
follow bottom-up approaches from the design to the implementation phase). The lack 
of public consultation and interplay among diverse entrepreneurial actors in the 
previous regional strategic framework, indicates a weak governance mechanism to 
implement successful regional innovation policies for local development. In the 
interviews, this idea is mentioned in a representative quote, which highlights the 
inefficiency of innovation support programmes to meet the needs of the local 





Policies are not designed to support local economy, neither to cover local 
entrepreneurial needs and regional development [...] the impact was 
limited and fragmented, for instance, see the RITTS programme 
(PECM26, 2015) 
 
The above excerpt highlights the view that without the involvement of the local 
community to jointly build with the national authorities a strong governance model, 
innovation strategies have had little chance of success. It is worth noting that we pay 
particular attention to the lack of involvement of the local community in implementing 
regional innovation strategies, given that smart specialisation theory recognises the 
commitment of local entrepreneurial actors as a key success factor of S3  (Capello 
2014; Landabaso and Foray 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014). However, as 
discussed in the following section, this attitude seems to be changing in the S3 context 
in favour of regional policymaking.  
 
7.2.2 The process of smart specialisation as a driver of change 
 Indeed, evidence from Crete and CM shows that part of the inefficiency of the 
previous governance structure is gradually changing alongside the deployment of the 
new S3 framework. There is a clear tendency in the responses, suggesting that this 
change is partly due to the functionality of certain methodological elements 
incorporated in the new strategic framework of smart specialisation, which have 
improved definite policy approaches. Referring to the importance of entrepreneurial 
discovery as a dynamic learning-by-doing process, a Cretan expert says: 
 
An important added value that smart specialisation could bring to 
regional learning comes from the practices undertaken to run the 
entrepreneurial process of discovery (TSCr22, 2015) 
 
This citation emphasises the systematic and collective way in which S3 is strongly 




as a key driving force of change in innovation policy governance. As an example, we 
refer to the contribution of the discovery process to build a more effective institutional 
collaborative framework for the development of regional innovation strategies as 
illustrated in the following quote provided by a CM expert: 
 
I think that the repeated and systematic efforts to engage a large 
number of organisations in the entrepreneurial process of discovery 
helped Central Macedonia bring closer diverse local players and 
institutionalise a more effective collaboration framework to support 
innovation policies (PECM26, 2015)      
 
The idea that entrepreneurial discovery has contributed to improve the governance of 
innovation actions in the regional context (in this case in the sense that more local 
actors are encouraged to take place in the process in a more co-ordinated way), has 
been also acknowledged in a series of other interviews, generated mostly by a set of 
specific questions included in the interview guide (see questions 22, 23, 24 and 25 in 
Appendices, Table 6). The answers to these questions show a notable change in 
addressing the way in which smart specialisation strategies are currently governed and 
regulated among regional, national and EU levels. This view becomes more apparent in 
the longitudinal research datasets, in which a changing attitude towards S3 governance 
is increasingly captured. Table 7.1 summarises the number of respondents who believe 
that the current regulation of policies and practices is changing in the new S3 
framework compared to previous innovation policy frameworks. It is worth noting that 
we have not captured any counter responses suggesting that policymaking and action 









Table 7.1 Number of responses indicating improvements in the governance of S3 
  No. of respondents  
Interviews Crete CM TOTAL(*) 
1st round  7 5 25 
2nd round (longitudinal) 9 n/a 10 
(*)Total number of respondents addressed this question 
Source: Author 
 
An analysis of the data from the first round of interviews in both regions, reveals that 
12 out of 25 experts, for which we have directly addressed questions related to 
institutions and governance issues, believe that policy governance has been improved 
in some way during the smart specialisation period. This finding increases remarkably 
for the second round of interviews, (conducted only in the region of Crete - longitudinal 
fieldwork), in which almost all respondents (9 out of 10) see notable changes in the 
existing governance structure for innovation strategies. It is worth highlighting that the 
analysis does not refer to S3 policy outcomes per se, but rather to the way in which 
policy practices are governed and regulated to generate these outcomes. In this regard, 
a key point to discuss is what exactly is changing at present and how this change affects 
the implementation of S3 in the regions of Crete and CM. Elements from both aspects 
are analysed and discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.2.3 Ongoing governance and institutional reforms for smart specialisation  
 The data suggest that institutions and policy governance for smart specialisation 
are currently changing in two central ways: policy governance attitudes, patterns and 
routines are changing in the sense that their regulation is conducted in a more 
intensive, collective and informed way; institutions are adjusting in the sense that a 
series of new policy structures and tools are institutionalised at the regional, national 
and EU level to support these new ways of policy governance in the S3 context. Table 




governance reforms are currently taking place and seem to impact S3 development in 
both case study regions.   
 
Table 7.2 Number of responses highlighting ongoing institutional and governance 
changes for S3 
  No. of responses 
Nature and type of change  Crete CM TOTAL(*) 
Change in public administration attitude towards S3 
governance 23 12 35 
Intensity of policy practices  19 9 28 
Institutionalisation of new policy tools and structures for 
regional development 16 8 24 
(*)Total number of answers  
Source: Author 
 
As shown in Table 7.2, we identify three different types of institutional and governance 
change, which are currently going on and affecting S3 in the Cretan and Central 
Macedonian context. The first is linked to a changing attitude in the understanding of 
how modern-new innovation policies can be better governed and regulated. The 
second refers to the emergence of new and more intensive patterns in which policy 
action is governed. The third relates to the institutionalisation of new and existing 
policy structures to support the governance of regional development. Each is analysed 
below.   
 
7.2.3.1 Change in public administration attitude towards S3 governance 
 In general, the analysis identifies and discusses new ways of considering 
governance action for innovation policymaking at three administrative levels: the EU, 
national and regional levels. It also highlights  the development of joint practices which 
can explain how these territorial levels interrelate with each other to govern the design 
and implementation of S3. In particular, one important reforming step we have 




change as to how regional innovation strategies are currently considered and 
addressed in the new smart specialisation context. This attitude change in the public 
administration sector is expressed in the words of two Cretan respondents presented 
below:  
 
I have to say that it’s the first time that the region of Crete seems to 
consider innovation policy more seriously and thoroughly. I strongly 
believe this (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
I think that peoples’ perceptions are improving, they are not that 
reluctant to change, as in the past. It' s true that people with leading 
roles from different public authorities used to be very sceptical and 
hesitant about smart specialisation, but not anymore. It seems that they 
have embraced smart specialisation rationale (TRCr9, 2014) 
 
The data reveal a large number of similar responses (23 from Crete and 12 from CM) 
which highlight changes in certain governance trends for policy adjustments in the 
current European-national-regional collaboration. For example, a regional expert from 
the region of Crete explains how new EU-national approaches to innovation policy 
governance impact S3 practices at the regional level: 
 
It's good to see the EU and the national government collaborate with 
each other to support regions develop their own action plans, and I think, 
this time, it works well as both the EU and the national government don't 
seek to indicate regions what to do, but rather to show them how to do it 
(KACr46, 2017) 
 
The main idea observed from this view, is that EU and national authorities follow a new 
governance approach in which Crete and CM are further encouraged to exploit 
opportunities for self-learning. This is a notable difference in governing public policy 
towards overcoming regional policy weaknesses from centrally-designed actions 




towards the design of local policymaking, in which inter-regional collaborations may 
have a key role to play; for example, PECM26 (2015) points out:    
 
S3 efforts should have an inter-sectoral and inter-regional approach 
where actors from different areas of expertise should collaborate with 
each other not only within a region but also among regions. For example, 
when conducting the entrepreneurial discovery, the region of East 
Macedonia and Thrace didn't only involve its own actors but also 
engaged other players from neighbour regions like Central Macedonia to 
acquire new knowledge and expertise (PECM26, 2015) 
 
Both quotes underline the existence of an emerging attitude change which includes the 
adoption of a new perception in innovation policy making. Under this view, a more 
productive co-operation among European, national and regional institutions is 
emerging to support smart specialisation development in the regional setting. As to the 
first extract, the EU-national collaboration for governing innovation policies has been 
expressed in diverse ways in the Cretan and CM context. For example, the EU imposed 
the ex-ante conditionality to secure that European regions will progressively pursue S3 
approaches to meet their strategic objectives. In a European context, the enforcement 
of this conditionality reveals an additional EU option to promote decentralised policy 
governance to be followed in the regional setting. In practice, it is a means of imposing 
specific governance guidelines and regulations in regional policies. In a Cretan and CM 
context, it reveals a new policy approach in which the establishment of permanent 
national-regional synergies for bottom-up innovation policymaking is for the first time 
taking an institutional role with the support of the EU. It also shows a dynamic 
endeavour to engage local entrepreneurial actors in the design of regional strategies, 
something which as shown previously, it was missing from the earlier innovation 
frameworks.  
The extent to which this new European way of promoting and governing innovation 




For instance, it is indicative that answering the question as to whether Crete or CM 
would have started S3 without the enforcement of the EU ex-ante conditionality, 37 
out of 40 respondents in the first round of interviews admit that neither region would 
possibly have introduced S3 practices to design their new strategic framework. In 
regard to this aspect, an expert from CM says:  
 
I think that the ex-ante conditionality is something which keeps the 
attention of the regions alive. Perhaps regions would have not treated 
smart specialisation very seriously if the ex-ante conditionality was not 
there [...] You know, regions don't really consider innovation and 
innovation actions as a first policymaking priority, as other important 
problems and challenges should be firstly managed and controlled, 
particularly during the period of the crisis (PECM26, 2015)      
 
This evidence, along with the collective efforts of the national government to assist 
regions, follow S3 practises and meet the conditionality objectives (see the following 
sub-section), show the intention of European and national governance to give regions 
additional power for locally-designed regional innovation strategies. This is not only a 
policy option to innovation, but also a notable EU and national change to regional 
innovation governance, comparing to previous public policy action. This change favours 
the principles of S3 (e.g. encourage bottom-up interaction and place-based action), and 
as such, it should be primarily highlighted. 
 In respect of how attitudes to policy governance tend to change across different 
stakeholder groups in the case study regions, the data reveal a diversified mainstream 
between private and public sector actors. We ran NVivo coding queries to identify 
trends in policy attitude change among the key categories of respondents: public 
sector, academia and private sector (see chapter 4, table 4.3 for guidance). The main 
objective was to examine how perception of policy governance attitude is changing 
across different entrepreneurial groups. The results show that change in governance 




public authorities, academia, public agencies etc. Precisely, 29 respondents out of 35 
who have indicated a changing attitude, come from the public-sector and academia, 
while 6 come from the private sector (e.g. firms, business associations, chambers etc). 
A possible explanation to this finding is that private sector respondents may be less 
optimistic about the effectiveness of public policymaking, given the fragmented results 
of previous policy frameworks (see section 7.2.1). Our assumption fits with previous 
empirical findings, which underpin that private sector firms are found unwilling to take 
a key role in public policymaking due to high levels of disappointment and uncertainty 
coming from the past; see for example Tsipouri and Papadakou (2005).      
 
An example of changing public administration attitude towards S3 
 To show how the modernisation in innovation policy thinking affects S3 
practices, we refer to a place-specific case indicated from the Cretan respondents. This 
case highlights a new way of regional policy communication, conducted in the 
hinterland of Crete with very good outcomes. The idea was to move from a rather 
traditional way of policy action (where local actors from many different places of Crete 
had to travel to the capital city of Heraklion to take an active role in local 
policymaking), to a non-typical and more flexible model of governing entrepreneurial 
discovery (in which Cretan S3 co-ordinators made several face-to-face visits to collect 
ideas and motivate the engagement of various regional actors instead of asking them 
to join open events in Heraklion). This was a pioneering action conducted for the first 
time in the region of Crete in a systematic, collective and co-ordinated way, which 
enabled the participation of different stakeholder groups throughout the island. 
DACr44 (2017) explains how this new and rather unconventional approach of governing 
the design of innovation policymaking facilitated S3 practices:  
 
It's a good surprise for local entrepreneurs to see that we are going to 
their places to start a discussion with them, it's strange for them to see a 




active role in S3. So far, private actors were used to see public authorities 
with scepticism and this new way of S3 communication changed a little 
bit this old perception (DACr44, 2017) 
 
The option of Cretan policymakers to think and govern S3 practices differently, is a 
good example of how small-scale modifications in the regional governance structures 
could overcome previous policy inefficiencies (e.g. lack of public trust and confidence) 
and lead to better policy results. Particularly, the Cretan case shows clearly how 
particular processes during the entrepreneurial discovery can be enhanced through 
soft reforms in the existing public sector governance regime.   
 
7.2.3.2 Intensity of policy practices 
 Harmonised with the EU approach, both national and regional governments 
have also shown the first serious steps to reform innovation policy governance and 
induce institutional adjustments to favour these reforms in the smart specialisation 
framework. We found that at a national level, much of this effort has been devoted to 
support regions decentralise regional innovation action through the provision of 
additional independence for place-based policy design. At the regional level, important 
efforts have been made to change the degree of local interaction and engagement of 
regional actors in public policymaking. Both aspects embody elements of new policy 
governance and institutional reconfiguration, in the sense that they have been 
conducted in a systematic and intensive way comparing to previous governance 
behaviours.   
 Evidence of institutional and governance transformation at the national level, 
comes from a series of new public-action initiatives, intensively conducted to promote 
S3 in Crete and CM. The degree and extent to which these new initiatives were 
conducted by the central government, reveal a new way of governing regional 
innovation policies at the national level. Specifically, the early preparation of smart 




EU (Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy), and later the national 
government (General Secretariat of Research and Technology-GSRT) to introduce in 
Greek regions the smart specialisation logic. In 2012, a four-member team was created, 
aimed at organising regional workshops to inform local communities about the 
rationale and the methodological steps to be followed in the smart specialisation 
framework. Most of the public sector respondents who have had a direct engagement 
with this endeavour (mainly S3 co-ordinators) highlight the systematic approach of the 
EU and the national government to shift Cretan and Central Macedonian policy 
governance routines into the new smart specialisation framework. The following quote 
provided by a member of the S3 team in CM is indicative: 
  
The Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy recruited four 
experts to visit all Greek regions and organise informative workshops 
and events to explain the advantages of designing and implementing 
smart specialisation strategies, and also to let them know about the ex-
ante conditionality for getting access to potential funding [...] I think all 
these governance actions included intensive and collective efforts to 
embody smart specialisation in the regional setting (PECM26, 2015) 
 
From a policy governance perspective, the interesting point is in the way in which all 
these actions have been carried out. An analysis of the public sector respondents 
suggests that, no matter of its effectiveness and ultimate results, European and 
national endeavour to put S3 in the regional context was characterised by high 
intensity (embodies repeated and targeted actions) and high collectivity (mobilises 
multi local actors), comparing to previous efforts. It is indicative that almost all of the 
interviewees from the Cretan and Central Macedonian S3 co-ordination teams point 
out that European and national action to regional development seems to be, for the 
first time, in the right direction. The way in which the introduction of S3 early 
approaches was conducted by the EU and national authorities is summarised in the 




I think there were many steps forward, many targeted efforts were made 
to promote RIS3 in a systematic way, given that smart specialisation is 
something totally new and unknown in the regional setting (TSCr22, 
2015)  
 
This summary quote constitutes a sort of evidence which indicates the ongoing efforts 
to address policy governance in the new and, at that time unfamiliar policy framework 
of smart specialisation in a systematic way.  
 
7.2.3.3 Institutionalising and empowering existing and new tools for intensified S3 
implementation 
 We know from the literature that the enforcement of appropriate institutional 
tools and mechanisms is possible to facilitate the governance of smart specialisation 
(Landabaso, McCann, and Ortega-Argilés 2014). The question, however, is what tools 
and in what ways. In the case of Crete and CM, the answer to this question can be 
found by analysing the new way that institutional tools are currently used and 
developed at EU, national and regional levels to regulate S3 in the regional setting. We 
found that the current S3 regulatory and administrative change discussed above is 
supported by a combination of institutional structures launched at all these three 
governance levels, promoting a multi-scalar endeavour for the co-ordination of 
regional development (Todtling, Asheim, and Boschma 2013). These structures differ 
from previous regulatory mechanisms introduced in similar initiatives, in the sense that 
they have been given a formal and institutional shape to regulate S3 policies and 
objectives in the long-run. 
An example of such structure at the regional level is the creation of the new Regional 
Scientific Councils for Research and Innovation, which constitute a revised continuation 
of the previous Regional Innovation Councils, established well before the onset of S3. 
For example, in the case of Crete, the Regional Scientific Council for Research and 




number of regionally-based organisations (6 academics, 3 representatives from the 
wider business community and 2 from the public sector). The green light for setting up 
the new councils was given by the national government in 2016 to support the 
governance of regional innovation policies within and beyond the smart specialisation 
context. From a policy governance perspective, the difference with these new forms of 
innovation councils, (comparing to previous forms), is that they take a formal and 
institutional shape, which was neglected in previous shapes. In particular, the 
responses suggest that the new institutional dimension innovation councils are 
currently taking, makes it possible to bring better policy governance results, by 
strengthening further their authority and operation, and allowing for more smart 
specialisation flexibility and action. To back up this finding, we performed in-depth 
interviews with two members of the past Cretan Innovation Council. As shown in the 
following quotes, the respondents mention that the previous council lost part of its 
political power and led to organisational inertia because it was not given a formal 
institutional structure with comprehensible regulatory tasks and directions. 
Furthermore, to highlight the importance of the renewed institutional role of the new 
innovation councils in regulating local S3 practices, the interviewees cite: 
 
I strongly believe that when regional innovation councils take a formal 
role, they will be more supportive and useful for smart specialisation. If 
innovation councils take a formal role, an institutional role, no one could 
devalue their usefulness. A formal research council, which may also have 
the power to allocate resources, is more likely to mobilise different 
players taking part in RIS3. So, yes I strongly believe that innovation 
councils can have a great role in the RIS3 only if they take a formal, a 
typical structure (OICr3, 2014) 
 
The new regional innovation council of Crete, as it is designed and 
planned in the new law, with clear institutional tasks and responsibilities 
could also play a supportive role for the region of Crete in designing and 




Both extracts disclose that the previous innovation councils would not be able to fully 
assist the realisation of smart specialisation due to the lack of an official structure with 
clear objectives and tasks; this reveals the growing importance of revising and 
institutionalising new or existing regional tools to meet the governance objectives of 
S3. Surprisingly, while these new forms of regional councils are intended to play a key 
role in formulating the governance of smart specialisation at the sub-national level, at 
the time of updating this section (first semester 2018), only a few Greek regions have 
had composed their local councils.  As to the case study regions we are examining in 
this thesis, the new innovation council has been established only for Crete. 
 In a similar way, the National Council for the Smart Specialisation Strategy was 
established in 2015 by the national government as a central institutional tool for the 
development of S3. It was a new initiative, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Economy, 
Development and Tourism, and comprised of representatives from the Greek ministries 
and the Association of the Greek Regions. Its main responsibility was to introduce a set 
of new regulations that will effectively shape the smart specialisation governance 
regimes and ensure, therefore, an effective implementation of the S3 priorities as 
identified and approved by the regions.  
 At the EU level, the new institutional tools to govern S3 regulation include the 
smart specialisation platform, established in Seville-Spain as a permanent supportive 
structure10. Also, to provide additional support at the regional level, the EU in 
collaboration with the national and regional governments, has organised a series of 
regional S3 events. Indicatively, we refer to the peer-review workshop organised in the 
capital city of Heraklion in September 2013, for which a Cretan S3 expert says: 
 
The peer-review event organised by the EU and the region of Crete was 
really supportive and we actually got really good feedback for our work 
(ANCr11, 2017) 
 
10 see http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu  
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From a governance perspective, it is remarkable the intensive way in which such EU 
tools were promoted in the regional context. For example, in the case of the peer-
review event in Heraklion, our observation research (through our participation in the 
event) can confirm a wide participation of diverse entrepreneurial actors (firms, 
development agencies, public authorities, academia, intermediaries etc), which show 
an increased policy enthusiasm for the emerging S3 framework, probably due to the S3 
ex-ante conditionality, imposed by the EU.   
 
7.3 PART B: New governance and institutional reforms for smart specialisation 
strategies in Crete and CM  
 In this second section, we investigate the way in which new governance and 
institutional reforms affect the implementation of smart specialisation in the two 
regions. This section refers to the second part of RQ2. Specifically, we intend to study 
how new ways of smart specialisation governance improve S3 practices in Crete and 
CM and, simultaneously, examine what specific reforms in institutions might be 
necessary to make these governance improvements. To meet the second objective of 
RQ2, the analysis of the findings was based on data collection from the first round of 
interviews (see indicative questions 27-31 in Appendices Table 6), as well as on data 
gathered during longitudinal research in the region of Crete (see Appendices Table 7 
for guidance).   
 
7.3.1 Mapping the need for new governance and institutional arrangements 
towards S3 
 Despite the recent progress made in integrating the governance of smart 
specialisation in Crete and CM, there is a clear view in the responses reflecting the 
belief that both regions need a series of governance improvements to maximise the 
results of smart specialisation implementation. In particular, the idea of improving 




been recorded in diverse ways in 41 out of 50 responses, covering a wide range of 
representativeness in both regional environments. We present two indicative quotes, 
one from each regional environment which show how this need is expressed in the 
words of the respondents: 
 
We need an effective governance model to support smart specialisation 
which is currently missing from our region (PECM26, 2015) 
 
The region should find a mechanism which will enable the design of RIS3 
policies and actions and ensure an effective implementation, monitoring 
and assessment (OICr3, 2014) 
 
The analysis of these quotes can be based on the discussion of two key elements. On 
the one hand, governance conditions and institutions currently regulating S3 practices 
require further modifications in order to enable a productive realisation of smart 
specialisation. This is a clear finding. On the other hand, the capacity and readiness of 
the local entrepreneurial actors to induce, adopt and implement these modifications 
are relatively weak, particularly at times of economic austerity (the aspect of capacity 
building is evidenced and discussed analytically in chapter 8). As to the first element, 
the key finding is that the existing governance and institutional mechanisms of S3 are 
still inadequate to support the implementation of S3 in Crete and CM. Examples of 
inefficiencies in S3 governance are found at the regional, national and EU levels 
discussed briefly in the following sections. In this respect, the key point is to investigate 
empirically what governance improvements, at what administrative levels and in what 
institutional manners could gradually initiate a more effective development and co-
ordination of S3 in the case study regions. In the following sections we study these 





7.3.2 Governance reforms, changes and adjustments for smart specialisation 
strategies 
 Our analysis identifies and discusses the need for introducing four new ways of 
governance transformation. Transformation, in this study, takes the form of any 
possible reform, change or adjustment that innovation policy governance may take. 
Table 7.3 summarises the number of the interview responses on each policy 
governance reform, change and adjustment. We used keywords and specific ideas and 
concepts from the data to create four meta-categories of meaning. Despite the 
practical difficulty in predicting the effects of this governance transformation in 
advance, each type of transformation is seen by the respondents as an important part 
of the re-configuration needed to gradually build a new more effective smart 
specialisation governance framework in both regions.  
 
Table 7.3 Number of responses on S3 governance transformation 
  No. of respondents    Percentage(*)  
Governance transformation Crete CM TOTAL   Crete CM TOTAL 
Changing autonomy and flexibility 
levels in regional policy governance 13 9 22  43.3% 45.0% 44.0% 
Adjustments to simplify the 
governance of smart specialisation 
related practices 18 11 29  60.0% 55.0% 58.0% 
Governance reforms in public 
administration collaboration 22 9 31  73.3% 45.0% 62.0% 
Policy governance adjustments to 
accumulate critical mass 18 12 30  60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 
(*)Based on a total number of 50 interviews: Crete=30, CM=20 
Source: Author 
 
7.3.2.1 Changing autonomy and flexibility levels in regional policy governance  
 A first change in the governance of S3 is the provision of additional 
administrative autonomy in regional innovation policymaking and action. Evidence 




flexibility in the way regional innovation strategies are governed and regulated by 
public-sector agencies. The idea of giving regions greater flexibility to govern and 
regulate the development of S3, was raised from a systematic endeavour to 
understand whether changes in policy governance autonomy are possible to affect S3 
development. Interestingly, we found 22 responses (out of 50 interviews) showing that 
the provision of more administrative flexibility in the way in which regions govern their 
innovation strategies can be seen as a key S3 enabler, suitable to overcome specific 
practical implementation challenges. For example, interview responses from 
longitudinal research indicate that regional public-sector agencies are flexible to 
regulate the design of S3, but they are not administratively independent to implement 
it, given the governance domination of the central state and the strict policy 
regulations enforced by the EU (see following section). The state and European 
domination in regulating S3 on the one, and the limited power of the regions to govern 
the implementation S3 on the other, is described in the following quote provided by a 
Cretan S3 co-ordinator: 
 
You are allowed to design, you are given the option to select, but in the 
implementation stage a bottleneck appears as you have to conform with 
national and European bureaucratic regulations or rules, emerging from 
the fiscal consolidation imposed by TROIKA11 (KACr47, 2017) 
 
This quote shows a key barrier to S3 implementation, caused by the fact that an 
important part of the S3 governance does not take place at a regional but also at a 
national and European level. Arguably, this view reveals the need for additional policy 
governance autonomy at the regional level. Simultaneously, the idea emerges that in 
order to make S3 implementation more effective, it is critical to find a state of 
equilibrium between regional policy governance autonomy and central authority 
(which obviously cannot be entirely eclipsed). A precise identification of this 
11 In the context of the European-Greek crisis, the Troika includes: the European Commission (EC), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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equilibrium, however, is by no means a simple process, given the complexity in 
predicting the effects of changing part of the policy governance routines and practices 
at several administrative levels. This challenge raises a number of interesting questions. 
For example, what adjustments and to what extent should be made to increase 
autonomy in S3 governance? To what extent these adjustments can increase regional 
governance autonomy to impact S3 development? How can an extended and perhaps 
unnecessary self-autonomy in S3 policy governance be avoided? In what ways can a 
desired balance of policy governance autonomy be achieved between regional and 
national levels?  
 To provide an analytical answer to these questions, a main stream in the 
responses indicates that adjustments, reforms and changes in regional governance 
autonomy need to be made gradually, based on a learning-by-doing approach. 
Specifically, it is proposed that the extent to which S3 policy governance should be 
independent from central and EU policy intervention on the one, and its possible 
impact on S3 development on the other, could be better predicted if they are tested in 
certain selected domains of S3 at a pilot basis (e.g. in the tourism complex). An 
representative extract showing this view is given by a Cretan respondent:   
 
Achieving regional autonomy is of great importance and I would start 
regional decentralisation with some specific areas at a pilot basis. We 
can't do this for everything, because it will be a mess. It would be good to 
give autonomy to one or two sectors at a pilot basis to test if it works 
properly (AZCr6, 2014) 
 
The emerging idea from this excerpt is that since decentralisation and self-governance 
at the sub-national level require large-scale institutional reforms (Baier, Kroll, and 
Zenker 2013a), empowering gradually regional policy governance options in pre-
selected S3 domains would be an ideal option to test the extent to which the existing 
regional structures are appropriate to support self-development efforts. Undoubtedly, 




of thinking and addressing regional innovation governance in Crete and CM, which goes 
beyond previous policy routines and practices. This approach to policy governance is 
new in regional innovation, in the sense that it includes co-ordinated and collective 
steps for gradual and experimental development. 
 
7.3.2.2 Adjustments to simplify the governance of smart specialisation related 
practices  
 A second important change in the governance of S3 is the simplification of 
certain policy processes which are related to different developmental stages of smart 
specialisation. This outcome derives from the analysis of 29 responses which suggest 
that a number of procedures and structures currently governed and regulated in the 
context of S3, are complex and time-consuming, raising policy uncertainty and 
weakening the reliability of S3 as an appealing innovation policy tool. This uncertainty 
increases the need to simplify the way in which S3 is presently governed, by reducing 
the complexity of specific processes and by increasing their functionality. This need was 
more obvious in the data collected from the region of Crete during longitudinal 
research, in which 9 out of 10 respondents marked this need as a high priority 
particularly for the implementation phase of S3. One can assume that this was due to 
the fact that when longitudinal fieldwork was carried out (summer of 2017), the 
implementation of S3 was already under way and its practical challenges were more 
evident. The datasets include a number of examples which show how the restructuring 
of specific procedures governing the implementation of S3 can lead to better policy 
outcomes. Three examples of policy governance complexity which need to be 
rethought and reconfigured in a more simplified way to bring S3 governance 
integration in Crete and CM are discussed below. 
 
Local cases of S3 governance transformation 




 The case of the State Aid Information System is a representative example that 
displays the difficulty of governing smart specialisation practices due to extensive 
bureaucracy and complexity in regulatory processes. This system constitutes the main 
centrally-designed mechanism which is placed to monitor and control any state aid 
action, including a range of procedures related to S3. In practice, it is the official public 
sector mechanism which governs the interaction between regional and national 
authorities as to what S3 projects will be approved and funded as well as under what 
specific conditions. The key point with the State Aid Information System is that it is not 
the system itself which raises regulatory complexity and policy uncertainty, but a series 
of bureaucratic rules which have been enforced by the national government to govern 
its function. Cretan and Central Macedonian S3 co-ordinators from the public 
administration sector (with a direct engagement  to the system), mention that the 
regional-national cooperation under this governance scheme is not appropriate to 
deliver flexibility and fast-track services, increasing the possibility for creating 
significant delays in approving and funding S3 projects. This is a key governance barrier 
to S3 implementation in the sense that it is not the system-tool itself which raises 
uncertainty, but the way it is currently used and regulated by the regional and national 
authorities (e.g. lots of paperwork and open time-consuming procedures that are 
supposed to ensure transparency). Indicative quotes which show how the case of the 
State Aid Information System is possible to affect S3 development in Crete and CM is 
captured in the respondents' words from each region: 
 
There might be potential risks from the usage of the State Aid 
Information System, which is very slow. Previous experience showed that 
this system is very slow, and I see that this may be a big obstacle for 
RIS3. For example, we may be ready as a region to publish a S3 call, but 
the system won't be ready to make the evaluation [...] the system is 
obligatory from the Commission, which is about right, but it seems that 





An important barrier particularly for the implementation of smart 
specialisation is the difficulties due the long delays and bureaucratic 
processes emerged from the PSKE12. The PSKE delays and complicates 
the implementation phase (KOCM25, 2015)       
 
The above quotes show that speeding up the procedures of approving and financing S3 
projects at the sub-national level is only one part of the process, as approvals and other 
related actions are required at the national level. The example of the State Aid 
Information System reveals the need to rethink and re-build the governance 
mechanisms which are currently available for policymaking, with the aim of reconciling 
national and regional administrative power for further flexibility to S3. 
 
ii. Regional policy, trapped in European and national mechanisms: the case of 
state aid rules 
 This challenge relates to the new state aid policy imposed by the national and 
EU governance regulations. As shown in the following citation from a Cretan S3 co-
ordinator, a number of strict rules that several state aid programs have lately 
incorporated to deliver additional transparency when publishing new calls for tenders, 
act as an important prohibiting factor to stimulate private actors' engagement (e.g. 
administrative processes increase implementation complexity due to loads of 
paperwork to approve and disburse instalments, bureaucratic and out-of-date 
normative regimes at the national level). Moreover, it is argued that the new 
regulations, mainly coming from the EU, as a mechanism to control European funds, 
seem to affect negatively the attractiveness of the new innovation support programs 
and, therefore, the participation of several beneficiaries, particularly from the private 
sector. An indicative excerpt is presented below: 
The regulations of the new programming period introduce a number of 
rules which possess limitations. As an example, I would like to mention 
the state aid rules for innovation actions which raise bureaucracy and 
12 State Aid Information System 
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policymaking difficulties in attracting beneficiaries through the new calls 
for tenders (KACr47, 2017)     
 
This particular case highlights the dysfunctionality of this control mechanism, that the 
EU has imposed to control funding and ensure accountability and accountability, to 
facilitate S3 practices and ensure an effective participation of the private sector in the 
development of smart specialisation.      
 
iii. National conditionality limitations   
 This challenge refers to the so-called national conditionality framework which 
introduces new directives and regulations in the ongoing programming period. 
Particularly, the national government has to approve and fulfil a set of conditionalities 
under the EU structural adjustment programme in order to eliminate several existing 
obstacles and harmonise its national policies with diverse EU 2020 regulations. KACr40, 
(2016) explains this process by discussing the example of the digital agenda. Moreover, 
the EU digital agenda is part of the Europe 2020 strategy aiming at "developing a digital 
single market in order to generate smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in Europe" 
(EC 2014a, 3). The process of fulfilling the conditionality of the national digital shows 
the difficulty of the regions to proceed with smart specialisation due to the delay of the 
central government to align the conditions of the national digital agenda with the EU 
standards. Practically, the EU authorities expect from the Greek regions to adapt their 
smart specialisation plans according to the EU regulations, whilst the national 
government has not yet fully embedded them in its strategic planning. This 
contradiction raised legal policy implementation conflicts among national and regional 
actors, leading to important delays. With regard to this challenge, KACr47 (2017) says: 
 
We can't really proceed with RIS3; we can't do anything until the central 
government settles all appropriate requirements related with the ex-ante 
conditionalities that the EU has set in respect of the smart specialisation 





Practically speaking, the launching of S3 was depended on the ability or even the 
political priority or will of the national government to urge specific political institutions 
aligning part of the national legislation with the EU regulations and standards. This 
suggests that while local authorities are supposed to design and make sense of their 
own regional innovation plans, a series of national-level governance inefficiencies 
represent an essential bottleneck for the implementation of S3 at the regional level. 
The example of the national conditionality (e.g. the enforcement of EU regulations) 
shows clearly the dominance of third national and EU bodies on regional development 
and reveals the need for additional regional autonomy and flexibility in innovation 
policymaking as discussed in following sections.  
 Interestingly, we saw that it is not only the policy governance mechanisms 
directly related to S3 that are proposed for review and re-design, but also other 
complementary to S3 actions that must be changed and improved at both the regional 
and national level. Moreover, the data shows cases in which a range of policy 
governance inefficiencies have affected the implementation of S3 in the sense that 
important barriers and delays were caused, delivering complexity and uncertainty in 
policy action. An example which is highlighted in the data and indicates the need to 
consider and make governance adjustments well-beyond the strict policy boarders of 
S3 is discussed below.   
 
iv. Simplifying recruitment processes for S3 development  
 The difficulty of recruiting new experts appropriate to run S3 is indicated by the 
public sector respondents as an example of governance ineffectiveness, which 
currently hampers the realisation of S3. In this respect, the existing governance 
regulations cause inertia in public recruitment. In particular, provided that smart 
specialisation has been introduced as a regional innovation tool for the first time in 




number of experienced policymakers to address S3 challenges, the need for 
introducing a series of governance modifications to simplify recruitment becomes an 
imperative. In respect to this necessity, a Cretan policymaker mentions:   
 
We don't only have to tackle bureaucracy related directly to RIS3, but 
also administrative bureaucracy which relates to other types of policy 
action and support. For example, I want to hire five experienced people 
that will be able to run RIS3 without following the national procedures of 
ASEP13. ASEP is an obstacle itself, because I want to hire these people 
immediately, not in six or twelve months from now (KACr48, 2017). 
 
In a similar manner, another respondent from the Cretan public sector highlights the 
fact that regional authorities lack an adequate number of experienced human capital to 
support the development of S3:  
 
The truth is that we don't have adequate human resources, personnel 
with expertise. You really need to have a new human capital, people who 
can understand what innovation or entrepreneurship are, we don't have 
such a human capital at present (KACr42, 2017)   
 
Both quotes indicate the lack of an adequate number of appropriate staff and the need 
to modernise public-sector recruitment for the purpose of S3. In this respect, some 
respondents suggest that modernisation of public sector governance structures needs 
to include a variety of changes towards achieving fast and less bureaucratic 
administrative processes. This procedure requires key modifications in the existing 
systems of public sector recruitment which will bring efficiency, flexibility, 
accountability and transparency.  
 
 
13 ASEP is the Greek Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection established by Law 2190/1994 as an 
independent authority responsible for securing the implementation of the provisions on public sector 
staff selection and recruitment (source: www.asep.gr) 
199 
 
                                                          
 
7.3.2.3 Governance reforms in public administration collaboration 
 A third change in respect to S3 governance is pinpointed by the data which 
suggest that a series of policy adjustments that public sector organisations are needed 
to improve national-regional collaboration. Despite the progress discussed in section 
7.2.3.1, the respondents emphasise that the existing S3 governance model needs 
additional modifications, as it still lacks clear directions of the way in which bottom-up 
and top down S3 approaches could be better reconciled and governed. For example, 
we have captured eight individual responses which point out that although a series of 
S3 national tools were introduced to support the governance of S3 (e.g. the national 
council, national innovation platforms), their co-operation and support at the sub-
national level is still limited and unknown, raising collaborative and administrative 
barriers (e.g. who is doing what, unclear tasks, problems with time schedules). To show 
the uncertainty currently surrounding the co-operation at a national-regional level in 
the context of S3, an innovation expert from the Alexander Innovation Zone of 
Thessaloniki reveals:        
 
At present everyone is responsible for everything and at the end of the 
day nothing has been achieved. We need clear responsibilities and tasks 
for everyone (TRCM35, 2015) 
 
In the same vein, supporting the argument that the existing S3 regulatory governance 
includes levels of vagueness, SOCM37 (2015) says: 
 
The role of GSRT14 on S3 is absolutely unclear. At present, we don't know 
if GSRT is the responsible authority to co-ordinate and supervise the 
development of S3, there are not any clear guidelines on this issue. 
Typically, GSRT is responsible for the whole co-ordination of the regional 
innovation strategies, but is this also applicable in the case of S3? We 
don't know (SOCM37, 2015) 
 
14 General Secretariat of Research and Technology (GSRT) 
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While the collaboration and interaction of key S3 actors is increasingly important to 
take place at a national-regional level, the above citations indicate weaknesses in the 
way in which institutional communication is currently taking place between national 
and regional authorities for the development of S3. To overcome this challenge, a 
series of adjustments are suggested in the responses. For example, the national and 
regional entities responsible for the development of S3 need to institute a permanent 
collaborative dialogue to examine more closely how a series of new regional and 
national tools introduced for the purpose of S3 could be better governed to promote 
S3 (e.g. the innovation platforms, the national S3 council, the Regional Scientific 
Councils for Research & Innovation, see section 7.2.3.3). This view is supported by 22 
out of 31 responses, which promote the idea that a first step has been made already 
through the creation and institutionalisation of these policy tools, but what is now 
necessary is to ensure their functionality in the sense that they promote synergies and 
they do not operate in isolation. In this regard, what is required from a policy 
governance perspective is not the introduction of additional policy instruments, but the 
substantial exploitation and governance of these tools. Therefore, a clear and 
comprehensive direction of how these institutional tools will function towards S3  
would be shaped by new more intensive and frequent interactions among public sector 
regional and national smart specialisation actors.  
 
7.3.2.4 Policy governance adjustments to accumulate critical mass 
 The data evidence one further requirement. S3 governance change is related to 
policy adjustments which are needed to secure private firms critical mass. Precisely, 
when we looked for smart specialisation enablers in Crete and CM, more than half of 
the respondents (30 out of 50) pointed out that S3 implementation needs to be 
governed towards identifying, engaging and favouring the interaction of a large 




business community. This need is articulated in the following quote, provided by a 
public sector respondent from CM:    
 
We need to see how to favour more beneficiaries through our policies 
and strategies. We should look for a wide participation of private actors, 
and we should build a proper control mechanism to support these actors 
implement  their smart specialisation strategies (KOCM18, 2015)  
 
In chapter 6, we saw that the participation of the private sector in the entrepreneurial 
discovery was relatively low in the sense that only a small number of firms and 
entrepreneurs have been directly involved in the discovery process (private sector was 
broadly represented through chambers, business associations and other similar 
intermediaries). Firms critical mass, however, and particularly the direct engagement of 
local entrepreneurs (under the narrow meaning of making business) is a key success 
factor to drive the entrepreneurial discovery successfully (Gianelle et al. 2016; McCann, 
van Oort, and Goddard 2016), given that it is the entrepreneur itself who must lead the 
entrepreneurial searches (Foray 2014). The mobilisation and engagement of a broad 
participation of diverse entrepreneurial firms in which smaller firms, and possibly less-
innovative, will also have a role to play in the process of discovery is captured also in 
the findings. For example, KOCM25 (2015) says: 
 
The logic of the region is that everyone is welcome to have an active role 
in the smart specialisation. Apart from the giants, regional innovation 
systems include also less innovative firms. We want to attract best 
innovation performers to start smart specialisation strategies, and then 
other firms, less innovative, can start engaging and participating 
(KOCM25, 2015) 
 
To determine what policy governance adjustments could support the mobilisation and 
engagement of S3 beneficiaries in the case study regions, we run specific queries in 




to make changes in the way firms are reached and encouraged to take an active role in 
the design and implementation of regional innovation strategies. In previous 
innovation policy frameworks, most of the public sector initiatives which aimed at 
promoting private sector commitment, were based on the identification and 
engagement of single firms, usually knowledge-based firms and large companies. While 
this practice might be successful and beneficial for a small number of entrepreneurial 
actors, it is by far inappropriate within the smart specialisation rationale, which 
promotes public-private sector synergies in a more intensive and collective way 
comparing to previous endeavours.   
 Since smart specialisation funding will be mostly provided to private-public 
actions (Region of Crete 2015; Region of CM 2015), public-private synergies (e.g. 
industry-academia collaborations) are seen as a an effective means of mobilising firms' 
participation in S3. Moreover, the traditional collaboration between private and public 
sector actors for innovation policymaking and action is and remains weak, in the sense 
that it is not conducted regularly and repeatedly. In total, 19 out of 30 respondents 
suggest changes through the design and provision of a new series of policy initiatives 
for the promotion of public-private collaborations. As opposed to earlier efforts, we 
found that these new initiatives are different in the sense that they are designed to 
promote cross-sector collaborations at a permanent basis (e.g. support the creation of 
clusters and agglomerations), with the aim of supporting a large number of dissimilar 
firms improve their innovation capabilities (firms' innovation capacity is discussed 
analytically in chapter 8). The logic behind this idea is to constantly promote 
collaborative and systemic innovation, so that to provide equal opportunities not only 
for the local champions or leaders, but also for many other regional firms with less 
innovative capacities to participate in the development of S3. Through this process, the 
latter will benefit from tailor-made support and follow an imitation-to-innovation route 
(Kim 1997) to catch up with more advanced firms. We show an interview extract from a 





It's not good to take only the best innovators, the regional champions, 
you need also to consider the engagement of other businesses. It's good 
for S3 to support average-level companies catch up with the top leaders. 
And you will never be blamed that you selected again the usual suspects. 
So, different companies should be engaged in S3, but with a different 
strategic approach. You can't just go for everyone with the same 
strategy, you need to make a decision and it's crucial to see how this 
decision could mobilise companies innovate more (KACM32, 2015) 
 
7.3.3 Reforming and adapting institutions for smart specialisation governance  
 The importance of building a strong and stable institutional environment for 
innovation policymaking was highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, by 
acknowledging that economic development depends upon the existence of well-
established institutions (North 1990). However, despite the recognised role of 
institutions as innovation enablers (Edquist 2005; Strambach 2010), critical questions 
remained to be answered in the S3 context, regarding the implications of institutional 
integration and diversity on S3 (Grillitsch 2015). For example, how can institutions 
impact the realisation of S3 in practice? In particular, how can certain institutional 
changes, reforms or adjustments favour a more productive governance transformation 
discussed above? The answers to these questions are not straightforward, given the 
abstract nature of institutional theory and the difficulty of measuring institutions and 
their long-term effectiveness (Rodríguez-Pose 2013). To this end, this section aims at 
addressing these contemporary questions by studying the importance of integrating 
both formal and informal institutions for the development of S3. It uses empirical 
evidence to show what institutional reconfiguration is needed to support the 
governance of smart specialisation strategies in Crete and CM.   
 In general, we found that in the Cretan and CM context, the enacting and 
enforcing of new institutional arrangements is dependent on four critical factors which 
require a set of responsive legislative changes. Table 7.4 summarises the interview 




affect S3 implementation in the case study regions. Each of these aspects of 
institutional integration is discussed analytically in the following parts.    
 
Table 7.4 Number of responses on institutional reforms for smart specialisation 
governance 
  No. of respondents    Percentage(*)  
Types of institutional reforms  Crete CM TOTAL   Crete CM TOTAL 
Public sector reforms to reduce 
institutional uncertainty and 
administrative burden 
17 12 29   56.7% 60.0% 58.0% 
Increasing regional self-
government and autonomy 19 11 30  63.3% 55.0% 60.0% 
Implementation and 
enforcement of legislation 9 7 16   30.0% 35.0% 32.0% 
Regional restructuring for smart 
specialisation 3 6 9   10.0% 30.0% 18.0% 
(*)Based on a total number of 50 interviews: Crete=30, CM=20 
Source: Author 
 
7.3.3.1 Public sector reforms to reduce institutional uncertainty and administrative 
burden 
 Bureaucracy or other administrative uncertainty emerging from ineffective 
norms and routines are an important part of the institutional setting of a territory 
(North 1989). The importance of institutional bureaucracy has been evidenced in the 
data which highlight the need of institutional re-configuration to be oriented towards 
examining how state bureaucracy and administrative burden can be progressively 
reduced to tackle institutional uncertainty and facilitate S3. In previous sections, we 
discussed the need to simplify certain policy processes which are related to S3 
governance. In the analysis, we find that this simplification depends highly on the 
ability of the public sector administration to induce structural change and improve its 
functionality. Moreover, the view that existing institutions strangle the implementation 




include time consuming process, massive paper work, red tape, public trust problems, 
implementation uncertainty etc, was reported by 29 respondents. They evidence the 
administrative inefficiency of public sector as a significant barrier to S3 
implementation. The words of a Cretan respondent are indicative:  
 
Fearing corruption, we have made a very cumbersome and complex 
administrative system (DACr44, 2017) 
 
There is an emerging necessity to review and integrate the current institutional 
framework with the objective of improving the functionality of public sector 
administration to favour the implementation of smart specialisation. This necessity is 
reflected in the following quotes: 
 
Bureaucracy seems to be a hurdle to innovate, particularly for new start-
up ventures, so you need to rethink the existing institutional framework, 
it will need proper adjustments to reduce bureaucracy, and I think this is 
a necessity if we want to attract private funds for S3 investments 
(FRCr17, 2015) 
 
Bureaucracy surrounding RIS3 practices is huge and acts as an important 
inhibiting factor for implementing RIS3 projects on-time due to 
operational and institutional barriers (KACr40, 2016) 
 
Furthermore, both quotes underline the need to reduce public bureaucracy and 
administrative barriers, derived from a poor institutional environment, currently 
governing the operation of public administration at the regional level. In chapters 6, we 
indicated a number of institutional barriers in public administration processes, 
including the ineffective co-ordination among governmental authorities at the national 
and sub-national levels, lack of public trust and limited interaction among private-
public sectors. There is widespread acceptance in the data that, administrative burden 




administration. This is clear in the findings. What is not clear though, is what 
institutional changes are particularly relevant to increase the administrative efficiency 
of each public sector unit which may have an impact on S3 development. Given the 
different organisational structures, responsibilities, needs and capacities that each 
public sector organisation may possess, an analytical answer to this question is not 
possible, unless a new empirical investigation, well beyond the boundaries of this 
thesis, is exclusively dedicated to this end.  
 
The case of the Directorate of Transport and Communications in Crete  
 An interesting example emerging from the Cretan case study, which shows how 
endogenous public sector reforms could bring further institutional integration and 
additional governance simplification, is the restructuring of the Directorate of 
Transport and Communications (DTC), which has been transformed from a deep 
bureaucratic structure to a very modernised public organisation. By reforming many of 
its institutional operations (e.g. digitisation of records and services, e-services for 
citizens etc), the DTC reduced bureaucracy and got the second regional award from the 
European Public Sector Award 201715. The public sector respondents from Crete 
indicate that the DTC is an ideal example of institutional change whose rationale could 
be adopted, adapted and applied in other similar initiatives of changing public 
administration as a good practice. A Cretan respondent with a key role in the 
modernisation of the DTC points out:  
 
The modernisation of the Directorate of Transport is a good example of 
how specific institutional reforms in the existing operation of a public 
sector organisation, for example, the introduction of e-Governance, 
reduced bureaucracy and led to additional administrative flexibility and 
fast-track services for the citizens. It works well, and we should do it to 
other public sector units (RACr4, 2014) 
 
15 Source: EPSA Best Practices & first results, https://epsa2017.eu/en/content/EPSA-first-results.54  
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We do not use the DTC case to understand how institutional change comes about. 
Besides, the DTC example does not really explain the mechanism by which change in 
public administration processes may take place. However, what the DTC case shows is 
that since it is not possible to induce institutional change in a universal way to assist S3 
governance (efficient institutional adjustments in one organisation does not necessarily 
mean the same for another organisation), it is of great importance to perform a step-
by-step investigation, in which institutional reforms can be examined and nominated 
separately for each public sector actor who has a key role in the development of S3. 
This process will help to endogenously change part of the institutional rules currently 
governing the implementation of S3. 
 
7.3.3.2 Increasing regional self-government and autonomy  
 A total number of 30 respondents regard the reforms which are intended to 
increase institutional autonomy at the regional level as a new indispensable element of 
governing smart specialisation strategies in the regional setting. In particular, this 
autonomy refers to the provision of additional institutional power to regions, with the 
objective of increasing their independence from the central state and raise the levels of 
self-governance in innovation policy making. To highlight the need for far-reaching 
institutional reforms, aimed at strengthening further regions' policy independence for 
innovation policymaking, RACr4 (2014) says: 
 
It is not possible for every single decision we want to make, for every 
minor issue to wait for the ministry's approval, it doesn't work like this, it 
should be changed (RACr4, 2014) 
 
This is an indicative extract which reveals regions' institutional limitation to develop 
innovation strategies in a productive way. There is a clear suggestion derived from the 
interview responses (19 responses from Crete and 11 responses from CM) that 
institutional reforms towards maximising regional self-government and autonomy have 




effective governance of S3. Moreover, we found that reforms are needed to increase 
regions' power to legislate, by providing them with additional institutional authority to 
develop and enforce tailor-made development laws at the regional level. As an 
example, we refer to the respondents' view who promote the significance of tax 
reforms, by granting fiscal incentives at the sub-national level to foster private firms' 
participation in S3. The main idea is that it should be the region itself (and not the 
central state) which must be given the option to decide on tax politics to support its 
own developmental priorities in the context of S3; for instance, to choose what 
financial incentives should be given and to which economic domains.  An example of 
how a change in the regional tax legislation might affect the implementation of S3 in 
the region of Crete is given by a local entrepreneur from the manufacturing sector: 
 
A second measure to facilitate S3 development is to support 
economically isolated areas, just like Crete, to overcome the costs of 
transporting raw materials in order to remain competitive. So the 
regional government could have power to reduce transportation costs or 
to provide tax reduction to support local companies and help them 
remaining competitive globally (KOCr15, 2015) 
 
This excerpt nominates a place-specific example as to how changes in regional 
institutional power (in this case increases in regions' legislative power for tax benefits 
in selected entrepreneurial priorities) may favour the realisation of S3. In this regard, 
we found that such legislative options and changes need to be place-specific, 
considering the particularities of the local economies (e.g. specific sectors and 
industries in which regional advantages exist) and, most importantly, the R&D domains 
which have been identified and selected during the entrepreneurial discovery for each 
region. The question to be answered, however, is to what extent Cretan and CM public 
sector authorities are ready to respond to these legislative changes. Similarly, what 




operational routines and use it effectively in the context of S3. This interesting issue is 
examined and discussed analytically in the following chapter. 
 
7.3.3.3 Implementation and enforcement of legislation 
 As a third reform, the respondents highlight the need to change the way in 
which institutions are currently implemented and enforced at both the regional and 
national level. Particularly, a total number of 16 interviewees have expressed directly 
the view that it is not only important to rethink and modify the existing institutional 
framework, but also to ensure that norms and laws are enforced effectively and 
rightfully. This finding is in line with previous research which draws attention to weak 
state capacity to induce and enforce new regulations and laws for policy development 
(Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2013). In this respect, the main idea is that change 
of improvement should not be necessarily in the institutions themselves, but in the way 
they are enforced by making it more rigorous, transparent and reliable. To show the 
importance not only of setting but also of enforcing proper institutions in building trust 
in innovation policymaking, ANCr11 (2015) points out: 
 
Trust is crucial for smart specialisation practices, and it comes when the 
whole system works well, when institutions and regulations are 
effectively enforced. What I mean is that you cannot just put hundreds of 
strict laws to counter corruption and when you catch corruption just to 
show leniency and impunity, it won’t work like this (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
This quote recognises the value of institutions enforcement capacity in public policy 
and the need to induce changes towards this direction. We link institutions and 
legislation with S3 practices by acknowledging the difficulties emerged due to the 
inefficiency of the current legal framework to promote a stable, fair and trust-worthy 
environment for S3 beneficiaries. Moreover, in chapter 8 we will indicate the relatively 
high levels of corruption and the lack of public trust as two important barriers for the 




believe that the lack of trust-based relationships remains a key barrier for developing 
private-public linkages). This finding is closely related with the lack of public-private 
trust, which in its turn, composes an institutional barrier which blocks the productive 
implementation of innovation policymaking in the S3 context.  
 In the same vein, a local entrepreneur from the manufacturing sector highlights 
the problem of generating innovation and becoming competitive in a weak institutional 
environment, in which formal rules and regulatory policies are not working properly. 
He points out: 
 
We are harmonised with the national norms and the European standards 
and we can innovative under these regulations, but this is not the case 
with many other competitors who are not comfort with these regulations 
but they can offer their products in low prices. So, we are talking about 
an unfair competition and it's a matter of inadequate control and 
monitoring institutional mechanisms (KOCr15, 2015) 
 
He continues:  
 
It's really important to have regional and national institutions that will 
be able to control and ensure that the private sector is in line with the 
existing legal framework. However, this is difficult because of the limited 
number of people working for the ministry, at least this is what they 
argue. So the state is unable to protect those companies which have 
decided to incorporate innovation and provide an actual added value to 
their products (KOCr15, 2015) 
 
The words of this entrepreneur confirm an implementation challenge of the current 
regulation, which hinders entrepreneurial development and raises competition 
problems. In this sense, a set of regulatory adjustments that can embrace strong 
enforcement policies, appropriate to secure the enforcement of the rules is 




7.3.3.4 Regional restructuring for smart specialisation (regional amalgamations) 
 This final section analyses data which underscore the importance of initiating a 
set of institutional changes to promote transformation of regional space for the 
purpose of S3. Particularly, we have collected responses from 9 interviewees who 
suggest that Crete and CM are two relatively small regions to implement smart 
specialisation (e.g. they have a small number of innovative firms) and that it would 
possibly bring more efficiency and better policy results if S3 has been designed and 
implemented in larger territories, beyond the NUTS2 level (e.g. neighbouring regions 
with common S3 priorities). This view promotes the idea of merging small regions for 
innovation policymaking and action to accumulate critical mass for the design and 
implementation of S3. An example of how geographic re-organisation could work in the 
S3 context is derived in the following quote, which suggests the production base of the 
regions as a criterion when considering territorial restructuring through mergers:    
 
In the case of Greece which is a small country, you can't implement RIS3 
in NUTS2 regions as they are too small with limited potential and 
different resources. For example, we can't really talk about RIS3 in 
Thessaly, in Epirus, or in Central Greece. RIS3 wouldn't be necessary  to 
be conducted in administrative regions but in areas which have similar 
production profiles which may not be connected administratively. For 
example, why didn't we consider Thessaly and Central Greece as one 
common area for the purpose of RIS3? Why not design and implement 
RIS3 particularly for this grater area? West Macedonia for example could 
go together with Epirus to focus on power generation or on sectors 
which are pretty much related with the electric generation industry 
(XACM29, 2015) 
 
This excerpt belongs to a local entrepreneur from the manufacturing sector, who 
promotes the idea of regional amalgamations on the assumption that Greek regions (at 
the NUTS2 level) are not self-sufficient to follow a systematic bottom-up approach to 
conduct an effective entrepreneurial discovery and facilitate place-based policy action 




regions at the NUTS2 level and 7 decentralised regions (see figure 1 in Appendices for 
guidance). This view suggests radical changes in the regional geopolitical dynamics and, 
as such, it requires political will and power, as well as a series of co-ordinated actions at 
both the national and regional administrative levels. Under this idea, adjustments in 
the regional landscape implies territorial restructuring for policy reorientation and 
regional renewal, which is almost certain that it will include significant conflict among 
and within regional and national stakeholder groups.  
 
The roots of regional regrouping for smart specialisation policymaking   
 The idea of regional regrouping and restructuring for policymaking as indicated 
in the responses is linked with a series of efforts conducted lately by the national 
government to restart the national economy. OECD (2017a) identifies four major 
drivers of territorial reforms: political change; demographic change; socio-economic 
change; and local management and finance. In the case of Crete and CM, the idea of 
territorial reform is more likely to include political and socio-economic reasons. 
Moreover, since the 2008 economic crisis, Greece attempted significant efforts for 
structural reform and renewal with the objective of reducing governmental spending, 
increasing administrative efficacy and facilitating the rationalisation and modernisation 
of the entire public sector. The Kallikratis Plan16, approved by the Greek parliament in 
2010, was possibly one of the most ambitious efforts to reform Greek local government 
by providing the public sector with more flexibility, autonomy and transparency. In 
practice, its aim was to reduce the number of municipalities from 1.034 to 325, abolish 
54 prefectures and 19 provinces, and introduce the new concept of the decentralised 
administrations where the 13 NUTS2 territories were administratively replaced by 7 
decentralised regions, (Fujita 2013). Under the new Kallikratis Plan, which came into 
force on January 1, 2011, the Greek local government consists of the 325 new 
municipalities (first tier level), 13 NUTS2-level regions (second tier level) and 7 
16 The Kallikratis Plan is fully described in the new Greek Law 3852/2010 (FEK  87Α'/ 2010) 
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decentralised administrations (third tier level). The new local administrative system of 
Greece is fully illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 




As shown above, the decentralised regions are administered by the General Secretary, 
appointed directly by the national government, and an advisory council consisting of 
the regional governors and the representatives of the municipalities. At the second 
level, regions are administered by the regional governor and the vice-regional 
governors which are responsible for the regional units; both are elected directly by 
local citizens. The third level of administration, composed of the new municipalities, is 
run by the majors and their municipal councils which are also directly elected. This new 
local government structure was created to provide more power and autonomy to the 
Greek regions in order to design and adjust their own regional strategic frameworks 
according to the national legislation and the EU cohesion policy. In reality, it could be 
treated as the first serious step of the national government to restructure its 
operations and devolve part of its mandate and political legitimacy to the regional 
governors. On the contrary, it is worth noting that in the case of the decentralised 




level, the political power and decision-making remain both at the central government 
(Fujita 2013).  
 Though the respondents mention that it is not necessarily the case for Crete 
and CM, it may be useful to rethink territorial restructuring and promote the idea of 
strategies' combination for the purpose of S3 particularly, based on the place-adaptive 
rationale of Kallikratis Plan. A number of proposals are found in the data, suggesting 
specific territorial patterns for new geopolitical policy action. We present two 
indicative quotes from CM interviewees: 
 
I would put Central Macedonia with Eastern Macedonia Thrace and 
Western Macedonia with Epirus together, it would make more sense, 
and in general, I think it would bring better results in the regional 
innovation policymaking, and this is because Greek regions are too small 
in terms of size (MPCM34, 2015) 
 
My personal opinion is that it would be useful to have larger regions for 
the development of S3 in order to achieve critical mass. However, I don't 
think that this will happen in practice because of politics (TRCM35, 2015) 
 
As discussed in chapter 5 (see background of the regions in section 5.2), Greece is a 
small EU country with an economically weak periphery at the NUTS2 level. Therefore, 
the main idea derived from the above quotes is that Greece consists of small-scale sub-
national ecosystems which may be unable to fully combine the essential elements for 
the transformation of smart specialisation theory into practice. The claims of this 
argument rely primarily upon three main views expressed by the respondents: first, the 
majority of the innovation systems at the NUTS2-level are very small in size, and 
therefore, unable to reach the appropriate critical mass in research, innovation and 
entrepreneurship. This idea has been also introduced in the recent innovation 
literature by other empirical studies, see for example (Landabaso, Georghiou, et al. 
2014), who stressed the importance of securing an active participation of a large 




financial resources to fully support S3 action plans (see chapter 5, sections 5.3 and 5.4 
which analyse the industrial and innovation potential of each region); and third, the 
existing micro and meso-level capabilities at the operational and political level may be 
too weak to secure a successful design and implementation of the entrepreneurial 
discovery (this sections is evidenced and discussed in the following chapter).  
 It is worth noting that the scenario of using Kallikratis Plan for the development 
of S3, requires the initiation of large-scale structural reforms at the administrative 
level, as well as the enhancement of political will and actual intention for changing part 
of the existing political regime at both a national and sub-national level. Additionally, 
while we have not investigated it in great detail, we also assume that merger reforms 
will need a careful consideration of the criteria to be selected for partnering regions to 
support S3 implementation (e.g. geographical and knowledge proximity, homogeneity 
of industrial sectors and complementarities of specialisation, history, tradition and 
regional routines, political will for reforms and policy modernisation etc). 
 
7.4 Conclusions  
 Chapter 7 aimed at providing an analytical answer to RQ2: "How do, and can, 
institutional arrangements and governance reforms impact on smart specialisation 
practices". Its objective was twofold. First, to provide a detailed analysis of what 
governance and institutional reforms are currently taking place in the regions of Crete 
and CM to support the development of S3. Second, to investigate what new ways of 
policy governance are relevant to assist smart specialisation in both regions, and 
examine what institutional adjustments might be necessary to facilitate their 
deployment. To identify and understand changes in the governance of S3 and meet, 
therefore, the first objective of RQ2, a brief analysis was performed, introducing the 
way in which previous generation of regional innovation frameworks were governed. 




 A first conclusion is the inefficiency of previous innovation policy frameworks to 
govern development strategies at the regional level. We saw that governance priorities 
of earlier innovation frameworks retained local players' involvement at very low levels, 
contradicting the principles of any contemporary regional innovation strategy which 
promotes bottom-up approaches. Our analysis revealed a design nationally, execute 
regionally governance model, in which a direct and continual engagement of local 
entrepreneurial actors was absent to lead the design of innovation policymaking at the 
regional level.  
 A second conclusion is that many of these previous policy governance practices 
are changing at present along with the development of the new S3 framework. This 
ongoing change in innovation policy governance is evidenced to take currently three 
different forms with place-specific effects on the implementation of S3 in Crete and 
CM.  
The first form of change is illustrated through the emergence of a new public 
administration attitude as to how new regional innovation strategies are governed and 
regulated in the context of S3. We showed that this new perception to innovation 
policy, shifts from previous administrative practices and routines (e.g. design 
nationally, execute regionally) to new governance ideas and patterns that are more 
consistent to what smart specialisation theory is currently proposing. Specifically, we 
highlighted that under this new policy governance approach, Crete and CM are further 
encouraged to follow bottom-up practices (not only during the implementation but 
also during the design phase), and exploit opportunities for self-searching and learning. 
We used data to show that this change in policy governance attitude was more 
profound in the public administration sector, lying on the acceptance that additional 
governance power is given to regions for locally-designed action in innovation policies.  
The second form of change refers to the way in which S3 practices were approached 
and carried out by both regions. The data showed how under this new way, innovation 




conducted in a clearly more intensive and collective way comparing to previous policy 
efforts which lacked connectivity and systemic approaches.     
Last, we found that the regulatory and administrative change to S3 governance 
discussed above, was supported by the transformation of several policy tools and 
unofficial governance shapes to formal and permanent institutional structures of policy 
making (e.g. the regional innovation councils). Interestingly, we showed that it was not 
the tools themselves that favoured the way in which S3 practices were governed, but 
the institutionalisation of these tools which empowered the practice of S3 governance.   
 A third key conclusion of this chapter is that despite the recent progress in 
integrating the regulation of S3 in Crete and CM, a series of new governance and 
institutional reforms are still needed to favour and improve S3 development. Four key 
governance reforms have been evidenced in the case of the selected regions. 
A first reform is to change autonomy levels in regional policy governance with the 
objective of giving further flexibility to the implementation of S3. For example, we saw 
that public-sector agencies were capable to govern the design of S3, but less 
administratively independent to implement it. However, we noticed that these kinds of 
reforms face serious challenges. Moreover, we saw that the extent to which it will be 
successful, depends on a state will to provide regional public-sector authorities with 
additional administrative flexibility to manage the implementation of innovation 
strategies in the context of S3. Given the apparent difficulty to move policy power from 
national to regional levels, the Cretan and CM case provides place-specific policy 
suggestions as to how efforts to overcome the difficulties of changing the equilibrium 
between regional policy governance autonomy and central authority can work in 
practice. Specifically, through the case studies we showed that the required regional 
autonomy in governing S3 can be gradually achieved through a learning-by-doing 
approach, followed by a learning-by-evaluating process (Rodrik 2004b). In these 
approaches, the extent to which S3 governance can be semi-independent from central 




S3 domains. This process is based on pilot testing which goes beyond previous 
'business as usual' practices in innovation policy governance in the selected regions.  
A second essential change in S3 governance is to simplify smart specialisation related 
practices. We studied three Cretan and CM examples and showed how a restructuring 
of specific procedures governing the implementation of S3, can lead to better smart 
specialisation outcomes. We displayed that the simplification of processes must not be 
only conducted for practices directly related to S3 (e.g. actions immediately related to 
the entrepreneurial discovery), but also for other bureaucratic procedures which may 
not constitute a clear part of the S3 approach, but they have a direct impact on its 
development (e.g. the example of recruitment). 
A third change to S3 governance is a move towards adjusting the way in which 
national-regional public-sector collaboration is currently taking place for the purpose of 
S3. Given the high levels of policy vagueness and uncertainty we captured in Crete and 
CM, there is an urgent need to change the way in which S3 tasks and responsibilities 
are currently regulated and communicated between regional and national-level 
authorities. We found that the key point of this change is to institutionalise a 
permanent and constant communication dialogue between regional and national 
public administration actors with a direct engagement in different S3 stages (e.g. 
design, implementation, monitoring).  
The inception of certain policy adjustments to introduce a new way of governing the 
accumulation of firms' critical mass, was regarded in the findings as a fourth element of 
change to S3 governance. Furthermore, given the importance of entrepreneurial firms 
in the discovery process on the one, and their low participation in the Cretan and CM 
practices on the other, there is a clear need to change the way in which local firms' 
participation is governed and regulated in the framework of S3. We introduced the idea 
that merely targeting and selecting single firms in public innovation policymaking (as 
happening in the past) is not any more a policy option for the development of S3 and, 




introduction of new means of addressing public-private interplay. These means include 
the undertake of more intensive initiatives for collaborative synergies (e.g. for the 
promotion of business-science clusters and agglomerations), from which a large 
number of private firms will have the opportunity to participate in smart specialisation 
actions through S3 clusters and consortia. 
 A fourth key conclusion is that the existing institutions in Crete and CM are 
relatively weak and, therefore, part of them need certain changes to support the 
governance of smart specialisation and become responsive to what S3 seek to achieve. 
In particular, we found that institutional reforms, changes, and adjustments are critical 
to at least four different directions. 
The first is to make public-sector administration more responsive to the S3 governance 
needs discussed above. To achieve this, we saw that the introduction of new 
institutions alongside existing rules, the process of layering (Mahoney and Thelen 
2009), is vital. In particular, we saw that public-sector organisations are far too 
bureaucratic and untrustworthy to support innovation policymaking. To overcome 
public-sector reliability, corruption and other similar problems, we found that 
institutional changes must focus on improving the way in which specific public sector 
agencies are currently operating. While our analysis cannot propose specific changes 
for each of the regional authorities that have a key S3 role to play (we saw that 
different organisations require different structural reforms), it highlights the 
importance of performing a step-by-step investigation, in which the instruction of 
prospective reforms, changes and adjustments can be examined separately for each 
public-sector authority.  
The second reform suggests changes in regions' legislative power which are critical for 
regional diversification and development. We found that the provision of additional 
institutional and legislative power can allow regions develop and enforce their own 
development laws. The creation of a new regionally-based legislative framework can, in 




institutionally-friendly environment for S3 development. As an example of how 
increases in regions' legislative power is possible to affect S3 development, we 
evidenced regions' potential to attract S3 private investments through the provision of 
tax benefits. We saw that while tax incentives may be part of a specific development 
policy, their enforcement in practice requires sound institutions to appropriately 
support this policy. 
The third reform is related to the implementation and enforcement of the institutions. 
We saw that the lack of an enforcement power in institutions causes public policy 
implementation problems, in the sense that a stable, fair and trust-worthy 
environment for S3 action is still missing from both regions.  
Finally, as a fourth institutional change for additional flexibility in S3 governance, we 
recorded the proposition of an ambitious institutional reform which promotes the idea 
of spatial re-organisation to meet the objectives of S3. Given the small size of the case 
study regions and their weakness to fully accumulate the required critical mass, the 
examination of territorial restructuring through regional mergers can show whether 
innovation policymaking can be better addressed. This is a process of displacement 
(Busetti 2015; Mahoney and Thelen 2009), discussed in the literature review chapter, 
which highlights the necessity to remove existing formal rules and introduce new 









Chapter 8: Capacity building for smart 
specialisation strategies in catch-up 
regions 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 In the previous chapter we investigated how existing and new institutional 
arrangements and governance reforms impact on smart specialisation practices. We 
also highlighted the need of conducting an investigation to understand empirically 
what capabilities exist and are required in the case of Crete and CM to favour these 
reforms and assist the realisation of regional policymaking in the S3 context. Chapter 8 
seeks to meet this research objective by answering RQ3 "What capabilities exist and 
are required to develop smart specialisation strategies in catch-up regional 
environments". It uses empirical evidence from the case study regions to meet a 
twofold research objective. First, it aims to identify what particular capabilities have 
been developed in the local ecosystems and currently exist for the two Greek regions 
to favour S3 development. Primary focus is given on those capacity building forms that 
have a direct impact on regional development and relate to formal or informal 
institutions and governance arrangements. This objective is connected to the first part 
of RQ3 "What capabilities exist... to develop smart specialisation strategies in catch-up 
regional environments". The second objective is to investigate what capabilities are 
needed to tackle the difficulty of implementing S3 in both regions, fitting to the second 
part of RQ3 "What capabilities (...) are required to develop smart specialisation 
strategies in catch-up regional environments". This section develops an exploratory 
approach to understand what capacities are still needed to assist governance and 
institutional re-configuration for the implementation of S3. Both parts examine 




 A large number of policymakers and strategists identify the growing importance 
of S3 as a regional innovation policy tool, and emphasise on the emerging need to 
incorporate and harmonise its rationale in the regional setting (Kroll 2016). The 
problem, however, is that S3 has been incorporated in the regional innovation agenda 
as an ex-ante conditionality, without examining whether regions were fully capable to 
support its policy approach (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2014). Moreover, while smart 
specialisation is indeed a smart approach to trigger regional diversification and 
development (Boschma and Gianelle 2014), it is still dependent on several social, 
political and economic place-specific aspects embedded in a national and regional 
environment. Arguably, in the case of Crete and CM, a number of questions were not 
examined analytically prior to the introduction of S3 as a regional innovation strategic 
tool. For example, do Cretan and Central Macedonian actors have the required 
capabilities to take a productive role in designing and implementing S3? To what extent 
do entrepreneurial actors' capacities allow S3 action plans to be implemented? If 
capacities are weak, what additional organisational capabilities are still needed to 
favour S3 development? Are regional capabilities appropriate to support governmental 
and institutional reforms to favour, facilitate and lead an effective discovery process? 
This chapter studies these sub-questions analytically, aimed to understand empirically 
how existing and potential capacities can affect S3 implementation in the Cretan and 
Central Macedonian context.  
 Chapter 8 is structured in two main parts. Part A sets out the framework in 
which different types of micro- and meso-level capacities are existing at present in the 
regions of Crete and CM. Particular attention is given to four types of capacities 
(technological & innovation, networking, entrepreneurial and administrative - 
governance capabilities). Part B investigates what new or improved organisational and 
regional capacity building forms are required to support the development of S3 in the 





8.2 PART A: Existing micro- and meso-level capabilities   
 This section examines what capabilities exist in the Cretan and Central 
Macedonian ecosystems, by investigating Technology and Innovation (T&) capabilities, 
networking capabilities, entrepreneurial capabilities and administrative and 
governance capabilities. A qualitative analysis was performed, based on the responses 
we collected on organisations' and regions' capabilities. Table 8.1 summarises the 
results of the analysis. It presents the number and percentage of respondents per 
region who highlighted at least one aspect of capacity building; it also presents the 
total number of quotes for each capability form in both regional environments.     
 
Table 8.1 Results of interviews: Number and percentage of responses 
  
  No. of 
respondents 
 Percentage of 
respondents(*) 
 No. of 
quotes 
    Crete CM Total   Crete CM Total   Total 
Type of 
Capability 
T&I 13 12 25  43% 60% 50%  74 
Networking 17 12 29  57% 60% 58%  100 
Entrepreneurial 14 11 25  47% 55% 50%  60 
Administrative/governance 6 8 14  20% 40% 28%  32 (*)Based on a total number of 50 interviews: Crete=30, CM=20 
Source: Author 
 
As shown in Table 8.1, we generated a total number of 266 quotes in NVivo, from 
which 34 single quotes were used in Part A to develop and support the evidence-based 
inferences.  The results are presented in the following sections.  
 
8.2.1 Technology and innovation capabilities of firms  
 To investigate firms' Technology and Innovation (T&I) capacity, we elaborate an 
empirical framework which allows an in-depth analysis that goes beyond the narrow 
examination of the usual T&I indicators employed by several EU studies to assess 




expenditures, EPO patent applications etc)17. In general our findings reveal different 
innovation paths and a rich diversity of T&I capacity at the level of firms. As explained 
later in detail, we found that in the Cretan and CM context, the ability of firms to 
innovate and make effective use of technological knowledge varies greatly across 
different types of businesses and sectors. For example, we have seen very innovative 
firms in industrial sectors that are usually able to lead high-tech industries and develop 
a supra-national reputation through incremental innovations; firms with good business 
ideas and entrepreneurial potential but with rather weak capacity to incorporate 
innovation and new technologies to diversify their entrepreneurial plans and business 
models; and firms, mainly retailers, with significantly low technological and innovation 
potential. To analyse and understand specific patterns of T&I capabilities, we grouped 
Cretan and CM companies into three basic categories: Zero-level capability firms, 
Technology & Innovation Learners and Technologically-mature firms. The formation of 
these groups emerged from the analysis of the interview data gathered both from the 
private and public sector. The key features of each group are examined and presented 
below.  
 
8.2.1.1 Group A: Zero-level capability firms (ZLC) 
 The first group comprises technologically inactive companies with no ability to 
develop T&I competencies. Bell and Pavitt (1995) argue that the resources and assets 
that are likely to support the development of technological capabilities are embodied 
in skills, competences and organisational systems. Similarly, Lall (1992) suggests that 
beyond skills, technology usually requires effort and financial investments by the 
receiving firm. In the case of ZLC, firms do not usually possess any of these critical 
aspects to introduce, develop and make sense of any advanced technology or 
innovative application with the objective of supporting or integrating basic business 
17 We note that quantitative indicators which assess the innovation and R&D trends in Crete and CM are 
presented in detail in chapter 5, Table 5.1 
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functions (e.g. improve production lines or product quality). The respondents underline 
that the majority of the companies in the ZLC group have the characteristics of 
the technologically illiterate firms, with a very low technological background and 
potential for initiating technological learning.  
 Our analysis suggests that ZLC firms represent high levels of introversion and 
critical gaps in exploiting technological applications and mobilising organisational 
learning. Usually, they are family-owned businesses, characterised by outdated 
business thinking and weak organisational models. They are found to operate in various 
areas of the local economy, particularly in traditional industries of the primary sector 
(e.g. agriculture and farming), as well as in the service sector (e.g. commercial retail). 
They lack incentives, motivation and willingness for organisational change, and they are 
usually unable to build productive capabilities. This view is evidenced by using data 
from interviews with representatives from diverse local business networks and 
associations in Crete and CM. The respondents believe that ZLC firms are not 
economically viable, they usually do not comply with the national regulations and, from 
an innovation perspective, there is no potential as they operate in cognitive isolation. 
We present an indicative quote from a CM business expert which reveals the limited 
potential of ZLC firms to develop T&I skills18.   
 
These entrepreneurs don’t really believe in innovation, they are not 
interested in innovation, they don’t really care how to develop new 
products or how to improve their existing products, you know, if it works 
well, just leave it and don’t try any attempt to improve it (MACM20, 
2015)  
 
 From a policymaking perspective, it is worth noting that ZLC firms cannot be 
included in any official survey of innovation activity in the enterprise sector. Hence, our 
knowledge and understanding of what specific policy options would be the most 
relevant to improve innovation capacity in this low-level innovation group is limited. 
18 A full list of all semi-structured interviews is presented in Appendices  
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This aspect raises policy questions as to how and under what conditions ZLC firms could 
potentially have an active role in the implementation of S3.      
 
8.2.1.2 Group B: Technology & Innovation Learners (learners)    
 The group learners includes most of the local firms which are found in both 
regional ecosystems in several industrial sectors. They are firms with a relatively low 
T&I potential. However, they seem to understand the importance of technological 
innovation and, consequently, they have started building learning mechanisms to 
improve various organisational skills and competences for innovation. The 
development and exploitation of these skills constitute the driving force of creating 
potential T&I capabilities. The process of acknowledging the importance of T&I, is, in 
fact, the first cumulative effort of these firms to learn how to use their technological 
resources and assets to develop innovation capabilities. In the data, this is a notable 
indicator of difference between learners and ZLC firm.   
 Furthermore, the responses from both regions show that learners operating in 
the services industry, are more capable in developing organisational and marketing 
innovation, instead of product or process innovation, which is more frequent in 
industrial sectors. This finding is also evidenced by EU and national studies, which 
shows that firms which introduce marketing or organisational innovations are usually 
operating in the services sector, while those with product or process innovations are 
frequently found in industrial sectors; see for example (EC 2016; EKT 2015c). 
Additionally, the respondents tend to mention that the ability of the learners in 
developing innovation is more profound in incremental rather than in radical 
innovations, for which the interview responses show the presence of knowledge-
intensive actions as a key necessity. In general, learners' capability to generate 
innovation is not systematic; it happens on an ad-hoc basis, through their participation 
in public research projects and other types of business synergies. The responses display 




technological background to participate in joint R&D projects in order for the first to 
meet the project requirements and get access to funding. Through these projects, firms 
usually develop project management techniques and technical competences. Within 
the learners group, university start-ups and spin-offs are more regularly involved in 
R&D projects, due to their knowledge proximity with academic and research centres.  
 In addition, we see that learners usually are firms that are more labour-
intensive, as innovation has not been fully embedded in their business and 
organisational mentality. For example, more than half of the respondents mention that 
learners do not reserve a specific budget for research, and that T&I improvements do 
not usually result from R&D activities as broadly argued by an important part of the 
innovation literature (Kirner, Kinkel, and Jaeger 2009). Rather, it is the result of other 
important determinants of innovation capacity, including the benefits of networking 
learning from daily business activities, and the acquisition and adaptation of incoming 
technology from external sources. Concerning the latter, we present the words of a CM 
entrepreneur, which show why an important number of firms have not developed 
proper capacities to generate knowledge internally:      
 
Firms were not used to look for new technologies, technology was there, 
available for them, mainly coming from abroad. It was better to buy 
existing technologies and not to jointly develop with a university or a 
researcher centre to cover their technological needs, because the policies 
for the enhancement of entrepreneurship, from '70s onwards, covered 
various costs of investments. These policies were there to cover the costs 
of new technologies, the costs of new infrastructures. Hence, companies 
could find money to buy new knowledge and technological solutions 
externally through various state grants and programmes. National 
policies and strategies provided good money and there was not any 
enticing reason for them to change their business routines and take any 
risk (XACM29, 2015). 
 
 Interestingly, the fact that previous state-aid policies were not aimed at 




inefficiency of the institutional framework to promote the development of knowledge-
based T&I capabilities. However, this inefficiency was not the only reason which 
prevented local entrepreneurs from developing in-house technological capabilities. The 
interviewees disclose a mixture of regional and national policymaking attributes which 
can possibly explain the reasons that most of the Cretan and CM firms (mainly learners) 
failed in developing strong T&I capacities. Furthermore, we identified relevant 
responses from different stakeholders and grouped them into different categories, by 
using a matrix coding query in Nvivo. We found that capacity building failure arises in 
three different ways. The result are presented in Table 8.2, which provides a synopsis 
of the most reported reasons that Cretan and CM ecosystems have not been fully able 
to increase their T&I capacity at the regional level. 
 
Table 8.2 Most reported reasons for meso-level shortcomings in regional innovation 
capacity building 
Meso-level shortcomings Explanation  
Investment laws  1. Public funding was available for firms to invest in 
infrastructures, buildings and machinery, not in R&D 
and innovation 
 
Policies for networking, 
clustering and systemic 
innovation  
2. Lack of strong networking and clustering policy, geared 
to support firms' engagement in innovation networks, 
R&D clusters and other forms of agglomeration. 
 
3. Weak industry-academia linkages  
 
Enablers of regional 
innovation  
 
4. Weak role of the Regional Innovation Councils and lack 
of public-sector innovation agents and technology 
transfer mechanisms, lack of clear regulations on 
innovation activity   
Source: Author 
 
 From a general perspective, our analysis displays that learners may have good 
business ideas but with limited T&I potential. In this case, the respondents indicate that 




capacity) which however, are not innovative and competitive in the global market. They 
tend to highlight that the main barrier of these firms to generate high-tech products 
and technological innovations is the lack of well-educated and specialised personnel 
(e.g. masters, engineers and MBA holders), their inability to establish permanent 
communication channels with knowledge creators (e.g. universities) and their difficulty 
to identify and use available tools relevant to introduce new innovative methods of 
production (e.g. they are not familiar with technology-self and technology-audit tools, 
they are not fully aware of the ongoing technological trends etc). The explanation of 
each of these barriers to innovation and new product development has been evidenced 
separately in the datasets. As to the personnel of the business sector, the data indicate 
a new tendency in the business community, which is to recruit low-cost staff (usually 
inexperienced personnel) as a means of cost-cutting measures in a period of crisis. The 
words of FRCr17 (2015) are indicative: 
 
Companies should recruit new, modern and well-educated personnel to 
become innovative and completive. They should invest in human capital 
and not just recruiting the less expensive ones, you know, we need to see 
the game from a longer-term perspective (FRCr17, 2015) 
 
The idea of this quote is that when innovation becomes the central issue in a business, 
looking for low-cost staff only is not a realistic option any more.  
 
8.2.1.3 Group C: Technologically-mature firms (TMF) 
 The respondents indicate a small number of Cretan and CM manufacturing 
firms that are able to combine and use a set of resources and competences to take 
advantage of new technological opportunities. These companies have developed 
relevant production capabilities to recognise and exploit technological opportunities to 
improve business performance and create a competitive advantage through product 




technological progressiveness which is usually equated with long-term investments in 
R&D and means of IPR protection to manage and protect their intellectual assets. We 
call these companies technologically-mature firms (TMF). The profile of these firms is 
given by an R&D manager from a TMF company: 
 
We strongly believe that innovation is the driving force of our company, 
as it seems to be the only way to achieve diversification, in fact, it's a 
vital component which is critical for our survival. R&D is also 
central. Usually, we establish technological collaborations and 
participate in research projects to improve process and product 
innovation. The reason we participate in R&D projects is to find solutions 
to our problems and not to get access to funding; also, through R&D 
projects we get access to new human capital to fulfil our research 
objectives. We use  a combination of patents and know-how secrets to 
introduce new product development and design our own business 
models (MECr13, 2015) 
 
 The TMFs have the characteristics of a technology leader, which according to 
Forbes and Wield (2002) has the ability to create new knowledge and use its existing or 
new technology to introduce new products in the market. Three of the top-level 
managers we have interviewed from the TMF group, tend to highlight the importance 
of innovation to diversify their products and get access into new markets. They also 
highlight their learning capacity to draw upon a diverse set of production capabilities to 
produce new innovative products and move into new entrepreneurial directions, in a 
globally connected environment (Mastroeni, Tait, and Rosiello 2013). The process of 
developing production skills is an important part, which usually comprises the ability of 
TMF to design, implement and monitor small and large-scale technological projects, 
either internally with the development of in-house projects, or externally through their 
leading participation in cross-regional R&D synergies. In this respect, TMF have 
developed production abilities appropriate to diversify into products that are 
technologically related to their current products (Boschma and Frenken 2009, 2). 




New product development is very much based on the upgrading of our 
previous or existing products as well as on the exploitation of new 
technologies (MECr13, 2015) 
 
There are a number of cases which show that technologically strong companies 
succeeded in entering into new foreign markets due to product diversification achieved 
by the systematic exploitation of technology advances. In this case, technology is seen 
as the most important tool for achieving a sustained competitive advantage, through 
the creation of new market opportunities. Successful examples include companies such 
as Plastika Kritis SA and Megaplsat SA which have been gradually expanding their 
businesses in Europe, Asia and the US19, owing to important investments in T&I. 
Moreover, interview evidence shows that critical to this internationalisation process is 
the existence of high qualified personnel (managerial skills) and the development of 
internal organisational cultures which are closely aligned with the acquisition and 
assimilation of new knowledge and know-how. We present a short quotation provided 
by MECr13 (2015):  
 
We achieved important improvements in our production and also 
expanded our businesses abroad by improving the technological 
competencies of our staff members in the production line (MECr13, 
2015) 
 
The respondents display that most of the TMF are likely to be either at an early stage of 
development (e.g. mainly university start-ups, spin-offs and science-based enterprises) 
or at an advanced stage with long business experience in the field (e.g. well-established 
companies in knowledge-intensive industries).  Plastika Kritis SA and Megaplsat SA are 
two examples of well-established companies with notable innovative capacity building. 
19 for more information see chapter 6  
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Indicatively, we refer to Megaplsat SA, which holds a family of ten patent applications, 
which protect five different products20.    
 
8.2.2 Summary of firms' innovation and technological capacity   
 The findings show that firms have a diverse range of innovation and 
technological capabilities in the regions of Crete and CM, showing that they cannot be 
considered and analysed as a homogenous group. The variation on T&I capacity across 
the different typologies of firms we have created is indeed notable, characterised by 
significant discrepancies. Table 8.3 illustrates these variations in respect to firms' T&I 
capacities.  
20 data gathered from http://www.megaplast.gr, (18 January 2018) 
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Table 8.3 Summary of characteristics of firm-level T&I capabilities 
Typology of firm Level of 
capacity 











No innovation   Lack of technological skills & innovation 
competences  
 Lack of technological background and 
learning potential  
 Disincentives for organisational change  
 Lack of other forms of capacity building  
 No R&D activities  
 
Family-owned firms, micro-




















 Understand and acknowledge the 
importance of technological innovation 
 Ability to exploit generic technological 
applications  
 Difficulties in accessing critical 
technological knowledge   
 Project management techniques 
 Technical competences  
 
 
Low-tech firms, Start-ups 
 
 
ICT firms, industrial 
manufacturers, branches of 








radical innovation  
 
 
Product & process 
innovation 
 Investments in industrial R&D  
 Ability to diversify products   
 Patent holders, use patents as a means to 
access and assimilate technological 
knowledge  
 Follow the technology frontier 
 Managing tacit-knowledge  
Firms in knowledge-intensive 
industries (plastics, 
chemicals, food possessing 





8.2.3 Micro- and meso-level networking capabilities   
 In this section we use empirical evidence to examine what networking 
capabilities exist to assist S3 development, and to what extent. In general, the data (33 
out of 50 respondents) display weak intra-regional networking activity among diverse 
players who have a key role in designing and developing regional innovation strategies. 
The respondents mention that this weakness is more profound in the process of linking 
innovation-related actions rather than in connecting entrepreneurial initiatives. 
However, apart from simply discussing this broad finding, we also identify and evidence 
certain cases in which inter-organisational networking capabilities are found to be 
stronger and more effective than those existing in typical local trends.  The presence of 
weak networking skills and competences can be identified both at an organisational 
and institutional context. The organisational level refers to individual actors, while the 
institutional level is discussed through the prism of regions. In this respect, the analysis 
falls into two levels: the micro-level and the meso-level. The analysis at the micro-level 
investigates organisations' networking capacity, with a particular focus on 
understanding what specific competences have been developed by private firms to 
build inter-organisational capabilities. The analysis at the meso-level studies capacity 
building from the regional perspective by investigating the ability of Crete and CM to 
address institutional networking and connectivity to promote change in regional 
innovation and development. 
 
8.2.3.1 Firm-level intra-regional networking behaviour (micro-level) 
 At the micro-level, we found that the capacity to develop inter-organisational 
relationships to access and exploit exogenous resources (e.g. knowledge, know-how, 
technology etc), varies remarkably across and within different groups of local 
entrepreneurs. The respondents represent high consensus on the opinion that the size 
of firms and the type of their business sector are two factors that highly affect firms' 




responses reveal that firm size tends to have a significant effect on capacity building in 
the sense that the smaller the company, the more difficult it will be to build inter-
organisational networks. The type of business sector and the area of specialisation also 
shape the way in which networking capabilities are created and developed (e.g. the 
case of the wine industry which is discussed in later sections).  
 Interestingly, companies of different sizes represent different potential for 
networking, and therefore, develop different networking behaviours. Firm size and 
ability to build other capacity building forms is also related with the type of networking 
(e.g. networking to promote innovation, networking to meet entrepreneurial objectives 
etc). For example, nearly 70% of the respondents who were asked to discuss the 
context of building organisational collaboration skills, mention that the capacity to 
build firm-level networking competences is relatively low due to the fact that most of 
the local firms are micro-enterprises21 or family-owned companies in the sense that the 
family controls management and perhaps other business operations22. According to 
this view, apart from the limited financial resources which block the configuration of 
communication skills, micro-firms are not usually able to develop a collaborative 
learning environment due to their organisational practices and routines developed over 
years. In practice, the main problem with the family-owned firms and micro-enterprises 
is that they have not yet developed a strong collaborative mentality to systematically 
interact with their networked environment (e.g. interplay with universities, research 
centres, public agents). Most importantly, micro-firms lack other types of capacity 
building (e.g. absorptive capacity, technological and innovation capabilities) and, also, 
they are not willing to get connected with other local players to share business ideas 
and develop synergetic advantages, fearing loss of competitive advantage through the 
exchange of entrepreneurial ideas and business secrets. 
21 According to the EU definition, micro enterprises employee less than 10 people with an annual below 
€2 million (source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3An26026) 
22 Micro-enterprises in Crete and CM with fewer than five employees represent more than 97% of the 




                                                          
 
 Additionally, they do not possess the appropriate mechanisms and resources 
(particularly from the human resources perspective) to transform their competences 
into strong inter-organisational capabilities and, therefore, their ability to build either 
entrepreneurial or innovative networking competences remains at low levels. This 
implies that it is rather unlikely for micro-enterprises to take part in innovation 
networks, implement R&D projects or be part of other related knowledge-based 
initiatives. At least, in our findings we have not captured such networking trends at a 
notable level. Instead, the data evidence that in the case of micro-enterprises, 
networking provides opportunities for accessing information in two ways: either 
through the direct interaction with customers and suppliers or through their 
membership in small-scale business-oriented associations. Concerning the latter, it is 
worth noting that there are cases in which a few micro-enterprises have developed 
some networking skills to get connected with related businesses to increase annual 
sales through business-oriented associations (e.g. micro-firms with less than five 
employees in retail markets and local shops function under business corporations to 
benefit from economies of scale). Examples of companies which have upgraded their 
networking competences owing to their participation in business associations include 
the Ariadni CRM partnership which accounts nearly 90 members throughout the island 
of Crete (mainly small-grocery stores) since 2012, as well as the Helios partnership 
established in CM which connects 150 local retailers23. However, while such initiatives 
promote the development of business networking skills at the local level, these skills 
are too abstract to generate innovative and sustainable entrepreneurship. The 
manager of a development agency in the region Crete stated:  
 
Family-owned companies, particularly the smaller ones, do not 
collaborate with other companies or organisations to generate 
innovation, due to their mentality, you know it's a matter of fear, lack of 
trust I would say, collaboration is something which is out of their 
23 Additional information in Greek: http://www.heliosgroup.gr and https://www.crm-ariadni.gr  
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organisational culture, they are not familiar with group working 
practices (FRCr17, 2015) 
 
 Concerning the type of business, the data shows that firms operating in a 
diverse range of knowledge-intensive industries (e.g. bio-tech, chemicals, plastics) are 
more likely to take part in either intra-sectoral or inter-sectoral innovation networks 
and technological synergies to support innovation and R&D activities. These firms 
represent a higher collaborative tendency for S&T partnerships as to some extent, they 
retain their own R&D competencies. On the contrary, firms of more traditional 
industries (e.g. service sector, agro-food etc), tend to develop organisational skills and 
competences related to entrepreneurial networking. Both views have been recorded in 
the datasets; we present the words of an intermediary organisation expert which 
shows this tendency:   
 
High tech companies and start-ups show better performance in building 
research collaborations with the university, comparing to more 
traditional companies of the services sector which usually develop 
entrepreneurial and business synergies  (SACr1, 2014) 
 
The wines of Crete Network as a case of entrepreneurial networking 
 Concerning entrepreneurial networking, the most successful example of linking 
homogeneous firms to enhance entrepreneurship (rather than innovation) is possibly 
the Wines of Crete, initiated in 2006 to connect local wine companies in the region of 
Crete. The Wines of Crete begun its operation from the prefecture of Heraklion, 
followed by other local producers who joined the network from the other three 
administrative prefectures of the island. Its main objective was to make Crete world-
renowned for its ability to produce world class quality wine. Financially, the network is 
independent, deriving capital from its members. Additional funding comes occasionally 
from national and European funds through funding programmes or other related 




which shows the ability of a number of firms in a specific local industry to set 
entrepreneurial networks with the objective of promoting inter-organisational learning. 
To indicate the importance of the Wines of Crete Network in the local winemaking 
industry and highlight its prospect to turn into a local cluster, KACr12, 2015 mentions:  
 
This initiative seems quite successful at the moment. These guys are 
good; they focus on new product development. For example, they invest 
in bringing back local grape varieties which have been disappeared, they 
conduct research in grapes and produce products with specific features 
and standards appropriate for exporting. This is a best practice for Crete, 
isn't it? Nobody else is performing like this at a regional level (KACr12, 
2015) 
 
The interviews with other individuals engaged either directly or indirectly in the 
network, we saw that the example of Wines of Crete reveals a dynamic approach in 
which the creation of firm-specific networking capabilities is linked with know-how 
sharing (e.g. exchange experiences to improve product quality) and getting access into 
new foreign markets (e.g. by exploiting economies of scale). Concerning knowledge 
sharing and inter-organisational learning, LYCr49, 2017, one of the Network founders 
which is currently an active member and develops a leading role for the transformation 
of the network to a local cluster, points out:  
 
I don't have any problem to share know-how and expertise with other 
wineries, for example with new incoming members in the network, 
because companies in this sector do not have business secrets (LYCr49, 
2017)         
 
The fact that local wineries did not fear losing competitive advantage from the leakage 
of a sensitive business information, (e.g. know-how in wine bottling or wine 
preservation techniques), acted as a facilitator in promoting inter-organisational 
networking in the local wine industry. As to the benefits of the network to access new 




Through this network, winemakers develop quite similar goals, achieve 
economies of scale and plan joint actions for their expansion abroad in 
markets such as Canada, Australia, US, they don't do it individually 
anymore, they do it as a network (KACr12, 2015) 
 
8.2.3.2 Networking capacity and institutional patterns at the regional level (meso-
level)  
 
Inter-regional networking and cooperation   
 This section analyses the ability of the case study regions to develop and 
promote networking within and outside the regional boundaries. Besides, local actors' 
networking is important for knowledge spill overs within the region (Asheim and Cooke 
2011) and beyond its boundaries (Grillitsch and Nilsson 2015). Starting from the latter, 
the respondents identify regions' capacity to build inter-regional networking to 
promote entrepreneurship and innovation in specific areas of regional specialisation 
which is owed to three main reasons. First, it is due to the collaborative skills that Crete 
and CM have gradually deployed through their participation in a series of territorial 
cooperation programs launched by the EU (e.g. Interreg programme). Through the 
implementation of several cross-regional programmes, regional authorities upgrade 
their project management and networking skills with the objective of improving 
regional performance. Second, it is because of the highly motivated actions of the 
regional authorities to lead foreign entrepreneurial missions and launch trans-regional 
cooperation agreements to promote and network local entrepreneurship abroad. 
Third, it relies on the high degree of extroversion of specific individual actors from both 
the private and public sector. In relation to extroversion, a leading role is played by the 
local academic community, for which we have seen a widespread acceptance for their 
competences to link and communicate R&D activities at an international level. 
However, as discussed later in this section, the capacity to connect academic 
knowledge and take advantage of R&D collaboration networks is limited when intra-




 In our findings we see that while inter-regional connectivity is seen as the 
opening up of new entrepreneurial opportunities, it represents some differences in the 
way it is addressed in Crete and CM. This is mainly due to their different spatial 
proximity. For example, respondents from CM reveal a relatively leading role of the 
region in setting and running strategic linkages with neighbourhood areas mainly from 
Bulgaria and FYROM for the production of textile, clothing and footwear. In this 
context, they highlight the dynamics of CM to affect the development of specific 
economic areas in the Balkans, as also indicated in previous innovation studies (Region 
of CM 2014). A fairly good performance of the region in building and promoting inter-
regional connectivity in certain industrial sectors is also highlighted in the cross-border 
cooperation programme for Greece and Bulgaria, which shows economic success and 
high participation rates in developing joint programmes (Region of CM 2015). However, 
we have captured responses which suggest that inter-regional networks are not always 
conducted systematically, but rather occasionally, depending on the available funding 
offered by cross-border programmes launched by the EU. A local policymaker from the 
region of CM says:   
 
It's good to see the interaction and results from the EU Territorial 
Cooperation Programme, say for example Greece-Bulgaria 2007-2013, 
but does this inter-regional cooperation go on when EU programmes 
end?  I'm afraid not (KOCM25, 2015) 
 
The main idea of this quote is that certain business activities of the core industrial 
sector of the CM economy which are linked with the several cross-regional networks 
are dependent on several EU cross-border policy initiatives.  
 On the contrary, Crete shows a slightly different picture in triggering and 
promoting cross-regional networking, mainly due to its geographical isolation and the 
nature of its local entrepreneurship and economy. Given that Crete is an insular region, 




other areas is more profound in the services rather than the industrial sector. This 
finding is also linked with the fact that Cretan economy is dominated by the service 
sector (OECD 2005). In addition, we saw that Cretan cross-regional linkages are not 
usually developed with neighbourhood areas, but rather with other regions and 
countries within and outside Europe. For example, a number of the Cretan respondents 
highlight the relatively high institutional ability of the region to maintain and endorse 
international networking linkages for the promotion of innovative tourism products. 
Interestingly, such networking endeavours include the promotion of business linkages 
not only with European but also with other foreign regions from Asia and Australia. The 
responses display also high levels of regional extraversion in business sectors 
dominated by high quality of agro-products. Most of these partnerships have been 
conducted through a series of cross-regional trade agreements between Crete and 
other foreign territories to support regional integration.   
 
Patterns of intra-regional networking  
 The results on intra-regional networking and institutional cooperation display 
diversity on the way, and the extent to which, capacity building has been developed 
over years in the selected regions. For example, we identify cases in which institutional 
networks are weak to effectively connect the activities of diverse regional actors. These 
cases refer mostly to public-private networking, with an emphasis on business-science 
networking initiatives, discussed thoroughly in the following sections. On the other, 
good practice in intra-regional connectivity is derived by examples such as the Wines of 
Crete and the Agro-nutritional Cooperation of Crete, which seek to network local 
producers operating in the agro-food sector. As to the latter, it is a public-policy 
initiative which supports firms' connectivity in specific areas of the local economy, and 
it has been identified as a good practice by a number of the respondents from both the 





(A) Public-private networking   
 Public-private networking is studied through the lens of industry-academia 
collaboration, which is seen to play a dominant role in the realisation of the self-
identification process (Rodrik 2001; Foray 2016). Therefore, with regard to the regional 
ability to collectively embrace and promote university-industry interaction, we observe 
a local paradox: though there is a strong scientific community, with well-established 
research infrastructures at the national level (EKT 2015c), university-industry 
networking remains at low levels and rather inefficient to stimulate regional 
specialisation and diversification. As an exception to this generalisation, the 
respondents indicate the ability of a small number of knowledge-intensive companies, 
usually hosted in science parks and technology incubators, to develop networking 
competences to link their businesses and technological operations with academia. 
These companies are normally university start-ups and academic spin-offs, that have a 
cognitive proximity with local universities and research bodies. The relatively higher 
ability of these companies (comparing to other traditional entrepreneurial actors) to 
communicate and interact with academia is pointed out by ANCr11 (2015) who says:    
  
Spin-offs and start-ups have an innovative potential as they tend to keep 
a close relation with university research labs (ANCr11, 2015) 
 
The responses show that the geographical proximity, in the sense that local actors co-
exist in a relatively small location which enhance knowledge flow and agglomeration 
effects, is also important for building strong business-science partnerships. In this 
respect, SACr1 (2015) says: 
 
In a relatively small geographical area many different institutes are 
located including the Foundation for Research and Technology, the 
University of Crete, the Technological Educational Institute of Crete, the 
university hospital, the Science and Technology Park of Crete, the 




significant agglomeration which allows for a fast and direct interaction 
among its members (SACr1, 2015)    
 
According to our findings, the paradox discussed above, is due to at least to five place-
specific reasons:  
 
i. Lack of a culture of collaboration and the different understanding of strategic 
networking between industry and academia. Specifically, we refer to a 
representative sample of the respondents who highlight the different attitudes 
that universities and firms are usually having when building networking 
capacities. In their view, universities and research centres tend to look for 
scientific excellence when building networking, while firms for making money 
and, therefore, science-business synergies do not usually lead to commonly 
expected outcomes. For example, academia is engaged in industry-academia 
projects to publish scientific work and strengthen its science linkages further, 
while companies usually participate to cover payrolls and other costs of doing 
business so as to produce profits. The following quotes, provided by a university 
professor, are indicative and reflect on the interviews' findings: 
 
Researchers are thinking of publications and papers while entrepreneurs 
are thinking of money; they speak different languages, they look for 
different things and the outcome of their work is different (ANCr11, 
2015) 
 
ii. Trust building problems associated with inefficiency in previous innovation 
policymaking (e.g. limited policy impact on companies through their 
participation in previous innovation programmes). The respondents identify low 
levels of public trust. The interesting point is that more than half of the 
interviewees (54%), no matter if they were asked a relative question, 




public authorities) is still a barrier for developing private-public linkages. In this 
respect, SOCM37 (2015) says:  
 
The local enterprises don't trust regional authorities, as they have never 
focused on their actual problems (SOCM37, 2015) 
 
iii. Lack of effective intermediary mechanisms and science-business translators to 
promote partnering between two words that speak a different language. For 
example, the interviews show that while science parks, business incubators, 
liaisons offices, and other technology transfer mechanisms have been 
established in both regions since years, their potential to connect diverse policy 
initiatives and actions is characterised low by most of the respondents. We 
present two representative quotes to illustrate shared perceptions in both 
regional environments.   
 
While we have established intermediary organisations and brokerage 
structures in Central Macedonia, nobody takes an active and continuous 
intermediary role, and intermediaries are crucial for setting industry-
university collaboration (GECM33, 2015) 
 
All previews efforts, for example the development of liaison offices, 
innovation centres, centres for the development of entrepreneurship 
failed. A lot of money were spent without bringing the required 
outcomes (KACr5, 2015)  
 
 
iv. Discrepancy between areas of academic research and local economic sectors. 
To discuss this interesting finding, we draw attention to two examples, 
presenting interview quotes from both regions. From the region of CM,  





Traditionally, innovation actions undertaken by local research bodies are 
entrepreneurially fragmented and scattered. They are not designed to 
support local economy, neither to cover local entrepreneurial needs and 
regional development (PECM26, 2015) 
 
As an example in the case of Crete, we refer to what a couple of the 
respondents have highlighted. Furthermore, while tourism has been selected as 
a key S3 domain for future specialisations, local academic research is not 
oriented towards tourism studies and research. Indicatively, the desktop 
research shows that there is no tourism department at a public university level 
for tourism studies, while there is no research lab predominantly focused on 
tourism research. Surprisingly, higher education in tourism is mainly provided 
from private universities located mainly in Athens and Thessaloniki, as well as 
from universities abroad. There is a higher school of tourism education located 
in east Crete24, which however provides professional training geared to hotel 
and tourist businesses.  
 
v. Easy access to public funding. There was no need for both universities and firms 
to develop skills for inter-sectoral networking. Access to funding was a relatively 
straightforward process for universities through national grants and their 
participation in national and EU funded research programmes, while for most of 
the companies through their participation in the developmental or investment 
laws. Notably, in previous years, public investments were seen as a first priority 
and, therefore, public funding was provided broadly to an extended number of 
companies in various sectors and industries. The respondents display that illegal 
overpricing of materials and equipment as well as other similar 'virtual' 
practices conducted by a number of project beneficiaries were a common 
secret to increase firms' funding.  In order to put an emphasis on the lack of 
24 http://astecrete.edu.gr/?lang=en  
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actual incentives for the local firms to invest and acquire new knowledge, one 
of the interviewees says:   
 
Why should entrepreneurs take the risk to invest in research and 
innovation when money comes fairly easily from the Greek development 
law? Innovation is tough with uncertain results; the development law is 
safe (FRCr17,2015) 
 
(B) Public sector cooperation 
 There is a widespread belief in the responses that cooperation between 
regional and national actors, that are responsible for innovation policymaking and 
action, is fragmented in the sense that it occurs occasionally. Specifically, the 
interviewees display that the communication among regional actors (e.g. public 
authorities within the same region) and between regional and national actors (e.g. 
ministries with local agencies) lacks a strong and trust-based collaborative focus. For 
example, SOCM37 (2015) says: 
 
Greek ministries don't fully trust Greek regions run smart specialisation 
strategies, and still don't do (SOCM37, 2015) 
 
In this example, the respondent reveals that national ministries do not trust regional 
authorities to design and run innovation policies, fearing of regional-level corruption 
and local lobbies.  
 
8.2.4 Entrepreneurial capabilities  
 In our analysis we incorporate the view that entrepreneurial capabilities are not 
only relevant for private-sector entrepreneurial actors but also for other organisations 
such as universities and research centres. We also accept the view that the concept of 
entrepreneurial capacity may go beyond organisational boundaries (Ács, Autio, and 




networks of entrepreneurial actors may shape the entrepreneurial potential of a 
region. Therefore, we examine entrepreneurial capabilities from three different 
perspectives: academic entrepreneurship, firm-level entrepreneurship and regional 
entrepreneurship.    
 
Micro-level  
8.2.4.1 Academic entrepreneurship 
 Academic entrepreneurship is a relatively new concept in the entrepreneurial 
agenda of the two regions, given that for years there was a common belief (mainly 
from academics) that entrepreneurial activities should stay away from universities. This 
view has been largely supported in the responses which show that while this general 
opinion is now changing, it has affected the ability of academic centres to develop and 
improve various skills appropriate to promote university-generated entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, there is a high consensus among Cretan and CM respondents that the ability 
of research centres and universities to promote academic entrepreneurship is relatively 
weak. Also, they point out that the degree to which research is integrated into 
marketable applications is different between universities and research centres, with 
the latter showing better commercialisation performance due to their legal status 
which allows for less bureaucratic rules in internal processes25.  
 The interviewees highlight that research centres and universities in Crete and 
CM have developed both hard and soft institutional infrastructures to support 
academic entrepreneurship (e.g. through the process of spin-off venture formation). It 
is argued that such structures are possible to enable and support the initiation of 
university entrepreneurial activities (Clarysse et al. 2005). Typically, hard 
infrastructures include the operation of liaison offices, business incubators, science 
parks, technology transfer offices (TTOs) etc. The establishment of TTOs for research 
25 We remark that research centres are state-private entities, while universities are state-public bodies 
with much more bureaucracy and strict internal practices. 
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centres and the creation of liaison offices for universities, initiated from 1994 onwards 
through the operational program Research and Technology-EPET II, co-funded by the 
EU and the General Secretariat for Research and Technology. The EPET II program was 
a catalyst for the upgrading of the public research and technological infrastructures 
(GSRT 2000). The Science and Technology Park of Crete was created in 1993, while the 
Thessaloniki Technology Park was established in 1994, as two fundamental 
mechanisms for the promotion of knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Soft 
institutional arrangements refer usually to the introduction of a series of policy 
initiatives and programmes geared to support commercialisation practices. Examples of 
such tools include the implementation of national and EU funded programmes, the 
design of in-house commercialisation routes and methods of IPR management and 
protection. 
 However, while such tools have been introduced since years, local academic 
bodies are characterised by the respondents as having weak capacities to exploit them 
for the promotion of entrepreneurial activities. As to hard infrastructures, FRCr17 
(2015) presents some interesting quotes to indicate the weakness of university TTOs, 
while ANCr11 (2015) discusses the inefficiency of soft infrastructures by showing the 
low impact of previous innovation policies.  
 
I know universities have liaison offices, but they appear in some way 
inactive and ineffective, so I think universities need to adjust their 
existing structures and make them accessible and active to the business 
community (FRCr17, 2015) 
 
We need to avoid what happened with previous R&D projects and 
development programmes which in general didn’t bring the required 
effects, and at the end of the day nothing really important happened, 
just some small and fragmented improvements with very limited added 





The difficulty to integrate their institutional mechanisms and routines, particularly in a 
crisis period, is seen by the academic respondents as one of the most important barrier 
in promoting academic entrepreneurship. They disclose the existence of university 
ideas with possibly good business potential, which however are not usually 
transformed into commercial applications, due to the lack of seed-funding and the 
limited interaction between universities and local firms' networks. As an expectation, 
the respondents cite the case of FORTHnet, a spin-off company created in 1995 by the 
Foundation for Research and Technology (FORTH-HELLAS) in the region of Crete. To 
highlight its leading role and success as an academic spin-off, the head of the 
innovation department of FORTHnet points out that:  
 
FORTHnet was the company which introduced the internet in Greece; it 
became a member of the Athens stock exchange in 2000 and at present, 
it's one of the two-three largest telecommunication and internet 
companies in Greece  (STCr2, 2014)      
 
Possibly, FORTHnet is the most successful example of exploiting academic 
entrepreneurship in the country.  
 
8.2.4.2 Firm-level entrepreneurship 
 We found large diversity in the ability of local firms to develop organisational 
competences to identify and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. This diversity not 
only refers to the extent to which entrepreneurship is being conducted by diverse 
firms, but also to its nature and type (e.g. start-up entrepreneurship, research-based 
and knowledge-based entrepreneurship). For example, if entrepreneurial opportunities 
are closely linked with the introduction of state-of-the-art technologies and high-tech 
innovation, then the ability of the local firms to demonstrate a productive output is low 
which reflects a relatively weak entrepreneurial ability. In general, the analysis shows 
that the majority of the local micro-enterprises have developed organisational 




advanced technology and innovation is not seen as a necessity. In the days of crisis, 
such entrepreneurship includes usually ventures in mass catering industry and retailing. 
This trend is confirmed from national statistics published during a period of 2008-16, 
which shows that nine out of ten new business ventures were usually found in non-
innovative sectors (e.g. food retail, cafes and restaurants, clothing and footwear 
stores); a representative year is 2012, in which nearly 23.5% of the new business 
ventures were recorded in catering and entertainment sectors (Kathimerini 2013).  
These firms do not usually take entrepreneurial risks, in the sense that research and 
innovation are not incorporated in firm's business functions. In this respect, one should 
not expect these firms to develop top-leading entrepreneurial skills to recognise and 
exploit new business opportunities to initiate domain specialisation and regional 
diversification in the way the principles of S3 are suggesting (Foray 2014). Interestingly, 
the most profound entrepreneurial skill that these firms have developed over years, is 
that they know how to operate in isolation, without the support of any institutional 
mechanism. In the sample, we found a widespread acceptance on the following words 
of a local entrepreneur:  
 
Entrepreneurs have learned to work and run their businesses alone, it's 
like an one-man show, they don't expect support from elsewhere, as this 
is out of their mentality. It's hard for them to change their business 
culture from one day to another. I'm not sure if this is good or bad 
(KOCr15, 2015) 
 
 In the responses, we have also recorded other types of entrepreneurial 
capabilities which comprise a mixture of organisational skills such as the effective use 
of business intuition, knowledge of market and experience and understanding of 
competition. Business intuition is ranked as the most common leadership skill of the 
typical entrepreneur, as it appears more frequently in the responses. To highlight the 
value of business intuition in local entrepreneurial policymaking, an entrepreneur from 




There many traditional entrepreneurs who use their personal intuition 
when they make business decisions with entrepreneurial risks, for 
example an investment  (KOCr15, 2015) 
 
Additionally, there are cases where previous business failure and learning have also 
contributed to the development of good entrepreneurial capabilities. In this respect, a 
CM interviewee mentions:  
 
People now are more experienced and this was gained from the previous 
innovation and entrepreneurial policies which in fact were not that 
successful, and due to this failure, people have been trained and are now 
more prepared to deal with innovation and entrepreneurship (MPCM34, 
2015) 
 
To summarise a list of the most commonly found characteristics of firms' 
entrepreneurship in Crete and CM, we created Table 8.4. The findings from this table 
are the outcome of the analysis performed in the answers we have collected for a 
couple of questions which aimed at identifying and understanding the particularities of 
local entrepreneurship. The results are representative for both regions, given that we 
have collected and analysed evidence from all three stakeholder groups of our interest 
(private sector, public sector, academia).  
 
Table 8.4 Most common characteristics of firm-level entrepreneurship 
       Explanation  
− Organisational competences to address low-level entrepreneurship 
− Weak ability to take entrepreneurial risks related to innovation and 
R&D actions 
− High level of imitative entrepreneurship 
− Entrepreneur isolation 
− High business institution and relatively good understanding of markets 
and competition  





 Concerning the type of entrepreneurship, the respondents stress also the fact 
that due to the current financial crisis, there is an increase in necessity-driven 
entrepreneurs who are usually engaged in the identification of non-technological 
opportunities, (e.g. people who have been fired and received financial compensation 
use this money to start their own businesses as they do not have any other 
alternatives). The ability to identify non-technological opportunities (in the sense that 
great opportunities are not raised due to strong innovative applications or because of 
the uptake of new technologies) was developed in the context of necessity 
entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al. 2002) due to two reasons. The first reason is related 
with a large number of family-owned businesses where family members became 
entrepreneurs by necessity to run the business of their families. In this case, firms are 
run by the children of the owner when the later is retired. The second reason is due to 
many individuals who turned their interest to businesses not to pursue an opportunity 
but due to the lack of other adequate employment opportunities. In both cases, the 
development of entrepreneurial capabilities is initiated and motivated by necessity 
rather than by personal ambitions or business opportunities. Concerning this 
interesting finding, two of the interviewees say:  
 
From my business occupation and professional experience I can tell you 
for sure that entrepreneurship in the region of Crete is entrepreneurship 
out of necessity and not out of choice (FRCr17, 2015) 
 
There is entrepreneurship in the period of crisis but this is because people 
do not have an alternative, so we are talking about necessity 
entrepreneurs (KACr12, 2015) 
 
 Apart from the above types of entrepreneurial capacity which are based on 
more traditional business practices and behaviours, we have also recognised a limited 
number of cases with more advanced business competences. Such competences are 
normally developed at an individual level through individual and team working. The 




the introduction and evaluation of new knowledge and critical information. In this 
respect, getting access into new knowledge is an increasingly significant component for 
the formation and development of effective entrepreneurial capabilities. Most of the 
entrepreneurs belonging in this category possess advanced information technology (IT) 
skills which have allowed them to use the applications of new technology to look for 
new business opportunities. Most of these entrepreneurs run start-ups, usually in 
different high-tech sectors. Examples in the case studies include new business ventures 
hosted in business incubators. The manager of the incubator in Heraklion mentions for 
these companies:    
 
We host innovative firms in our incubators, some of them develop very 
competitive products or services. Usually, they are technology start-ups 
and spin-offs from the university of Crete, FORTH or from elsewhere. 
These guys use advanced technology and seem to have a good 
perception around innovation (SACr1, 2014) 
 
Meso-level 
8.2.4.3 Regional-level entrepreneurship 
 At the regional level, we examine entrepreneurial capabilities by investigating 
the capacity of the regions to understand local patterns of entrepreneurship and 
develop institutional mechanisms to support the promotion of entrepreneurial 
activities in diverse business sectors within and beyond the regional boundaries. As a 
general finding we may note the weak ability of the regional mechanisms to map the 
entrepreneurial activity of the regions, in the sense that there are no official data to 
indicate its nature (tendency, characteristics, types, orientation, key players, number of 
new ventures) and degree of intensity (entrepreneurial frequency, level of risk-taking 
etc). As a result, the existing entrepreneurial support coming from institutional sources 
restricts the development of regional entrepreneurship. From a narrower perspective, 




intra-regional entrepreneurial activities and capabilities for the promotion of cross-
border entrepreneurship. Therefore, we present them separately.  
 
(A) Capacity for cross-border entrepreneurship 
 The respondents identify a relatively good ability of the regions to organise 
entrepreneurial missions abroad and take part in cross-regional cooperation 
agreements. In this respect, the capacity of the regions to support entrepreneurial 
actions takes a systemic dimension which embodies a collective endeavour to exploit 
new entrepreneurial ventures. As an example, entrepreneurs from the interviews refer 
to the organisational skills (e.g. know-how to promote local products abroad) that a 
number of regional authorities have developed through their continuous participation 
in various entrepreneurial exhibitions. AZCr6 (2014) says:  
 
Several regional initiatives are now being launched to promote local 
entrepreneurship abroad through the participation of the region in 
international exhibitions, business missions etc (AZCr6, 2014) 
 
0ur data exhibits a relatively good capacity of regional bodies to include mechanisms to 
support entrepreneurship. However, they mention that the outcome is not always the 
desired one as these actions tend to lack connectivity with actual business activity (e.g. 
practices conducted by business representatives or public servants cannot replace 
entrepreneurs' knowledge and experience), and usually fail to sustain a critical mass by 
embracing a large number of local enterprises. This challenge is highlighted in the 
following quotes:   
 
The problem is that regional authorities can't always bring the results 
that entrepreneurs themselves could bring for their companies, when 
participating in foreign exhibitions or other similar entrepreneurial 





Other regional competences which support the enhancement of entrepreneurship and 
facilitate cross-regional connectivity, contain the supportive mechanisms which have 
been established by the regions abroad. A recent example is the operation of an info-
office of the region of Crete in Brussels, which seeks to keep Crete connected with 
other European regions. This initiative reveals also a degree of decentralisation, in the 
sense that it is possible for regional authorities to have a direct interaction with EU-
level governance. In this respect, Crete has improved its administrative abilities by 
connecting its local authorities with European policies and structures. 
 
(B) Capacity for intra-regional entrepreneurship  
 Relating to the capacity of the regions to encourage entrepreneurship within 
and across different business sectors, the respondents found the existing mechanisms 
at a relatively low level. While regions possess a short of capacity to support 
innovation-driven actions in local entrepreneurship, (mainly through the 
implementation of horizontal policy actions, e.g. entrepreneurial programmes funded 
by national and regional money), the potential of this ability is limited in the sense that 
it does not have continuity. Once programmes come to an end, organisational skills and 
competences stop functioning. The main problem we have seen from the responses is 
that the role of entrepreneurship has never been adopted in the policy agenda as a 
regional-level phenomenon, which should be treated strategically. According to the 
responses, addressing entrepreneurship in a strategic way, means to prioritise the 
creation of an entrepreneurial mind-set that will constantly support local actors 
develop their business ventures. An indicative quote from a financial sector 
interviewee is presented below:  
 
Continuation in entrepreneurial ventures is a big word. To support 
business activity we should first introduce a better entrepreneurial 
environment in which firms can feel confident to run their businesses, an 




political power, firms won't make serious investments unless they feel 
safe (MICr16, 2015) 
 
The fact that Greek regions have very weak legitimate roles to create tailor-made rules 
according to their own needs, has been identified as a critical barrier for the strategic 
promotion of local entrepreneurship. The respondent's words show the lack of 
entrepreneurial policy and the system-level constraints of entrepreneurial action in 
both regional environments.      
 
I'm not sure I can find many effective mechanisms at the regional level to 
support local entrepreneurship in a systematic and collective way. You 
know, the truth is that regions were normally dealing with 
infrastructures, road connections, buildings, bridges and not with the 
promotion of entrepreneurship (SOCM37, 2015) 
 
 The above quote has been acknowledged in most of the responses and reveal a 
general attitude on the capacity of regional-level entrepreneurship. However, in spite 
of these particular patterns of entrepreneurial activity, the analysis indicates the 
creation and development of a new series of organisational skills, geared to enhance 
and promote local entrepreneurship. These skills have been mainly developed by 
certain regional authorities and include human resources upgrades and professional 
training, as well as collective efforts for institutional networking among private and 
public sector organisations. These initiatives are organised in the context of the S3 
framework, with the objective of supporting regional entrepreneurship by setting up a 
new entrepreneurial centre. This new centre will be established in both regions to 
support local entrepreneurship through regionally-based initiatives. At the time of 
writing, mid-2018, regional authorities are closely working towards setting this new 





8.2.5 Administrative and governance capabilities   
 Regarding the administrative capabilities of the regions, 14 out of 50 responses 
indicate that certain regional authorities, such as the local managing authorities and 
other administrative units related to regional policymaking, have developed inherent 
organisational skills to manage and monitor the development of innovation-related 
policies and R&D projects. Based on the view of the interviewees, such skills include 
project management techniques, know-how to manage national and EU funds (e.g. EU 
structural funds), understanding of formal rules and procedures in public tendering 
(e.g. e-procurement policies, calls for tenders in the context of large-scale projects) etc. 
Apparently, all these organisational competencies are relevant and useful for the 
development of S3. However, we have captured a general perception which raises the 
urgency for further improvements, aimed at reducing bureaucracy, recovering public 
sector trust and tackling public corruption. Gradual improvements in these critical 
areas will help addressing the overlap between national authorities and regional 
structures currently existing in the context of S3, as discussed in chapter 7.  
 Furthermore, the regional autonomy to implement tailor-made innovation 
policies at the regional level, remains at low levels in the sense that regions possess 
limited political, constitutional and executive power to induce appropriate structural 
changes for implementing regional innovation policies. The interviews highlighted that 
such changes should include the ability to modify and apply the national legislation 
according to several regional needs and place-specific particularities. For example, even 
the S3 tools which are available to regulate the finances of S3 are nationally-based, and 
therefore dependent on central policy actions. However, it  is important to note that 
from 2010 onwards, the national political system allowed the election of the regional 
governor directly from people, which according to the interviews, provided additional 
regional autonomy and control over the entire local government26. In practice, regional 
policy design began to take an actual role when the regional governor was elected by 
26  Note: previously, regional governors were appointed by the Minister of Interior 
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people. Previously, innovation policy was common for each region of the country 
regardless local needs, characteristics and particularities. In this context, the need to 
design new indicators at the regional level to monitor and assess policy implementation 
was increased importantly.  
 
8.3 PART B: Capabilities required at the micro- and meso-level 
 In this section we present the empirical findings concerning the second part of 
RQ2, which is intended to investigate what capabilities are required to support the 
development of S3 in Crete and CM. The analysis is based on the respondents' views 
and discloses their answers concerning a series of place-specific enablers in supporting 
the governance and institutions of S3. We assemble a number of organisational and 
regional competences and group them into six core types of capacity building. Table 8.5 
summarises the statistics of each type of capability based on the frequency of the 
interview responses. The interviews indicate that each type of capability has a 
particular complementary role to play in the implementation of S3, and increases the 















Table 8.5 Number of interview responses on what capabilities are required for S3 
implementation 
   No. of respondents     Percentage(*)  
   Capacity Description Crete CM TOTAL Quotes   Crete CM TOTAL 
I Capacity to map regional 
dynamics 11 10 21 36   37% 50% 42% 
II Capacity for 
decentralisation and 
regional autonomy 
15 12 27 90   50% 60% 54% 




14 13 27 61   47% 65% 54% 
IV Capacity to link cross-
sectoral activities 5 3 8 10   17% 15% 16% 
V Capacity to understand 
and upgrade firms' 
technological and 
innovation potential 
9 6 15 63   30% 30% 30% 
VI Capacity to enhance local 
entrepreneurship                 
  
(a) Embedding enterprise 
and entrepreneurial skills 
in academia 
9 10 19 42   30% 50% 38% 
  




6 4 10 18   20% 20% 20% 
  
(c) Competences to 
design new place-based 
tools to support S3 
entrepreneurial capacity 
13 10 23 69   43% 50% 46% 
(*)Based on a total number of 50 interviews: Crete=30, CM=20 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.1 Capacity I: Capacity to map regional dynamics  
 This capacity is related with the need to understand the framework in which 
innovation actions are taking place. This view is documented in a representative quote 





The regional innovation system of Crete has been never analysed in 
detail to understand how S3 can be better designed and implemented in 
it. Are we familiar with the particularities of the regional innovation 
system of Crete? I don't think so. (KACr48, 2017) 
 
The words of the respondent show that prior to any endeavour to change and improve 
the governance of S3, it is important to build capacities suitable to understand the 
environment in which innovation policy takes place. The data evidence that the 
capacity to map regional dynamics takes two central dimensions. The first refers to the 
competences needed to assess previous regional innovation policies. Several 
respondents point out what a policymaker from CM simply says:  
Previous innovation policies have not been yet evaluated, their impact is 
still unknown. So, how to design and implement new policies if you don't 
know what went well or wrong in your previous policy frameworks 
(TRCM35, 2015) 
     
The process of evaluating the impact of previous policies at the sub-national level 
requires the introduction of tailor-made indicators and the actual engagement of local 
institutional bodies (e.g. the Regional Innovation Council). The second dimension is 
linked with competences required for the assessment of the entrepreneurial potential 
of the regions. To underpin this view, two CM respondents mention:  
 
What is missing now is the collection of empirical data, we need to 
perform an empirical-based investigation to understand the 
developmental potential of the region (SACM38, 2015). 
 
What is also required for smart specialisation is to allocate experts who 
will have a deep knowledge of the localities of each regional ecosystem, 
its entrepreneurial capacity and potential, for example how many 
innovative companies exist, in what sectors etc (MPCM34, 2015) 
 
Both quotes underline the need to map regional dynamics with an emphasis on 




into homogeneous groups to facilitate S3 implementation. The analysis suggests that 
there is a growing need for the regions to emphasise the development of endogenous 
capabilities to assess entrepreneurial firms and classify them into homogeneous groups 
for S3 policy implementation. The principles of this suggestion are derived from two 
mainstreams of findings. The first relies on a large number of responses (approximately 
90% of our cohort of interviewees) which point out that not all firms are capable of 
taking an active role in the S3 implementation, and therefore, we should identify and 
engage the most proper ones. The idea of selecting and targeting innovative firms from 
a variety of industries to develop S3 is supported by an important part of the 
innovation literature (Isaksen and Trippl 2014). The main argument of this view is that 
it would be possibly useless to target firms which lack fundamental resources and 
critical organisational competencies for implementing S3, as it is very unlikely for them 
to meet the objectives of S3 (e.g. to be able to identify and exploit new entrepreneurial 
opportunities, diversify their products, get access into new specialised markets etc). 
Firms with these characteristics are usually found in the Zero-level capability group (see 
Table 8.3), which shows very low innovation and technological potential. The second 
finding is linked with a relatively high tendency in the responses which covers almost 
60% of the sample responses. It emphasises the need to achieve a deep understanding 
of the diverse types of capacity and potential that all entrepreneurial firms possess. In 
relation to this, KOCM21 (2015) says:  
 
In order to implement an effective regional innovation strategy, it’s 
crucial to have a solid understanding of your business environment and it 
traits, the competitive advantage of your region, the critical mass, the 
nature and types of the local companies (KOCM21, 2015) 
 
 It is broadly highlighted that capacity building should be understood as a 
systemic process. This will assist the process of designing additional policy 
interventions, aligned to support the implementation of S3 through a better policy 




competencies appropriate to assess different types of firms' performance (e.g. 
technological, innovation, entrepreneurial etc), will form regions' capability to group 
local firms into different performance groups for policymaking and implementation. 
We believe that the formation of classification capabilities at the meso-level (ability to 
classify entrepreneurial actors into different performance groups), is increasingly 
important in the sense that it will reveal what endogenous transformation processes 
should be initiated to facilitate S3 implementation practices. The responses reveal that 
such processes should be driven by trial-and-error approaches, which allow for 
effective policy learning. Current regional innovation policies are more likely to follow a 
horizontal approach in both the design and implementation phases, neglecting the 
diversity of firms' abilities and particularities. An R&D manager from a technologically-
mature company in the region of Crete says:   
 
I can see that the regional government tries to open new markets in the 
agro-food sector, for instance in Russia, but this is something that we 
don’t really want from the region, since we can do it ourselves. We are 
forward anyway, so it doesn’t make sense for us such a policy initiative. 
We would like to see other types of support for our company (MECr13, 
2015)   
 
 This view follows the rational in which different performance groups require 
different policy approaches and actions. From a practical perspective, there is a 
common line in the responses which underpins that once firms are classified into 
homogeneous performance groups, S3 policymakers will be more capable to 
understand what policy intervention is most relevant for different types of firms for the 
prioritisation of activities that are likely to boost regional diversity. For example, what 
policy actions are required to will assist the process of accumulating and ensuring firms' 
critical mass discussed in chapter 7, section 7.4.2.4. Critical questions with policy 
interest can be then answered analytically. For example, reflecting on the analysis we 




would be most appropriate in the S3 context to augment the ability of technologically 
mature companies to diversify into new products or markets by using external 
knowledge? Similarly, what policy-level actions are required to facilitate the 
development of science-business networks between universities and learners, in order 
for the latter to foster local entrepreneurship and become top-leaders in the region? 
The need to map firms' capabilities, create different performance groups and design 
tailor-made action plans is disclosed in our discussion with a local policymaker in CM.  
 
I think one needs to categorise companies, even within the same sector, 
into different groups. We need different models to support groups of 
firms with different performance (KOCM21, 2015) 
The development of Capacity I requires the co-existence of a number of competences 
and skills analysed previously in this section. Table 8.6 summarises a core set of 
competencies that should be developed regionally to facilitate capacity building for 
mapping regional dynamics.  
 
Table 8.6 Competences summary for Capacity I 
 Competences needed at the regional level  
- Assess the impact of previous innovation policy frameworks  
- Mobilise actual engagement of local institutional bodies 
- Competence to evaluate local actors' performance on the basis of 
innovation and technology (public and private) 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.2 Capacity II: Capacity for decentralisation and regional autonomy 
 This capacity relates to efforts for governance upgrading at the sub-national 
level and refers to the development of negotiation competences to make the required 
institutional changes in regional autonomy discussed in chapter 7. We analyse the 
importance of building bargaining capabilities for the restructuring of the regional 
governance systems in Crete and CM, towards facilitating the development of S3. This 




development of competences for the re-organisation of the regional setting. Moreover, 
the respondents point out the need to increase regional autonomy with the objective 
of supporting the initiation of place-based practices (e.g. self-identification processes), 
and allowing regions to implement their specialisation objectives. They specify the 
degree of regional autonomy as a central element for the effective development of S3, 
given the limited power of the regions to currently govern and implement their 
strategic priorities. Recent studies define Greece as a highly centralised state in which 
regions have little autonomy to implement smart specialisation (Marques and Morgan 
2018). In our case, examples of S3 governance failure include the inefficiency which 
derives from a strong regional dependency on national rulemaking. One of the S3 co-
ordinators in the region of Crete says:  
 
There are only a few things that our region can make alone with regard 
to smart specialisation strategies, because almost any critical action is 
supervised and governed centrally. For example, state funding and 
different forms of financial tools rely completely on national platforms, 
so you are not able to develop you own regional financial tools. You are 
dependent on the effectiveness of national structures - if they work well, 
you work well too, if not you can't proceed with your plans (KACr42, 
2017) 
 
 In this respect, some of the respondents mention that Crete and CM must 
develop a new policy role for the shaping of the national institutional framework in the 
S3 context. This new role should rely on the creation and deployment of endogenous 
negotiation competences, which will gradually form the augmented bargaining capacity 
of regions against the centralised state and its inherent inefficiencies (e.g. bureaucracy, 
time-consuming processes etc). Through these competences regions will develop 
opportunities to move from top-down approaches to bottom-up practices as broadly 
suggested by the regional innovation policy literature (Cooke et al. 2011; McCann and 
Ortega-Argiles 2013a; Asheim and Cooke 2011; Uyarra 2009). Interestingly, over half of 




the implementation of S3 cannot be effectively achieved unless regions increase their 
capacity for regional autonomy. In their view, increases in regional autonomy are of a 
foremost importance for a successful implementation of S3, as they will gradually 
improve the transformative ability of the region to rethink the existing national 
framework and propose a new tailor-made institutional framework, in which the 
realisation of S3 can be better facilitated. In this new governance framework, regions 
should be able to develop legislative and administrative competences, geared to meet 
the objectives of S3. Using NVivo codes related to decentralisation and regional 
autonomy, we created four main categories which indicate a list of tailor-made policy 
initiatives to be addressed in the S3 context from a bottom-up approach according to 
the most frequent responses. The results are summarised in Table 8.7. Most of them 
are expected to have a direct impact on innovation policy making, given that they are 
seen by the interviewees as an enabler to successful implementation.  
 
Table 8.7 Results on tailor-made policy initiatives related to regional autonomy 
       Policy action at the regional level 
− Option for additional policy power of regional authorities to manage local 
funding regionally and reduce bureaucratic and time-consuming processes 
− Authorisation of regional authorities to evaluate and monitor innovation 
policies at the regional level through the design of targeted regional indicators 
− Provision of tax incentives in selected S3 domains at the sub-national level to 
promote local entrepreneurship and attract foreign direct investments 
− Motivations for the mobility and attraction of specialised workforce in specific 
areas of regional specialisations 
Source: Author 
 
The degree of regional autonomy can be gradually increased through the development 
of decentralisation competencies, which will bargain national-level political power and 
allow for different institutional structures at the sub-national level to promote and 
enhance regional diversification. Obviously, this is not an easy task, as the central 




highlighted as a possibility is to increase regional autonomy gradually, by introducing 
pilot changes in one or two areas of S3. Addressing this process at a pilot basis will 
show what administrative opportunities and challenges are emerged for the regions. 
 The analysis indicates that the creation of regionally-based negotiation 
competencies should begin prior to S3 design, and co-evolve with other place-specific 
elements emerged during its realisation. The idea of promoting decentralisation 
capabilities at the regional level to support regional autonomy and flexibility in the S3 
context is adequately captured in the following quotes provided by a member of the 
Regional Innovation Council of Crete, with an institutional role in developing regional 
innovation strategies. He says:         
 
If regions are not able to legislate under certain circumstances to 
facilitate policymaking, we can't really have a proper implementation of 
smart specialisation. If a region is unable to modify its institutional 
framework and make legal or other valuable decisions on its own, smart 
specialisation is an unrealistic scenario. It's not possible to have 
competitive regions, if they don't have the authority to re-configure their 
institutional framework according to their needs. In this case, all regions 
will be in the same position, possessing the same degree of capabilities 
and innovation potential. For example, it is vital for an insular region like 
Crete to have the right to offer diesel for shipping in discount of 30%. 
This option should be both feasible and legal. Accordingly, regions which 
are good in mining and metals, for example, should have the legitimacy 
to provide double wages to mining workers (KACr48, 2017) 
 
 It is important to clarify that the upgrading of regional autonomy does not 
automatically mean lesser contribution of the national authorities. On the contrary, we 
have found that national efforts to support S3 implementation could be further 
enhanced through the development of specific competences and skills at the national 
level. One critical type of support proposed by ten responses is the creation of an 
observatory for the development of S3, geared to assist regions developing their S3 
action plans. The observatory could build permanent multi-level structures with 




evaluation of S3. Particularly, the interviewees from the public sector mainly highlight 
the importance of setting a national mechanism which will have the appropriate 
competences to provide guidance and support in areas where regions cannot perform 
well.               
 
8.3.3 Capacity III: Capacity to develop regional communication, networking and 
clustering 
 The interviews disclose a noteworthy emphasis on the importance of giving a 
strategic approach in the development of intra-regional co-operation and learning 
among different local actors, who currently show low networking performance. The 
respondents support the perception that there are local entrepreneurial firms which 
possess the potential to improve regional performance, yet these firms should benefit 
from networking, agglomeration and clustering effects. This process is closely linked 
with the need to introduce new network policies at the regional level, which will 
combine different organisational resources to promote key functions of production. At 
present, as we have discussed in the previous section, most of the local firms operate 
in isolation and thus little can be achieved at a regional level (see section 8.2.3.1). The 
urgency to design, create and co-ordinate networking initiatives at the regional level is 
considered by the respondents as a very important process which is expected to 
introduce collaborative culture and affect the implementation of S3. The creation of 
clusters is possible to have a spatial approach with regional, national and supra-
national dimension. One of the respondents says:  
 
It is important to take a small number of companies and try to help them 
create synergies with each other to develop joint collaborative efforts 
with the aim of identifying what breakthrough could be generated in the 





 This is an interactive process in which the formation of new regionally-based 
clusters and interactive communication platforms is on the top level of the priority list, 
aiming at improving firms' networking mentality and, gradually, re-building trust among 
different entrepreneurial actors. Both Cretan and CM respondents identify S3 as a 
significant opportunity to localise and formulate a bottom-up need for the creation of 
regional networks and clusters, through the opportunities emerged from the 
interaction of entrepreneurial actors, knowledge creators and policy makers who take 
part in the entrepreneurial discovery. In this respect, the entrepreneurial discovery is 
not only considered as a productive process for the discovery of potential 
specialisations in the regions, but also as an institutional and collective means for the 
enabling of regional clustering and networking. These networking schemes should 
predict the incorporation of flexible management structures, whose absence in 
previous efforts was identified from the analysis as one of the most important reasons 
that previous clustering and networking policies failed to form effective clusters or 
networks.      
 The idea of clustering is seen as a key tool for cross-sectoral networking among 
diverse regional actors, whose co-existence and co-development in certain 
agglomeration schemes is possible to support further the realisation of S3. However, 
while a series of policy studies highlight the importance of clustering for inter- and 
intra-regional cooperation in the S3 context (EU 2016), in our findings we saw that 
building strategic cluster capabilities is also very important for addressing other policy 
actions which are closely linked to S3. This idea derives from the perception that 
collective business endeavours which initiate and evolve within local networks or 
clusters, are most likely to bring better and more integrated policy results and 
recommendations, than single actions undertaken by individual firms. For example, 
high-level policymakers point out that it would be more politically correct and more 
acceptable for the regional governor of Crete to ask from the central government for 




need could be based on collective rather than individual outcomes. In this respect, 
doing things collectively is better secured through clusters and organised networks, 
which take an institutional dimension in the regional setting.  
 The adoption of the principles of this new dimension of networking and 
clustering during S3, could bring additional policy improvements both in the design and 
implementation phase and, therefore, better policy results. Furthermore, concerning 
the design phase, there are responses which see the inefficiency of the regional 
authorities to facilitate S3 as a problem, derived from the limited power of the regional 
government to bring about institutional change at the regional level. The idea that such 
problems might be better tackled through collective and powerful local networking is 
revealed by the following quote, which shows the potential for setting a better local 
policy design mechanism through the provision of tax invectives: 
 
The region lacks powerful business networks or strong industrial 
associations which could claim from the national politicians tax 
reductions in specific business sectors to attract foreign investments and 
support regional development (KACr48, 2017) 
 
The importance of building strategic cluster capabilities is more apparent in the 
implementation of smart specialisation, given that S3 actions have been designed to 
promote funding for joint actions (Region of Crete 2015; Region of CM 2015)     
 Along with regional networks and clusters, the analysis reveals the significance 
of promoting communication platforms for research collaborations, which could have a 
supplementary role in the process of networking S3 actors. In the respondents' view, 
the development of communication platforms could progressively facilitate research 
collaborations, and therefore embrace science-industry to support a continuous and 
more strategic dialogue between universities and firms, which as discussed in the first 
part of this chapter, it is still missing from the regional agenda. The respondents 
mention that particularly in the case of Crete which is a small region with insular 




developing pilot networks, which later can be transformed into research, technological 
or business clusters, due to the advantages of location-specific factors. This idea 
derives from the benefits emerging from the spatial proximity and the concentration of 
public R&D intensity highlighted in the responses in previous sections of this chapter. 
The standardisation of olive oil and the organisation of local farmers to promote their 
products in a collective way have been cited as examples of local business activities 
which should be conducted collectively through networks and clusters. A financial 
sector expert from Crete mentions:  
 
One could find all these small olive oil companies, and try to help them 
create joint business networks in order to be able to attract large 
customers and get access into new markets (MICr16, 2015) 
 
The practice of cluster policies is also seen as a driving force in the development of a 
collaborative culture which is currently missing at both an organisational and regional 
level. The creation of clusters should follow a learning approach in which firms, 
universities and other key regional actors should be trained towards rebuilding their 
connections for interdisciplinary knowledge exchange. This objective, however, 
requires time-consuming processes and by no means it can be seen as a 
straightforward process. A list of competences towards this direction has been 
analysed in this section and summarised in Table 8.8, which shows the theme notes 
generated in NVivo.   










Table 8.8 Key competences for building regional networking and clustering capacity 
       Competences  
− competences to re-build trust among different entrepreneurial actors 
− ability to exploit the opportunities raised from the entrepreneurial discovery to 
enable regional clustering and networking 
− ability to exploit collective and powerful local networking to fulfil S3 policy-related 
objectives (e.g. additional authority and autonomy at the regional level) 
− design and manage interactive communication platforms to facilitate inter-
organisational networking, as a supplementary action in S3 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.4 Capacity IV: Capacity to link cross-sectoral activities   
 The analysis identifies responses which are linked with the potential of regions 
to connect different but related business activities, with the objective of generating 
cross-sectoral innovation and achieve product diversification. The basic idea of this 
finding relies on previous research work on industrial branching, which examines the 
interplay between relatedness and regional diversification (Boschma and Capone 2015; 
Neffke, Henning, and Boschma 2011). Moreover, it highlights the need for developing 
and exploiting a combination of networking competences which will gradually compose 
a regionally-based capacity to identify and interconnect cross-sectoral business 
activities that are well related with each other, but still remain disconnected. In the 
Cretan and CM context, there is a need for this type of capacity building to be oriented 
towards building competences which are likely to support the identification of 
fragmented business activities which however reflect the conditions to get embraced 
by others (e.g. single business activities which possess entrepreneurial potential if they 
are organised and managed collectively). This view goes beyond the limits of traditional 
practices conducted in previous innovation actions, in which institutional support was 
only given on specific firms, neglecting the importance of cross-sectoral interaction. 
However, this old view seems to be changing in the new S3 context, given that 
disruptive innovation is likely to appear in cross-industry endeavours (Christensen 




I strongly believe that it is now much clearer that innovation is more 
likely to appear in interdisciplinary ventures (TSCr24, 2015) 
 
This is probably why we have collected responses which suggest the encouragement of 
S3 funding in activities which promote cross-sectoral collaboration. For example, 
TRCM35 (2015) states:  
 
It would be good to receive more funding if you are able to combine 2 or 
3 different areas of interest in one single project (TRCM35, 2015)   
 
The evidence from observational research in Crete (participation in consultation events 
for the entrepreneurial discovery), reveals the collective efforts of the S3 co-ordinator 
to stimulate the promotion of cross-sectoral projects (e.g. explicitly discussed in 
speeches and presentations). The fact that cross-industry collaboration was extensively 
indicated as an additional enabler for getting access in S3 funding, it highlights the 
growing importance of creating and developing capabilities for inter-sectoral 
connectivity. We refer to a number of local cases from the agro-food sector which have 
been highlighted by the respondents during the interviews and rely on the need to 
deploy regional skills to stimulate product relatedness (Neffke et al. 2014) and input-
output relatedness among different industries (Essletzbichler 2015). In the findings, 
examples of product relatedness include the combination of tourism with electronic 
health services in hinterland or other inaccessible tourist destinations, while input-
output relatedness among similar industries embrace the combination of aromatic 
plants with olive oil, (in this case aromatic plants take a lonely business journey in the 
marketplace, while olive oil dominates the agro-food market). A diagrammatic 
illustration of the role of capacity building in linking cross-sectoral activities (product 






Figure 8.1 Linking cross-sectoral related activities 
Source: Author 
 
In the first case, the combination of two related products/services (alternative forms of 
tourism and e-health) from two different economic domains (tourism and ICT) is 
expected to spark creativity and innovation in specific business areas (health services in 
inaccessible tourist destinations). Likewise, the complementarity of two local products 
(olive oil and aromatic plants) from two related sectors (olive oil production and 
cultivation of medicinal and aromatic plants) can lead to new product development 
with significant potential in the global market. Interestingly, the value of creating an 
inter-sectoral potential within the S3 framework is also recognised by MICr16 (2015) 
who points out that the local bank of Crete is highly interested in identifying and 
funding innovations which emerge from cross-sectoral activities and interactions of 




the main competences needed to build capabilities for linking cross-sectoral related 
activities.      
 
Table 8.9  Capacity to connect related, yet disconnected business activities 
 Competences  
- Ability to recognise industrial and sectoral diversity  
- Ability to identify related but disconnected business activities for 
potential networking 
- Competency to link fragmented entrepreneurial activities, using 
several channel linkages 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.5 Capacity V: Capacity to understand and upgrade firms' T&I potential 
 Evidenced opinion of various interviewees suggests that the case study regions 
must first measure and understand firms' technological and innovation capabilities in 
depth, and then design and develop their S3 action plans. To do this, it is essential to 
motivate bottom-up practices to exploit regional resources instead of using again 
national or EU structures (e.g. central indicators), which are appropriate to provide only 
a rather general view on Innovation and Technological (I+T) performance. This view is 
linked with the idea introduced in Capacity I, which analyses the importance of 
developing assessment and classification capabilities at the regional level. 
Understanding firms' organisational capabilities in a particular local context, is seen as a 
complementary capability, that should be developed to support and enable the 
implementation of S3 in Crete and CM. This is critical because S3 priorities should 
evolve in response to innovation and technological capabilities that currently exist or 
might exist after proper realignment.  
 As discussed previously, we found a large diversity in the way in which local 
firms develop innovation competences and technological knowledge and, therefore, 
their potential to deploy appropriate capabilities and take an active role in the S3 




need for developing regionally-based capabilities, suitable to map the ability of diverse 
local entrepreneurial actors to innovate and exploit new technological opportunities. In 
this process, the design of new tailor-made indicators to assess regional innovation and 
technological performance is seen by almost all of the respondents as a required 
condition which should be made before, during and after the implementation of S3. 
Common findings from Cretan and CM datasets reveal that the existing indicators (e.g. 
GERD, BERD, no. of patent holders etc) have been designed centrally by the EU and, in 
fact, are not relevant to sufficiently measure and analyse patterns in regional 
innovation input and output. While previous innovation policymaking failed to design 
appropriate indicators, in the S3 context where practices and evaluations should be 
repeatedly conducted, the presence of place-based indicators to assess fluctuations in 
firms' technological and innovation dynamics is crucial. In this respect, it is important to 
abandon previous policy shortcomings as illustrated in the quotes provided by a 
representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in CM: 
 
In previous policy frameworks indicators were more focused on exploring 
how funding was absorbed. In this programming period we need to 
identify a proper mechanism to see what's going on with the impact of 
this funding, what's going on with the impact of our policies (VLCM36, 
2015) 
 
 Obviously, the idea of supporting capacity building in the context of S3 is not 
new. Contrariwise, it has been extensively cited in the literature (Foray 2016; McCann, 
van Oort, and Goddard 2016; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; Gianelle et al. 2016). 
However, what comes out from the analysis with a policy-level interest, is that the 
process of achieving a deep understanding of firms' competences is essential for 
capacity building, which should be conducted prior to any S3 action, only if relevant 
indicators are put in place. This will allow the introduction of new policy initiatives, 
geared to prepare as many firms as possible for a productive participation in the 




building efforts which are conducted before S3 would help policy designers setting 
complementary policy actions, geared to improve organisational capabilities in 
different innovation-performance groups, and prepare therefore a variety of firms to 
participate in the development of S3. There is high consensus in the interviews 
(approximately 60%), that progress in understanding what particular competencies and 
knowledge skills have been developed by local firms over years, will lead to more 
targeted regional innovation policies, aiming at supporting companies developing their 
own learning capabilities. For instance, entrepreneurial actors with very low capacities 
can receive tailor-made support to catch-up with basic technological trends, firms with 
weak technological and innovation capabilities to start building their own R&D 
capacities, independent R&D firms or technologically-mature companies to retain and 
improve further their research infrastructures and so on so forth. For example, to show 
how an understanding of firm-level innovation performance could practically support 
S3 policymaking for technologically mature companies, we use again the view of an 
R&D manager from the industrial sector of Crete who points out:   
 
I can see that the regional government tries to open new markets in the 
agro-food sector, for instance in Russia, but this is something that we 
don’t really want from the region, since we can do it ourselves. We 
would like to see other types of support for our company (MECr13, 2015)   
   
 We know from previous empirical studies that critical mass does matter for 
smart specialisation (Landabaso, Georghiou, et al. 2014) and for economic 
development in general (Iammarino, Rodriguez-Pose, and Storper 2017). Thus, it is 
increasingly important to engage a large number of firms and secure that they are 
capable to meet the requirements of S3 in a progressive way (e.g. set intra- and inter-
regional technological collaborations to generate innovation-driven growth in 
specialised areas of the local economy). Practically speaking, it is not realistic to 




rational of smart specialisation goes beyond the process of picking winners (Foray, 
David, and Hall 2011; Asheim, Boschma, and Cooke 2011), or selecting merely regional 
champions (Hughes 2012). This implies that other firms with less-developed 
organisational skills and innovation competences should be also motivated and 
engaged in the S3 processes. KOCM18 (2015) says:  
 
It seems that the more companies we have the most effective results we 
will achieve, because the main aim is not to provide the opportunities to 
a small number of companies to innovate but to have a more productive 
and competitive regional innovation system, So if we support only 5% of 
the companies which innovative, I’m afraid we haven’t succeed at all. It 
seems like creating a small agglomeration or a technology 
neighbourhood which is fine but definitely not the objective of smart 
specialisation strategy. Therefore, we should look for a wide 
participation of private institutes, however, we should not expect that 
the level of support and its outcome will be the same for all institutions 
participating in the smart specialisation practices, the level or intensity of 
support could be stronger in areas or institutions that one could expect 
more, without excluding companies which have demonstrated poor or 
even none innovative activity in the past (KOCM18, 2015) 
 
 In this regard, the interviewees highlight the idea of supporting horizontally all 
entrepreneurial actors to upgrade their innovation and technological skills. This process 
could include tailor-made training and targeted support to assist a large number of 
firms to improve their organisational competencies and build on new capabilities 
inspired by learning and knowledge exploitation. Interestingly, this idea does not 
prompt the provision of support at an individual level (e.g. target single firms); rather, it 
promotes the logic of addressing the whole region through the different groups of 
homogeneous firms (e.g. firms with similar innovation skills and needs). The co-
ordinators of S3 we have interviewed in both regions articulate a clear view on this. The 
process of mapping firms' innovation and technological capabilities should result in the 
formation of different performance groups, in which the S3 implementation should be 




(clusters of firms), instead of single entrepreneurial actors (e.g. market leaders who will 
possibly motivate later the engagement of other local firms to follow and take an active 
role), is found broadly in the results. While there are ideas in the smart specialisation 
literature which suggest that S3 can be initiated by a small number of local actors (at 
least in the beginning), we highlight the value of engaging an expanded number of 
firms in the capacity building process. The idea of promoting large-scale support for the 
enhancement of entrepreneurial capabilities was evidenced in regional policymaking 
through the work of Rosiello et al. (2013), who postulated it as a pre-condition for 
policy action in the S3 context. In line with this view, the respondents mention that the 
realisation of S3 should be based on a massive participation of local firms, which 
however, should not be targeted and addressed individually (e.g. funding firms with 
advanced innovation capacities only), as it happened in previous regional innovation 
programmes, but rather at groups. To sum up, we present Table 8.10 which outlines 
the basic principles analysed and discussed in Capacity V.   
 
Table 8.10 Competences to map firms' technological and innovation potential 
 Competences  
- Introduce new regional indicators to assess and understand the particularities of 
firm-level innovativeness Provide tailor-made support 
- Provide tailor-made training and targeted support 
- Assess organisational competences and knowledge skills for better policy 
intervention 
- Take over large-scale initiatives for the enhancement of firms capabilities 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.6 Capacity VI: Capacity to enhance local entrepreneurship 
 The findings highlight the importance of improving entrepreneurial capabilities 
at both the level of firms and regions and emphasise a series of competences that 
could progressively upgrade organisational and regional capacities. These competences 





8.3.6.1 Embedding enterprise and entrepreneurial skills in academia 
 The need to modernise academic entrepreneurship receives widespread 
acceptance in the findings, given that it is seen as an increasingly important means to 
produce research-based innovations. As research is driven by universities and research 
centres in the selected regions, their role in supporting industry-academia interactions 
is critical. The interviews indicate the need to improve university structures to get 
closer to the local business community and affect S3 policy outcome through industry-
academia partnerships. However, this is not the only suggested action. They also point 
the need to transform academic bodies into more entrepreneurship-friendly 
organisations that would be able to build inherent entrepreneurial competences and 
co-ordinate entrepreneurial capacities such as the commercialisation of research 
outcomes, the development of productive routes to protect and manage IPRs etc. 
These sets of findings are intended to highlight the increasing value of creating 
regionally-based spin-offs and university start-ups in the implementation of S3. 
Because it is spin-off companies with a strong association with academia, that are 
expected to shape S3 practices in Crete and CM.  
 The analysis indicates also the imperative to leave behind anachronistic 
attitudes which still view universities and entrepreneurial activity as two different and 
unrelated aspects of the local community. We saw that the process of embedding 
entrepreneurship in universities and research centres is still a big challenge for Cretan 
and CM academe, which suffers from low levels of entrepreneurial awareness. To show 
the difficulty involved in changing university attitude on entrepreneurship, a professor 
from the Technological Institute of Crete points out:    
 
Please don't forget all these problems with entrepreneurship are very 
recent. It was only 15 years ago that academics and students considered 
academic entrepreneurial activity with scepticism, academic 
entrepreneurship was totally unwanted, it was forbidden for the majority 
of the Greek academic institutions. This is something that needs a lot of 




 Despite the efforts to give universities a more entrepreneurial orientation, the 
respondents tend to mention that university entrepreneurship is still underdeveloped 
and non-institutionalised, in the sense that internal institutions and university norms 
which regulate entrepreneurial activity remain vague. Examples of institutional 
vagueness and collective inertia include the absence of permanent supportive 
structures to promote entrepreneurship within the university community (e.g. 
entrepreneurial programmes, TTOs), the lack of incentives for academics to create 
spin-offs etc. In this respect, S3 policymaking should be partly oriented towards 
recovering this anachronistic perception. We have elaborated data which shows that 
the capacity to modernise academic entrepreneurship relies on certain competences 
that universities should gradually build. Table 8.11 summarises the most frequent 
responses reported in the context of Crete and CM.  
 
Table 8.11 Competences to promote academic entrepreneurial capacity 
 Competences  
- Building up and institutionalisation of permanent technology transfer and 
commercialisation mechanisms 
- Re-think internal rules and ensure elimination of internal bureaucracy to speed up 
the creation of start-ups and spin-offs   
- Entrepreneurial skills training and rewards 
- Initiation of entrepreneurship from down to top 
- Support the creation of financial tools, e.g. VCs 
Source: Author 
 
8.3.6.2 Leverage private capital for entrepreneurial investments  
 We emphasise the importance of triggering structural changes to enhance the 
mobilisation of private capitals in the S3 context. Despite the keen financial crisis and 
its direct effect in public-private liquidity, we have captured entrepreneurial views 
which reveal that there are cases in which private money is still available for 
entrepreneurial investments. Arguably, government money for high-risk investments in 




book (Mazzucato 2018) is rather an unrealistic scenario in periods of keen financial 
crisis. This political and economic uncertainty keeps also an effective leveraging of 
private investments at risk. There are views in the interview datasets which highlight 
the importance of creating and maintaining a stable environment in which local 
entrepreneurial actors could attempt new business ventures. A local entrepreneur 
from Crete says:  
 
If the region seeks to support innovation and high-tech entrepreneurship 
in the S3 context, I think the first thing is to create and sustain a 
favourable environment in which companies could take the risk of 
innovation (KOCr15,2015) 
 
 The idea of creating a favourable regional environment for S3 investments goes 
beyond the obvious and imperative need for policy initiatives aimed at stimulating 
finance for innovation. The core need is to develop a new innovation-friendly 
environment in which entrepreneurial actors will routinely mobilise financial resources 
to start investments in innovation, not because of public funding opportunities, but due 
to entrepreneurial opportunities that emerge and evolve during the implementation of 
S3. The responses indicate that this new environment is more likely to trigger 
technology-driven entrepreneurship if it is re-built on less-bureaucratic processes and 
promotes simplification of practices, more transparency at both the regional and 
national level and provision of tax incentives.  
 
8.3.6.3 Competences to design new place-based tools to support S3 entrepreneurial 
capacity 
 There is a clear view in the data that regional competences in Crete and CM 
should be oriented towards the design of a series of new and more effective tools to 
support local entrepreneurship. The support of complementary entrepreneurial actions 




addressed simultaneously with the realisation of S3. In their view, such structures 
include the creation or upgrading of local business incubators, one-stop-shop offices, 
seed capital services and other tools for the acceleration of innovative 
entrepreneurship. These tools will support local entrepreneurial ventures by providing 
a systemic approach. A CM policymaker says:     
 
The previous innovation policy was not systemic, it rather followed a 
linear approach meaning we actually provided funding to businesses and 
we expected from them to develop strong entrepreneurial capabilities 
(KOCM18, 2015) 
 
These words show that previous innovation policies which neglected a systemic 
approach to innovation are no longer effective, highlighting the need to introduce 
permanent supportive tools. As analysed in the first part of this chapter, the ability of 
both regions to enhance and promote local entrepreneurship remains at relatively 
weak levels. We found that the lack of effective permanent structures and procedures 
to mobilise entrepreneurial ventures affects S3 practices in two different ways. The 
first is linked with the difficulties of the regional co-ordinators to implement S3 
productively. Particularly, we have captured views which reveal that if entrepreneurial 
support structures were better organised and pre-embedded in the local 
entrepreneurial system, the mobilisation of diverse entrepreneurial actors in the 
discovery process would be much more efficient. Examples of how entrepreneurial 
structures would support S3 co-ordinators to address the difficulty of the self-
identification process include the fast and collective identification of diverse local firms, 
their easier approach and information etc. The second is associated with the problems 
that firms themselves as S3 beneficiaries should overcome to take an active role in the 
implementation phase. The existence of limited entrepreneurial support mechanisms 
at the regional level does not facilitate the creation of a business collaborative culture 




 An ideal example to show that S3 must not unfold alone but in combination 
with other territorial policies, comes from the case of Crete. Locally, there is a common 
attitude which suggests that for S3 to have productive results in the long-term, it is 
crucial to introduce place-specific entrepreneurial policies to support Crete balance the 
costs of transportation (e.g. logistics, supply chain costs etc). For example, being an 
isolated periphery, Crete experiences high costs of transporting raw materials which 
affects its competitiveness in the long-run. We have also analysed responses which go 
one step forward by indicating the potential of Crete to develop a pioneer role in 
shaping the logistics among the Mediterranean countries. In general, we present a 
mixture of policy actions-tools that have been highlighted by the respondents during 
interviewing as entrepreneurial capacity enablers in the S3 context (Table 8.12). 
 
Table 8.12 Mixture of policy supportive tools to enhance innovative entrepreneurship 
 Policy supportive tools 
- Enhance the role of regional innovation councils in entrepreneurial actions 
- Increase the power of local chambers to support the development of firms 
- Reduce bureaucracy, simplify processes and deliver additional flexibility in private-
public interactions  
- Prevent entrepreneurial brain drain and enhance entrepreneurial opportunity 
- Design and institutionalise cross-sectoral technology foresight tools at the regional 
level 
- Identify and promote local examples and good practices to stimulate entrepreneurial 
imitation 
- Attract knowledge-based companies through incentives and create stable 
entrepreneurial environments  
Source: Author 
 
8.4 Conclusions  
 This chapter aimed at creating an understanding of what forms of 
organisational and regional capabilities are most appropriate to support the 
implementation of S3 in Crete and CM. To provide an analytical understanding, two 
main parts were developed and elaborated. The first part investigated what key 




examined both micro-level and meso-level capacity building, with a particular focus on 
competences and skills relevant to innovation and regional development. In the second 
part, an empirical framework was built to identify capability enablers and explain how 
their effective exploitation is possible to facilitate the governance of S3 in Crete and 
CM. The findings show a notable difference of the way in which S3 development is 
affected by the existence of diverse forms of capabilities at the micro- and meso-level. 
For instance, we identify cases in which well-developed organisational competences 
favour the realisation of S3, and others in which the lack of strong capabilities does not 
allow the creation of an appropriate institutional environment to support the 
governance of S3 (institutional capacity). Starting the discussion from what capabilities 
exist and how they can impact S3 development in Crete and CM at present, four central 
types of capacity building have been examined systematically: technology and 
innovation (T&I) capabilities, networking capabilities, entrepreneurial capabilities and 
administrative and governance capabilities.  
 T&I capabilities are examined at the level of firms and revealed an extended 
variety, ranging from very low to very high performance. To understand this variation 
through the lens of S3, we created and studied three main groups of T&I performance: 
zero-level capability firms (ZLC), learners and technology-mature firms (TMF) (see Table 
8.3). We found that the ZLC firms are usually family-owned businesses with very weak 
T&I capabilities to take a key role in any of the S3 stages. As such, our analysis suggests 
that one must not expect from ZLC firms an active participation in the development of 
smart specialisation. In contrast, the learners have a relatively low T&I potential which, 
however, could be increased upon proper policy intervention in the context of S3. We 
showed that these companies are able to generate different types of innovations (e.g. 
process/product, organisational, technological), but their efforts are limited and not 
systemic. Since most of the Cretan and CM companies belong in this group, we 
highlighted the importance of conducting an analytical investigation of what policy 




implementation role in the context of S3. Last, we found a small number of firms which 
can demonstrate high T&I capacities. These are the TMF, which usually operate in high-
tech manufacturing sectors with strong technological skills and well- built production 
competences. From the private sector, we saw the potential of TMF to lead the 
development of S3 action plans in Crete and CM.  
 Concerning networking, we examined capacity building at the level of firms and 
regions. We showed that the majority of local firms (ZLC and learners) have developed 
networking competences to support daily business operations instead of promoting 
innovation-related actions (as happening the case of TMF). We saw that firms' ability to 
build networking capabilities depends on their size and sector. Concerning size, the 
smaller the firm, the more difficult it will be to build inter-organisational networks for 
innovation activities. We have seen that micro-enterprises are less likely to participate 
in innovation or technology networks, comparing to medium-sized firms which can 
demonstrate a better networking performance. As regards to the type of sector, firms 
operating in knowledge-intensive industries (e.g. ZLC) show a higher collaborative 
tendency for S&T partnerships, while companies in more traditional industries (e.g. 
tourism) are more able to develop competences for entrepreneurial networking. 
Arguably, both types of networking are relevant for the implementation of S3. At the 
meso-level, inter-regional networking is usually built through the implementation of 
cross-regional programmes, as well as, through foreign entrepreneurial missions and 
trans-regional cooperation agreements. Our results on intra-regional networking 
highlight the limited ability for public-private networking (e.g. university-industry 
interaction) and the ineffective collaboration for policymaking in the public sector.  
 Entrepreneurial capacities were examined through three main types of 
entrepreneurship: academic entrepreneurship, firm-level entrepreneurship and 
regional-level entrepreneurship. As to the first, Cretan and CM academic centres have 
established both soft and hard infrastructures to support academic entrepreneurship. 




parks and other similar knowledge transfer initiatives remain weak. Regarding firm-
level entrepreneurship, we found a large diversity in the ability of firms to build 
capacities for entrepreneurial searches and opportunities. Typically, organisational 
competencies are more relevant to address low-level entrepreneurship than 
knowledge-based entrepreneurship. At the macro-level, the capacity of Crete and CM 
for cross-border entrepreneurship is relatively good given the mechanisms which have 
been set by regional authorities to promote entrepreneurship abroad. The capacity for 
intra-regional entrepreneurship was found low in the sense that entrepreneurship has 
never been adapted in the policy agenda as a regional phenomenon which should be 
addressed constantly and systematically.   
 Last, as to the administrative and governance capabilities, we saw that while a 
number of Cretan and CM authorities have developed administrative skills to co-
ordinate and run innovation-related actions, the meso-level governance capabilities 
remain at relatively low levels due to the low degree of regional autonomy, which 
suggests that Crete and CM are two regions with relatively low levels of policy 
autonomy and discretion.    
 In the second part of this chapter, we identified six types of capabilities and 
provided an analytical understanding as to how their development can support the 
implementation phase of S3 in the Cretan and Central Macedonian context. A summary 
is presented in Appendices Table 9. The process of mapping regional dynamics is a first 
capacity needed to favour the design and implementation of S3 in the selected regions. 
Three specific competences are required to develop this capacity efficiently: 
competences to assess the impact of previous innovation policy frameworks, to 
mobilise actual engagement of local institutional bodies and to evaluate local actors' 
performance on the basis of innovation and technology (public and private). A second 
is the capacity for decentralisation and regional autonomy which are needed to allow 
regional authorities to manage S3 practices locally, e.g. manage local funding 




of tax incentives in selected S3 domains at the sub-national level to promote local 
entrepreneurship and attract foreign direct investments. The capacity to develop 
regional communication, networking and clustering is a third type of capacity building 
seen by respondents as important to facilitate S3 development in the case of Crete and 
CM. Four competences are suggested: competences to re-build trust among different 
entrepreneurial actors; ability to exploit the opportunities raised from the 
entrepreneurial discovery to enable regional clustering and networking; ability to 
exploit collective and powerful local networking to fulfil S3 policy-related objectives 
(e.g. additional authority and autonomy at the regional level); design and manage 
interactive communication platforms to facilitate inter-organisational networking, as a 
supplementary action in S3. As a fourth capacity we refer to all these skills required to 
link cross-sectoral activities including the ability to recognise industrial and sectoral 
diversity, the ability to identify related but disconnected business activities for 
potential networking, and the competency to link fragmented entrepreneurial 
activities, using several channel linkages. The capacity to understand and upgrade 
firms' technological and innovation potential is also important. We saw that this fifth 
process of capacity building requires the introduction of new regional indicators to 
assess and understand the particularities of firm-level innovativeness; competences to 
provide tailor-made training and targeted support and skills to assess organisational 
competences and knowledge skills for better policy intervention. Last, there is a need 
to build capabilities to enhance local entrepreneurship. The key competences should 
be developed for this process include: the building up and institutionalisation of 
permanent technology transfer and commercialisation mechanisms; re-think internal 
rules and ensure elimination of internal bureaucracy to speed up the creation of start-
ups and spin-offs; policy initiatives to upgrade entrepreneurial skills training and 






































 This penultimate chapter brings together empirical findings from chapters 6, 7 
and 8, with the objective of formulating and justifying certain contributions to 
knowledge. An analytical discussion aims to explain how the empirical findings from 
Crete and Central Macedonia (CM) connect to, and enhance, previous ideas, theories 
and concepts explored in the literature review and the conceptual framework chapters. 
The discussion is structured around the three key research questions (RQs), which have 
been formulated to drive the study and to meet its research objectives. A number of 
conclusions are discussed, allowing for claims of theoretical and practical contributions 
to knowledge.  
 
9.2 Putting empirical results together - interpretation and discussion  
 
RQ1 In what ways did the selected Greek regions develop smart specialisation 
strategies? 
 This first RQ aimed to understand how smart specialisation strategies were 
developed in the case study regions. Particular attention was given to analysing the 
methodological approaches which were used to design and implement S3 in both 
regional environments. Three main conclusions are drawn from the analysis regarding 
the implementation of smart specialisation in catch-up regions.     
 The first conclusion derived from RQ1 is that, even today, the development of 
S3 cannot be taken for granted in the regional setting, given that there are still a 
number of open implementation challenges which are particularly related to the 




implementation challenge of S3 in Crete and CM refers to problems of critical mass 
accumulation; confusion and ambiguity of the role that local governance actors must 
take in the context of S3; state-centric bureaucracy and administrative burden in 
bottom-up innovation policymaking and action; and limited legislative power and 
autonomy of the regions to support place-based development. We saw that these 
barriers to S3 implementation are in their turn the result of the relationship 
between institutional design, modes of governance, and regional performance. In 
particular, the problem of the lack of thick institutions (e.g. regional-national state 
institutions lack public trust and increase state corruption challenges) and of good 
governance structures (e.g. absence of responsive regulatory systems to ensure 
transparency and accountability in public policy), raised policy uncertainty, increased 
local actors' inertia and led to important delays in conducting entrepreneurial searches 
and discoveries.  
Interestingly, we saw that due to the lack of strong and interconnected industrial 
structures at the local level, as well as the inefficiency of the public sector to 
collectively respond to public policies to promote systemic innovation, Crete and CM 
encountered important difficulties not in designing but mainly in implementing S3 as a 
core territorial innovation strategy. In this respect, our findings support further the 
view that research on S3 must shift attention from theory (design) to practice 
(implementation) as recently suggested by Capello and Kroll (2016). It also evidences 
that no matter what policy studies advocate about the relevance of S3 to trigger 
regional renewal and promote convergence among European territories (EC 2013; 
OECD 2013; Gianelle and Kleibrink 2015), smart specialisation-driven convergence is 
unlikely to occur unless policy implementation barriers are effectively understood and 
addressed in European catch-up regions. While the idea behind this finding has been 
advocated by several studies since the onset of S3 (McCann 2015), our work shows that 
it is still an open and important issue which requires further empirical investigation of 




catch-up regions where the innovation paradox is more profound (Oughton, 
Landabaso, and Morgan 2002).      
 A second key conclusion is that no one development pattern is ideally suited to 
the realisation of smart specialisation strategies in catch-up regions. We found that 
there is no best way to design S3 and, certainly, there is no optimal way to implement 
it. On the contrary, regardless of what several policy directions suggest regarding the 
implementation of S3 (EC 2012; EU 2016; Kempton et al. 2013), the case of Crete and 
CM shows that implementation decisions and practices can and must be different, to 
some extent, across regions with unlike specificities, capacities and dynamics, so as to 
be realistic, feasible and responsive to S3. To evidence empirically that S3 
implementation approach is place-sensitive, we showed different patterns of smart 
specialisation behaviour between Crete and CM, (e.g. different ways of addressing and 
executing the entrepreneurial discovery, different routes to acquire critical mass) but  
by no means were we confident about showing notable differences in the success of S3 
implementation outcomes. In this case, the selected regions illustrate an example in 
which two areas with a relatively similar innovation performance -they are moderate 
innovators (EC 2016), follow different methodological approaches to implementing S3 
(e.g. narrow-to-broad vs. broad-to-narrow strategies), consistent with their ability to 
respond to challenges related, for example, to local actors’ mobilisation and critical 
mass accumulation.  
Previous research suggests that there is no optimal way to run entrepreneurial 
searches and implement smart specialisation strategies in a universally accepted way 
(Foray 2016; Foray 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015) and, therefore, regions 
should find their own path to S3 implementation. Our findings enhance this view 
further by showing that in a Cretan and Central Macedonian context, the consideration 
of introducing tailor-made options to S3 implementation is not a policy suggestion nor 
a desired strategic option, but a necessary condition for a place-based implementation 




related to the smart specialisation process, and becomes increasingly relevant when 
implementation decisions are to be made.  
 The third conclusion is that smart specialisation development displays notable 
variations even across catch-up regions with very similar contextual conditions and 
closely related S3 priorities. We found that although Crete and CM are two regions 
which operate under the same national framework (they obey the same national and 
EU laws), possess innovation systems with many similar STI infrastructures (see chapter 
5, Tables 5.3 and 5.6), represent a relatively similar innovation and R&D performance 
(see comparative figures for the last six years in chapter 5, Table 5.8) and, 
simultaneously, set similar entrepreneurial priorities (see chapter 6, Tables and 6.2 and 
6.7), their approaches to S3 implementation were different.  
The way in which regional disparities affect innovation policymaking and outcomes 
across different innovation performance territories has been broadly discussed in the 
economic geography literature (Asheim and Cooke 2011; OECD 2011a). In the context 
of S3, most of the available studies examine regional specificities and S3 practices 
either separately for each region (Luke et al. 2014; Morgan 2016; Gianelle et al. 2014; 
Valdaliso et al. 2014), and many of them focus on institutionally thick regions 
(Moodysson, Trippl, and Zukauskaite 2015), or on different performance regions with 
concrete economic, geographical, cultural or historical differences. Concerning the 
latter, investigations and comparisons are usually made between leading and catch-up 
regions, industrial and rural regions, or among regions from different countries 
(Landabaso 2014; Kroll et al. 2014; Baier, Kroll, and Zenker 2013b; Reppel 2012). In our 
study we emphasise the importance of regional diversity in framing and progressing S3 
across regions with very similar institutional contexts, by showing that even in these 
regions, path dependency keeps playing a determinant role in shaping the 
implementation decisions of S3. In this respect, through the case study regions, we 
evidence that S3 debate should no longer be about the importance of conducting 




of how regions can best identify their own implementation paths for S3 development 
through governance adjustments and institutional reforms. 
 
RQ2 How do, and can, institutional arrangements and governance reforms impact 
smart specialisation practices? 
 Given that S3 implementation challenges are seen as the outcome of thin 
institutions and weak policy governance structures, the second RQ of the study aimed 
at investigating the role of governance and institutions on S3 development. Specifically, 
it was intended to examine what governance and institutional reforms are currently 
taking place in the regions of Crete and CM to support S3 implementation and further, 
to understand what new ways of policy governance are needed to assist the 
implementation of smart specialisation, and examine what institutional adjustments 
might be necessary to facilitate their deployment. In addition to a number of specific 
governance and institutional reforms discussed analytically in chapter 7, the analysis of 
RQ2 leads to four key conclusions. 
 Firstly, the cases of Crete and CM evidence that institutional change for S3 
implementation in catch-up regions is most likely to happen through the modes of 
displacement and layering. In the literature review chapter, we saw that institutional 
change in economic development can take four different forms: displacement, layering, 
drift and conversion (Busetti 2015; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The likelihood of 
displacement and layering, as two different but closely related modes of institutional 
change, in triggering new path creation and path renewal in the context of S3 has been 
discussed in previous empirical studies (Moodysson, Trippl, and Zukauskaite 2015). 
That work, however, sought to understand institutional change and smart 
specialisation adaptation in institutionally thick and economically strong EU regions 
(the authors discuss the case of Scania, South Sweden). This study focuses investigation 
on the nature of institutional change and its potential to affect S3 development in less-




2004a). In this respect, our work builds on existing empirical findings and contributes 
further by formulating the view that the development of regional smart specialisation 
strategies is most likely to be favoured through the displacement and layering of 
institutions.  
In a Cretan and Central Macedonian context, the necessity to remove existing formal 
rules and introduce new institutions to favour S3 implementation (the process of 
displacement) is evidenced in chapter 7. In particular, section 7.3.3.4 analyses the idea 
of spatial re-organisation, in which a territorial restructuring through regional mergers 
can ensure the acquisition of critical mass. Crete and CM are two regions which face 
important difficulties in implementing smart specialisation due to their size, and the 
data show that it would be more effective if S3 has been developed in larger territories, 
beyond the NUTS2 level. As to the introduction of new institutions alongside existing 
rules (the process of layering), institutional change embodies the simplification of 
public-sector organisations and the increase in regions' legislative power to enforce 
place-specific development laws to respond to S3 development.  
 Secondly, smart specialisation implementation has acted as a policy trigger to 
jolt previous policy development inefficiencies and to improve regional innovation 
policy making. As a policy inefficiency, the study recognises the design nationally 
execute regionally approach, which was widely embedded in previous development 
frameworks, contradicting the emerging role of local entrepreneurial actors, e.g. public 
sector agencies, universities, intermediaries, and firms in regional development (Foray 
2014; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015).  
A number of regional development studies introduce smart specialisation as an 
innovation policy strategy which aims at bringing about change (Foray 2014; McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2014; Foray 2016). In current research, change is usually discussed 
in order to highlight the importance of structural reforms in S3 development (Asheim 
and Grillitsch 2015; Grillitsch 2015), its relevance to diversification and regional 




regions' economic development (OECD 2013). In our study, we found that in the 
framework of smart specialisation, change refers also to policy development 
improvements and happens in parallel with, and because of, the S3 practices; in this 
respect, change is studied in the context of place-based policy transformation.  
Specifically, we showed that S3 have contributed to change the way in which regional 
development was understood and addressed in Crete and CM in four different ways. 
Firstly, by introducing the design of innovation strategies at the regional instead of the 
national level, we showed that this was the outcome of the ex-ante conditionality 
imposed by the EU to allow regions access to European funding and, in fact, it brought 
the central administration in Athens closer to the governments of Crete and CM for the 
purpose of designing regional innovation policies; secondly, by promoting a more 
closely European, national and regional co-operation in which multi-level 
communication is conducted regularly for the development of regional innovation 
policies; thirdly, by mobilising the involvement of local actors in a more intensive and 
collective way, data revealed a growing tendency in which local entrepreneurial actors 
and public administration authorities have shown more responsiveness in public-
private collaboration; fourthly, by institutionalising and empowering existing and new 
institutional tools for intensified S3 implementation, for example, the case of the new 
Regional Scientific Council for Research and Innovation which took an institutional form 
in order to support S3 practices.  
Our findings contribute to other related studies which tend to implicitly imply the 
importance of S3 dynamics in triggering change for regional development (Grillitsch 
2015; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a), yet they do not evidence this empirically. An 
exception is possibly the empirical work of Kroll (2015a), which discusses some novelty 
in regional strategies due to S3 practices. 
 Thirdly, the modernisation of S3 governance in catch-up regions is not only 
dependent on improving smart specialisation-related processes, but also on changing 




policymaking, yet they impact on its development. There is a growing recognition that 
the capacity of catch-up regions to build strong innovation governance models is 
critical for the design, and more importantly, for the implementation of S3 (McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés 2016a; OECD 2017b). In current S3 debates, the ability of regions to 
govern regional development is examined and analysed from different perspectives. 
For example, some studies examine policy governance from the Science, Technology 
and Innovation (STI) policymaking perspective (OECD 2013), aiming at understanding 
how participation, ownership and critical mass can be better ensured and regulated 
during S3 development (Landabaso, Georghiou, et al. 2014; Marinelli and Perianez-
Forte 2017; Kyriakou et al. 2016). Other studies emphasise the move from the triple 
helix model (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995) to a quadruple helix approach 
(Carayannis and Campbell 2011), in which the process of understanding the elements 
of governing the relationships among government, industry, academia, and civil actors 
is the primary aim (Reek 2013; EC 2012; Carayannis and Rakhmatullin 2014). 
Undoubtedly, all these aspects to S3 governance are crucially relevant to smart 
specialisation theory, and increasingly important for its implementation in the regional 
setting.  
 However, in the case of Crete and CM, we showed that other, non-smart 
specialisation-related governance aspects have affected regions' capacity to govern S3 
effectively. We used the example of recruitment to illustrate how old and new 
inefficiencies of public administration governance impact on regions' S3 policy 
governance options. Specifically, we saw that the recruitment of external smart 
specialisation experts was neither a possible nor a realistic option for Cretan strategists, 
not because of the fiscal consolidation (e.g. cutting wages and employment in the 
public sector), but due to public sector bureaucracy (time-consuming 




the TROIKA27-external inefficiencies. The case of recruitment shows that Cretan and 
Central Macedonian options to S3 governance were to a large extent dominated by 
continuous exogenous control mechanisms. While these mechanisms were not linked 
to smart specialisation policy, they affected its implementation by raising its 
governance constraints. Arguably, though other recent empirical studies underline the 
influence of non-smart specialisation factors on S3 implementation, (see for example 
the work of Marques and Morgan (2018) and Morgan (2017), our case study regions 
are not a typical EU situation, but rather a place-specific dimension of S3 policy 
governance, particularly emerging during the Greek economic crisis.  
 Fourthly, the implementation of smart specialisation strategies is not only a 
regional but also a national issue. In particular, we found that while weak regional 
institutions are indeed the main cause of the S3 implementation challenge (Kroll 
2015b; Gianelle et al. 2016; Foray 2016), other national-specific routines, including 
political will, vested interests and administrative flexibility at the national level, also 
have an influential role in smart specialisation development. This view progresses 
further the idea of multi-scalar endeavour for the co-ordination of regional 
development (Todtling, Asheim, and Boschma 2013), in which different aspects of 
regional, national and supranational institutions should be examined for mutually 
beneficial ends (Morgan 2017). The importance of multi-scalar co-ordination is 
illustrated in our case by showing that the success of increasing regions' administrative 
autonomy to favour S3 practices is not only dependent on their effectiveness to induce 
and adopt institutional change (Grillitsch 2015), but also on the extent to which central 
governments are willing to desert state knows best routines and to support the process 
of this change. The cases of Crete and CM show also that it depends on the willingness 
of the central state to move autonomy and authority from the national to the regional 
27We recall that in the context of the European-Greek crisis, the Troika includes: the European 
Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 




                                                          
 
level, particularly in a period of keen financial crisis with high levels of instability, and 
uncertainty. 
Without doubt, smart specialisation is a place-based regional innovation strategy and, 
as such, most attention regarding its implementation has been given to regions 
themselves and their ability to overcome several institutional governance barriers (Karo 
and Kattel 2015; Grillitsch 2015; Rodríguez-Pose 2013; Iacobucci 2014). Given that 
smart specialisation strategies focus on regional development (EC 2012; Landabaso and 
Foray 2014), an important part of the S3 debate investigates mostly the regional 
dimension, and neglects to study systematically how the national aspect impacts on S3 
development in the regional setting. For example, many efforts are made to 
understand and improve the interplay among universities, regional authorities and 
entrepreneurial firms within the borders of a region (Fotakis et al. 2014; Gianelle et al. 
2016; Landabaso and Foray 2014), while simultaneously, little is known as to how this 
local interplay is affected by diverse national elements beyond the regional context. 
Along the same line, other studies focus investigation on how to better build regional-
level experimentation mechanisms for local learning (Moodysson, Trippl, and 
Zukauskaite 2015), how to align policy actions to priorities (Kyriakou et al. 2016), how 
to set local monitoring and evaluation systems for the purpose of S3 (OECD 2013) or 
how to overcome connectivity problems among different kinds of regional actors 
(Aranguren et al. 2018), without examining in detail non-regional factors. In our study, 
we acknowledge the importance of studying regional dynamics for S3 development, 
but we also evidence the need for examining national and European factors that affect 
S3 implementation; for example, political will and support to promote transformation 







RQ3 What capabilities exist and are required to develop smart specialisation 
strategies in catch-up regional environments? 
 The last RQ of this study aimed to identify what capabilities currently exist in 
Crete and CM, as well as what new ones are still required to improve institutions and 
favour the development of S3. Based on the findings presented in chapter 8, two key 
conclusions are extracted and discussed that are directly related to smart specialisation 
and capacity building.   
 Firstly, the governance and institutional reforms, examined in chapter 7, are 
less likely to succeed unless accompanied by the introduction and exploitation of well-
developed capabilities at both the micro- and meso-level. Our case shows that there is 
a close relationship between micro-level and meso-level capacity building, and it 
underlines the importance of improving both. This finding highlights the aspect of 
complementarities in capacity building and promotes the idea of building synergetic 
effects between firm-level and regional-level capacities for S3 development in catch-up 
regions.  
Furthermore, a number of studies show that economically weaker regions lack 
capabilities to address S3 practices and develop modern regional development policies 
(McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016b; Foray 2016; Iacobucci 2014; Capello 2014). We 
showed that Crete and CM fit into this category, as they are two regions with little 
social capital, weak governance capacities, relatively low learning performance, 
significant challenges for institutional and structural change and, simultaneously, their 
S3 practices have been dominated by their weak institutional and governance 
capacities to implement public policy (see section 9.2 RQ1). However, we found that 
the capacity building challenge in Crete and CM was not simply due to the difficulty of 
less-advanced regions to enhance firms’ capabilities, as currently advocated by several 
S3 studies (Foray 2014; Patricia and Tea 2017; Gianelle et al. 2016; Kyriakou et al. 
2016), nor due to the obstacles of improving regions' administrative capacities 




Grillitsch 2015). Rather, we evidenced that it was mostly due to the relatively weak 
ability of the regions to build and exploit a combination of both micro-level (firm-
specific) and meso-level (regional) capacities, appropriate to develop an innovation-
friendly environment for public policy implementation.  
In the case of Crete and CM, the way in which firms' and regions' capacity building is 
linked to governmental and institutional integration for S3 development is captured in 
various ways. For example, while we revealed the need to make institutional changes 
to increase regional autonomy and gradually eliminate regions' dependency on 
national rulemaking (capacity building at the meso-level), Cretan and Central 
Macedonian public sector actors lacked the required legislative and administrative 
competences to create self-governing mechanisms for public policy implementation 
(capacity building at the micro-level). Similarly, while there was a great need for making 
policy governance adjustments to accumulate critical mass (meso-level), the ability of 
local firms to participate in S3 implementation (e.g. through R&D consortia) was limited 
due to their weak innovation and technological competences (micro-level). In this 
respect, our evidence goes beyond the views in which regional capabilities are treated 
as an important component for developing the self-discovery and prioritisation 
processes (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015). Even more, our case shows that the 
success of S3 development depends on the extent to which a mixture of both micro- 
and meso-level capabilities can response to institutional and governance changes. 
 Secondly, we view institutional capacity building as a dynamic process in which 
catch-up regions can increase their institutional thickness, by reflecting the principles 
embedded in the six capability types discussed in chapter 8 (capacity to map regional 
dynamics; capacity for decentralisation and regional autonomy; capacity to develop 
regional communication, networking and clustering; capacity to link cross-sectoral 
activities; capacity to understand and upgrade firms' technological and innovation 




Given that institutional intervention cannot work through one-size-fits all approaches 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2013), the value of the six capacity building forms emerging from our 
analysis does not lie on a direct adoption and implementation, but rather on an 
analytical reflection which can show what might work well for other institutionally thin 
regional environments beyond Crete and CM. 
We saw that institutional capacity or institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift 1995) is an 
emerging policy concept in the S3 literature (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a), 
recognised as a highly relevant theoretical approach to understanding why policy 
implementation fails, particularly in less-developed EU regions (Grillitsch 2015; Kroll 
2015a). However, it has been argued that "there is little agreement about what 
improving institutional capacity really means and even less about what to do in order to 
weed out institutional inefficiency across what are widely varying geographical 
contexts" (Rodríguez-Pose 2013, 1039). In this respect, it seems that there is no 
consensus as to what constitutes institutional capacity building. For example, Morgan 
(1997) argues that it is the improvements in place-based habits, conventions and 
routines that foster the institutional capacity of a territory. In a quite similar manner, 
Healey (1998) suggests that by increasing the level of trust and translatability among 
governance, citizens and companies, the institutional capacity of places is also likely to 
increase. Simply, this implies that the process of building institutional capacity can be 
examined from different perspectives, understood differently and addressed in diverse 
ways. The analysis of the study, however, shows empirically which capacity building 
forms are more likely to favour the process of institutional change and integration for 
S3 development in catch-up regions. 
 
9.3 Contribution to knowledge 
 This thesis has provided an in-depth case study to examine and understand the 
development of smart specialisation innovation strategies in two catch-up European 




Firstly, it contributes to the conceptual foundation and design of regional innovation 
theory through the analytical lens of smart specialisation. Secondly, it contributes to 
the existing policy implementation literature by providing an empirical understanding 
of how S3 implementation challenge can be addressed in catch-up regions. Both 
aspects are discussed analytically in the following sections. 
 
9.3.1 Contribution to regional innovation theory development    
 This thesis contributes to the conceptual foundation and design of regional 
innovation theory, and of smart specialisation theory in particular. It does so by 
evidencing that public policy thinking and development in catch-up regions need to be 
examined, understood and conceptualised through a systematic analysis of the 
interplay among governance, institutions and capabilities embedded in the wider 
environment of these regions. Especially, the thesis progresses regional development 
theory by showing empirically that the implementation challenge of smart 
specialisation goes beyond the claim that catch-up regions cannot develop S3 because 
of their limitation in building strong and receptive multi-level governance models 
(Kyriakou et al. 2016; OECD 2017a; Aranguren et al. 2018), the inability to change their 
thin institutions and make them responsive to regional development (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Wilkie 2015; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a) or their enduring weaknesses in 
building exploitation capacities for innovation-driven growth and regional renewal 
(Iacobucci 2014; Landabaso 2014; Boschma and Gianelle 2014). On the contrary, the 
thesis uses empirical evidence to show that S3 implementation challenge is not simply 
due to obstacles and limitations in regions' governance, institutions and capacities, but 
mostly due to a number of interdependent barriers emerging from the interaction of 
these three critical regional development aspects, as well as from the effort to bring 
about change to improve each of them. 
 Furthermore, the thesis evidences that the S3 barriers go far beyond S&T, 




challenges due to prolonged socioeconomic uncertainty (e.g. need to tackle significant 
liquidity problems, high unemployment rates) and to TROIKA's exogenous intervention 
in public policy implementation (e.g. financial regulation and supervision). For instance, 
in contrast to other empirical studies, this study suggests that S3 challenge is not just 
about regions' inherent difficulties in setting up and exploiting industry-university 
partnerships for the purpose of S3 (Kempton et al. 2013); in engaging research 
universities in the entrepreneurial discovery (Edwards et al. 2017); in making large-
scale R&D investments for S3 development (OECD 2013); or, more generally, in 
overcoming traditional barriers in science and innovation for smart specialisation 
implementation (Charles, Gross, and Bachtler 2012). And as such, simply focusing on 
strengthening regions' research and exploratory capacities, as partially suggested by a 
number of recent guides to S3 implementation (OECD 2013; EC 2012, 2014d), is 
absolutely relevant and useful, but it is by no means sufficient for catch-up regions to 
fully overcome the development barriers of smart specialisation. Rather, the thesis 
evidences that S3 implementation challenge in regions such as Crete and CM, is mostly 
due to a number of non-S&T barriers which are the result of a concurrent existence of 
ineffective governance models (e.g. lack of responsive public policy implementation 
regulatory mechanisms), thin institutions (e.g. limited regional power and institutional 
autonomy for self-governance in policy development) and regions' lacking 
transformative capacities to reverse this challenge (e.g. lack of transformative 
capacities to induce structural shifts and to introduce systemic change in smart 
specialisation-related practices).  
 This theoretical approach to S3 development barriers proposes that the smart 
specialisation debate should no longer be about regions' poor governance models or 
weak institutional capacities. Besides, the importance of improving governance and 
institutional capacity in smart specialisation development has been acknowledged in 
this study along with other empirical work; see for example Rodríguez-Pose and Di 




Morgan (2017). Rather, it should be on how to best understand and address the 
opportunities and challenges emerging from the process of bringing together 
institutional integration, changes for responsive policy governance structures and 
capacity building improvements for the purpose of S3 development. This process is 
particularly challenging for Crete and CM which both experience important budget cuts 
and financial constraints for effective public policy implementation. 
Especially, in a Cretan and Central Macedonian context, this is translated into a 
simultaneous examination of what non-smart specialisation-related institutional 
changes can be introduced (e.g. provision of additional regional autonomy for public 
policy implementation), what adjustments in governance models are critical (e.g. how 
to reduce bureaucracy in policy implementation processes) and what new capacities 
are still needed to support change for S3 development (how change can be supported 
by a combination of capabilities).  
Furthermore, given that smart specialisation barriers may differ across regions with 
different development features (Marques and Morgan 2018; Sörvik et al. 2016), the 
thesis advances STI theory by showing that S3 implementation challenge can be 
addressed in a certain regional environment by tackling the challenge of bringing 
together and promoting governmental, institutional and capacity building progression. 
However, while such progression is seen as essential to smart specialisation 
development, we showed that its process remains complicated, with uncertain 
implications for public policy implementation (e.g. it is still unknown how institutional 
capacity building can lead to better policy governance modes). One main difference 
between our finding and the work of earlier theoretical and empirical studies about the 
importance of institutions, governance and capabilities on S3 development, see for 
example Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie (2015), Gianelle et al. (2016), Kyriakou et al. (2016), 
Iacobucci and Guzzini (2016), McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016a) and Foray (2016) is 
that this study evidences empirically that these three forces of regional development 




studied separately, as frequently addressed in the S3 literature at present, but 
concurrently and in close connection with each other in order to understand and 
address the multi-faceted challenge of S3 implementation. 
Therefore, the study suggests that a simultaneous analytical examination of these 
inter-reliant policy development factors can contribute further to an understanding of 
the regional development gap discussed in the conceptual framework chapter: what 
governance and institutional change is required in catch-up regions for regional 
renewal and development (Kroll 2016; Radosevic et al. 2017), how such change impacts 
on economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018), when this change must be 
initiated to be feasible and realistic (Morgan 2017) and what capabilities are needed to 
induce and support this change (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013a).  
The way in which the thesis' theoretical approach to public policy implementation can 
improve further our understanding of how to best address S3 challenges in lagging 
regions is illustrated in Figure 9.1 diagrammatically. In particular, a place-specific 
example is used (see C), which evidences that S3 implementation challenges are not 
just about S&T and, even more importantly, that they are not emerging independently 
from separate problems in governance, institutions and capacities (see A), but from 














Figure 9.1 Theoretical approaches to S3 implementation challenge 
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Principally, Figure 9.1 shows that the problem of engaging and securing an adequate 
number of private firms in the development of S3 was due to three interrelated 
challenges concurrently emerging from inefficiencies in governance, institutions and 
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capacity building. Firstly, regions lack the required institutional power and autonomy to 
decide on tax politics (e.g. provide tax incentives at the sub-national level) to attract 
private investments in selected S3 domains and promote their smart specialisation 
developmental priorities (this is an inefficiency of institutions). Secondly, S3 options, 
decisions and practices related to regional taxation are to a large extent pre-scheduled 
and fixed by third parties; in fact, they are shaped by a number of national regulations, 
EU obligations and policy governance rules exogenously imposed by third parties, e.g. 
the TROIKA, particularly in regions such as Crete and CM which are currently under 
strict financial supervision (this is a multi-level governance inadequacy). Thirdly, the 
regional governments are not yet fully able to support tax reforms and promote large-
scale investments for S3 development. They were not able in the sense that public 
administration authorities lack the required competences to respond to institutional 
change (this is a capacity building barrier), no matter if national and European 
authorities would have not been willing to promote decentralisation for regional self-
governance in public policymaking. 
 Through this case study example, the thesis evidences a place-specific challenge 
to S3 implementation which is due to a combination of three inefficiencies that are 
closely interrelated to each other (see Table 9.1, C). As such, it suggests that its solution 
cannot be unilaterally found by simply looking at one single part (e.g. find a solution to 
overcome the institutional barriers), but rather by investigating the role and 
consequences of all related aspects derived from the interplay among governance, 
institutions and capacities. For example, in order to address the problem of critical 
mass acquisition, a process of concurrent consideration and change is important at the 
institutional, governance and capacity building levels. Particularly, an institutional 
reform is necessary, in which the provision of additional legislative autonomy and 
flexibility is necessary for the Cretan and Central Macedonian governments. This 
implies that part of central political power must be shifted from the national to the 




reflection, but also imposes intensive political thinking and working as also suggested in 
previous empirical studies; see the work of Marques and Morgan (2018). In its turn, 
this process requires changes in multi-scalar governance co-ordination and political 
commitment at the EU, national and regional levels. In a very optimistic scenario 
(which is not evidenced in this thesis), the central government in Athens or even in the 
EU, may be willing to give additional legislative and policy governance autonomy at the 
sub-national level to assist regions to implement their S3 plans. In this case, 
institutional and governance barriers are theoretically overcome. The question, 
however, is to what extent are Cretan and Central Macedonian public administration 
agents ready to respond to these legislative changes? And, even more importantly, do 
they have the required administrative capacity to embody part of this central-state 
power in their operational routines and use it successfully in the context of S3? 
Obviously, this is a capacity building aspect which needs to be examined in parallel with 
the institutional and governance aspects. In any case, the thesis evidences that the 
selected regions are not yet fully capable of supporting high levels of decentralisation 
(e.g. the data show that they lack strong self-governance systems and administrative 
capacities to support policy implementation) and, therefore, it suggests a gradual 
decentralisation of power from the national to the sub-national level.  
The Cretan and Central Macedonian case provides an example (Figure 9, C) in which 
smart specialisation development depends on particularities specific to each region and 
its broader environment, and it co-evolves with the investigation of what public policy 
governance aspects work well and what need to be changed, what institutional reforms 
are required to support change, and what micro-level (firm-specific) and meso-level 
(regional) capabilities exist or must be built to enhance this endeavour. This evidence 
contributes to recent knowledge gaps by improving further our empirical 
understanding of how smart specialisation policy can become more attuned to the 
heterogeneity not only of the regional conditions as suggested recently by Marques 




which smart specialisation development attunes to local specificities and is shaped by 
national and EU factors is evidenced in our case by showing that institutional change 
decisions for S3 governance improvements cannot be made without previously 
analysing whether and to what extent regions are able (e.g. to develop inherent 
capacities to govern and implement public policies) or allowed (e.g. due to exogenous 
pressures and limitations) to respond to this change adequately.  
 In particular, the example illustrated in Figure 9.1 shows that if our theoretical 
thinking does not reflect the examination of S3 implementation in parallel with 
institutional and capacity building aspects, then we certainly run the risk of 
conceptualising a regional development model in which innovation policymaking failure 
is a high possibility. In a Cretan and Central Macedonian context particularly, this S3 
failure risk rests on the likelihood of introducing novel institutional changes for 
additional regional autonomy in regions which are not yet administratively mature 
enough to enforce them effectively. In our view, this is not simply an implementation 
challenge of regional innovation strategies at the policy level. Rather, it takes the form 
of a theoretical challenge in which there is neglect of an examination of our 
understanding of S3 implementation through an analytical study of the relationship 
among governance, institutions and capacity building within and beyond the regional 
boarders. The way in which S3 development challenges can be better addressed at the 
policy level, constitutes the second contribution of this study and it is discussed 
analytically in the following section. 
 
9.3.2 Contribution to policy implementation   
 From a policy thinking perspective, our work contributes to understanding how 
the S3 implementation challenge can be better perceived and addressed in practice. 
Given that there is no best way to put S3 theory into practice (Foray 2016), in the sense 
that similar methodological approaches may bring different S3 results across regions, 




empirically captured and explained through an interplay of three core policy thinking 
aspects to regional development: governance, institutions and capabilities. In this 
model, a number of policy suggestions are generated to inform S3 policy thinking and 
practice in Crete and CM, and potentially, in other less-developed regions with weak 
governance and institutional environments (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper 2011), 
and an arguably profound difficulty in implementing S3 (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo 
2015; Grillitsch 2015). The value of this work rests on the fact that it provides S3 
implementation guidelines in a period of growing criticism of the S3 adaptability in 
catch-up regions, due to their difficulties in building responsive institutions and 
adequate capacities for policy implementation (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 
2017; Marques and Morgan 2018; Capello and Kroll 2016; Iacobucci and Guzzini 2016; 
McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a).  
 Our model builds a conceptual analysis of the ways by which S3 development  
can take place in catch-up regions, by suggesting that the process of understanding S3 
implementation must be addressed through the examination of three different but 
closely related policy development stages (see Figure 9.2). This model rests on the 
premise that aspects emerging from governance, institutions and capabilities must be 
treated collectively and addressed as one coherent strategic effort. A number of 
recommendations for innovation policy strategists are made to support S3 








































Furthermore, it proposes that firstly, one has to understand the framework in which 
regions govern and regulate innovation policy development. Understanding previous 
and current regional policy routines, learning practices and implementation patterns is 
increasingly important in the S3 context, given that path-dependency is seen as one of 
the fundamental features of economic development (Martin and Sunley 2006), on 
which smart specialisation builds and extends its principles for regional renewal and 
new path creation (Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; Valdaliso et al. 2014). This first stage 
involves an analytical investigation of what innovation policy governance models are 
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currently used and why, e.g. top-down vs. bottom-up; who is involved in this dynamic 
process, e.g. multi-scalar co-ordination among regional, national and supra-national 
actors (Marques and Morgan 2018); and how decisions are made and when, e.g. place-
based vs. place-neutral approaches. Our case evidences the importance of this first 
stage, by highlighting that a number of practical implementation barriers were due to a 
limited understanding of how regional governance models were set to work in Crete 
and CM, e.g. policy uncertainty and local actors' inertia due to an unclear policy design 
and implementation framework. At a practical level, this first stage will help local 
strategists to develop a strategic approach to S3 development and create the base for 
building a more integrated policy implementation model, through a better 
understanding of the regional dynamics.      
 The second stage includes the consideration of institutions and institutional 
change in favouring innovation policy governance and implementation. In this stage we 
bring together the importance of institutions in regional development (Danny et al. 
2009; Gertler 2010), their pivotal role in supporting regions in increasing their 
institutional thickness (Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015), and political thinking which is 
currently seen as a necessity for inducing regional institutional change for regional 
renewal and development (Marques and Morgan 2018). Moreover, our model 
examines institutional change and smart specialisation development on the premise of 
two critical aspects, which are highlighted and evidenced in our analysis.  
First, based on the empirical observation that S3 development is not only dependent 
on institutions directly affecting innovation policy governance, (e.g. formal rules and 
regulations associated with innovation funding), our model considers the process of 
change in non-innovation policy-related institutions. Its aim is not to show universally 
how a series of generic institutional reforms (e.g. inducing most effective rules and laws 
to ensure property rights) are likely to favour economic growth (Rodrik 2004a; North 
1989). Rather it seeks to show the way in which certain place-specific institutional 




governance and smart specialisation development. In the case of Crete and CM, this is 
evidenced by using the example of small-scale recruitment to show how TROIKA's 
formal regulations, well beyond the sphere of innovation policymaking, strangled S3 
development in the case of Crete.  
Secondly, reflecting on the way in which political processes shape the institutional 
environment (Marques and Morgan 2018), this model proposes that institutional 
change needs to go hand-in-hand with political thinking, not only at the sub-national 
level (e.g. regional government) but also, and perhaps most importantly, at the 
national and supra-national level (e.g. the EU). This implies that understanding both 
politics and timing is crucial for implementing S3 and, as such, it must be deeply 
embedded in policy design and implementation. Moreover, given that institutional 
transformation at the regional level usually implies shifts of political power from central 
to regional levels, our model suggests that the examination of institutional reforms for 
innovation policymaking must be accompanied by analytical reflections of political will 
and multi-scalar co-ordination among regional, national and EU authorities. The case of 
recruitment in Crete shows that if politics, beyond the boundaries of a region, are not 
seen as a core part of developing regional innovation strategies, the success of smart 
specialisation is not realistic, but rather utopian. 
 The third stage stresses the importance of micro-level (firm-specific) and meso-
level (regional) capabilities in the processes of policy construction, and aims to 
understand what capacities exist, and are still required to support governance changes 
and institutional reforms for S3 development. The critical aspect in this stage is not to 
recognise the profound need for building more responsive capabilities for economic 
development (Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock 2017), but to examine which 
particular forms of capacity building and what specific dynamics embraced in these 
forms are most likely to build and enhance the institutional capacity of the regions. In 
our case, we saw that Cretan and Central Macedonian policymakers were capable of 




development, but they were far from understanding how this process could be 
promoted through capacity building. We also evidenced the importance of 
complementarities in capacity building, by drawing attention to the synergetic effects 
between micro- and meso-level capabilities that S3 strategists must consider when 
moving from the design to the implementation phase. For example, we showed the 
significance of linking regions' capacity to design and retain interactive communication 
platforms for inter-organisational networking to the ability of firms to build a strong 
collaborative mentality to systematically interact with their networked environment. 
In our empirical work, we identify six forms of micro-level and meso-level capacity 
building which are ideally suited to the Cretan and Central Macedonian environments 
in order to support institutional integration in the context of S3 (see Table 8.5). We 
suggested that the development of a mixture of these capabilities contains processes 
which can increase regions' institutional thickness, e.g. raise additional institutional 
autonomy and flexibility (Capacity II), recover public trust (Capacity III) and build, 
therefore, the required institutional capacity to respond to regional innovation 
strategies (Rodríguez-Pose 2013). While these six capacity building forms have been 
proposed in a Cretan and CM policy environment, we suggest that they can be also 
reflected in other similar regional contexts in which catch-up regions encounter similar 











Chapter 10: Conclusions  
 
10.1 Thesis overview  
 Inspired by the ongoing debate about how smart specialisation strategies (S3) 
can be best developed to increase European competiveness, this thesis has 
investigated the implementation challenge of S3 in catch-up regions. Smart 
specialisation is a policy-prioritisation logic which builds on the existing regional 
innovation systems literature (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013b), and it has been 
introduced as the main EU regional innovation strategy to promote economic 
convergence across European territories (EC 2012). However, while smart 
specialisation's theoretical underpinnings have been well documented in the literature 
(McCann, van Oort, and Goddard 2016), S3 implementation cannot be taken for 
granted in the regional setting, given that we still lack understanding of how to 
overcome a number of practical barriers in less-favoured regions (Marques and Morgan 
2018; Patricia and Tea 2017; Capello and Kroll 2016).  
 Recent empirical work suggests that these barriers are multi-dimensional and 
varied across different less-favoured European regions. For example, a number of 
studies link S3 implementation challenge to regions' weak governance systems 
(Gianelle et al. 2016; OECD 2017a). Typically, this work relates S3 implementation 
obstacles with the limited potential of catch-up regions to build strong and responsive 
multi-level governance structures for public policy implementation (Kyriakou et al. 
2016; Radosevic et al. 2017; Sörvik et al. 2016). Others claim that smart specialisation 
development is affected by thin institutional environments that catch-up regions 
usually have (Rodríguez-Pose 2013; Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ketterer 2018), as well as by weak transformative capacities of lagging regions to bring 
about change for regional renewal and development (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 




 This thesis aimed to understand the implementation challenge of S3, by 
focusing research on southern European catch-up regions with prolonged economic 
recession, weak institutions and profound difficulties in developing S3 (Landabaso, 
Komninos, et al. 2014). To this end, S3 implementation was investigated in two Greek 
catch-up regions (Crete and Central Macedonia-CM), which have been in fiscal crisis for 
over a decade. Its objective was to understand empirically the challenging process of 
putting S3 theory into practice, by examining the role of governance, institutions and 
capacity building in shaping regional innovation strategies and smart specialisation 
development.  
 Acknowledging the importance of investigating governance, institutions and 
capabilities on economic growth and on S3 development particularly, as suggested by 
the ongoing literature, the thesis uses related concepts and ideas from a combination 
of STI theories (catch-up theory, institutional theory, policy governance and capacity 
building theory) to build an analytical conceptual framework. This model 
conceptualises the view that S3 implementation barriers derive from a theory-policy 
gap in regional development studies, which goes beyond the narrow boundaries of 
smart specialisation theory. That is, we still lack empirical understanding of what 
institutional change is required in lagging regions for regional renewal and 
development (Kroll 2016; Radosevic et al. 2017), how change impacts on economic 
growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2018), when change must be initiated to be 
feasible and realistic (Morgan 2017) and what forms of capacity building are needed to 
induce and support this change (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013a). The study aimed 
to address this gap and it makes both theoretical and practical contributions to regional 
policy implementation by investigating when, how and what policy intervention and 
change can bring improvements in governance, institutions and capabilities to support 
S3 development in catch-up regions. To do so, both general and specific research 





General and specific research objectives  
 The general research objective of this thesis is to study the implementation 
challenge of S3 in catch-up regions, which have been at the top of the EU cohesion 
policy agenda (EC 2014c). Research focus is primarily given to Southern European 
catch-up regions, given their prolonged economic recession, weak institutions and 
profound difficulties in implementing S3 (Landabaso, Komninos, et al. 2014).  
Its specific research objective is to investigate and understand empirically how 
governance, institutions and capacity building can impact on S3 practices and support 
smart specialisation development in two Greek regions (Crete and Central Macedonia), 
which have been in fiscal crisis for almost eleven consecutive years.  
 
Research Questions  
(RQ1): In what ways did the selected Greek regions develop smart specialisation 
strategies? 
 
(RQ2):  How do, and can, institutional arrangements and governance reforms 
 impact smart specialisation practices? 
 
(RQ3):  What capabilities exist and are required to develop smart specialisation 
strategies in catch-up regional environments? 
 
 To operate the conceptual framework and test its theoretical underpinnings in a 
Cretan and Central Macedonian context, a specific research design based on a 
qualitative case study approach was developed. Three research questions were 
formulated, using both inductive and abductive research strategies to explore the 
research objectives systematically. To gather the data, fifty semi-structured interviews 
were carried out in both case study regions during 2014-17 (including longitudinal 
research in the region of Crete). To provide additional validity to the study, participant 




S3 workshops including entrepreneurial discovery and open consultation events. Given 
that the in-depth interviewing generated an enormous amount of textual information, 
NVivo (Ver.7) was used to organise and analyse the data effectively. The majority of the 
interviews were transcribed and then translated from Greek to English.  
   
10.2 Key findings, conclusions and contribution to knowledge   
Key findings 
 In chapter 6 (RQ1), we examined the development options of S3 in the case 
study regions. We found that Crete and CM encountered notable difficulties in 
adopting smart specialisation as a core territorial innovation strategy. The 
implementation challenge of S3 in Crete and CM rests on place-specific problems 
derived from governmental and institutional inefficiencies, within and beyond the 
boundaries of the regions, leading to critical mass accumulation, public-sector 
administrative burden and limited power of the regions to legislate for regional 
development. In their turn, these problems raised policy uncertainty, increased local 
actors' inertia and led to delays in conducting entrepreneurial searches and discoveries. 
To address this policy implementation challenge, the local governments of Crete and 
CM followed different methodological approaches, based on a slightly different 
understanding and conceptualisation of the smart specialisation rationale. Particularly, 
in the case of Crete, a narrow-to-broad approach was adopted for entrepreneurial 
searches and priorities, in which a small group of S3 experts was allocated unofficially 
by the regional government to commence the process of discovery, followed by public 
consultations to guide the prioritisation and selection processes. In the case of CM a 
broad-to-narrow approach was selected, accompanied by widely open and transparent 
practices. In this option, the entrepreneurial discovery was initiated through the joint 
work of a large number of private and public sector actors. Progression was achieved 




justified and approved by a large number of actors through a series of consultations 
conducted in the region.  
In addition, we saw that different policy tools were created and used by local 
policymakers and strategists to assist S3 development. In the case of Crete, attention 
was given to the introduction of certain complementary instruments, including the 
regional innovation council and the Crete Innovation Initiative (CRINI), while in CM the 
creation of an S3 one-stop-shop was seen as first priority. 
  To move research forward and to meet the second research objective of this 
study (RQ2), chapter 7 investigated the role of governance and institutions on S3 
development. We started our analysis by evidencing the weakness of both regions to 
govern regional development strategies in previous innovation policy frameworks. We 
linked this policy implementation inefficiency to design nationally, execute regionally 
governance models, in which there was a lack of direct engagement of local 
entrepreneurial actors for leading the design of innovation policymaking at the regional 
level. However, we saw that this policy governance practice is currently changing along 
with the development of the new S3 framework. In particular, we evidenced a new 
perception to innovation policy thinking, in which the process of designing regional 
innovation strategies was shifted from central to regional governments. This new policy 
approach ranked the design of innovation strategies as a high regional priority and 
raised new opportunities for place-based policy development as extensively suggested 
by the literature (Barca 2009b). Nevertheless, despite progress in regional policy 
thinking, we saw that the challenge of governing innovation-driven growth was still an 
important open issue, predominantly for the implementation stage, in which both 
Crete and CM encountered a number of implementation challenges as discussed 
above.    
 As a solution to this policy implementation problem, the study evidences three 
key governance reforms to be made in advance, or at least during the development of 




The first is to change autonomy levels in regional policy governance and allow for more 
administrative flexibility in public-sector agencies' procedures. We showed that public-
sector agencies were capable of governing the design of S3, but less administratively 
independent to implement it. Therefore, regardless of whether Brussels or Athens may 
or may not be willing to give Greek regions more administrative autonomy, fearing 
corruption at the sub-national level, the data of this study show that increasing regional 
autonomy is an emerging issue to be thoughtfully considered in the new policy 
implementation agenda of smart specialisation. 
As a second reform, the study evidenced the simplification of smart specialisation-
related processes. Three Cretan and Central Macedonian examples were used (the 
state aid information system; national conditionality limitations; and weaknesses from 
European and national mechanisms) to show how the process of governance 
simplification can lead to better S3 practices and outcomes. 
The third proposed change is related to the way in which local firms' critical mass was 
accumulated and governed. Given the significance of entrepreneurial firms in the 
discovery process on the one hand, and their low participation in the Cretan and 
Central Macedonian practices on the other, the analysis suggests the undertaking of 
more intensive policy initiatives, complementary and supportive to S3 governance  (e.g. 
target groups of firms instead of single firms), in which a large number of groups of 
firms can be ensured in S3 implementation. 
 As to the institutions and the institutional changes to support policy governance 
options and S3 development, our evidence from Crete and CM showed a series of 
reforms, changes, and adjustments to be conducted in at least four different directions.  
Firstly, the thesis evidenced the importance of the public administration sector in 
introducing organisational changes to tackle public sector uncertainty and rebuild 
public trust.  
The second reform suggests a thorough consideration of the existing institutions in 




Crete and CM to develop and enforce their own development laws. We saw that a new 
regionally-based legislative framework, in which regions can support place-based 
options and decisions (e.g. provide tax benefits to accumulate critical mass), can 
support the creation of a more institutionally-friendly environment for S3 
development. The study showed empirically that this change is of high priority and 
requires different scales of governmental co-ordination and action within and beyond 
regions.  
The third reform is related to the implementation and enforcement of the institutions. 
We found that institutions in Crete and CM are not effectively-enforced (e.g. public 
services are not delivered in time), and this weakness leads to specific public policy 
implementation problems (e.g. public-private sector inertia) due to the lack of a stable, 
fair and trust-worthy environment for S3 action.  
Finally, an ambitious institutional reform is proposed for the purpose of public policy 
development, and particularly of smart specialisation implementation. This reform 
promotes the idea of spatial re-organisation (e.g. territorial restructuring through 
regional mergers) to accumulate and ensure the required critical mass from both the 
public and private sector.  
 Lastly, in chapter 8 (RQ3) we provided an analytical understanding of what 
forms of organisational (micro-level) and regional (meso-level) capabilities are most 
appropriate to support the implementation of S3 in Crete and CM. As to the existing 
capabilities, the findings show cases in which well-developed organisational 
competences favoured the implementation of S3, and others in which the lack of 
strong capabilities prevented the creation of an appropriate institutional environment 
to support the governance of S3. Four central types of capacity building with a direct 
relation to regional innovation have been examined systematically: technology and 
innovation (T&I) capabilities, networking capabilities, entrepreneurial capabilities and 




The study of T&I capabilities was conducted at the level of firms. Three main groups 
were created and examined: zero-level capability firms (ZLC), learners and technology-
mature firms (TMF). The study shows that the ZLC firms are usually family-owned 
businesses with very weak T&I capabilities and low potential for S3 action. The learners 
usually have low T&I capacity, but a relatively high potential for S3 action given that 
they can learn to innovate following proper policy intervention. The TMF demonstrate 
high T&I capacities and potential to lead S3 practices. 
Concerning networking, capacity building was examined at the level of firms and 
regions. At the micro-level, we found that ZLC and learners have developed networking 
competences to support daily business operations, and TMF to promote innovation-
related actions. The cases of Crete and CM reveal that the smaller the firm, the more 
difficult it will be to build inter-organisational networks for innovation activities due to 
limited resources. It also shows that micro-enterprises (usually learners) are less likely 
to participate in innovation or technology networks, compared to medium-sized firms 
(TMF), which can demonstrate a better networking performance. At the meso-level, 
inter-regional networking is built through cross-regional programmes, foreign 
entrepreneurial missions and trans-regional cooperation agreements. The results on 
intra-regional networking highlight the limited potential for public-private networking 
and ineffective collaboration for policymaking in the public sector.  
Entrepreneurial capacities were studied through the lenses of academic 
entrepreneurship, firm-level entrepreneurship and regional-level entrepreneurship. As 
to the first, while there are a number of TT mechanisms (e.g. liaison offices, TTOs, 
technology parks), academic entrepreneurship in Crete and CM remains at relatively 
low levels, due to the weaknesses of academia to exploit them effectively. Concerning 
firm-level entrepreneurship, we saw that firms' organisational competencies are more 
relevant to address low-level than knowledge-based entrepreneurship (except learners 
and TMF which operate in knowledge-intensive industries). At the meso-level, the 




given the mechanisms which have been built by regional authorities to promote 
entrepreneurship abroad. The capacity for local entrepreneurship was found to be low 
in the sense that entrepreneurship was not part of the regional policy agenda.  
Lastly, as to the administrative and governance capabilities, the study evidences that 
while a number of Cretan and Central Macedonian authorities have developed 
sufficient administrative skills to co-ordinate and run innovation-related actions, 
regions' capabilities remain at relatively low levels due to the low degree of regional 
autonomy for bringing about change in governance and institutions.  
 In respect to new capacity building, the thesis identified six types of capabilities 
and explained how their development can support S3 implementation in Crete and CM. 
The process of mapping regional dynamics is a first collective capacity appropriate to 
allow regions to understand in detail the framework in which innovation actions takes 
place. Three competences are required to build this first capability for S3 development: 
competences to assess the impact of previous innovation policy frameworks, to 
mobilise actual engagement of local bodies and to evaluate local actors' T&I 
performance. A second is the capacity for regional decentralisation, aimed at allowing 
for more place-based options in regional development. We saw that the creation of 
regionally-based negotiation competencies is seen as essential for this type of 
capability. The capacity to develop regional communication, networking and clustering 
is evidenced as a third type of capability to facilitate strategic collaborative synergies 
for S3 development. As a fourth capacity we refer to all those skills required to link 
cross-sectoral activities including the ability to recognise industrial and sectoral 
diversity, the ability to identify related but disconnected business activities for 
potential networking, and the ability to link fragmented entrepreneurial activities. The 
capacity to understand and upgrade firms' technological and innovation potential along 
with the need to build capabilities to enhance local entrepreneurship are also two 





Key conclusions from the discussion  
 We started our discussion by pointing out that the design, and particularly the 
implementation of S3, is still an open issue for European regions. This is evidenced in 
the case studies by revealing a number of implementation barriers which are due to 
weaknesses derived from the interplay among governance, institutions and capabilities 
in catch-up regions. In this respect, the thesis supports further the view that S3 debate 
must shift attention from theory to practice (Capello and Kroll, 2016), with the 
objective of understanding how lagging regions can move from smart specialisation 
policy design to S3 implementation. The analysis of Crete and CM shows empirically 
that while S3 is currently seen as the core EU territorial strategy for regional renewal 
and European convergence (EC 2013; OECD 2013; Gianelle and Kleibrink 2015), smart 
specialisation-driven convergence is unlikely to occur unless policy implementation 
barriers are effectively understood and addressed in European catch-up regions.  
 However, this process is by no means easy, nor are the ways in which it takes 
place. The thesis shows that this is due to a place-sensitive and still unknown approach 
to S3 implementation, in the sense that there is no one implementation pattern ideally 
suited to S3 development in catch-up regions. This view rests on the principles of the 
one-size-fits-all argument (Tödtling and Trippl 2005), and it  further progresses previous 
empirical and theoretical claims which suggest that there is no best or common way to 
address the implementation of S3 (Foray 2016; Foray 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 
2015). It does so by evidencing that the consideration of introducing place-specific 
development options for S3 implementation must not be seen as a policy suggestion or 
a desired option anymore (OECD 2013), but as a necessary condition for a successful 
place-based implementation of S3 across EU regions.   
 In addition, we saw that the consideration and selection of place-specific 
options for smart specialisation development is not only critical for catch-up regions 
with apparent differences in their structures, but is also important even for areas with 




studies by examining S3 implementation options between regions that obey the same 
national and EU laws, possess innovation systems with many similar STI infrastructures, 
represent a relatively similar innovation and R&D performance, and identify similar S3 
priorities, yet they address S3 practices differently (e.g. narrow-to-broad vs. broad-to-
narrow entrepreneurial searches). This raises, in the context of S3, the increasing role 
of regional diversity in shaping economic development (Asheim and Cooke 2011; OECD 
2011a), and evidences the importance of regional disparities in framing and 
determining S3 practices even across regions with very similar institutional contexts.    
 The need to understand empirically how smart specialisation can be best 
realised in less-favoured environments, led this study to a more analytical investigation 
of the governance and institutional dynamics of Crete and CM. Focus was primarily on 
understanding what regional governance and institutional adjustments are currently 
taking place to support innovation policy action, as well as what new ways of policy 
governance and institutional reforms are still required to support the development of 
S3. The empirical analysis points to potential governance and institutional adjustments. 
These changes, discussed analytically in the previous section of this chapter, have been 
envisaged to fit the specificities of Crete and CM and, as such, they refer particularly to 
a Cretan and Central Macedonian context. However, during investigation, a number of 
other empirical findings, beyond the interest of the case study regions, emerged, 
contributing to a theoretical and practical understanding of S3 adaptability in the 
regional setting. 
 Firstly, acknowledging the four modes of institutional change discussed in the 
literature review chapter, meaning displacement, layering, drift and conversion (Busetti 
2015; Mahoney and Thelen 2009), the thesis evidences that S3 implementation in 
catch-up regions is most likely to happen through displacement and layering. Given 
that previous research sought to understand the relation between modes of 
institutional change and smart specialisation adaptation in institutionally thick EU 




empirical findings and contributes further by evidencing that the development of S3 in 
less-advanced regions is most likely to be favoured through the displacement and 
layering of institutions. In a Cretan and Central Macedonian context, the necessity to 
replace existing formal rules with new institutions to favour S3 implementation, the 
process of displacement, is evidenced through the idea of spatial re-organisation, in 
which a territorial restructuring through regional mergers can ensure the acquisition of 
critical mass. As to the introduction of new institutions alongside existing rules, the 
process of layering, institutional change embodies the simplification of public-sector 
organisations and the power of regional governments to enact tailor-made 
development laws, such as granting fiscal incentives, to support S3 development. 
 Secondly, we saw that smart specialisation has acted as a trigger of policy 
implementation change by inciting regions to overcome previous policy development 
inefficiencies. In the case of Crete and CM, S3 helped regions to overcome the design 
nationally-execute regionally ineffective approach. Given that S3 is currently seen as an 
innovation strategy that aims to bring about change (Foray 2014; McCann and Ortega-
Argilés 2014; Foray 2016), we show that smart specialisation-driven change is not only 
related to structural reforms (Asheim and Grillitsch 2015; Grillitsch 2015), institutional 
adjustments (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo 2015), or diversification and regional 
renewal (Boschma and Gianelle 2014; Balland et al. 2018), it also relates to policy 
development improvements which happen in parallel with, and because of the S3 
practices. This view is evidenced empirically in this study by showing that smart 
specialisation acted as an important driving force in encouraging Crete and CM to start 
designing public policies at the regional instead of the national level. It also supported 
regions to promote a close European, national and regional co-operation, to mobilise 
the involvement of local actors in a more intensive and collective way, and to empower 
existing and new tools for S3 implementation including structures such as the new 




 Thirdly, while weak regional institutions and governance regimes are seen as 
the main cause of the S3 implementation challenge (Kroll 2015b; Gianelle et al. 2016; 
Foray 2016), we showed that other non-regional factors and usually beyond S&T, 
including political will, national vested interests and governance constraints imposed 
exogenously (e.g. by the TROIKA or the EC), also hinder S3 development. Our case 
evidenced a non-typical EU situation, in which the success of S3 development is not 
only dependent on the effectiveness of catch-up regions to change their institutions  
(Grillitsch 2015; Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015) or improve their governance 
structures (Kyriakou et al. 2016; Radosevic et al. 2017), but also on the extent to which 
non-regional political level factors impact on S3 practices (Marques and Morgan 2018), 
e.g. the reluctance of central administration to shift power from national to regional 
levels and TROIKA's constraints in public-sector recruitment. This view progresses 
further the idea of multi-scalar endeavour for the co-ordination of regional 
development (Todtling, Asheim, and Boschma 2013), in which different aspects of 
regional, national and supranational institutions should be examined for mutually 
beneficial ends at the regional level (Morgan 2017).  
 Fourthly, we saw that the success of promoting governance and institutional 
integration on the one hand, and the ability to address non-regional challenges to S3 
development on the other, are less likely to succeed if not accompanied by the 
introduction and exploitation of well-developed capabilities at both the organisational 
and regional level. Inspired by previous empirical studies which suggest that 
economically weaker regions are more frequently found to lack capabilities to address 
S3 practices (McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016b; Foray 2016; Iacobucci 2014; Capello 
2014), we draw attention to the aspect of complementarities in capacity building and 
to the importance of building both regions' and firms' level capacities for S3 
development in catch-up regions. Given that there is no consensus as to what 
constitutes institutional capacity building (Rodríguez-Pose 2013), we proposed a 




to research or S&T related aspects, as broadly suggested by a number of S3 studies 
(OECD 2013; EC 2012, 2014d), yet they are seen to have an important impact on S3 
development. These capabilities are specific to lagging regions and, apart from 
supporting them to increase their institutional thickness (Kroll 2015a; Grillitsch 2015),  
they can also assist regions to overcome S3 implementation barriers derived from 
exogenously imposed S3 challenges.  
 
Theoretical and practical contribution to knowledge   
Contribution to regional development theory  
 This thesis contributes to the conceptual foundation of regional development 
theory by improving smart specialisation implementation theory. In particular, the 
study progresses regional development, by showing empirically that smart 
specialisation implementation challenge needs to be examined and understood 
through a concurrent and systematic analysis of the way in which governance, 
institutions and capabilities embedded in the wider environment of a region are related 
and have evolved. It suggests that S3 debate should no longer be about how to 
improve exploratory capacities in catch-up regions, as currently suggested by a number 
of S3 implementation guides, (see for example (EC 2012; Reek 2013; EU 2016; OECD 
2013). Rather, more emphasis could be put on simultaneous and systematic theoretical 
understanding of the interrelation of these three components of regional development 
(governance modes, institutions and forms of capabilities) and that will show what 
implementation practices are realistic, feasible and responsive to S3 development. 
Realistic in the sense that not only regions' resources and capacities, but also other 
multi-scalar factors of public policy governance and development can be ensured and 
co-ordinated to build responsive mechanisms for S3 implementation (e.g. political will, 
commitment and support at national and EU level); feasible in the sense that the 




scheduled timeline; and responsive in the sense that S3 practices fit to specific needs 
and development features of the regions.  
Our theoretical contribution is built on the empirical findings from Crete and CM which 
progress the existing research about S3 by evidencing that governance, institutions and 
capacity building are closely related to and depend on each other and, therefore, they 
must not be examined separately as is usual in the literature (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Wilkie 2015; Capello and Kroll 2016; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a) but 
concurrently, collectively and in great detail. We showed that, in the context of S3, 
public policy implementation is a dynamic process in which governance improvements 
and institutional integration co-evolve with the potential of regions to build policy 
implementation capacities. And as such, a theoretical investigation of how current and 
prospective aspects of governance, institutions and capabilities are related to each 
other is essential in order to bring more responsive policy results. For example, we saw 
that while institutional reforms such as the provision of additional governmental 
flexibility at the sub-national level to allow regions make small governance decisions 
(e.g. recruit an S3 expert), are critical for regions to change existing governance 
regimes and to favour place-based policy implementation, Crete and CM lacked the 
required administrative capacity to induce and support these reforms effectively.  
 In this respect, we strongly agree with the vast majority of the latest empirical 
suggestions that the examination of governance, institutions and capacity building are 
increasingly critical for the design and implementation of S3 (Foray 2016; Morgan 2017; 
Iacobucci and Guzzini 2016; Gianelle et al. 2016; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2016a; 
Radosevic et al. 2017), but we partly agree with the tendency to study them separately, 
as an in-depth investigation to study their impact on S3 development as a joint and 
collective endeavour is neglected. In this thesis we conceptualise the view that the 
implementation challenge of S3 in catch-up regions should no longer be about their 
poor multi-level governance systems (OECD 2017a; Marques and Morgan 2018), or 




2015; Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; Kroll 2015a; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015), 
but rather on understanding the interplay between policy governance, institutional 
integration and capacity building. In fact, there are a large number of studies which 
broadly suggest that S3 require good institutions and strong policy capacities (Foray 
and Goenaga 2013), but most of these studies do not show empirically what particular 
changes or improvements are ideally needed to meet this objective systematically. On 
the contrary, this study evidences that a simultaneous and analytical investigation of 
governmental, institutional and capacity building aspects can contribute further to an 
understanding of what place-specific governance and institutional change is required in 
catch-up regions, how such change can affect policy development and when, and what 
organisational and regional capacities, beyond S&T, are required to support this 
change.  
 
Contribution to policy implementation  
 As to policy implementation, this thesis contributes to the further advancement 
of regional policy studies, by providing a practical understanding of how S3 
implementation challenge can be better perceived and addressed in practice. 
Acknowledging the role of regional diversity in S3 development (Bachtler et al. 2017), 
and the complexity to follow similar policy implementation routes across different 
regional environments (Foray 2016; Aranguren et al. 2018), the thesis proposes a 
three-stage policy implementation model (see Figure 9.2), that innovation strategists 
can use to search for an S3 implementation mix that best corresponds to their own 
needs. An understanding of how governance, institutional and capacity building aspects 
are related to each other to support public policy implementation is primary 
highlighted in this model. In particular, the model is not for showing how change and 
improvements can play a key role in developing S3 when governance, institutions or 
capabilities are examined and improved, but that S3 implementation challenge can be 




territorial context. Three main stages are evidenced and proposed in this model 
through the case studies.   
Firstly, one has to analyse and understand the framework in which regions govern and 
regulate innovation policy development. This is an important stage, given that the 
structure and operation of policy governance frameworks may not be always clear and 
understandable in less-favoured regions (OECD 2017a). For example, does the region 
run, at present, a model which routinely favours place-based options and practices 
(Barca 2009b), enables the interaction of local entrepreneurs (Foray 2014), or 
promotes multi-level co-ordination for public policymaking (Kyriakou et al. 2016)? Or is 
it a top-down model in which decisions about regional development are made centrally 
at a national and European level? In the case of Crete and CM, we saw that public 
policy governance and particularly smart specialisation regulations are to a large extent 
shaped exogenously by third parties due to the financial crisis (e.g. the TROIKA, EU). 
Hence, this first stage involves an analytical investigation of what innovation policy 
governance models are currently used and why, who is involved in this dynamic 
process and how key decisions are made.  
The second stage includes the consideration of institutions and institutional change in 
favouring innovation policy governance and implementation. Building upon empirical 
evidence from Crete and CM, this stage underlines the importance of examining 
institutions which are not only related in a straight line to public policy governance (e.g. 
institutional tools for policy implementation), as broadly suggested by the S3 literature 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Wilkie 2015; Grillitsch 2015; Sörvik et al. 2016), but also to norms 
and regulations, either formal or informal, that may not be directly related to public 
policy governance, yet they impact S3 implementation (e.g. institutional barriers for 
fast-track requirement).  
The third stage recognises the emerging role of capacity building as a means of 
understanding what capacities exist, and are still required, to support governance 




importance of complementarities in capacity building, by stressing the synergetic 
effects on S3 development between micro-level (firm-specific) and meso-level 
(regional) capabilities.   
  
10.3 Limitations of the study   
 A number of limitations regarding our methods must be considered and 
discussed. First, given that we use a case study approach, a potential limitation of our 
methodology is the selection and analysis of only two regions, which may imply that 
our empirical findings and conclusions are not necessarily transferable to other 
regional contexts (Yin 2009). In our analysis, we use Crete and CM as an example of 
catch-up European regions to study smart specialisation development. These regions, 
however, are by no means identical to other European environments and, therefore, 
assumptions which neglect or go beyond the consideration of regional specificities run 
the risk of not being robust. To address this methodological challenge and broaden our 
findings into a wider STI discussion, theories and concepts which advocate the risk of 
transferring and applying development strategies from one place to another, e.g. the 
one-size-fits-all approach (Tödtling and Trippl 2005), were examined and considered 
systematically. 
 Secondly, given that smart specialisation policy development is currently on 
board in our case regions, there is an objective difficulty in recognising and studying all 
possible elements and factors that may be related to S3 implementation. In this 
respect, there is a potential challenge from accidentally neglecting the examination of 
place-specific evidence which has not yet emerged from the implementation of S3, yet 
it may come up later. We consider the possibility of this limitation as a methodological 
constraint which, to some extent,  was addressed through the longitudinal research 
conducted in Crete. In this regard, the longitudinal analysis was important not only in 




for the identification of new emerging S3 elements which were not previously defined 
in our study for investigation.    
 Thirdly, a potential limitation arises from the restricted availability of updated 
secondary data, which has been used in this thesis to build, analyse and understand the 
case study profiles. In particular, the vast majority of the available secondary sources 
(e.g. regional indicators, official studies and state reports) neglect the way in which the 
macro-economic crisis in Greece has ultimately affected the regional ecosystems. 
Though this weakness does not affect the quality of our ultimate empirical findings, it is 
worth highlighting it as a potential limitation of this study.  
 
10.4 Areas for future research 
 Arguably, there is still a great deal of room for additional research in the 
implementation of S3 at the regional level. Given that it is not self-evident that policy 
implementation practices can be sufficiently applied across diverse territories (Tödtling 
and Trippl 2005), an important direction for future research is to examine the extent to 
which our academic and policy thinking on S3 implementation can be transferred to 
other regional contexts. This can be seen as part of the ongoing smart specialisation 
research, and it would require the conduct of additional similar studies in European 
catch-up regions, which currently face important difficulties in putting their S3 
priorities into practice (Iacobucci and Guzzini 2016; Capello and Kroll 2016).  
We built an empirical-based policy implementation model to understand how S3 
development can be better examined, understood and addressed in the regional 
setting. Given that it has been created for the Cretan and CM environments 
particularly, our model requires testing in other regional contexts to find out whether 
its theoretical underpinnings are relevant for other European cases beyond our study 
regions, and to examine which of our policy suggestions can also be made for areas 
beyond Crete and CM. Drawing on a broader regional base that collects evidence from 




improvements which will help to implement better the next generation of smart 
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Appendices Table 1 Early-stage Research Questions 
 Research Questions   
1 Why do less-favoured regions engage in S3?  
2 Can the S3 concept and its evolutionary approach help improve the theoretical and 
analytical treatment of the complexity of RIS?  
3 What innovation conditions exist and are required for S3 entrepreneurial activity to 
take place in less-favoured regional environments? 
4 How do such innovation conditions differentiate themselves when applied at regions 
which represent different structural traits and R&D routines? 
5 How are local specificities incorporated in S3 strategy when key conditions are 
missing or a strategic policy objective cannot be easily identified? 
6 Can S3 approaches improve innovation dynamics in less-favoured regions with 
different innovation potentials? 
7 What particular actions might follower regions undertake to manage the risk of 
weakening strategic advantage through excessive narrowing of R&D specialisation?   
Source: Author 
 
Appendices Table 2 Participant Information Leaflet 
-General information- 
Researcher 
George Papamichail (s1258376@ed.ac.uk) 
PhD candidate in Science and Technology Studies 
 
The University of Edinburgh 
School of Social & Political Science 
Institute for the Study of Science, Technology & Innovation 
Old Surgeons' Hall High School Yards  
Edinburgh, EH1 1LZ 
Supervisors  Dr. Alessandro Rosiello Prof. David Wield  
Research subject  Capacity building and Smart Specialisation 
Purpose To investigate and understand Smart Specialisation challenges in catch-up regions 
Research method Face-to-face semi-structured tape-recorded interviews, confidential and anonymous 
Ethical issues None  








Aims and objectives  
The proposed PhD research is intended to examine Smart Specialisation and study its 
influencing attributes particularly on poor and less-advanced EU regions with the 
objective of overcoming theoretical and practical disconnections. Its research outputs 
seek to make an academic contribution through an understanding of the dynamics and 
evolution of structurally weaker innovation systems, and a contribution to policy through 
the design of an analytical and conceptual model aiming to support Smart Specialisation 
policymaking and implementation.  
 
Target group and invitation  
Research targets high level Smart Specialisation experts from academics, policy makers 
and innovation practitioners from the  regions of Crete and Central Macedonia. The 
project seeks to address top-level experts who are currently involving in Smart 
Specialisation practices and undertaking a key role in designing, implementing and 
monitoring Smart Specialisation strategies at a regional level.    
 
Participation and confidentiality 
Participation is completely voluntary and respondents are free to withdraw at any time. 
There is no compensation for participation in this study. Due to confidentiality 
reasons participants’ views and records will be anonymised. Respondents will have the 
right to ask questions during and after the interviews. All interviews will be tape-


















Appendices Table 3 Informed Consent Form 
 
You have been asked to participate in the above research study. By signing below, you 
are agreeing that: (1) you have read and understood the Participant Information Leaflet, 
(2) questions about your participation in this study have been answered satisfactorily, 
and (3) you are being asked for your permission to audiotape this interview and agree to 
take part in this research study voluntarily.  
 
 
   












   















Appendices Table 4 List of semi-structured interviews 
I/N Pseudonym  Group of 
interviewee 
 Position of 
interviewee 
 Region  Date of 
interview 
 Type of 
interview 
 
1  SACr1  Private  Manager, Science 
and Technology 
Park of Crete 
 Crete  01.8.2014 
 
 Face2face  
2  STCr2  Private  R&D Manager, 
FORTHnet SA 
 Crete  20.8.2014  Face2face  
3  OICr3  Academia  Professor, 
University of Crete 
 Crete  4.09.2014  Face2face  
4  RACr4  Public  Governor office, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  12.09.2014  Face2face  




 Crete  30.09.2014  Face2face  




 Crete  4.12.2014  Face2face  
7  PACr7  Academia  Manager, Research 
Centre 
 Crete  4.12.2014  Face2face  
8  STCr8  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  13.12.2014  Face2face  
9  TRCr9  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  17.12.2014  Face2face  
10  ZOCr10  Public  Regional 
Development Fund, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  24.12.2014  Face2face  
11  ANCr11  Academia  Professor, 
University of Crete 
 Crete  17.01.2015  Face2face  
12  KACr12  Private  Heraklion Chamber 
of Commerce 
 Crete  17.01.2015  Face2face  
13  MECr13  Private  R&D Manager, 
Plastika Kritis 
 Crete  17.01.2015  Face2face  
14  TSCr14  Private  Entrepreneur, Olive 
oil sector 
 Crete  17.01.2015  Face2face  
15  KOCr15  Private  Entrepreneur, 
Manufacturing 
sector 
 Crete  11.02.2015  Face2face  
16  MICr16  Private  Managing Director, 
Pancreta bank 
 Crete  25.02.2015  Face2face  
17  FRCr17  Private  Managing Director, 
Development 
Agency of Crete 
 Crete  27.02.2015  Face2face  
18  KOCM18  Academia  Professor, Aristotle 
University of 
Thessaloniki 
 CM  6.03.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 






20  MACM20  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of CM 
 CM  23.04.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
21  KOCM21  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of CM 
 CM  3.06.2015  Face2face  
22  TSCr22  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  8.07.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
23  KYCM23  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of CM 
 CM  13.07.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
24  TSCr24  Academia  Technological 
Educational 
Institute of Crete 
 Crete  5.08.2015  Face2face  
25  KOCM25  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of CM 
 CM  3.09.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
26  PECM26  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of CM 
 CM  3.11.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
27  MECM27  Private  Consultant, 
Intermediary 
organisation  
 CM  16.11.2015  Face2face  
28  XACM29  Private  Entrepreneur, 
manufacturing 
sector   
 CM  17.11.2015  Face2face  
29  ANCM28  Academia  Professor, Aristotle 
University of 
Thessaloniki 
 CM  17.11.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
30  KACM30  Private  Science and 
Technology Park of 
Thessaloniki 
 CM  18.11.2015  Face2face  




 CM  18.11.2015  Face2face  




 CM  18.11.2015  Face2face  




 CM  19.11.2015  Face2face  
34  MPCM34  Academia   Professor, 
University of 
Western Macedonia 
 CM  19.11.2015  Face2face  
35  TRCM35  Private  Alexander 
Innovation Zone of 
Thessaloniki 
 CM  20.11.2015  Face2face  
36  VLCM36  Private  Entrepreneur, cloth 
and textile industry 
 CM  24.11.2015  Face2face  




for Research and 
Technology 
Skype 
38  SACM38  Public  Manager, National 
Documentation 
Centre 
 CM  23.12.2015  Telephone 
Skype 
 
39  XACM39  Private  Entrepreneur, ICT 
sector 
 CM  12.02.2016  Telephone 
Skype 
 
40  KACr40  Public  Manager, Managing 
Authority, Region of 
Crete 
 Crete  17.02.2016  Face2face  
41  KOCr41  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  6.6.2017  Telephone 
Skype 
 
42  KACr42  Public  Manager, Managing 
Authority, Region of 
Crete 
 Crete  5.7.2017  Face2face  
43  SACr43  Private  Incubator Manager, 
EDAP SA  
 Crete  6.07.2017  Telephone 
Skype 
 
44  DACr44  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  11.07.2017  Face2face  
45  SACr45  Private  Manager, Science 
and Technology 
Park of Crete 
 Crete  18.7.2017  Face2face  
46  KACr46  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  21.07.2017  Face2face  
47  KACr47  Public  S3 consultant, 
Region of Crete 
 Crete  21.07.2017  Face2face  




 Crete  25.07.2017  Face2face  
49  LYCr49  Private  Entrepreneur, Wine 
sector 
 Crete  9.8.2017  Face2face  
50  SACr50  Private  Manager, Piraeus 
Bank local branch  














Appendices Table 5 Observational research: list of S3 events 
Event   Organiser   Date   
Development Priorities for Research, Technological 
Development and Innovation for the 2014-2020 
programming period-Regional Smart Specialization 
Strategy 
 Region of Crete  22/04/2013 
S3 Platform peer-review  EU  26/09/2013 
Thematic workshop on Tourism complex   Region of Crete  30/06/2015 
Thematic workshop on Tourism complex   Region of Crete  18/12/2015 
Youth Strategic Priority in Learning Regions: Innovative 
Entrepreneurship and Smart Specialization 
 Region of Crete  04/11/2016 
Thematic workshop on Environmental complex   Region of Crete  19/12/2016 
Thematic workshop on Environmental complex  Region of Crete  20/02/2017 
Open meetings with local entrepreneurs (Cultural - 
Tourist Sector/Rural Tourism) 
 Region of Crete  01/03/2017 
Thematic workshop on Tourism complex  Region of Crete  13/03/2017 
Final consultation on the 1st round of the 
environmental complex  
 Region of Crete  21/03/2017 
Final consultation on the 1st round of the Tourism 
complex 
 Region of Crete  04/04/2017 
Thematic workshop on Agro-food complex   Region of Crete  09/06/2017 
Information workshop for the Agro-food complex   Region of Crete  23/06/2017 
S3 informative workshop   FORTH  21/07/2017 
Final consultation on the 1st round of the Agro-food 
complex 





















1. Could you please give me some general information about the organisation you work 
for?  
E.g. Name, position, goal, main tasks, years of experience etc  
 
2. Can you briefly describe the role you have in the S3 process?  
 
3. What was the main reason(s) of starting S3 beyond the ex-ante conditionality for 
getting access in the EU Structural Fund Programmes?  
 
4. When did you officially start working on S3?  
 
5. Do you have a realistic timeline for its execution/duration?  
 
6. Have you received any grants either from the public or private sector for S3?  
 
7. What do you expect from S3 strategies?  
Please explain in detail    
 
8. From a general perspective, did S3 work well for your region? Do you have any 
examples? Please elaborate 
 
9. S3 proposes a particular philosophy. Are you familiar with it? 
For example, is it absolutely clear for you how to design, implement or monitor S3 in 
your region? Are all S3 process/steps clear enough for you?  (e.g. design, implement, 
monitor, evaluate) 
 
10. According to your personal view, has S3 conceptualised in a proper way? Do you see 
any important knowing-doing gap? 
 
11. What strategy did you follow to identify and select different 
participants/entrepreneurs to take part in S3? 
For example, how did you identify and contact them?    
 
12. Did you cover all stakeholder groups? If not, please explain why.  
 
13. At what level are they represented  





14. How often do you meet each other in the S3 context?  
 
15. How would you evaluate the collaboration among different entrepreneurs? Please 
explain why. 
Effective, unproductive, rare, frequent etc   
 
16. What were some barriers, if any, that you encountered during their collaboration?  
 
17. Have you met any resistance from different stakeholders’ groups? If yes, what was it 
about? Intellectual Property issues, confidentiality, power of politics, fear of failure, 
lack of time and resources etc  
 
18. How did you manage this problem?  
E.g. What kind of strategies have you used to overcome such barriers?  
 
19. How would you evaluate S3 understanding of those engaged with S3 strategies?   
E.g. in terms of its rationale, philosophy, methodology etc   
 
20. Could you describe what their view is around S3?  
For instance do they find it necessary, valuable, challenging, useless etc?  
 
21. What effect, if any, do you feel S3 had on local stakeholders?  
For example, have key local players and stakeholders come closer to each other due to 
S3 practices? Have you seen any improvements in their relationship/collaboration 
because of S3?  
 
22. Based on your own experience/view does S3 as an emerging regional innovation tool 
provide opportunities to support innovation-driven growth and catch up?  
 
23. Do you believe that S3 can help your region move the STI paradigm towards a more 
systemic and interdependent approach? If so, how? Can you give some specific 
examples?  
 
24. Can S3 help us understand better part of the complexity of RIS? If so, how and 
where? Can you give some examples from your own experience?  
E.g. understand better complexity and uncertainty about knowledge systems, 
institutions, proximity, absorptive and receptive capacity etc)   
 
25. Would you say that people have started thinking differently about innovation in their 









26. How would you assess the regional innovation system in your area?  
- General:   v. weak..... weak...... medium...... strong..... v. strong.... 
 
- Specific areas: 
Innovation autonomy  v. weak..... weak...... medium...... strong..... v. strong.... 
Intellectual property    
Knowledge spill overs    
knowledge generation-diffusion-exploitation  
Funding and financing  
Cluster activities  
Technology cooperation  
..... 
 
27. According to your view, what general or particular conditions are required for S3 to 
take place properly in your region? (i.e. specific governance structure, institutional 
systems)  
 
28. Was your region (e.g. all stakeholders engaged in the process) fully ready to start 
implementing a S3 approach? If not why?  
Please explain  
 
29. Are the existing innovation conditions in your region suitable/proper to assist the 
entrepreneurial process of discovery?  
 
30. If not what else was/is missing, required or needs further improvement in all S3 
stages?  
Design, implementation, monitoring etc 
 
31. Have you overcome this gap? If so, how did you manage to overcome the absence of 
S3 conditions? If not what actions are you going to you take? 
 
32. Have you already identified your R&D domains to focus on? If not, why?  
For example, is it because key S3 conditions are missing?  
 
33. Was it difficult to identify and agree on specific R&D domains? If yes, why?  
If so, what were the main barrier/problems/difficulties? (E.g. identification process was 
difficult, time-consuming etc) 
 
34. How did you overcome the barrier(s)? 
 
35. As you have decided on specific domains are you now worried about excessive 
narrowing of R&D specialisation? 
 
36. If yes/no why? Can you explain?   
 





38. How can you ensure that you will avoid the risk of lock-in? If things go wrong, do you 
have any plan B?  
 
39. Do/will you take any particular actions to avoid potential strategic drifts?  
 
40. How do you balance the trade-off between too much and too little specialization? 
 
41. Have you established any monitoring or/and evaluation mechanisms?  If yes please 
describe 
E.g. multi-level governance mechanisms 
 
42. If no why?  
E.g. not important, never think of it, problems/difficulties to identify proper ones etc  
 
43. How will you assess S3 outcome? Have you considered/identified any particular 
evaluation mechanism  
E.g. indicators) 
 
44. Thinking about your previous answers can you give me an overall estimation of S3 as 
an emerging innovation tool for regional development?  
E.g. Is it successful/unsuccessful, difficult/semi-conceptualized, vague, helpful, useful, 
valuable, appropriate, necessary for your region etc    
 
45. Before we conclude this interview, is there anything else you would like to share with 
me?  
E.g. other issues, recommendations etc you want to say/add 
 



















Examining the challenges that catch-up regions experience during the RIS3 implementation 
phase, this questionnaire guide seeks to investigate what firms- and regional-level 
capabilities are required to develop smart specialisation strategies in the region of Crete, as 
well as, what institutional arrangements and governance reforms may be useful.  
 
1. What is the progress in the RIS3 practices (from 2012 - up to present)? 
 
2. Do you see any notable differences in the way innovation policies are currently governed 
and regulated? (as compared to the past)    
 
3. What are the main barriers/difficulties/challenges during the implementation phase for 
public and private sector regional actors? 
o public actors   
o private actors   
 
4. Are there any new (or enhanced existing ones) capabilities developed during the 
development of RIS3 both at the firm-level and the regional-level?  
 
5. What is strong - what is still missing?  
 
6. Can the region of Crete support all RIS3 stages effectively at the 
sub-national level without the direct support of the central 
government?   
 
7. Thinking of resources, competences and capabilities:  
o what is the case in the public sector (what is there, what 
is partly developed, what is still missing?) 
o what is the case in the private sector (what is there, 
what is partly developed, what is still missing?) 
 
8. How (and in what areas) can the central government support the region to develop RIS3 
effectively?  What type of support (central policy intervention/action) is necessary? 
 
9. What would be an ideal combination of top-down (national) and bottom-up (sub-national) 
approaches for the development of RIS3?   
 
10. How can we achieve this reconciliation?  
 







12. What organisational and regional-level capabilities are needed for progress towards 
decentralisation, what types of capacity building would be more relevant to improve 
regional bottom-up governance structures? 
o organisational  
o regional (e.g. institutional arrangements, governance reforms) 
 
13. Please describe the main traits of the following types of capabilities of the Private firms & 
local entrepreneurs and Public administration sector players separately for the period: 
-up to 2012 
-2012-present (period of RIS3 development) 
o Absorptive capacity 
o Technological & Innovation  
o Networking  
o Administrative 
o Entrepreneurial   
o Financial-investment 
  
14. How  can we support the development/progression of the following types of capabilities 
for  Private firms & local entrepreneurs and Public administration sector players? What is 
still missing?  
o Absorptive capacity 
o Technological & Innovation  
o Networking  
o Administrative 

















Appendices Table 8 List of organisations participated in the CM consultation process 
Organisation  
Region of CM   
University of Macedonia  
Geotechnical Chamber Greece 
Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Thessaloniki Chamber of Handicrafts 
Greek International Business Association 
Business and Cultural Development Centre 
Federation of Industries of Northern Greece 
The Centre for Research & Technology 
Chambers  
Federation of Hellenic Associations of Young Entrepreneurs 
International Hellenic University 
Greek Tourism Organisation 
i4G SA  
Technology Park of Thessaloniki  
Alexander Innovation Zone 
Association of IT Companies of Northern Greece 


























EL30  Attica  
EL41  North Aegean   
EL42  South Aegean  
EL43  Crete   
EL51  Eastern Macedonia & Thrace 
EL52  Central Macedonia   
EL53  Western Macedonia 
EL54  Epirus   
EL61  Thessaly   
EL62  Ionian Islands  
EL63  Western Greece   
EL64  Central Greece   
EL65  Peloponnese 
Source: Author 
 
Appendices Table 9 Forms of capacity building for developing S3 
Capacity   Competences and skills 
I. Capacity to map regional 
dynamics 
  Assess the impact of previous innovation policy 
frameworks 
 Mobilise actual engagement of local institutional bodies 
 Competence to evaluate local actors' performance on the 
basis of innovation and technology (public and private) 
II. Capacity for 
decentralisation and 
regional autonomy 
  Option for additional policy power of regional authorities 
to manage local funding regionally and reduce 
bureaucratic and time-consuming processes 
 Authorisation of regional authorities to evaluate and 
monitor innovation policies at the regional level through 
the design of targeted regional indicators  
 Provision of tax incentives in selected S3 domains at the 
sub-national level to promote local entrepreneurship and 




 Motivations for the mobility and attraction of specialised 
workforce in specific areas of regional specialisations 
III. Capacity to develop 
regional communication, 
networking and clustering 
  Competences to re-build trust among different 
entrepreneurial actors  
 Ability to exploit the opportunities raised from the 
entrepreneurial discovery to enable regional clustering 
and networking  
 Ability to exploit collective and powerful local networking 
to fulfil S3 policy-related objectives (e.g. additional 
authority and autonomy at the regional level)  
 Design and manage interactive communication platforms 
to facilitate inter-organisational networking, as a 
supplementary action in S3 
IV. Capacity to link cross-
sectoral activities 
  Ability to recognise industrial and sectoral diversity  
 Ability to identify related but disconnected business 
activities for potential networking 
 Competency to link fragmented entrepreneurial activities, 
using several channel linkages 
V. Capacity to understand 
& upgrade firms' 
technological and 
innovation potential 
  Introduce new regional indicators to assess and 
understand the particularities of firm-level innovativeness 
Provide tailor-made support 
 Provide tailor-made training and targeted support 
 Assess organisational competences and knowledge skills 
for better policy intervention 
 Take over large-scale initiatives for the enhancement of 
firms capabilities 
VI. Capacity to enhance 
local entrepreneurship 
  Building up and institutionalisation of permanent 
technology transfer and commercialisation mechanisms 
 Re-think internal rules and ensure elimination of internal 
bureaucracy to speed up the creation of start-ups and 
spin-offs   
 Entrepreneurial skills training and rewards 
 Initiation of entrepreneurship from down to top 
 Support the creation of financial tools, e.g. VCs 
Source: Author 
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